SHAPING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN KOSOVO AND AFGHANISTAN

Jane Kirkpatrick

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Lincoln for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

November 2017

ABSTRACT

New protectorates, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor and Kosovo, have experienced a medium to long term international presence, which has sought to ensure security and implement liberal democracy. Given that social movement activity has been linked to democratic development, the presence and development of social movements in new protectorates presents a novel and interesting context in which to study social movements. Using a political opportunity framework as a guide, this research examines the extent to which international actors in new protectorate contexts influence the strategy of social movements. A case analysis of two entities, Vetëvendosje, a social movement and social movement organisation (SMO) in Kosovo, and Afghanistan 1400, a civil society organisation (CSO) in Afghanistan, is supported by documentary sources and a range of interviews with members, and employees of international actors and CSOs.

To date, there has been little research on the wider effects of this type of international presence and the consequences for social movement activity have been largely overlooked. This study analyses the influence of international actors on two levels. The first is seen via the impact of international actors on political opportunities. The second is seen via the strategic decisions made in response to the international presence, by the case studies. Although the international presence generally increases political opportunities, the level of opportunities in Afghanistan and Kosovo is still low. Both case studies have taken the decision to participate in electoral politics alongside their existing activities in an attempt to exert a greater level of influence. The study concludes that international actors play a key role in shaping social movement strategy within new protectorates, but that this influence often occurs in unexpected and indirect ways.

DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Jane Kirkpatrick declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. None of this work has been published before submission.

Signed: 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis has only reached completion with the support of several people. I would first like to thank my supervisors Professor Hugh Bochel, Dr Louisa Parks and Dr Simon Obendorf, for their advice, encouragement and feedback on drafts of this thesis. I would also like to thank the University of Lincoln School of Social and Political Science for the funding that allowed me to undertake this thesis.

I am very grateful to all those who took the time to be interviewed for this thesis. The insights I gained from these interviews were extremely valuable to the research and allowed me to gain a fuller picture of events in Kosovo and Afghanistan. I would also like to thank Sonia Eqbal for the lively discussions during the early stages of Afghanistan 1400's formation that contributed greatly to the thinking behind this research. I also appreciate her introducing me to several other willing interviewees. I am grateful to those who made my experience conducting fieldwork in Kosovo both productive and enjoyable.

My thanks go to Saba for her translation help and Henry for his detailed and amusing comments on my draft chapters. I would also like to thank Mum, Scott, Sam, Caroline, Nanna, Diane, Gerry, Ben, Tarnia, Sophie, Minal and Gareth for their support and encouragement throughout the research and writing of this thesis.

Finally, a special thanks to Sven Schiltz who has been more supportive than I thought possible from the application stage to the submission of this thesis. I would like to thank him for the many conversations we have had about the research, his feedback on drafts, his infinite patience, as well as his unwavering enthusiasm and encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLES AND FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A3	Afghanistan Analysis and Awareness
AAK	Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës [Alliance for the Future of Kosovo]
AKR	Aleanca Kosova e Re [New Kosovo Alliance]
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
Anon	Anonymous
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CDHRF	Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms [Kosovo]
CEC	Central Election Commission [Kosovo]
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIVPOL	Civilian Police [United Nations]
COE	Council of Europe
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority [Iraq]
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
D4D	Democracy for Development
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development [UK]
DRC	Development Research Centre
ECAP	Election Complaints and Appeals Panel [Kosovo]
ECMI	European Centre for Minority Issues
Ed.	Editor
Eds.	Editors
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUPOL	EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FCCS	Foundation for Culture and Civil Society [Kosovo]
FeR	[Partia] Fryma e Re [New Spirit Party Kosovo]
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [Friedrich Ebert Foundation]
FRIDE	Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior [Foundation for International Relations and Exterior Dialogue]
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSDRC	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICO	International Civilian Office
ICR	International Civilian Representative
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission [Afghanistan]
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDEP	Institute for Development Policy [Kosovo]
INTRAC	International NGO Training and Research Centre
IOM	International Migration Organisation
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force [Afghanistan]
KAN	Kosovo Action Network
KCSF	Kosovo Civil Society Foundation
KDI	Kosovo Democratic Institute
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army [also known as the UÇK in Albanian UÇK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës]
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS	Kosovo Police
LB	Levizja per Bashkim [Movement for Unification Kosovo]
LCY	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
LDK	Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës [Democratic League of Kosovo]
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
n.d.	no date
NA	Northern Alliance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NISMA [për Kosovën]	Initiative [for Kosovo]
NPR	National Public Radio
NUG	National Unity Government [Afghanistan]
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [United Nations]
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PD	Partia e Drejtesise [Justice Party Kosovo]
PDK	Partia Demokratike e Kosovës [Democratic Party of Kosovo]
PK	Partia Konservatore e Kosoves [Conservative Party of Kosovo]
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSHDK	Partia Shqiptare Demkristiane e Kosoves Ibanian [Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo]
PSIG	Provisional Institutions of Self Government [Kosovo]
PTK	Post and Telecom of Kosovo
R2P	Responsibility to protect
RTK	Radio Television of Kosovo
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLS	Samostalna liberalna stranka [Independent Liberal Party, Kosovo]

SNTV	Single non-transferable vote
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIST	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	University of Southern California
WTO	World Trade Organisation

INTRODUCTION

This project began with the broad idea of studying social movements in new protectorates to gain an understanding of how movements might develop within a context that has not been considered in the social movement literature. New protectorates are territories in which "a medium- to long-term international presence […] was established with transformative goals at their core" (Mayall and Oliveira 2011: 1). They provide a fascinating context in which to study social movements as they represent many of the shifting norms within the international system in the post-Cold War period.

Those involved in new protectorates often present such projects as multilateral efforts conducted by the international community, and although each actor involved has different approaches and methods, they tend to be largely initiated by Western-led international actors pushing a broadly liberal democratic agenda (Mayall and Oliveira 2011). This includes the promotion of values and rights such as voting, gender equality, minority protection and the development of civil society. This type of project raises questions regarding state sovereignty, democratisation, neoliberal governance, civil society development, and the responsibilities and effectiveness of state and international institutions. Many of these issues have been considered in the existing literature, but social movement activity has been largely overlooked.

Social movements have long been associated with the consolidation of democratic political systems (Caruso 2015; Johnstone 2012; Tilly 2004a; 1986, 1985; Goldstone 2004; Marks and McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996; Tilly 1984) and Western governments and development organisations are increasingly recognising that social movements are important actors in democratic processes (della Porta 2014). Some also hold the belief that democratisation itself promotes social movement activity (Tilly 2004a; Amenta and Young 1999). Therefore, if social movements were important to the establishment of democratic states, it would follow that they could also be important to new protectorates in which international actors are attempting to implement democratisation. Thus, the presence of social movements in new protectorates is extremely interesting, as is the way in which the presence of international actors may shape the landscape in which movements operate. Given the often extensive executive authority held by international actors at the domestic level, which presents a distinct form of international influence on domestic democratic development, the emergence of social movements, SMOs and similar grassroots activities in this context may provide important signs of democratic development. As international actors commit huge amounts of time and resources to new

protectorates, it is appropriate to question whether the presence of these actors influences the development of social movement activity, and if so, how?

The preliminary research for this thesis highlighted groups within new protectorates that self-identify as movements and on first look demonstrate some movement attributes, such as collective action and the involvement of networks of citizens. However, after looking closer these groups tended to resemble social movements as defined in the literature less. The type of activity found in new protectorates tended to represent a mixture of organized and unorganised protests, which are sometimes spontaneous but are generally over short periods of time and do not necessarily represent a social movement. At the other end of the scale, many groups appear to be too organized to be termed social movements, and instead are closer to social movement organisations (SMOs), civil society organisations (CSOs) or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This issue in itself raised a number of questions about the presence of social movements (or lack of) within new protectorates. As a result, I have applied an exploratory approach using qualitative methods, which focuses on the analysis of two case studies and drawn upon a political opportunity framework to guide the analysis. The first case is that of movement turned SMO, *Lëvizja Vetëvendosje!*, or 'Movement for Self-Determination' in English (which I will refer to as Vetëvendosje throughout the thesis) in Kosovo; the other is the Afghan CSO, Afghanistan 1400. Both case studies define themselves as movements to position themselves as alternatives, which has also raised some interesting questions.

Anecdotal evidence from members of those involved in Afghanistan 1400 provoked the initial interest in this subject, and further enquiries demonstrated that there was a lack of information or existing literature in this area across new protectorates. Guided by preliminary research, the central question of this thesis is: How, and to what extent, does the presence of international actors shape social movements? Conducting a case study analysis of a movement and CSO has allowed me to assess the extent to which international actors present within new protectorates influence and shape social movement activity and this approach has also allowed me to determine how other entities respond to the international presence and gauge the influence of the international presence on the lack of, and potential for, movement activity.

As well as using a political opportunity approach, this thesis also draws on the literature on social movement strategy, which proved useful in assessing the strategies of the two case studies. Social movement scholars have acknowledged that social movement strategy can be profoundly affected by a variety of changing, exogenous factors (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), yet there is little research

that considers how international actors can influence the strategy of social movements and SMOs, a gap in the literature which this thesis addresses. The influence by international actors on the case study organisations has been assessed on two levels. First, I examine the impact of international actors on the political opportunities broadly available to such organisations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, exploring an otherwise under-researched set of exogenous factors. Second, I analyse specific strategic decisions of the case studies themselves.

The research is informed by, and situated within, a number of fields of academic scholarship, including new protectorates, international interventions and state-building, post-conflict societies, development, democratisation, civil society and social movement studies. Although there is a great deal of literature on these broad areas, there is significantly less that considers social movement and grassroots activity in the context of new protectorates. The majority of studies on new protectorates, interventions and state-building tends to be concerned with military, diplomatic and security elements, or on specific aspects of state-building such as the conduct of elections (Lindberg 2009). There are some exceptions within the literature (for example Lemay-Hébert 2013), but largely the wider impacts of new protectorates are left underexplored. This thesis contributes to addressing this gap in the literature by focusing on one dimension of the social and political changes occurring during and after a new protectorate context, shedding light on an area that has so far been neglected in the literature on new protectorates and social movement studies.

In recent years, social movement theory, which sits within the field of social movement studies, has paid increasing attention to previously understudied movements and social movement organisations (for example, see Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013; Benin and Vairel 2011; Review of African Political Economy 2010*;* Escobar and Alvarez 1992). Many of these are active in regions outside of Western Europe and the United States which have been the traditional focus of social movement study (see Fominaya and Cox 2013). This has inevitably led to the analysis of a broader range of contexts in which social movements and SMOs function, including studies in authoritarian, democratic and hybrid states. Despite these recent trends, there are still a number of contexts in which the development, mobilisation and strategic choices of social movements and SMOs have not been considered.

The development of social movement activity in post-conflict states generally receives less attention than other developments regarding civil society and democratisation, despite the potential of social movements to play an important role in the transition the state is experiencing (Banks 2007). Much of the literature addressing this area is produced by, or largely reliant upon, reports produced by

policymakers, institutions or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and often tends to focus on activities which are funded or supported by international donors (see Kelmendi 2012; Fagan 2010; Pula 2005). This understandably relies on the data available, such as voter turnout or the numbers of registered NGOs in an area, whereas data on more grassroots developments such as informal community groups and social movements is more difficult to obtain. Social movements appear to be peripheral to the development policies of international actors involved in new protectorates, which may also contribute to grassroots developments receiving less attention than other more formal organisations, a gap in the existing literature which this thesis fills.

Despite the considerable academic attention paid to Kosovo and Afghanistan there is little literature on locally organised political activity in these two states. There is no academic literature on Afghanistan 1400, although there has been a small amount of media coverage (see Bhatti 2014; Huffington Post 2014; Druzin 2013; Kazemi 2012). There is significantly more coverage of Vetëvendosje. The latter movement has existed longer, and some of its activities have been widely reported on. There is also some literature on Vetëvendosje (see Lemay-Hébert 2013; Schwandner-Sievers 2013), however the movement has not been analysed in this way before. This analysis therefore provides new empirical evidence on social movement and grassroots activities in Kosovo and Afghanistan and allows a comparative analysis of the two case studies. It focuses on more domestic grassroots political rather than on the power structures and networks that are the usual focus of studies on new protectorates. In doing this, the thesis draws attention to political activism demonstrating societal adjustments to post-conflict realities and the processes of state-building.

This research is concerned with the ways in which the presence and actions of international actors can shape the nature of social movement activity and the political context in which they function. It is only by understanding the mechanisms through which international actors operate, as well as the mediating role of domestic factors, that the potential influence of new protectorates on social movement activity can be determined. In this thesis, I explore the economic, social and political agendas of international actors and their implementation. The nature and structure of new protectorates shift over time, along with the variable nature of the domestic contexts. These shifts are considered in relation to the activities and strategic choices of the two case studies. Some of the influences may be more obvious or direct, such as meetings with representatives of international actors. While these more direct influences will be examined, my analysis here attempts to look beyond direct interactions, and applies a wider approach that also considers more indirect interactions and influences of international actors.

Chapter One includes a review of the existing literature on new protectorates, including the types of international actors usually involved. The presence of international actors is explored in detail including the goals of these actors, particularly democratisation and civil society development. I then provide an assessment of the literature on social movements and their presence within new protectorates. The chapter also explores the relationship between social movements and civil society. Chapter One and its review of the literature provide the background to the following chapter that considers the influence of international actors on political opportunities. It also lays the foundations for an enquiry into the two states in which the case studies of this thesis were conducted.

Chapter Two outlines the research strategy, beginning with an assessment of the case study analysis, including a brief overview of the two case studies and the reasons for their selection. Following this, I have outlined the methods of data collection and analysis, including the use of interviews. The second part of the chapter details the political opportunity framework by first providing an overview of the concept of political opportunities and how they may affect strategy. I then outline my political opportunity framework that utilises the existing literature on political opportunities and new protectorates and includes four categories that have been applied during the case study analysis.

Chapters Three and Five build upon the literature review in Chapter One, focusing the field of enquiry to the specific contexts of Kosovo and Afghanistan respectively. Gaps in the existing literature are highlighted relative to each state, as well as in reference to the broader topics outlined in Chapter One. In addition to an analysis and narrowing of the relevant literature, both chapters provide a brief historical overview of the state and an assessment of the involvement by international actors. The actors active within each state are identified and their remits, goals and actions are explored in order to provide an overview of the contextual factors that may influence social movement activity. This overview helps establish the political opportunities available within each territory and sets the scene for the analysis of both case studies in Chapters Four and Six.

Chapter Four considers the first case study, Vetëvendosje. It draws on information collected from documentary sources, including those produced by Vetëvendosje, particularly its English-language newsletter, as well as interviews with its members and employees of embassies, international organisations and civil society. A number of key elements of Vetëvendosje are analysed, including the reasons for its formation, and its strategic decisions such as its choice of tactics and allies. Vetëvendosje formed as a direct result of international intervention and in opposition to the way international actors saw the future of Kosovo. This position changed somewhat with the declaration

of independence and the following 'supervised independence' by international actors. Vetëvendosje then expanded its claims and tactics, eventually forming a political party alongside its existing activities. Several of the changes made by Vetëvendosje arguably resulted from the ways in which international actors and Vetëvendosje framed each other and the future of post-conflict Kosovo.

Chapter Six considers the second case study, Afghanistan 1400, also drawing on a number of interviews and information produced by the organisation. The aims of Afghanistan 1400 were not directly opposed to aspects of the international presence. Interestingly, Afghanistan 1400 has sought to maintain its independence from both international and domestic groups, which is symbolic of a wider yet still unusual trend in Afghanistan. It has found its momentum difficult to sustain at times, often due to a number of domestic and cultural factors, and, at the time of writing, is focusing on internal issues and making plans to form a political party.

Chapter Seven draws together and discusses the findings of the thesis. I analyse and compare the international influence over political opportunities broadly in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as in relation to the two case studies specifically. The conclusions in Chapter Eight reflect on the three key areas of literature drawn on throughout this thesis: new protectorates, social movements and political opportunity, and suggest potential research.

The primary contention of this thesis is that the new protectorate context provides a setting for democratisation that is systematically different from those found in more conventional states, in which the level of international intervention in domestic politics is not as profound. The findings are particularly relevant to those interested in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as other states that have experienced state-building activity more broadly. The research is also relevant to the analysis of post-conflict states or those with a less direct international presence but that receive international aid or experience a short-term international military presence. The conclusions of this thesis will therefore be useful to academics, policy-makers and practitioners who are working in the fields of state-building, development, governance, democratisation and civil society promotion.

CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW

This introductory chapter will present and discuss the relevant literature on new protectorates and social movements in order to provide vital contextual information to the case study analysis and the political opportunity framework found in Chapter Two. Below, I begin with a discussion of the concept of new protectorates and briefly explore their emergence and some of their key features addressed in the literature on new protectorates and related fields. I follow this with an assessment of the types of international actors that are involved in new protectorates and their various roles and organisational structure. I have then paid particular attention to the efforts made by international actors to state-build and democratise within new protectorates, which form a significant part of their activities and are key areas of international activity that affect political opportunities. In the second part of the chapter I provide an overview of the literature on social movements. This includes a discussion on what a social movement might consist of, why the development of social movements within new protectorates is of interest, such as their historical link to democratisation, as well as how they feature in relation to civil society development.

New protectorates

New protectorates are a feature of the post-Cold War international system, in which state sovereignty is the key organising principle and security threats are viewed in a global context. New protectorates are "territories where a medium- to long-term international presence, multilateral yet under de facto Western leadership, was established with transformative goals at their core" (Mayall and Oliveira 2011: 1). New protectorates have been present in Kosovo and Afghanistan (where the case studies are active), as well as East Slavonia (1995-1998), East Timor, Iraq, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. All of these territories have seen an extensive and intrusive governance role at the domestic level by international actors, either via international trusteeship (as was the case in Kosovo (1999-2008), East Slavonia and East Timor), or they have experienced international actors playing a direct and influential role in shaping the nature and direction of a new political regime, i.e. state-building. Although some of these territories are located in different regions and have been subject to differing levels and types of international influence, there are a number of broad contextual similarities to be found in new protectorates, which I explore below.

There are a number of terms that are used to refer to the processes that take place in new

protectorates such as liberal state-building, state-building, nation-building[1], democracy promotion, post-conflict reconstruction, or peace-building. Some of these terms are used interchangeably in the coverage of such situations, though they can have different implications or uses depending on who is using the term or intended audience (Bain 2011). In order to provide a fuller contextual background, this research draws on the literature on new protectorates, as well as the literature related to these terms from several other disciplines.

It is clear that protectorates and state-building attempts are by no means a new phenomenon. Mandates and trusteeship systems were part of the activities of the League of Nations a century ago. One example was the mandate, authorised by the League of Nations, which placed Iraq under British control from 1920 until 1932. There have also been more ad hoc civil administrations, such as those in Congo and West Papua in the 1960s. Despite similarities with earlier protectorates[2] there are some novel elements to more recent interventions and state-building efforts in the post-Cold War period, which arguably justify the addition of the word 'new' (see Bain 2011). The starkest difference can be seen in the justifications for intervention and the manner in which interventions are conducted. Mayall and Oliveira (2011) argue that new protectorates stand out from their predecessors because of the narrow scope in the form of governance that is applied, regardless of the context.

State building

Modern state-building was adopted by Western policy-makers in the early 1990s as part of a broader peace-building strategy for dealing with problems, such as security threats to the international system, arising from what were referred to as post-conflict societies, fragile or failed states[3] (Kostić et al. 2012; Boege et al. 2008; Kostić 2007; Chandler 2006; Mac Ginty 2006; Chesterman 2005; Paris 2004). This

[1] The focus of state-building is to reconstruct institutions and should be differentiated from nation-building, which focuses on establishing a common identity. The concept of nation-building was heavily discussed in the 1950s and 1960s and was strongly linked to modernisation theories of development (for more on the use of the term see Scott 2007: 3-4; on nation-building see Swain and Krampe 2011; Kostić 2007; Dinnen 2006; Hippler 2005; Hobsbawn 1990; Gellner 1983). Despite these differences, the terms nation-building and state-building are often used interchangeably, particularly in the US (see Dobbins 2008, 2007, 2003).

[2] Bain (2011) uses the example of Britain's declaration of the Buganda (Uganda) protectorate in 1894. He argues that although this was defended in a similar way (for peace, order and preventing 'barbaric behaviour' (see Chamberlain 1897: 117-28)), it is very different to the US and EU supported independence of Kosovo, for example.

[3] There are a wide variety of terms used to describe these types of states and a blurring of the distinctions between them (see Debiel and Klein 2002). It should also be noted that those that are considered to be 'fragile,' or 'failed' are largely viewed from the perspective of Western security concerns (see Bøas and Jennings 2005: 388).

differed from the market-orientated approach that was prominent in the 1980s when structural adjustment programmes were viewed as the best way to deal with 'troubled' states (Morgan Edwards 2010). At the end of the Cold War, discourse on globalization, human rights, humanitarian intervention, global governance, neoliberal economics, sovereignty and international society became increasingly prominent, and a shift occurred in the thinking behind Western security policy (Sedra 2012: 47). Both George W. Bush and Barack Obama emphasised the threat posed by fragile and failed states in National Security Strategies, and an increasing number of other Western states and international agencies began to develop strategies and policy approaches that involved addressing these security concerns. Part of these approaches involved liberal state-building, which focused on building the capacity of the state, democratisation, the introduction of a market economy and the Western concept of statehood (Sedra 2012; Kostić et al. 2012; Kostić 2007; Chandler 2006; Kaldor 2006; Mac Ginty 2006; Chesterman 2005; Paris 2004; Mandelbaum 2002; Atwood 1994).[4]

Efforts by international actors to 'state-build' are inevitably state centric. However, there are different assumptions about what 'the state' should be within the state-building literature (see Chesterman et al. 2005; Brock 2001; Zartman 1995), the prevailing concept is that a state is a liberal market democracy within a particular territory, and there is little debate over the type of state that international actors should attempt to build (Samuels and von Esiedel 2004). Boot (2002) argues that the way that Western states have conducted their post-intervention presence reflects a convergence, albeit a vague one, of liberal values prominent at the time. As a result, the form of democracy which is promoted, and the development programmes used to implement this, are intended to mould the state into one that emulates a European liberal Weberian version. This type of state is characterised by a top-down, centralised focus, with an emphasis on the state maintaining a monopoly the use of force, the ability to mobilise and manage resources and to provide services to the population. However, the premise that the Weberian model is the best fit for all territories is questionable, particularly for cases where historical developments are dissimilar.

Western European states formed via a significant amount of coercion and violence (Tilly 1985; Mann 1993) and many scholars have argued that the substantial changes that have occurred within the international system since the formation of Western European states make this type of state formation unlikely now (Vu 2010; Eriksen 2010, 2005; Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Kostovicova 2008; Ayoob 2007). Surprisingly there is little in the new protectorate or related literature that addresses

[4] For more on the aims of state-building see Chandler and Sisk (2013), Berdal and Zaum (2012), and McMahon and Western (2010).

the issue of nationalism (with some exceptions, see Del Rosso 2013; Lemay-Hébert 2009; Laremont 2005), which, although hard to define (see Brubaker 1996; Smith 1993; Greenfield 1992; Hobsbawm 1990; Gellner 1983; Deutsch 1966), has been explored in depth in the literature more generally. Based on the existing literature it appears that attempts to state-build often "encourages mobilisation processes in ideology, politics and sentiment" that has meant "installing culturally and socially blind policies that followed a rationality of nationalism" (Seifert 2014: 239). This is thought to inform and influence the behaviour and policies of those governing new protectorates (Blumi 2003; Doubt 2000). This has the potential to create a backlash against external actors in the form of an anticolonial opposition and nationalist discourse (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Stroehle 2011).

State legitimacy is necessary for the state to function and, although the term is used without consensus on its meaning or outcomes (Jones and Elgin-Cossart 2011), it is increasingly recognised as a key part of state-building by those agencies involved (USAID 2011; World Bank 2011; Zoellick 2009; OECD/DAC 2008). International interventions and subsequent state-building projects often face legitimacy issues in relation to their presence and actions (see Lemay-Hébert 2013; Narten 2009; Hehir 2009, 2007, 2006; King and Mason 2006; Caplan 2005; Yannis 2004, 2001; Chesterman 2005). Lemay-Hébert (2009: 66) argues that international administrations, in particular, suffer from a legitimacy dilemma due to the presentation of the project as exogenous to society, leading to the conditions for a backlash by local societies. This dilemma can also extend to the domestic actors that international actors choose to collaborate with.

Legitimacy can be strengthened in a number of ways, such as the deployment of international police units, such as UN-deployed international police units, often with military forces (for example, UN Police (UNPOL) in East Timor or the Civilian Police (CIVPOL) in Kosovo), which, as Boyle (2011) argues, are meant to involve democratic policing, and can boost support and legitimacy for the new political regime (see Bayley 2005: 206-215; Duffield 2001; Nield 2001: 21-42; Marenin 1998: 159-77. The establishment of the law is one of the many elements that contribute to the state's monopoly on the use of violence. Other policy areas regularly deployed by international actors in post-conflict territories are disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants and security sector reform (SSR), which should provide the state with a monopoly on the use of force and allow international security forces to leave (Rubin 2013). Post-conflict societies are often still coming to terms with ethnic, racial or religious divisions, and solutions to this are often integrated into the transition process.

These are just some of the areas which those involved in new protectorates must address, along with humanitarian issues, in order to achieve the broad goals of putting an end to conflict, strengthening the state by building, or rebuilding, transparent and accountable democratic institutions with the capacity to provide citizens with physical and economic security and to support political and economic developments (Kostić et al. 2012; Paris 2004; Chesterman 2005). The establishment of a sustainable market economy is a key priority for many international actors and is usually representative of the broader neoliberal agenda associated with new protectorates. Usually the types of economic policies promoted by international actors focus on privatisation, improving conditions for foreign investment and increasing urbanisation (Kostić et al. 2012: 41). There has been criticism that economic reconstruction agendas are ill-fitting (Cramer 2006: 245 ff.), and that the prioritisation of privatisation has resulted in destabilising consequences (Castillo 2008); for example, see Chandrasekaran (2008) on Iraq.

Scott's (2007) review of the state-building literature highlighted the key concerns of some of the different disciplines, which, he argues, can appear self-contained in their assessments of state-building, though collaborative work has increased. Scott (2007) found that the security related literature is dominated by discussion of exit strategies (see Rubin 2006; Fearon and Laitlin 2004); the international relations literature is predominantly concerned with the role external actors play in restoring the state (see Etzioni 2004; Mallaby 2002; Jackson 1990); and the social studies and political science literature attempts to focus on the historical and socio-political context (see Dodge 2006; Ottaway 2002; Brock 2001). In terms of comparative literature, much of the early research on these types of efforts can be seen as having taken a relatively narrow form, using single case studies, resulting in limited comparative scope. More recent works, however, have attempted to develop more systematic studies highlighting common features, influences and potential lessons (for example, see Monten 2014; Zaum 2007; Caplan 2005; Chesterman 2005).

Scott (2007) highlights a number of gaps in the literature which he suggests would drive debates within state-building forward, including issues surrounding gender, how cultural identities emerge and are shaped, local ownership, comparative historical analysis, transferability and mechanisms for supporting the development of civil society. Elements of the peace-building literature appear to address some of these issues in more depth due to its consideration of a wider range of formal and informal politics (Campbell and Peterson 2013). Peace-building is also largely concerned with state-building though it is considered to be 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' (UN 1992). The literature on

peace-building does appear to be more concerned with the voices of ordinary people that are often unheard in the state-building process (Mac Ginty 2006; Richmond 2005; Bendaña 2003; Fetherston 2000). Rubin (2013: 190) argues that "[s]tudies of state-building operations often try to identify "best practices" without asking whom they are best for."

Significantly more has been written on the failures, rather than the successes of international actors state-building efforts (Scott 2007: 9), resulting in much critical discussion on the effectiveness and implementation of such projects (see Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Narten 2009; Bickerton 2007; Chesterman 2005; Chopra 2002). Criticism of international actors ranges from accusations of neo-colonial or imperial exercises (see Berdal and Zaum 2012; Mayall and Oliveira 2011: 13; Amin 2004) to under-resourcing (Dodge 2006) and the failure to create peace while state-building (Jones 2010; Egnell 2010; Goetze and Guzina 2008; Call 2003), and short-termism (Campbell and Peterson 2013; Krebs and Rapport 2012). The US-led intervention in Iraq has received particularly strong criticism for being a predominantly neoliberal exercise that involved very little thought for the future of Iraqis (Bridoux 2011; Dodge 2010; Harvey 2007, 2003; Herring and Rangwala 2006; Juhasz 2006; Kiely 2005).

A number of authors within the state-building literature have suggested that external actors can only play a limited role in state reconstruction and that state-building efforts must come from within the state (see Narten 2009; Carothers 2007a; Chesterman 2005). These authors argue that

> [w]here external actors do play a leading role in state-building, they undermine the ability of the emerging state to learn to govern independently and they disrupt patterns of local ownership, often breeding resentment and creating spoilers (Scott 2007: 7).

These spoilers are "groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement though a variety of means and for a variety of motives" (Newman and Richmond 2006: 1). Newman and Richmond (2006) state that the term is potentially subjective and cannot be applied in a binary fashion and that most actors have the capacity to act as spoilers. Determining what consists of a spoiler requires value judgments, particularly because the values associated with a liberal peace are contested, such as human rights, democracy and self-determination.

Success of new protectorate projects is perhaps subjective and probably not only difficult to achieve but also difficult to measure. The process of state formation and democratic development can occur at a much faster rate than it might elsewhere, which can result in what may be lauded as a success at

the time being reflected on differently in light of subsequent events. This research does not set out to clarify the success or failures or international actors but instead seeks to establish what influence their presence has, positive or negative, and to contribute to the small body of literature that considers the developments of local grassroots political organisations, whilst also providing, to some extent, a comparative analysis of elements of the international presence over a significant time period.

International actors

Before continuing to assess some of the goals and the role of international actors within new protectorates, it is worth outlining who is being referred to when talking about 'international actors' in this context. As mentioned, interventions and subsequent new protectorates in the post-Cold War period have been presented as enlightened, multilateral efforts to solve problems affecting the security of the wider international community (Bain 2011; Mayall and Oliveira 2011b). This supposed multilateral and enlightened approach is one of the novel elements of new protectorates and highlights the shift from unilateral clientalism that was present during the Cold War. In recent decades, Western-led interventions, particularly humanitarian interventions (see Barnett 2005; Bellamy 2004; Ayoob 2002), have been presented as though sanctioned and implemented by the international community.

The term 'international community' is used extensively in academic and policy circles, by politicians and the media (Jacques 2006; Blair 1999; Simma and Paulus 1998), and regularly appeared in documentary sources and interviews throughout this research. Therefore, some explanation of the term is required in order to establish what the term really refers to in relation to the potential influence of international actors on political opportunities.

The term 'international community' is frequently used in reference to the international system, including international actors such as governments and NGOs, and their relations with each other (Simma and Paulus 1998) and is often used to suggest there is an international consensus on an issue. The international community conveys a sense of solidarity or a 'community' in the international sense, most associated with the UN and embodied in the General Assembly. Yet, despite the widespread use of the term, the real meaning, or the specifics being referred to, is more difficult to establish, and appears to vary depending on who is using the term and in which context.

Lindberg (2014) argues that the term potentially serves as a legitimising tool for intervention and state-building efforts. This need for legitimacy was demonstrated by the US when, after it failed to ally

with many other international partners or Iraqis, the US was forced to ask the UN to assist it. This case also highlighted that, despite the US's adoption of a doctrine of preventative war, in which the US sought to neutralise what it perceived to be security threats, the US, at some point, had to act within international norms that warrant multilateralism.[5] Efforts to legitimise actions on behalf of the international community can also be seen in the high-profile international conferences often conducted before or after interventions, such as those on Afghanistan in Bonn (2001), Berlin (2004) and London (2006). Ogata (2002: 40) argues that such events are often an "attempt to force compromise in the name of some vague consensus. At the end of such gatherings, leaders can claim success in the name of the international community."

Some critics question the very existence of an international community (Haas 2013), while Gowers (2002: 32) argues that it more often

> obscures than illuminates. It allows bien-pensants everywhere to propose optimal imaginary courses of action for the betterment of humankind to hypothetical enlightened actors. And the phrase makes it easy to avoid hard thinking about who might act, out of what motive, and to what effect.

Ogata (2002) suggests that the idea of an international community is symbolic of aspirational aims rather than representative ones. Others have also argued that the idea is not all that representative and primarily refers to Western countries, organisations and ideas (see Jacques 2006; Appadurai 2002; Chomsky 2002; Simma and Paulus 1998). Rao (2011) has argued that often, the perspectives and interests of the developing world are neglected or ignored, while Lindberg (2014: 11) argues that it is "the preoccupation of a subset of international actors whose claim to speak for all is highly dubious." It is the case that Western states have still dominated proceedings in most cases of interventions, even those that received UN authorisation or when the UN became involved post-intervention.

The US is one of the key proponents of the idea of an international community, and soon after September 11th, Paulus (2003: 74-75) suggested that the international community was in danger of

[5] Haas (2013) argues that there is a "multilateralism's dilemma" in which multilateralism benefits from "the inclusion of more actors increases an organization's legitimacy at the expense of its utility." Wedgewood adds that there is a problem with the "diffusion of responsibility" within the international community that "excuses countries that have no intention of lending a hand" (Wedgewood 2002: 44). However, some remain sceptical of attempts at multilateralism, so that as Bain (2011: 26) suggests, "[a] special place is also given to multilateralism in the belief that obtaining the blessing of the international community somehow vacates standard objections to alien rule."

becoming indistinguishable from American perspectives and aspirations.[6] The majority of states have little to do with new protectorates, many states are strong defenders of the concept of state sovereignty, particularly China and Russia (see MacFarlane 2005; Baranovsky 2001), and many African, Asian (Clapham 2011) and postcolonial states.[7] This partly explains the lack of interest or opposition to interventions and liberal state-building efforts, based on principle and self-interest that stems from concerns about domestic secessionist issues and that precedents may be set. It is also possible that some states view liberal state-building as a hegemonic exercise by Western powers (Suzuki 2011: 94). Vocal opposition from other states is unlikely due to the potential benefits for states that take a less prominent role, such as investment opportunities, recognition as a member of international society or the maintenance of good relations. Therefore, rather than being a fully representative term, the reality suggests that the interests supposedly represented by the international community, particularly in the case of interventions and new protectorates, are actually quite limited.

Despite the frequent use of the term 'international community' there is lingering uncertainty about what it represents. Therefore, it is not a term that can be relied upon to give a clear indication of the international actors involved, their roles and goals in new protectorates. With this in mind, it is important to distinguish which actors are actually involved in new protectorates generally, and those present in the relevant case study states, which are outline in Chapters Three and Five. Throughout this thesis the term 'international actors' is used to refer to a wide range of external actors, including states represented by embassies, NGOs, military forces as well as international organisations or institutions. Some of these actors may have less of a physical presence in the state, but may provide funding or support to both domestic and international recipients. Generally, international actors are

[6] Some have argued that the US is keen to promote the idea of the international community as it legitimises elements of its foreign policy, aiding the perception of the US acting in the service of the international community (Chomsky 2002).

[7] For instance, China and India have not participated in the interventions leading to new protectorates. For China, the concepts of sovereignty and intervention are closely linked. Suzuki (2011: 92) argues that new protectorates and similar forms of peacekeeping are viewed "with considerable suspicion" by China. However, the stability of a new regime in Afghanistan was beneficial to both China's and India's interests. China supported UN resolution 1511 in 2003, that placed Iraq's sovereignty under CPA authority, and supported the 2005 resolution on R2P (Suzuki 2011), and there is discussion about a future Chinese 'peacekeeping force' and participation in humanitarian and law enforcement efforts (Gill and Huang 2009: 3). India takes a similar position to China, and does not feature much in the policy discourse on these issues, again most likely due to the desire to maintain the sovereignty norm, due to its own secessionist issues, colonial memory and some scepticism of US foreign policy (Ray 2011). India has been the fifth largest donor towards reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, also donating to reconstruction efforts in Iraq, from both the private sector and aid programmes. However, there has been media criticism that Western donor policies are self-serving (Ray 2011), but, Both China and India demonstrate some desire to be recognised as a member of international society (Ray 2011; Suzuki 2011).

working in a coalition coordinated by the UN, NATO or another state or organisation. The huge range of tasks and actors involved inevitably leads to a wide variety of policies and strategies being employed by different international actors and some tend to take responsibility for different tasks and policy areas or regions of the territory.

It cannot be overlooked that the US has featured as a prominent actor in several new protectorates, often as the instigator of the intervention and subsequent state-building. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has been considered the sole military superpower (Gelb 2009), giving it wide-ranging influence on the international stage. The US has taken different levels of responsibility in each new protectorate project it has have been involved in, often taking a novel approach, delegating and relying on allies, which may enter agreements with the US and act as junior partners in a coalition. Many US-led actions have been supported by some European powers, encouraging an assumption of their shared values and culture. Relations between the US and European powers were viewed by some to have drifted apart somewhat in the post-September 11th era, after an initial period of solidarity (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005; Gower 2002),[8] although there have been a number of attempts to strengthen co-operation, particularly between the US and the EU (see Rice 2005).

The wide variety of actors and levels of influence involved in new protectorates leads to an unsurprisingly complex structure and governance system. Generally, there is little clear hierarchy, and power is shared between various partners across different sectors. Existing research on the organisational elements of state-building projects suggests that organisations tend to work in a networked fashion (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Holohan 2005; Duffield 2001). These 'network organisations' contain a number of traditionally hierarchical (usually horizontal rather than vertical, see Slaughter [2009]) and bureaucratic organisations that are temporarily brought together. Mayall and Oliveira (2011: 18) suggest that governance in new protectorates occurs through "a patchwork of loose, decentralized arrangements and ill-defined and sometimes non-existent hierarchical relationships".[9] Poor communication, in particular, is often cited as the cause of some of the disorganisation occurring within these projects (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Berdal and Keen 2011; Holohan 2005). Several authors have suggested that, in reality, the organisational structure has limited

[8] Some argue that European states show a general tendency towards multilateral solutions to a variety of problems, whereas the US is more sceptical of multilateralism (Haas 2013; Kirkpatrick 2002; Rice 2000).

[9] There have been some efforts to rectify these issues, such as the establishment of the OCHA (the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and the Brahimi Report, which argued for more integration within missions (Panel on UN Peace Operations 2000), though little research has arisen since to confirm whether these have delivered any improvements.

the effectiveness of state-building projects (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Holohan 2005). In addition to working alongside other international actors, the relationship between international actors and domestic elites is of vital importance to the transition of the state (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Tansey 2009; Holohan 2005). I will discuss the relationships among international actors, as well as those with domestic actors in relation to political opportunities in the following chapter.

Democratisation

One of the core features of a new protectorate is a transition to democracy. The attempts to establish democracy by international actors can have a significant impact on political opportunities, which will be discussed in the following chapter. Here, I will briefly explore the approach of international actors to democractisation, its appropriateness for new protectorates, and the role of elections.

Democratisation put simply by Potter (1997: 3), means that a country experiences "political changes moving in a democratic direction". The process of democratisation is largely subjective and the concept has been debated at length as part of a subfield within comparative politics. Since the mid-1980s there has been a substantial amount of literature on the causes, processes and outcomes of democratic transitions (see Tansey 2009; Carothers 2002; Linz and Stepan 1996). International institutions, donor governments and development agencies have upheld the centrality of democratisation as a means to achieve stability and development in post-conflict contexts since the 1990s (Lake 1994), and has been encouraged via democracy promotion. The promotion of democracy involves external actors attempting to install or aid democratic governance in other territories (Hobson and Kurki 2012). This is usually done via democracy assistance (a mixture of financial, technical and symbolic tools), conditionalities or the use of force (see Burnell 2000). Proponents, who come from both liberal and realist schools of thought, see democratic states as politically and economically open and free, and argue that democratisation lessens, or even removes the potential for conflict between democratic states and increases stability (see Bridoux and Kurki 2014; Suzuki 2011; Barnett et al. 2007; Gurtov and van Ness 2005; Paris 2004). The use of force, as well as the overt promotion of democracy, became much less popular after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan damaged the legitimacy of democracy promotion (Carothers 2007b).

The US is one of the main proponents of democracy promotion, which features heavily in its liberal internationalist foreign policy. European states, as well as the EU, have also committed increasing resources for the purposes of democracy promotion in the post-Cold War period, albeit with a different approach to the US. The EU is now seen as one of the most successful actors in this field

(Bridoux and Kurki 2014; Youngs 2001). In addition there are a variety of other democracy promoting actors, such the UN, OECD, international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, which are increasingly interested in governance structures and tend to promote a neoliberal democratic model (Kurki 2013). Western states such as the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany implement various projects directly or have political foundations. Private companies, NGOs and CSOs such as Amnesty International, are also all involved in the promotion of democracy. Interestingly, a study by Kurki (2013) revealed that the dominant conception of democracy among key donors is a broadly 'liberal democratic' framework, which has been largely accepted. These actors, which pursue the promotion of liberal democracy, are largely the same as those that have been involved in new protectorates to date.

There are still some different approaches to democracy and what internationally-promoted democratisation should comprise of, or what its end-goal should be. However, several uniform assumptions have been made based on the key tenets of Western liberal democracy, such as individual voting, property and other citizenship rights, gender equality, the development of civil society and freedom of the press. In theory, when democracy is promoted it is not only meant in the practical sense, but also in relation to the wider values and ideas seen by Western democracy promoters to be an implicit and essential part of a democratic state.

Like the concept of state-building, whether the promotion of liberal democracy is appropriate for all contexts is a hotly debated topic (see Bridoux and Kurki 2014). Many have criticised the promotion of democracy as the imposition of certain ideas, values and practices by Western governments on 'weak' states. This serves the governments promoting democracy but leaves those within the state without much of a say (see Pridham 2005; Whitehead 1996). In response to this criticism the language of democracy promotion has changed in recent years. Some actors have attempted to adjust their strategies by encouraging more 'local' initiatives and 'bottom up' democratisation, local ownership and civil society development (see EC 2012; UN 2011; UNSC 2005). Despite these efforts, several scholars argue that there is still a tendency for the modern, democratic and powerful West to enlighten those that are not or that these efforts still serve as a means to implement the will of international actors (Vogel 2016; Bridaux and Kurki 2014; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Teivainen 2009). Bridaux and Kurki (2014: 73) also argue that instead new forms of power have emerged which are "being exercised in implicitly and covert, if sometimes unacknowledged and unintentional ways."

In early research carried out in this field, domestic factors were considered to be the primary

influences on democratisation and internationally influences were explicitly given subordinate roles (see for example, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Przeworski, 1991; O'Donnell et al. 1986). However, from the early 1990s onwards, the focus on domestic factors came under increasing criticism. Recently, more attention has been paid to the variety of international actors and contexts that can affect the likelihood and nature of regime change. This has resulted in the identification of a broad range of international variables and mechanisms which are thought to influence democratic transition, such as the effect of the number of democratic neighbours (see Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2009; Munck 2007; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditch and Ward 2006; Pevehouse 2005; Wejner 2005; Whitehead 2001; Pridham et al. 1997; Huntington; 1991). This research is most concerned with the international influences as it seeks to explore the impact of international actors on the democratic transition within new protectorates, in order to establish how they influence political opportunities.

In new protectorates, the conduct and outcome of elections plays a key role in the establishment of democracy and in legitimating the post-war state (Sisk 2013). The process of establishing elections in post-conflict contexts has, in most cases proved difficult, and has often led to violence and even the re-emergence of war, or has created the conditions for state capture by factions or heightened existing divisions (Mulaj 2011; Sisk 2008; Mansfield and Snyder 2007, 2005; Paris 2004; Lyons 2002). There is wide range of factors that can affect the conduct of elections, such as the type of elections held (local or national), their timing, and the preparation, including the drafting of electoral law, the establishment of electoral bodies, efficient voter registration and successful DDR. The potential effects of elections on political opportunities are outlined in the next chapter, followed by an overview of the processes and outcomes of the elections that took place in Kosovo and Afghanistan in Chapters Three and Five.

Civil society development

International actors have placed a lot of emphasis on civil society development in new protectorates, which also has the potential to open or constrain political opportunities as explored in Chapter Two. Here, I will briefly discuss the concept of civil society and how it became part of the policy and discourse of international actors.

Without delving too deeply into the literature on civil society it can be said that the concept is ambiguous. Taylor (1991: 52) defines civil society as "a web of autonomous associations independent of the state which, bound together in matters of common concern by mere existence or action, could have an effect on public policy". Civil society development became an integral part of democracy

promoting foreign policy in the 1980s. Political upheavals in Latin America and Eastern Europe were largely perceived as positive examples of democratisation from below, and civil society was seen as crucial element of the revolutions that took place (della Porta 2014; Carothers 1999: 207-208; Hann and Dunn 1996: 144). An increasing amount of aid has been put into developing civil society, particularly since the shift in rhetoric on democracy promotion. The focus of support by international actors then shifted from party building to incentivising civil society groups.

The development of civil society is of particular interest to this research because of the role it can play in the democratisation process, the efforts by international actors to promote it, and its potential effect on political opportunities. Some consider civil society to be a significant part of the democratisation process (see Chandhoke 2007; Linz and Stepan 1996; Diamond 1994: 5). Diamond (1999) argues that civil society generally has a positive influence on democratisation, as it can keep checks and balances on the power of the state, increase political participation, help the development of a democratic culture and institutions, and create additional channels through which a variety of interests can be put forward.

In a similar vein to the discussion on democratisation and state-building, the concept of civil society has been considered by some to maintain a historically Western and ethnocentric bias. Some argue that it has not transferred particularly well to other regions (Bain 2011: 36; Lewis 2002; Hann 1996: 3). There are different approaches to civil society, for instance, mainstream American or neo-liberal approach, which views the emergence of NGOs as desirable due to their contribution to economic efficiency and political pluralism. The European or activist approach, on the other hand views civil society as active citizenship and growing self-organisation outside formal political circles (Kaldor 2003: 8). There are also differences in the approaches of various institutional and collective actors, such as social movements (della Porta 2014).

However, the way the concept of civil society is framed by international actors who attempt to promote democracy is quite different to the way it is discussed within traditional discourses of liberal modernity (Chandler 2013). Some argue that just like the 'term international community', the term 'civil society' obscures more than it illuminates (Veltmeyer 2004). Many civil society organisations provide services as a supplement to state provisions (della Porta 2014). For this reason, they can be a popular choice for donors, particularly if the latter believe that the state itself is incapable of handling the donations or providing certain services. However, although CSOs may effectively fill this role, in the long term, this practice can arguably lead to the undermining of the state's capacity (Stephenson

and Zanotti 2012). Aside from service providers, Belloni (2008) identifies two broad areas of civil society that are generally supported by international actors. One is support for 'democracy groups,' which includes NGOs that educate or advocate inclusive civic principles. The other is for NGOs that advocate for a pluralism of political identities such as youth and women, which have the potential to break down dominant collective affiliations (Chandler 2013).

The focus on civil society support by international actors is less overtly political than previous efforts to promote democracy via the support of institutions or political parties (Bridaux and Kurki 2014). Several scholars have argued that the type of civil society promoted by international actors is depoliticised (Bridaux and Kurki 2014; Chandler 2013; Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009) which can result in local actors and efforts being side-lined (Vogel 2016; Pouligny 2005; Veltmeyer 2004; Kasfir 1998), and more radical, contentious or 'uncivil' elements of civil society losing their ability to advocate for radical change (Heathershaw 2008; Sen 2005; Richmond 2005; Bendaña 2003; Fetherston 2000). Esteves, Motta and Cox (2009: 3) argue that the 'civil' usually consists of "officially-approved versions of popular participation in politics geared towards the mobile[s]ation of consent for neo-liberalism through institutional channels."

Some scholars go further to suggest that international actors actually work against civil society groups that are considered spoilers to liberal state-building and peace processes (Chandler 2013; Sisk 2008). Chandler (2013: 88) argues that civil society becomes "central to the international statebuilding paradigm […] when civil society becomes a sphere of external or international policy-intervention rather than an unproblematic sphere of autonomy." He goes on to argue that the policy interventions that take place within the framing of civil society are not always about developing civil society but are "organised around minimising the opportunities and raising the costs of rebellion" (Chandler 2013: 90). This side-lining of more radical or 'uncivil' elements of civil society is particularly relevant to this research, given the effect it could have on social movement activity, which is considered in more detail below.

The development of a more depoliticised civil society is also supported by more specific criticisms such as the impact of external funding, which has led to the professionalisation of civil society, increased competition between organisations, and a growing gap between those who claim to be representatives and those they claim to represent (Smith 2015; Lynch 2013; Choudry and Kapoor 2013; Paffenholz 2009; Aksartova 2009; Alvarez 2009; Rajagopol 2003).

The literature on the strength and effectiveness of civil society in post-conflict and post-totalitarian contexts presents a mixed picture. Some studies have suggested that civil society is often weak due to a wide range of issues such as distrust, as well as due to the external funding of civil society (see Fagan 2010; Kerr 2009; Demjaha and Peci 2004). It is very difficult to establish how local civil society might continue to develop without intervention by international actors. It does appear that some elements of local civil society may be overlooked or ignored by international actors. For example, the constitution writing process had minimal local input in Iraq (see Arato 2009) and East Timor (Garrison 2005). Banks (2007: 105) argues that generally in post-conflict states, constitution writing generally goes on out of sight, with "no input from average citizens or civil society." However, there are some cases that have seen a more participatory approach to the constitution writing process (see Banks 2007; Samuels 2006; Ghai and Galli 2006; McCool 2004). The level and type of civil society development in Kosovo and Afghanistan will be considered in Chapters Three and Five, as well as the resulting political opportunities.

Social movements

Even a brief consideration of the literature on social movements highlights an array of definitions, perhaps reflecting the different theoretical assumptions or empirical requirements of researchers (Fominaya and Cox 2013). As discovered in the course of this research, the term 'movement' is often applied to entities that do not fit with traditional definitions of movements. Batliwala goes as far as saying that the term 'movement' has "become so *au courant* and loosely used in current discourse to become almost devoid of meaning" (2002: 393). Many scholars have attempted to address the definitional issues surrounding social movements by comparing social movements to pressure groups or NGOs (see Igoe 2003; Hilhorst 2003; Foweraker 2001; Taylor 1997; Masden 1997; Fisher 1997; Schlaepfer et al. 1994). Diani (1992: 7) has identified four common and linked factors to many definitions of social movements: collective identity, shared beliefs and solidarity, collective action, and networks of informal interaction.

Whittier (2002) describes the shifting nature of social movements, perhaps highlighting why a universally accepted definition seems to be so elusive:

> Social movements are neither fixed nor narrowly bounded in space, time, or membership. Instead, they are made up of shifting clusters of organisations, networks, communities, and activist individuals, connected by participation in challenges and collective identities through which participants define the boundaries and significance of their groups (Whittier 2002: 289).

Movements can take many different paths but generally go through four stages (Blumer 1969). The first stage is the emergence of the movement, which can occur for a variety of reasons (see della Porta and Diani 2006; Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Tarrow 1998; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tilly 1978; Mauss 1975; Blumer 1969). Stage two is coalescence, during which members are recruited and strategies are determined. Stage three involves institutionalisation of bureaucratisation, which often involves the payment of some staff. Movements might begin to work within the system rather than outside it by becoming an NGO or by participating in electoral politics. Decline is considered to be the fourth stage of a movement, which can occur for a number of reasons such as a lack of resources, a decline in enthusiasm or they may experience repression (Voss 1996; Tilly 1978; Mauss 1975; Blumer 1969). It is also possible, and perhaps almost inevitable in some cases, that a movement might fizzle out once their goals have been reached or if the political situation changes enough. Tilly (2004a) has argued that political decentralisation, a move from democratisation, or the privatisation of the governmental or political sphere are the circumstances most likely to affect movement sustainability.

Given the shifting nature of movements, there is a tendency for activity levels to rise and fall due to changing contextual factors, previous successes and failures and fluctuating membership. The number of social movements active at any time tends to fluctuate more than other types of civil society actors functioning in what Tarrow (1998) calls 'cycles of contention'. Most studies of movements focus on the periods when they are most active. This results in little attention being paid to a movement's latent periods and the reasons for it. Neglecting their latent phases may, however, lead to some important and interesting elements of movement development being overlooked (see Meyer 1999). An assessment of how movements react to the shifting context within a new protectorate is an essential part of this study; therefore attempts have been made to consider the less active periods of both case studies as this may symbolise a shift in strategy or the impact of political opportunities.

As already mentioned, social movements can emerge for a number of reasons and the goals and tactics of a movement can be incredibly varied. A standard typology of social movements does not exist though some movements are easier to distinguish. Some movements can for example be considered revolutionary, nationalist, conservative, religious, or reformist. Generally, movements tend to politicise their aims and demonstrate resistance to the status quo, typically forming organically with financial support provided by their membership. Social movements are considered to be more organised entities than ad hoc formations or coordinated protests, though they are not organisations (Tilly 1988; Oliver 1989; della Porta and Diani 2006).

As Whittier (2002) states, social movements can include organisations, which are known as SMOs. A number of SMOs may form part of a social movement and often coordinate and conduct tasks necessary for a movement to succeed. Movements and SMOs can express challenges and demands using a variety of tactics, which can include institutional or non-institutional methods, such as direct action, protests, lobbying or campaigns. SMOs, according to McCarthy and Zald (1977), make claims on authorities by combining an organisational element with the direct participation of a movement's constituents. Zald and Ash (1966: 327) state that "[s]ocial movements manifest themselves in part, through a wide range of organisations. These organisations are subject to internal and external pressures which effect their viability, their internal structure and processes, and their ultimate success in attaining goals."

An increasing amount of attention has been paid to the development, actions and theories of social movements, particularly since the 1980s (della Porta and Diani 2006; Morris and Herring 1987). Social movement theory (SMT) attempts to explain why and how social mobilisation occurs, and what the consequences of this mobilisation are. There are a number of theories, including relative deprivation, rational choice, resource mobilization, and political opportunity. That latter is the aspect of SMT that is of interest to this thesis and elaborated on in Chapter Two.

Until recently, the majority of research on social movement activity and the application of social movement theory has concentrated on cases in Western democracies in the United States and Europe (see Fominaya and Cox 2013; della Porta and Diani 2006). Outside of these areas, there has been some research of non-Western movements (Arbatli and Rosenberg 2017), a significant amount of research on Latin America (see Petras and Veltmeyer 2011; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Calderón, Piscitelli and Reyna 1992;), some research on post-communist states (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013; Mendelson and Glenn 2002), and other states, such as India (see Shiva 1989; Shet 1987; Kothari 1987) and Russia (see Ivanou 2013; Chebankova 2012; Fröhlich 2012; Richter 2002; Sperling 1999), some of which have included comparative and regional assessments (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013; Beinin and Vairel 2011; Petras and Veltmeyer 2011). The protests in the MENA region that emerged in 2011 have led to increased research on movements and political activism in the region (Beinin 2016; Abdelrahman 2015; Povey 2015; Beinin and Vairel 2011). One area of social movement studies that remains understudied, however, is social movement activity in post-conflict states or states that have experienced international interventions. It is this area, which this thesis contributes to.

Social movements and new protectorates

The activity of social movements within the context of new protectorates is of particular interest because of the emphasis placed on democratisation by international actors involved in state-building. Many scholars have acknowledged the historical significance of social movements in the establishment of democratic states (Tilly 1985) and the consolidation of political systems, which can often be seen through the relationship between social movements and political parties (see Caruso 2015; Johnstone 2012; Tilly 2004; 1986; Goldstone 2004; Marks and McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996; Tilly 1984). Even at a basic conceptual level, democracy and the Western nation-state are strongly interconnected and the development of the social movement as a form is closely tied to the development of the state as a political entity (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1984).

Generally, social movements are thought to promote the processes of democratisation and to encourage a feeling of citizenship amongst movement members (Earle 2011). At the same time social movement activity is considered to be galvanised by increasing democratisation (Tilly 2004a). Norris argues that there is strong evidence that many of the actions taken by social movements, such as demonstrations, petitions and boycotts "encourage a vibrant and active democratic state" (Norris 2006: 16). Avritzer and Santos (2003: 21) highlight the important role which social movements have in recovering local forms of participation that have been excluded by the state, referred to as the 'constituent power' of social movements by Hardt and Negri (2001: 42). Earle (2011: 4) suggests that where more formal channels for expressing demands do not exist or function, movements provide an alternative means to make demands.

Despite these elements, it should be acknowledged that some scholars suggest that movements are not always beneficial to democratic development as understood from Western perspectives. For instance, some argue that the presence of social movements, can, in fact, generate instability (Earle 2011). Also, not all movements are progressive, they do not reach everyone they claim to represent, and they can be internally undemocratic, overshadow or marginalise other groups, and may become less participatory if they enter electoral politics (Foweraker 1995). Earle (2011: 12) argues that "even those that provide some benefits locally, may not be stimulating democratic values, as understood by Western governments" (also see DRC-Citizenship 2010: 13).

The broader, less technical aspects of democratisation require the development of democratic norms and practices in order to reform a political sector capable of supporting the building and functioning of democratic state institutions. These broader aspects are often harder to quantify, and therefore

most assessments of democratisation focus on measurable elements such as voter turnout. A number of ways of measuring democracy have been utilised, including the qualitative methods which were used by Tilly (2007) as well as quantitative comparisons like the Polity Model by Jaggers and Gurr (1995) or the works of Freedom House (2011) and Vanhanen (2000). These comparisons determine how democratic a country is by using several indicators, such as election frequency, competitiveness, officials' responses to citizens' demands, and how 'free' civil society activism is in opposition to government. International actors tend to focus on these types of indicators and on the progress of technical issues as signifiers of being on the right track, such as the passing of certain legislation, elections and time frames for the military and civilian presence. Therefore, despite the use of these models, there is little information about how much democratisation beyond the technical level has really occurred, particularly in new protectorate contexts. As a result these measurements are quite limiting when trying to assess levels of grassroots activity, political protest or social movement activity.

There is little written about the role or development of social movements, SMOs and grassroots political organisations in the state-building literature or in the contexts of post-conflict or fragile states more broadly (Oosterom 2009:5). This may be, in part, due to the limitations on such developments in these areas, as well as the difficulty in gaining access or information. One useful source is a literature review produced by The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) on the Dynamics of Social Movements in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States that gives some useful insights into movement activity in fragile states but the literature covered in the review largely focuses on states in Africa and the MENA and not those that have experienced extensive state-building (Earle 2011).[10]

The lack of literature also highlights the tendency in the state-building literature, to focus on international actors, as Scott notes, the bulk of state-building literature is "less self-consciously altruistic and carries overtones of meeting the needs of the external actors in the international community, rather than the needs of poor communities on the ground" (Scott 2007: 5). Although a number of authors have emphasised the importance of local ownership (Marten 2006; Chesterman

[10] The literature review highlights several themes arising from the literature on movements in fragile states, particularly in reference to the types of movements, which include work on women's movements (see Fallon 2008; Norris 2006; Molyneux 2002 (on Sub-Saharan Africa); Gbowee 2009 (on Liberia); Castillejo 2008 (on Sierra Leone); Kaufman and Williams 2010), peace movements (see Castillejo 2008; Press 2010 (on Liberia); Kaufman and Williams 2010; Shrestha and Adhikiar 2010 (on Nepal)), socio-economic movements (see Mochizuki 2009; Obi 2005), faith-based movements (Kirmani 2008 (Palestine); Grynkerich 2008; Ladbury and Khan 2008 (both Egypt); Gunming 2007; Casonova 2001; Beckford 2001) and youth movements (USAID 2006; Bernard 2005).

et al. 2005) and reforms moulded to suit the local context (see Migdal 2001), the majority of the literature in this area focuses on the technical aspects of democratisation and 'high politics' (Scott 2007). This thesis contributes to the smaller body of literature that considers the consequences for, and reactions from, citizens within a new protectorate context.

Elements of the literature on societies in conflict, fragile states and post-conflict states highlight several features that are likely to affect a post-conflict society and the potential development of grassroots political activity such as movements. Several authors also suggest that there are generally low levels of trust in the state and other communities (Howard 2003; Earle 2011: 4) and that societies are "often polarised in ethnic, religious or class-based groups, often as a result of a legacy, or, some argue, colonialism" (Mcloughlin 2009: 23) (see also Howard [2003] on the effects of communism). Generally, Mcloughlin (2009:23) argues, "these societies are often dislocated from – and ambivalent towards – the state" and lack the "virtuous cycles of cooperation, trust, reciprocity and collective well-being that are vital in forming the social contract." This can be damaging for the positive development of state-society/citizen relations such as the 'capacity to aspire' - "the desire or ability to engage in collective action" (Earle 2011: 4). These factors, along with violence and repression, also have the potential to stimulate engagement (Earle 2011: 4), as well as the agency and determination of some within post-conflict societies. Social movements can be seen as a demonstration of the presence of active citizens who show a desire to engage with the state and provide a way to increase the level of interaction between citizens and the state (Earle 2011: 30).

Social movements and civil society

There is little in the social movement literature that directly addresses whether social movements are a part of civil society. To start with "civil society and social movements often have complex and contradictory practices and relationships which do not always fit within easily definable categories" (Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009: 3). Della Porta (2014) states that social movements are largely missing from the civil society literature, and that the study of the two fields has grown apart, each with their own approach and different conceptions of democracy. Howard (2003: 39) argues that the differentiation between social movements and civil society has been underspecified due to the tendency for academics to study one and not both. Movements active at the global level have been discussed (see della Porta 2014; Costoya 2007) and a small number of authors have linked social movements and civil society more broadly (see della Porta 2014; Mercer 2002; Baker 2002). While van der Heijden (2010) argues that there is an important overlap between social movements and the public sphere as part of civil society, Habermas (1992: 443) provides one of the few definitions of civil

society that specifically mentions movements as an inclusive part.

> Civil society is made up of more or less spontaneously created associations, organi[s]ations and movements, which find, take up, condense and amplify the resonance of social problems in private life, and pass it on to the political realm or public sphere (Habermas 1992: 443).

Proponents of deliberative democracy (see Dryzek 2000; Offe 1997; Mansbridge 1996) have argued that social movements can play a key role in the development of autonomous public spheres, by contributing to the dialogue and interaction between individuals and the state that forms the 'public sphere' (Wainwright 2004: 94; Howard 2003).[11]

The literature on civil society suggests that it is more appropriate to consider social movements and SMOs to be civil society actors, but not civil society organisations (CSOs). A CSO, as defined by the OECD (2009), can include "all non-market and non-state organisations outside of the family in which people organize themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain." CSOs, which include NGOs, generally have less disruptive methods than social movements, which tend to have a more grassroots base and their claims are often considered to be radical (della Porta 2014). Van der Heijden (2010: 39) argues that movements challenge prevailing politics and highlight alternatives using a "critical, sometimes counter-hegemonic way of defining problems and solution strategies." This may result in movements being considered spoilers or 'uncivil' as discussed above. NGOs also tend to possess more resources and are organised in a more formal manner (della Porta 2014). NGOs tend to receive funding from external sources, while social movements do not, which allows the potential for movements to be subject to exclusion by international actors (Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009).

There is little mention in the academic or policy literature of any direct interest by international actors in social movements. Earle's (2011) literature review on social movements in fragile states does point to ways in which international donors may support social movements, but there is little other literature like this. There are a number of reasons that direct funding of social movements does not seem to be particularly common. From a movement perspective, it may wish to remain as

[11] Guidry writes in a mix between Habermasian and Gramscian terminology about a dominant public sphere, controlled by the state, the elite, and the media, and opposed by several counter public spheres fronted by social movements putting forward the views of those marginalised by the dominant public sphere (Guidry 2003: 499). According to this model the democratic arena is extended when views from a counter public sphere are adopted in the dominant public sphere and the opinion of marginalised groups is thus heard.

independent as possible and not want to risk the possibility, or perception, of co-option or a loss of autonomy (Earle and Pratt 2009). International funding of social movements has the potential to create the same competition for resources (DRC-Citizenship 2006) that exists amongst NGOs and civil society. Paffenholz (2009) notes a move towards the professionalisation and formalisation of activist networks as they seek funds from international donors, dubbed the "taming of social movements" and the "NGOization of social protest," which can generate competition between organisations and "shifted accountability from the societies concerned to the donors themselves" (Paffenholz 2009: 24; also see Smith 2015; Lynch 2013; Choudry and Kapoor 2013; Aksartova 2009; Alvarez 2009; Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009; Rajagopal 2003). International funding may encourage social movements to behave in a certain way, responding to donor's interests over those of their members (Earle 2011: 7; Earle 2009), which may impact their abilities to mobilise or sustain the movement.

From the perspective of international actors, they may not be interested in funding movements if they view them as unpredictable or too politicised, as discussed above. International actors may view social movements as spoilers, a hindrance to state-building that may also create resentment from national governments, particularly if these groups are viewed as opposition (DRC-Citizenship 2006: 15). Della Porta (2014: 140) argues that when civil society actors are viewed as non-contentious, donors are content to fund them. She argues that this has the effect of marginalising those movements "that could claim social and political reforms, as well as practicing different conceptions of democracy" and are "excluded from the understanding of 'civil society' that is key in current donor strategies." Nuscheler (2003) suggests that aside from a number of large NGOs with more resources and access, smaller, grassroots-orientated organisations that can survive only on the basis of volunteer work tend to articulate civil society more. This literature suggests that internationally donor-funded civil society development in new protectorates provides a crucial link between international actors and those seeking political change and is highly likely to impact upon political opportunities available.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the wide range of literature that applies to social movements and new protectorates. It has demonstrated that the presence of international actors within a territory is systematically different to more conventional domestic political settings, in which such extensive international intervention is absent. International actors not only provide assistance and guidance regarding domestic development, and in some cases also hold temporary executive authority over some or all of the functions of government, but can have considerable influence over a wide variety of political factors, including the form of governance, rule of law, institution building, economic and social reforms, and civil society development. International actors often assume roles usually filled by

domestic actors, and therefore have a wide variety of mechanisms of influence. The level of such influence is variable over time and delivered by different actors. It is also the case that the existing domestic context will shape the influence and role of the international actors. However, it is inevitable that international actors contribute to the shaping the political context in which movements in these territories have to function, the extent to which is explored throughout this thesis.

CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH STRATEGY

This chapter outlines the research strategy I used to answer my research questions. Here I introduce the approach of the research and the methods used, including an outline of the case studies themselves and the reasons for their selection. I also detail the way data was collected and analysed in support of the case analysis. Following this, I introduce the political opportunity framework, which incorporates the literature on new protectorates into four categories that are used to assess the political opportunities available.

Given the lack of existing academic research on elements of social movements within new protectorates and on the two case studies, the research strategy and goals of the study required an exploratory approach. Concepts were developed and refined throughout the collection and analysis of the data. Primarily qualitative methods were used to collect data and to interpret the complex social processes of interest to the study. Documentary sources and interviews were the key methods of data collection that contributed to the case study analysis. These methods, which are detailed below helped to gather a variety of data necessary to analyse the situation in both territories and assisted in the attempt to apply existing research on social movements to the specific context of new protectorates, enabling the research to make a contribution to the literature. The lack of data or existing research into the areas of interest to this study made it difficult to provide concrete variables in relation to the movements' activities and influences. Therefore a formal variable model was not appropriate.

A political opportunity framework, explained later in this chapter, was used as a guide to analyse the impact of the presence of international actors via their influence on political opportunities. Given that a political opportunity framework has not previously been applied to a new protectorate context, I drew on the political opportunity and new protectorate literatures to provide an altered framework that could be used to better assess the influence of international actors on movements.

Case studies

The selection of viable case studies for the case study analysis was a vital part of the research process. The specific context of new protectorates significantly narrowed the number of territories and time periods from which the cases could be selected. Once the new protectorates had been established several initial ideas were explored within each new protectorate territory before it was possible to decide which cases to select. I began by seeking out reports of social movement activity in new

protectorates from internet and academic searches, news reports, social media, and personal knowledge. This preliminary research highlighted a number of groups that considered themselves to be movements and, on first look, demonstrated some movement attributes, such as collective action and the involvement of networks of citizens. However, often after further research, the less they resembled social movements as defined in the literature. The grassroots political activity found in new protectorates often represented either that of a mixture of organised and unorganised protests, which were sometimes spontaneous and generally over short periods of time, and did not necessarily represent a social movement. At the other end of the scale, many groups appear to be too organised to be termed social movements and were in fact NGOs.

It cannot be said that local actors are entirely deprived of agency and it is possible that the new protectorate context has the potential to galvanise social movement activity (Earle 2011: 4). There are clear instances of protests and cases of resistance by local actors against the methods of political, social and economic reconstruction, often initiated by international actors, within new protectorates. A number of studies on Iraq have assessed local resistance and protests that were organised against the ongoing occupation, corruption and demands for better security and infrastructure (see Isakhan 2015, 2012, 2009, 2008, 2006; Bridaux and Kurki 2014), and more recently an increasingly prominent workers' movement (Isakhan 2009). There are also a number of religious movements that existed in Iraq before the US invasion, particularly the Sadr movement. There have been women's movements present in Iraq since the 1920s and international actors have emphasised women's rights since the US intervention in 2003. However, this emphasis has actually changed the way women's groups function and Al-Ali and Pratt (2009) argue that the calls for women's liberation by international actors may actually end up oppressing women in Iraq in the long term.

Another example can be seen in East Timor, which was administered by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) from 1999 until independence in 2002, followed by a UN support mission, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), and peacekeeping forces until 2005. After this, police and administrative staff remained, as part of the United Nations Office in Timor Leste (UNOTIL). After the intervention in 1999 political participation was limited and a number of students, opposition elites and former veterans had protested to increase it (Salmon and Anderson 2013). In 2006, what started as a peaceful protest turned into violent clashes, prompting a military intervention by Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal and eventually resulted in a change of leadership (Simonsen 2006; Chopra 2002, 2000; Suhrke 2001). However, the protests did not constitute a movement.

Thus, the initial research demonstrated that the type of activity considered to be social movement activity (as outlined in Chapter One) is limited within new protectorates, or is at least on a far smaller scale than one would expect to find in an established democracy. There are a number of likely reasons for this in conflict and post-conflict situations and it is to be expected that there may be limitations on social movement activity. Also, as explored in Chapter One, the type of civil society development promoted in new protectorates is generally of a 'civil' nature, which provides services or advocates for civic principles or pluralism (Bridaux and Kurki 2014; Chandler 2013; Belloni 2008), which has the potential to side-line and hinder social movement activity, a factor that is considered in the following chapters.

Bearing the above discussion in mind, I have selected case studies which do not necessarily resemble social movements in the strictest sense but are the closest entities I could find in each territory, post-international intervention. The first case study, Vetëvendosje, arguably began as a social movement, which became an SMO. Afghanistan 1400 is more representative of a CSO, but as I argue below, it is still provides a useful case study for the research questions.

Both case studies self-define as movements and, prior the decisions to become political parties, actively wanted to avoid being considered as political parties or NGOs. This highlights some interesting questions relating to the definitions of social movements, CSOs, and NGOs. This is particularly pertinent in light of the type of civil society that is promoted in new protectorates and, as Esteves, Motta and Cox state, social movements and NGOs should not be considered as two distinct spheres, but as different modes of popular organisation. They argue that

> "their abilities to ally with one another, to play each other's roles (as when things that look like movements act like NGOs or vice versa), to push each other out of the way or to play a good-cop, bad-cop routine can be analysed within a single frame of reference - and assessed in terms of their effectiveness and strategies and their ultimate outcomes" (2009: 18).

Also, it has been acknowledged that within social movement studies generally, scholars tend to analyse movements as coherent entities (della Porta and Rucht 2002), which, as discussed above can be problematic due to the shifting nature of movements (Whittier 2002; Tarrow 1994). This is particularly problematic for this study because there are few distinct movements within new protectorates, although some organisations do consider themselves part of broader movements. In addition these definitional issues, and the efforts made by the case studies to position themselves as

movements highlight potential constraints and opportunities for movement activity, which I discuss in the case study chapters.

Thus, I believe that both cases facilitate the investigation of the research questions and has led to a wider understanding of how international actors can influence political opportunities and how organisations similar to social movements have developed within the new protectorate context, as well as how social movement activity may be better placed to develop. There were also several pragmatic factors that were considered when choosing the case studies, which are common considerations when assessing case study viability (Yin 1994; Langrish 1993). Examples of such considerations were my own knowledge, linguistic and cultural limitations, access and the resources required to conduct the research.

Vetëvendosje

The first case study detailed in this thesis is Vetëvendosje (Movement for Self-Determination), which is active in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje gained particular prominence within Kosovo as one of the main bodies of opposition to the international presence and supportive of independence. I did not come across any other entities that could be considered a social movement or counter-movement within Kosovo. Arguably, Vetëvendosje began as a social movement in 2005, possessing the four common elements of a social movement outlined by Diani (1992) - collective identity, shared beliefs and solidarity, collective action, and networks of informal interaction. It can be considered as the modern day expression of the wider Albanian nationalist movement because Vetëvendosje had the main objective of gaining self-determination for Kosovo and advocated that Kosovo become part of Albania. All other movement claims stemmed from this main objective. It has opposed elements of the presence of international institutions, particularly the role of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which the movement regarded as anti-democratic and an obstacle to self-determination. The movement has used a wide variety of tactics, including direct action and protests.

Since Kosovo declared independence in 2008, Vetëvendosje has broadened its goals and put candidates forward for parliamentary elections. From this point there are arguments that support the ideas that Vetëvendosje then became a political party, an SMO, or continued as a movement. Members of Vetëvendosje argue that they remain a movement and continue their movement activities alongside their parliamentary participation. This is explored in more detail in the case study analysis of Vetëvendosje in Chapter Four.

Afghanistan 1400

The second case study is Afghanistan 1400, an organisation that advocates youth engagement and peace in Afghanistan. Afghanistan 1400 formed in 2012 as an organisation that aimed to mobilise the 'new generation' in Afghanistan and to provide a platform for youth participation in a range of areas considered challenges for Afghanistan. It has a diverse but selective membership and attempts to engage young Afghans and raise awareness of its goals via events, statements and lobbying. At the time of the completion of this thesis Afghanistan 1400 had a lull in its public activities and was in what they consider to be a transitional phase as it reassesses its internal structure and considers the prospect of forming a political party in addition to its existing activities.

Afghanistan 1400 displays elements of a social movement such as collective action and a network of activists but its organisational element situates it more as a civil society organisation. The organisation considers itself a movement and is adamant that it will not take international funding or function as an NGO, something that is explored later in Chapter Six. The reasons for the choice of Afghanistan 1400, as noted above, are partly due to the lack of entities which clearly fit within the definition of a social movement in Afghanistan. One notable other movement is the Islamic movement, the Taliban. However, the practical issues of researching the Taliban are obvious and Afghanistan 1400 provides an interesting case because it developed after the international intervention, while the Taliban have existed for much longer. Afghanistan 1400 does see the Taliban as a threat, although this is largely in relation to their aims rather than as a direct counter-movement.

There are some well-known groups advocating women's rights in Afghanistan, however Grau notes, "[w]hat seems to be missing is a broader women's movement, rooted in society and enabling women to advocate jointly for change on local levels" (2016: 420). A similar claim can be made for Afghanistan 1400. The organisation has aims that link it to youth and peace movements more broadly but, although there has been an increased interest in these areas since the intervention, there is little that represents a youth or peace movement that has strong foundations in Afghanistan (see Kazemi 2012). However, Afghanistan 1400 is still a particularly interesting case for the application of a political opportunity framework, which allows us to see what opportunities or constraints there might be to social movement development in Afghanistan and in new protectorates more broadly.

Case comparison

An initial assessment of Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 highlighted that the international presence has had different influences on both of the case studies, which provides for an interesting comparative analysis. Both case studies have also responded to the international presence and its

influences in quite different ways, which has highlighted the variety of ways in which the presence of international actors as well as political opportunities can affect the development of social movements.

It was also beneficial to select case studies within new protectorates that were within different regions in order to contribute more to the comparative element of the study. Although all new protectorates have different histories I felt it beneficial to study only one new protectorate within Europe. Both Kosovo and Afghanistan have experienced a significant international presence, and are considered to be new protectorates by Mayall and Oliveira (2011), as explained in Chapter One. Their histories differ significantly as do the reasons for intervention in the first place. Therefore, the nature of the international presence differed in each territory as both experienced differing levels of influence from international actors at different times. For instance, the pre-independence period in Kosovo experienced a UN administration, while the UN mission in Afghanistan took a more assistive role. The contexts of both territories will be discussed in depth in Chapters Three and Five and a comparison is made in the discussion chapter.

This selection of two case studies provided a robust way of testing some elements of the analysis in this study. It allowed for the intensive investigation necessary in order to generate the thick descriptions required to answer the research question. The use of two cases also allowed elements of comparison between several aspects of each case (Tarrow 2010; Stake 2005; de Vaus 2001) and highlighted potential points of interest for other cases. The comparative element, which involved within-case and cross-case comparisons, provided rich contextual descriptions that helped to identify similarities and differences between the cases and the territories and made it possible to develop a method of classification which produced data relevant to the research question.

A study of a larger number of cases might have helped to draw broader conclusions (della Porta 2002: 297), however, this was not possible within the time limits of this research and would have meant a less in-depth, and consequently less informed consideration of the smaller number of case studies selected. However, due to the small amount of literature that exists in this area and thus, the exploratory nature of my research, it can be argued that two case studies were sufficient. A study of more cases may be appropriate at a later stage in order to apply the political opportunity framework and the suggestions made in this thesis.

The choice of one case in two different territories showed how the different claims and tactics of each movement have been enacted in relatively similar contexts, in the sense they both have high levels of

influence from the international presence, although no new protectorate project has followed exactly the same trajectory. Similar actors were at play in both territories, although some organisations and institutions were more prominent in each country. Their location in different regions meant that some different regional actors were involved. Analysing two different new protectorate contexts enabled an assessment of a wider variety of potential influences, rather than facilitating a direct comparison between the two. This enabled relationships between different movement elements and international actors to be examined in different contexts. Both territories demonstrated differences in the actions and level of influence of the international actors, as well as domestic circumstances, broadening the potential for comparison and analysis. While the study does not seek to generalise findings, or to argue that it is representative, it does provide data on understudied movements and CSOs and offers an analysis of an otherwise understudied context for social movements which can be subjected to further research.

Data Collection

This research focused on learning and understanding the values and perceptions of a variety of actors, and so qualitative methods were judged to be the most effective for the collection of data and analysis in this research. Fieldwork was carried out in Kosovo, where I spent most of a year, which provided useful insights into everyday life in Kosovo as well as my research questions. It was not practical to do the same in Afghanistan due to the timeframe of the research, the expense, and the safety concerns at the time. It was, however, still possible to gather significant amounts of information on the international presence and the case studies, including several valuable interviews. The period of data collection ended in December 2014, and so the case analysis considers the activities of international actors and both cases until around this point.

Several different types of documentary sources have been collected throughout the research phase of the thesis, including resolutions, regulations and legislation, texts of speeches, press releases and official reports and publications produced by the case studies themselves. Documentary sources have been gathered in order to gain evidence on the activities and perspectives of both international actors and the case studies to verify and assess how strategies, claims and policy changed over time. Random sampling was not appropriate for this research, so a cyclical process was used, which involved starting with a small selection of relevant and similar samples. After some analysis further selections were made based on these findings (see Bauer and Aart 2000: 19). Other documents were also highlighted during interviews.

The main purpose of gathering documentary sources on international actors was to establish who the

key actors were, and to establish state and institutional interests and goals. This provided the basis for exploring the activities of these actors and aspects that may influence social movement development and strategy. Locating documents relating to the case studies served a similar purpose and was vital in outlining the activities and claims of both case studies as well as their perspectives on the international actors present within the territory.

Information relevant to the Afghan case study was gained largely from online sources and via the British Library. I collected data from the websites of international institutions and organisations, such as UNAMA and NATO. I gained some additional information directly from these sources after contacting them with questions or interview requests. I also collected data from embassy websites and reports from research organisations. Data on the Afghanistan 1400 itself was collected from the organisation's website and Facebook page, which was used more frequently. Some of the Facebook posts were available in English, but the majority were written in Dari or Pashto. I was able to obtain some of the documents posted in English from a member and some posts were translated.

For Kosovo, data on international actors also came largely from websites, particularly those of UNMIK, EULEX, USAID, UNDP, the EU External Action Service and various embassies. The released WikiLeaks cables proved insightful, particularly those sent by the US ambassador in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje have a large amount of information available in Albanian, but a weekly newsletter in English that has been published online since 2006 provided a huge amount of information on the movement's actions, aims, responses to events. The newsletter also often cited articles that members had written elsewhere. During one of the interviews I was given a copy of the movement's manifesto, first published in August 2013 under the title *the Governing Alternative*, and containing information regarding the movement's organisational structure. A number of articles were available on the website as well as news updates and photographs. It was possible to gain a more visual impression of some of the *Vetëvendosje's* past activities by viewing their online gallery and other photographs of protests and direct action available online.

I used secondary data from academic literature, think tanks and CSOs. There was a wealth of general information on both countries, particularly regarding the conflict and the activities of international institutions. However, I found little information regarding the two cases, the presence of social movements in general, or their interactions with the state or international actors. This lack of information highlights the contribution to empirical knowledge that this thesis makes, especially regarding empirical data on Afghanistan 1400, which formed relatively recently. Although more

information can be found on Vetëvendosje as it has been established for longer, my thesis also contributes additional empirical data.

It also became clear to me that some of the literature referring to certain aspects of each territory was quite polarised, particularly in the case of Kosovo. On some issues there were often stark differences in the presentation of facts and figures within both journalistic and scholarly accounts, each of which can be viewed within a particular agenda, including those presented by Serbian, Albanian and international sources. This study engages with, but does not attempt to clarify, debates that are not a direct focus of the study, such as the issue of Kosovo's statehood and the overall success or failures of the interventions.

Interviews

Over 30 interviews were conducted in Kosovo and London, or via Skype. The interviews were carried out with a wide range of actors to gain multiple accounts of events and processes relevant to both cases. Interviews were conducted with members of both case studies, including those within the leadership as well as with international and local employees of CSOs, institutions, NGOs, embassies and journalists. Semi-structured interviews were used to allow guided but flexible questioning (Bryman 2008; Mason 2002; Marshall and Rossman 1999). They allowed me to follow up on specific issues or new topics or themes that arose (as suggested by Yates 2009), and to clarify or expand on issues arising from their position or area of expertise. 'Sensitising questions', according to Strauss and Corbin (1998: 77) address the issues of concern to the interviewee, establish who is involved, and how the interviewee defines the situation and it's meaning to them. These types of questions were used in order to understand the interviewees' perspectives on a number of issues and assist the development of particular themes.

As my research is concerned with the impact of the presence of international actors, it was important to recruit participants from both the case studies and various international actors. As a result, 'purposive sampling' was used, and interviewees were selected due to their relevance to the research area rather than for their representativeness (Bryman 2008: 458). A representative sample would also, in practice, be very difficult to achieve; however, attempts were made to get interviews with a wide range of relevant participants. Sampling generally happened in stages as I gained more information on the case studies and other significant actors, highlighting other potential interviewees. In some instances, therefore, 'snowball' sampling occurred, with more interviews being made possible after interviewees introduced or suggested further participants.

Generally, potential interviewees within Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 were identified in their publications and via their websites. In the case of Afghanistan 1400 I had contact with a founding member prior to beginning the PhD. This member had made me aware of the development of the organisation in its early stages. After conducting an interview with her she put me in touch with other members. Similarly, in Kosovo, after initial interviews I was provided with further contacts. The wide variety of respondents within and outside of Vetëvendosje facilitated the collection of broad perspectives that covered events and activities over a substantial timeframe, both prior to and during its existence. I attempted to gain respondents from similar organisations and institutions in both states as well as those specific to each state such as UNMIK. Although I was able to gain a range of interviews, and there were no significant gaps, it would have been interesting to interview more employees of international actors, such as the US embassy, however some interview requests did not receive a response.

After direct contact with interviewees was established, usually via email, a brief explanation of the research was given. This was followed up with an email explaining the objectives of the research and the interview procedure. Prior to the interview, a document was sent to the interviewee informing them about the research, what topics were likely to be discussed, the subsequent use of the data, and the option to remain anonymous or to withdraw from the interview. The document was intended to help resolve any potential ethical issues and required the signature and date from the participant to confirm they were aware of these issues and to consent to the interview. A further optional signature was required to confirm whether the participant agreed to be referred to by name in the thesis or preferred to remain anonymous.

At the start of each interview issues of anonymity and the participant's right to withdraw were re-addressed, and interviewees were asked if they preferred the interview to be digitally recorded or hand-written notes to be taken. Data protection of interviewee details and interviews has been maintained. I ensured this by naming transcripts and recordings with a code, which did not directly identify them. This provided extra protection of data, and in the unlikely event of third party access it would not be possible to link files to individuals. Stored audio files and transcripts were password protected as an extra security measure. The majority of interviewees were fluent in English making it was possible to conduct all the interviews in English.

Potential ethical issues that could have arisen during the research were submitted to, and approved by, the University of Lincoln Ethics Committee. The assessment of ethical issues was conducted in

accordance with the guidelines of the University of Lincoln and the Social Research Association. Most participants gave me permission to use their names and were keen to be interviewed and the majority of interviewees asked to be informed about the findings and outputs of the research.

During the interviews, I made efforts to present myself as an impartial interviewer, not showing signs of agreement or disagreement with the interviewee's responses or asking leading questions. In some cases it was necessary to steer interviewees to the specific requirements of the research, to ensure they were covered within the time available. This is a recognised issue when interviewing committed activists (for example, Taylor and Rupp 1991). The presence of factions within social movements is commonplace (Blee and Taylor 2005: 98) and, therefore, had the potential to raise interesting challenges regarding the sampling and conduct of interviews. Remaining neutral was important to help ensure that access to other elements of the case studies were not denied. As previously mentioned, the contacts for interviews with members of Afghanistan 1400 were provided through an initial contact though I was assured, and it seemed to be confirmed during the interviews, that I would speak to a variety of members with diverse opinions on Afghanistan 1400's progress, future and organisation. It was not clear to me that there were any significant divisions within Vetëvendosje at the time of the interviews. Several interviewees did, however, acknowledge that during the period in which they were discussing participating in elections some members had strongly disagreed with such a move (see Chapter Four).

The analysis of the interviews was an ongoing process that helped to develop research ideas and raised new questions for further interviews. All of the interviews which were carried out, usually lasting between 30 and 90 minutes, were transcribed. Interviewees were emailed again after the completion of the transcription, thanking them for their participation and allowing them to review the interview transcription if they chose to. Depending on the agreement made over confidentiality, in some cases this provided the opportunity for the respondents to point out any areas of the interview where they could be identified. Allowing the respondents the opportunity to review their transcript is not necessarily to encourage censorship but also has the potential for useful comments and additions which could benefit the research (Burnham et al. 2008: 293). The interview transcripts were re-read in order to establish any relevant themes.

Overall, the interviews were an effective means of obtaining information and opinions from activists involved in the case studies. The interviews filled some gaps in information on their activities, particularly in the Afghanistan 1400 case due to less information in the public domain, and helped to

highlight where further research may be useful. The interviews also helped to gain an understanding of the motivations behind some actions, such as discussions about becoming a party, which would have been difficult to gain with other methods. Similarly, the other interviews were an extremely helpful source on the roles of international actors as well as opinions on the case studies, which would have been difficult to obtain otherwise.

Interviews with international and local employees, for example, provided a useful insight into the workings of a variety of organisations, their aims and perceived roles, as well as their perceptions of other actors and the cases in question. The interviews were also useful in aiding understanding of how different audiences interpreted the ideas of both case studies, and how they were intended to be perceived by the cases themselves. This is important to this study as it helps to gauge the perspectives of both how the cases are received, and also how they perceive this reception and the effect this has on their decision-making. The interviews with members allowed greater understanding of the 'how' and 'why' (Warren 1988), through the participants' experience, their opinions and attitudes (Arksey and Knight 1999: 2), which provided a range of meanings and perspectives (Gubrium and Holstein 2001).

Qualitative methods can be criticised for having a number of weaknesses (Theam Choy 2014; Hammersley 1989), while some argue that the data collected in interviews can be largely anecdotal, open to misinterpretation or inaccuracies, and the value can be exaggerated leaving the potential to over identify with the subjects or to overlook anomalies which appear as accepted norms (Alsaawi 2014; Blee and Taylor 2002). Although it is impossible to overcome all of these issues, there are strategies that I have employed to reduce them. The use of several sources of data helped provide a fuller account of each case study and made it easier to assess comparisons between the cases. The use of primary and secondary sources allowed for triangulation that helped to corroborate and validate the data sources, highlighted gaps or potential inconsistencies, and increased the level of detail (Denzin 1989), whilst also going some way to addressing the potential issue of researcher bias. Semi-structured interviews have also been recommended as a means of reducing potential researcher bias, and allowing wider questioning which can be followed up later on in the interview (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Blee and Taylor 2002).

Political opportunity

A political opportunity framework has been used to guide the analysis of the two case studies, informed by interviews and documentary evidence. Before discussing the framework created for the

case study analysis, the literature is on political opportunity is briefly outlined, including they ways in which political opportunities can affect movement strategy. This is followed by a discussion on the categories used within most applications of a political opportunity framework. Then, by bringing together the literature on new protectorates and political opportunities, I have outlined some of the key elements of new protectorates that are likely to impact upon political opportunities, and incorporated these into the framework. This framework is applied to the contexts of Kosovo and Afghanistan in Chapters Three to Five and reflected on in the case study chapters. The utility of the framework's application to a new protectorate framework is reflected on in Chapter Eight.

Political opportunities are considered to be the "consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provides incentives for collective actions by affecting people's expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow 1998: 76-77). Scholars have argued that political opportunities can affect a variety of movement aspects, including their emergence (Tarrow 1998; Oberschall 1996), strength (Rucht 1996), behaviour (della Porta 1996), as well as strategy (Kitschelt 1986) as discussed below. Several proponents of the political opportunity framework suggest that social movements emerge or mobilisation increases when political opportunities expand (Jenkins and Perrow 1997; Tarrow 1998, 1996, 1994; della Porta 1996; Oberschall 1996; Voss 1993; McAdam 1982; Tilly 1978). A number of scholars also suggest that opportunities can arise from constraints or the closing of opportunities, or from threats external to the movement (Suh 2001; Brockett 1995). As Koopmans (1999: 96) states, "'[o]pportunity' is seldom defined, but generally refers to constraints, possibilities, and threats that originate outside the mobilizing group, but affect its chances of mobilizing and/or realizing its collective interests."

Several studies have questioned some of the specifics of political opportunity theory by testing it against alternatives (see Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003; Van Dyke 2003; Snow et al. 2003; Van Dyke and Soule 2002; McCammon et al. 2001; Cress and Snow 2000; Soule et al. 1999; Amenta and Zylan 1992; Lieske 1978). Despite questioning the concept, Meyer (2004: 134) argues that these studies still support the core idea that context is important in the analysis of social movement development, and concedes that "[g]iven the broad range of empirical concerns and settings, conceptual statements are necessarily broad" (Meyer 2004: 134). This study is not intended to test political opportunity itself, but uses it as a framework to help explain the cases and gain an understanding of the factors that can affect their strategy in contexts like those found in Kosovo and Afghanistan, contexts which have not been the considered in relation to political opportunities before. I am also expanding the use of a political opportunity framework by applying it to entities that are considered to be social movements,

SMOs and civil society organisations. In this study comparisons between the two cases and these political opportunities can be made, which Kitschelt (1986: 59) argues, "can show that political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environments."

Critics have suggested that existing definitions of political opportunity are very broad, and that the concept does not consider movements not in opposition to the state (Goodwin and Jasper 2003). Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) suggest that the concept is "in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment." McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) have responded to some of this criticism in Dynamics of Contention, and Gamson and Meyer (1996) have suggested that a more analytical distinction between relatively stable aspects of political opportunity, such as traditions and institutions, and more volatile elements of opportunity, such as public policy, political discourse, and elite alignment, may help clarify the concept. They also suggest that political opportunity does not just consist of a fixed external environment that activists must confront, but that it is also something they can influence or change (see also Tarrow 1993). The analysis in this thesis has been conducted with consideration of this criticism, and the utility of the political opportunity framework in the context of state-building is revisited in Chapter Eight.

Political opportunities in new protectorates

Traditionally, political opportunity has focused on the relationship between social movements and the state (Marks and McAdam 2000) and it has been suggested that the changes in this relationship determine mobilisation (Kurzman 1998). However, some scholars have found that other factors can also influence political opportunities, often elements resulting from globalization (Lahusen 1999; Smith 1999; Passy 1999). There have been a number of applications of different political opportunity models and comparative studies to a range of states (see Snow et al. 2003; Van Dyke and Soule 2002; Banaszak 1996; Amenta et al. 1994; Joppke 1993; Amenta and Zylan 1992; Jutschelt 1986). There has also been a small amount of literature that considers how a political opportunity approach can apply to transnational actors (Parks 2015; della Porta et al. 2009). The use of a political opportunity framework has been criticised for being biased towards developed democracies (Banks 2007: 136), though some studies have applied a political opportunity framework in non-democratic contexts (see Schock 1999; Boudreau 1996; Brockett 1991).

The context of new protectorates provides a novel use of the political opportunity framework, as international actors not only influence elements of the state and its governance, but also by less direct

means, such as the funding of civil society development. The rapid developments which occur in new protectorates, generally at a much faster rate than in an organically developed democracy, make this novel application of a political opportunity framework particularly relevant and interesting. Although scholars have previously acknowledged the impact of exogenous factors on a movement's development and strategy (see Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1633), it has not been applied to contexts similar to new protectorates.[12] Due to the nature of new protectorates and the extensive international influence the political opportunities available sit somewhere between the state and inter-state arena, something I discuss in further detail in Chapter Eight.

There are a number of elements of the new protectorate context, that are less common to other contexts, which are likely to have some impact upon the political opportunities available to movements. As previously mentioned, the form and nature of new protectorates tends to differ in each territory. A number of states have experienced an extensive international presence, some have seen an international administration or trusteeship temporarily responsible for governing the state, such as UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) in Kosovo (1999-2008) and UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) in East Timor (1999-2002), while others have seen the extensive influence of international actors on security and political developments, such as the presence of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan (2001-2014).

Strategy

Before expanding on the categories within the political opportunity framework, it is useful to outline what strategy is and how it may be impacted by political opportunities. There are a number of ways in which a movement can be affected by political opportunities, including: the ability to mobilise; the use of particular political strategies and tactics; the advancement of particular claims over others; the cultivation of some alliances rather than others; and the potential to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy (Meyer 2004). This thesis is particularly concerned with how political opportunities may influence the strategy of a movement, SMO or a CSO. Just as the political opportunity framework is a useful tool to guide the analysis of social movements as well as other entities, the existing literature on social movement strategy can also be applied to elements of social movements, such as

[12] A couple of studies were found to apply political opportunities to Vetëvendosje in Kosovo, both of these were undergraduate independent studies from study abroad programmes and their focus was on the movement's mobilisation and its shift to becoming a party (see Bruce 2013 and Delafrouz 2009). Both studies include interviews with other movement activists and provided some new insights into Vetëvendosje. No such work has been found in relation to any movements in Afghanistan.

SMOs, or CSOs in order to establish how these elements are affected by the presence of international actors.

Social movement strategy is regarded as the:

> overall plan for action, the blueprint of activities with regard to the mobilization of resources and the series of collective actions that movements designate as necessary for bringing about desired social changes (Jenkins 1981: 135).

Strategy affects the ability to mobilise, attract participants and potential allies and the possibility to persuade, interact with and influence their targets (Meyer and Staggenborg 2007; Banks 2007). Strategy involves decisions regarding a variety of interrelated factors, including which tactics to use, the demands to make, and their targets and audiences (Meyer and Staggenborg 2007). It encapsulates a CSO's inevitable attempts to react to changes in available political opportunities in order to maximise their impact.

Meyer and Staggenborg (2007) outline three key aspects of a social movement's strategy which can be affected by, and contribute to, the political opportunities available. These aspects are demands, arenas and dilemmas. Demands may be about the actions, identity, or those which a movement or SMO claim to represent. The importance attached to each of these may vary, and it may be viewed as strategically better to focus on certain goals at more or less favourable times (Tilly 2004b), which may be influenced by the political opportunities available. It may be the case that political allies are promoting similar demands as part of an electoral campaign, providing a favourable moment to pursue similar goals.

The arenas, or venues, which movement elements choose to act within have the potential to reach different audiences and targets. Each arena may operate differently and could be institutional or non-institutional, and tactics may range from participation in elections to protest in public squares. The tactics chosen will have a significant influence on the chances of claims being heard and attracting (or putting off) potential supporters (Snow et al. 1986: 464, 470). The choice of venue and tactics can depend on the opportunities for access, and the position of the movement or SMO in relation to their targets and audience (Meyer and Staggenborg 2007).

Often, Jacobsson and Saxonberg (2013: 2) suggest, scholars have presented movements as having an

"either/or" attitude regarding engagement in contentious politics or other activities, such as advocacy or providing social provisions or services, when in reality they often do both, although perhaps at different times. For example, a movement may find it more effective to pursue economic and legal options if the state has favourable laws but weak implementation (Fröhlich 2012; Jacobsson 2012; Ivanou 2013), whereas open states may provide more options for lobbying or advocacy. Other scenarios may make protest or direct action appear to be the most effective or viable method. Several studies have considered the use of aggressive or violent tactics by social movements (see Sajjid and Härdig 2016; Seferiades and Johnston 2012; della Porta 1995; Gamson 1975). Scholars have suggested that the use of these types of tactics are the only option for those with few resources (Piven and Cloward 1977), however, the use of these tactics can bring the risk of a repressive response from authorities (Jasper et al. 2015: 405).

Conflicting interests and pressures on movements and SMOs, which can stem from political opportunities, present a number of dilemmas for movements (Meyer 2007) that may influence their strategic decisions. These dilemmas could involve decisions to use of disruptive instead of orderly tactics, to focus on internal rather than external audiences, or to use a different method to manage tensions within movements (Jasper 2004: 10). Meyer and Staggenborg (2007: 7) consider this to be an iterative process, as the reactions to one set of tactics can impact upon future opportunities and constraints. The case studies selected include a movement/SMO which regularly uses mass mobilisations as part of a larger repertoire of direct action, and an CSO with contrasting tactics, focusing much less on mass mobilisation and more on lobbying and awareness raising through meetings, shorter term, reactive campaigns, and social media. Interestingly, both have chosen to field candidates in elections, a decision that appears to have been influenced by political opportunities and some international influence. The strategies and tactics of both are considered in depth in Chapters Four and Six.

The influence on political opportunities by international actors has been assessed in Chapters Three and Five. This assessment made it possible to see, in Chapters Four and Six, how some of the shifts in strategy have been shaped by international actors. Strategy is of course influenced by a number of other aspects such as internal conflict and resources. However, the focus of this thesis is on the influence of international actors, and though these other aspects are acknowledged where relevant, they are not subject to extensive discussion in the case analysis. These issues are not considered to be hugely influenced by international actors or considered as part of the political opportunity framework.

The political opportunity framework

Here, I incorporate the findings from the literature review in Chapter One into the political opportunity framework, introducing potential characteristics of new protectorates that might impact upon political opportunities. Some of these influences on political opportunities are heightened or even novel in the new protectorate context in comparison to other types of states (democracies, authoritarian states, for example) or in the contexts in which political opportunity has been applied thus far.

McAdam and Tilly have both suggested categories into which political opportunity can be divided (see McAdam 1996; Tilly 1978). Tilly (1979) outlined five categories: openness, coherence of the elite, stability of political alignments, the availability of allies and, repression and facilitation. McAdam (1996: 26-29) attempted to improve the reliability of the concept by specifying four dimensions: relative openness of the institutionalised political system; instability of elite alignments; presence of elite allies; and the state's reduced capacity or propensity for repression. These categories have been used as a guide to outline some of the main factors affecting political opportunities found in the literature, which are explored within my own four categories below.

Openness

Political opportunities are often discussed in reference to how open or closed the political system of the state is (see Eisinger 1973). Several scholars have argued that the level of openness impacts upon the opportunities for social movements to put forward their demands (Tarrow 1998; Clemens 1997; Koopmans 1996; Esman 1994; Tilly 1978). This refers to the capacity for competition for elite status, the potential to change laws and to participate in political opposition. A closed system does not allow for these changes. It is not possible to categorise most states as open or closed, but they can be placed on a spectrum, and that position may shift over time (McAdam 1996: 41). Existing research has highlighted a relationship between state openness and movement mobilisation that demonstrates that closed regimes tend to repress social movements, open and responsive ones assimilate movements and more moderate regimes tend to allow for the broad presence of movements, although they do not readily agree to movement demands (Kitschelt 1986: 62). Meyer and Staggenborg (1996: 1634) suggest that is it not only political openness that increases mobilisation prospects, but that mobilisation may also be more likely when threats to movements increase. It is also possible that even in circumstances where the state wants to engage with citizens, it is difficult for it do so, especially if it lacks resources or there are security risks associated with sending staff to certain areas of the country.

In states that are not considered to be new protectorates, the analysis of the openness of the state and its effect on political opportunities is confined to domestic governance structures. In the case of a new protectorate, the presence of international actors and their influence on these governance structures ought to be assessed to determine whether this presence does have an effect on the openness of the state, and therefore the available opportunities. As outlined in Chapter One, democratisation is one of the key goals of international actors in new protectorates, including the creation of democratic institutions and elections. These processes, which tend to happen very quickly in relation to other states, have varying levels of success but it can be expected that with democratisation the political system is likely become more open than the previous system (at least during the time of the conflict, if not before). As explained above, increased openness is likely to lead to increasing opportunities for movements and SMOs to mobilise. The processes and outcomes of the democratisation process are also likely to have a degree of influence over the capacity for competition, the fragmentation within the party system, the type of government that emerges and the potential to influence laws or participate in political opposition, which are also likely to affect opportunities such as the opening up of channels of interaction and the potential for new political allies, which are discussed further in the categories below.

Coherence of elites

Many of the political opportunities available are dependent on the situation within the political system, often linked to how open the system is. For example, the number of political parties, groups and factions that are able to effectively engage and put forward their ideas in electoral politics can all impact upon political opportunities. Kitschelt (1986) argues that the higher the number of these groups, the more difficult it is to confine electoral interests to those of the established and bureaucratised parties. The degree of fragmentation within the party system can also present different opportunities. Several scholars have argued that a division among elites is a significant factor in the success of revolutionary movements (Selbin 2006; Goldfrank 1994; Goldstone 2001, 1994; Skocpol 1979; Trimberger 1978; Gurr 1970). Division among elites may create incentives for mobilisation, and may present the possibility for movements and SMOs to promote their causes to elites who may take them on, particularly if it is likely to increase their own political influence (Tarrow 1998; Banks 2007).

The positioning of a government on the left or right, and the ideological leanings of political parties may affect their general level of responsiveness towards movement activity (Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1995; Amenta and Zylan 1992). Electoral vulnerability or the immediacy of elections may also increase

the likelihood of government responsiveness (Burstein 1999). Another factor is the capacity of the legislature to develop policy independently of the executive, which is thought to increase opportunities due to the nature of an electorally accountable legislature that will be more sensitive to the demands of the public (Kitschelt 1986).

The literature on post-conflict and fragile states highlights some interesting findings regarding the elites that may also be found in new protectorates. For instance, movements and SMOs may find that they are attempting to air their demands within a context of conservative elite control, a common feature of such states (Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009; Banks 2007). Tilly (1978: 135) argues that this encourages elites to "resist changes which would threaten the current realisation of their interests even more than they seek changes which would enhance their interests." Further, they,

> fight tenaciously against loss of power […] They work against admission to the polity of groups whose interests conflict significantly with their own. Existing members tend to be more exacting in their demands of contenders whose very admission would challenge the system in some serious way (Tilly 1978: 135).

Banks (2007: 132) argues that this applies to social movements with moderate goals just as much as those whose goals are contrary to the interests of the political elites.

In the case of new protectorates, it is not only the domestic elite that need to be considered but also the international actors, which effectively form an international elite. As discussed in Chapter One, the international actors involved in new protectorates agree on broad goals, often seen as representative of the international community. However, each actor comes with its own ideas, interests, and responsibilities which are put forward with varying levels of coordination or partnership with other actors. In addition to the common issues of poor coordination and communication between international actors, highlighted in Chapter One, Mayall and Oliveira (2011: 18) argue that:

> In practice, external interveners have different institutional cultures and political agendas, and often opposing senses of what should be prioritized. More important, they stand in no particular relationships with each other and are under no obligation, except the broadest of terms, to advance common objectives.

In fact, international actors have received heavy criticism for the lack of harmonisation and coherence

within state-building projects (Paris 2006; Rubin 2006; Ghani et al. 2005; Samuels and von Esiedel 2004). Paris (2006) notes that several missions have been marred by the inability of international actors to work together effectively, putting this down to the underlying problem of a lack of harmonisation in their values and ideals, and the lack of an agreed 'blueprint' to work on. This lack of coherence may have the potential to open up opportunities in the same way it can in relation to domestic elites.

Relationship between international actors and domestic elites

State-building projects do not start with a blank canvas and must work, to varying extents, with aspects of the existing elite and political system. Peace deals, new constitutions or international agreements are often written by foreign experts, frequently on the basis of a number of deals made amongst domestic and international elites. Thus, the relationship between international and domestic actors has a significant impact on the transition of the state (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Tansey 2009; Holohan 2005) and on political opportunities. Given the unique situation found in new protectorates, which usually involves a close relationship between domestic and international elites, it is worth delving further into the literature to gain a better understanding of this relationship and how it might impact upon political opportunities.

Domestic elites are not homogenous and the elites that international actors choose to work with, and how they do so, will have an impact on the post-conflict transition and the nature of the balance of power within the domestic elite (Tansey 2009; see Scott 2007: 6). International actors will prefer those elites who are most likely to represent their goals and desires (Tansey 2009). When local elites favour the introduction of a democratic regime, international and domestic elites are likely to interact along consensus lines and work together to establish the institutions of a democratic political system. However, when domestic elites would rather frustrate democratic development, the nature of the domestic and international interaction is likely to be significantly different. The resulting transition is more likely to be marked by confrontation rather than consensus, and new democratic institutions may be more likely to be imposed by international actors.

In most cases it is difficult to assess how much the views of elites and local populations converge with those of the international actors present. Mayall and Oliveira (2011b) note that international actors often make an initial assumption, which is that the local population are equally enthusiastic to become liberal versions of themselves, and are thought to fulfill similar ambitions. However, this is not always the case, for instance in Iraq Bridaux and Kurki (2014) found that although some elements were in

place to allow for democratic decision making, this did not result in the widespread adoption of liberal values by Iraqis. They argue that the "US failed to win over the Iraqi civil society essentially because of its inability to get the Iraqi elite to adhere to the US project for Iraq" (Bridaux and Kurki 2014: 95). This was due, in part, to the model of electoral democracy and quick elections which entrenched rivalries between Iraqi factions and led to a battle for votes that resulted in political organisations trying to provide services in exchange for votes.

Even on occasions when international actors and domestic elites agree it may not result in widely positive outcomes for the local population. For instance, Banks argues that the constitutions, usually written by foreign experts and based on deals with domestic elites

> tend to regulate the distribution of political, economic, and social power in ways that address the concerns and interests of the elite drafters. This has led to the adoption of constitutions that entrench the political power of elite drafters, limit the development of competitive political opposition, and fail to create institutional and procedural mechanisms for addressing existing and future political, economic, or social conflicts (Banks 2007:105).

There are also a number of reasons that certain elites may not wish to support international actors (Scott 2007: 5). Existing domestic political actors and those returning from exile are likely to have their own agendas they wish to pursue. Some elites, in the knowledge that most of the international presence will be keen to leave as soon possible, may just bide their time until the international presence has left (Mayall and Oliveira 2011: 26). Several authors have suggested that neo-patrimonalism may be an important, yet often overlooked, factor when assessing who the elites in a state are and where power really lies (see Scott 2007). Some scholars suggest that even in states that appear to be structurally weak, strong informal networks actually hold most of the power (see Reno 2000; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Reno (2000) calls these 'shadow states', which often allow elites to increase their economic power and may serve as a disincentive to work with international actors.

The state-building literature offers different opinions on the importance of engaging with strong elites. Some authors argue that strong elites provide local leadership for the rest of society (see Morales-Gamboa and Baranyi 2005; Chesterman 2005). Others (Barnett and Züercher 2009) argue that when international actors work with strong elites an oppressive form of social hierarchy can be recreated (Scott 2007: 6). The literature that addresses post-conflict states also provides some useful insights into the types of elites that could be expected in new protectorates. McAdam (1982) suggests

that it is particularly common in post-conflict states to find political power concentrated among a small elite. This elite is likely to have a conservative approach to maintaining the boundaries of the political system (Walter 2002) and it is likely that there are few incentives for this type of elite to be more inclusive, as discussed above (see Banks 2007 and (Tilly 1978).

There are also occasions when international actors feel the need to work with some elites who do not wholly represent their goals. Mayall and Oliveira argue that some international actors have a "penchant for cutting corners" by accommodating certain actors, which may explicitly stand for political and social projects at odds with the purposes of the new protectorates" (Mayall and Oliveira 2011: 29). It may also be the case that international actors ignore existing structures as well as some local elites, as observed by Holohan in Iraq and Kosovo (2005). Berdal and Keen (2011) argue that poor communication and collaboration with domestic actors can help to emphasis the distinction between "us" and "them".

Another issue that may affect the relationship between international and domestic elites is that of elites engaging in activities that international actors are trying to curb. For example, Boyle (2011: 197) highlights that in the new protectorate context it is possible that criminal networks may be active, and organised violence, such as reprisals or insurgencies, or looting, may occur. Often criminal networks develop as a result of conflict, and in some cases they constitute some of the elites or influential groups in the post-(or continuing) conflict period (Capussela 2015; Boyle 2014: 126; Briscoe and Rodríguez Pellecer 2010). The prevalence of corruption is another area that may put strain on the relationship between various actors. Corruption is often pervasive in new protectorate contexts and some have argued that it is even perpetuated by internationals that often maintain or work with the corruption rather than countering it (see Chayes 2016 on Afghanistan; Capussela 2015 on Kosovo).

The working practices within international organisations may also have an impact on international and domestic relationships as well as on the overall effectiveness of the mission. For instance, the assumption of an overarching agreement and a shared culture amongst international actors can often lead to disagreement over policy or ideas amongst those working in, and between, these organisations being ignored or overlooked by the actors themselves (Autesserre 2007). Another consideration is the employment procedures within international actors such as NGOs, donor agencies and the UN, that are notably similar within each sector (Mayall and Oliveira 2011), often involving short term placements of up to a year, and so potentially impacting upon institutional memory. Transparency and accountability is often lacking, particularly in relation to international decision-making, and when

employees of international organisations engage in criminal behaviour or incompetence (see Syal 2015; Le Billon 2008).

Internationals, both military and civilian, have often been criticised for a lack of knowledge of the countries they are based in (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Panel on UN Peace Operations 2000). The potential to increase that knowledge as quickly as required can be limited by security concerns, and the fact that staff are usually deployed in urban areas and provincial cities. These elements, and the fact that international employees are often presented as living the high life in Green Zones (see Chandrasekaran 2008) or military camps, may also impact upon public perceptions of the international effort. The literature related to international actors in new protectorates suggests that the coherence of international actors, their internal effectiveness and their ability to work with other actors is likely to have an impact on political opportunities to movements and should be considered in addition to the coherence of domestic elites.

Facilitation and repression

The types of interactions between government and movement elements can influence the ease of access for new claims and interests to be aired within the decision-making process. In order for this to happen there must be mechanisms available for new demands to make it into this process (Kitschelt 1986). Institutional rules that govern access to the public sphere and the political decision-making process can cover a host of elements that may impact on the decisions of movement elements, such as electoral laws or the relationship between government and civil society actors. These rules, Kitschelt (1986: 61-62) argues,

> allow for, register, respond to and even shape the demands of social movements that are not (yet) accepted political actors. They also facilitate or impede the institutionalisation of new groups and claims.

Kriesi et al. (1995) suggest that facilitation can occur through the support of allies, including political parties or unions, which can facilitate a movement by participating in their protest events. Marx (1979) highlights a number of strategies that actors external to a movement can carry out should they want to facilitate or inhibit a movement. These strategies are set out in Table 1 below. In Marx's analysis of efforts by the US government to facilitate or inhibit movement activity in the 1960s and 1970s, he found that the efforts intended to damage movements were more formalised and prevalent (Marx 1979). Marx also found that the actions of some government agencies, legislators or the courts are

much “more likely to be of a general and overt nature, rather than being at the specific micro-level in response to a given movement. When micro-level facilitative actions do occur, they are often indirect, and reactive” (Marx 1979).

Table 1: General Strategies for Facilitating or Inhibiting a Social Movement

To facilitate the movement	To inhibit the movement
Facilitate capacity for corporate action	Inhibit capacity for corporate action
Make it possible for energies of movement to go toward pursuit of broader social change goals, as well as maintenance needs	Direct energies of movement to defensive maintenance needs and away from pursuit of broader social goals
Create favorable public image; develop and support ideology	Create unfavorable public image and counter-ideology
Give information to movement	Gather information on movement
Facilitate supply of money and facilities	Inhibit supply of money and facilities
Facilitate freedom of movement, expression, and action; offer legal immunity	Inhibit freedom of movement, expression, and action; create myth and fact of surveillance and repression; apply legal sanctions
Build and sustain morale	Damage morale
Recruit supporters	De-recruitment
Build leaders	Destroy or displace leaders
Encourage internal solidarity	Encourage internal conflict
Encourage external coalitions with potential allies and neutral relations (or conflict only insofar as it is functional) with potential opponents	Encourage external conflict with potential allies and opponents
Facilitate particular actions	Inhibit or sabotage particular actions

(Marx 1979)

The inhibition of movement activity can, in some cases, be considered repressive or as a threat to a movement. Tilly states that repression is "any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action," while facilitation is an action which lowers that cost (Tilly 1978: 100). It is more likely that acts of repression will be used towards movements that seek fundamental changes within a society and are viewed as a threat to elite power. Those demanding less fundamental changes are less likely to experience repressive actions, even in contexts that are considered authoritarian or generally repressive (Tarrow 1998: 80).

There has been much debate over the significance of repression and its effects on mobilisation. Scholars have argued that state repression will damage the chances of social movements emerging or being sustained (Banks 2007: 149); it is also possible that people will withdraw from engagement and choose to self-censor (Earle 2011). Conversely, some scholars argue that repression may stimulate engagement or serve to facilitate a movement (Earle 2011; Brockett 1995; Marks 1989; Kimeldorf 1988; Barkan 1984; Lipset 1983), and that expectations of repression generally do not correlate with protest participation (Opp 1994; Opp and Gern 1993; Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991; Opp and Ruehl 1990; Muller and Opp 1986).

In the new protectorate context it is possible that the government, or other domestic groups, may facilitate or repress movement activity. Given the unique scenario in new protectorates, it may be possible that international actors also have the potential to affect the facilitation or repression of movements, directly and indirectly. For instance, as Chapter One highlighted, international actors can play a role in rule of law issues, which could provide them, with either the responsibility for, or influence over, police and military reactions to protest and movement activity. Equally, there may be ways in which international actors facilitate movements, such as the setting or influencing institutional rules or via civil society development, which could affect the channels available to influence or interact with elites and the public.

Presence of allies or opposition

The presence of allies or opposition within the elite (those with some power valued by the movement or SMO) may influence strategic decisions. A movement's or SMO's allies, who could range from individuals to other movements or organisations, may provide financial assistance, or other resources such as expertise, office space or a means of publicity for its demands (Schock 2005: 33-34; Tarrow 1998: 79). Political allies may put forward a movement's issues into institutional arenas or incorporate them into their agendas (Giugni 2007: 55).

Banks (2007: 149) suggests that in non-democratic states, where movements may have fewer internal resources, having influential allies can be of even greater importance (Schock 2005: 34; Tarrow 1998; 80). These allies, or opposition, could be in the form of a variety of international actors. Given the far-reaching influence of some international actors in new protectorates, it may also be the case that potential allies or opponents are influenced by their relationship with international actors, either directly or by the nature of the positions they take.

It is possible that in post-conflict states sources of funding and certain types of domestic organisations, such as trade unions, professional associations, or strong opposition parties, that are often found in more stable states, may be lacking, therefore decreasing the potential number of allies and impacting upon the state's relationship with civil society actors more broadly. Schock (2005: 361) argues that in cases where these types of organisations do exist in post-conflict contexts, they are often under state control and, therefore, the potential for influential allies are limited.

The appearance and disappearance of other movements, or counter-movements (see Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), as well as a historical precedent for mobilisation can also affect mobilisation opportunities and strategy (see Kurzman 1998; Kitschelt 1986). Movement activity may have a 'demonstration effect' (Kitschelt 1986: 61), potentially encouraging other movement activity. Recent theories focusing on solidarity suggest that social movement activism grows from pre-existing organisation, which can provide the setting, the solidarity, and the resources for sustained protest activity (Tilly, et al. 1975: 4-8). Kitschelt (1986) suggests that when several movements are active at the same time, this is often the best moment to maintain the momentum of a movement and to influence policy. This is similar to other research findings that suggest more people are likely to protest if they think expected numbers will be higher (Opp 1988; Klandermans 1984; Blumer 1969).

It is possible that social movements become a more common form used for the representation of interests in particular contexts due to previously successful social mobilisations (see Quadagno 1992). However, from the discussion in Chapter One it appears that the type of civil society development that occurs in new protectorates may affect the development of social movements more generally as well as the potential relationships between movements and other civil society actors. For example, Esteves, Motta and Cox (2009: 2) argue that, while some NGOs have successfully cooperated with movements, elements of civil society more frequently see their privileged access to funders and policy-makers under threat if they are associated with more critical groups. They go on to argue that aspects of civil society has "often colluded with the state and corporations in deligitimsing or

demonising them [critical groups], which can in turn easily mean cooperating in their criminalization and justifying the deployment of force" (Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009: 2).

Conclusion

The political opportunity framework outlined above is applied to the new protectorates of Kosovo and Afghanistan in Chapters Three and Five, which provide an assessment of how international actors may affect political opportunities in these states specifically. However, while it is possible to discover some of the political opportunities taken up by the case studies, it is not easy to discover all the alternative opportunities that may have been available (Amenta 2005; Valocchi 1993). Similarly, it may not be always be possible to speculate on missed opportunities (see Sawyers and Meyer 1999). There may also be cases where movements and SMOs may not be able, or want, to respond to certain opportunities (see Schock 2005; McAdam 1982). And even this already presumes that these opportunities are recognised in the first place. The perception of opportunities is, arguably, as important as the existence of the opportunities themselves (Suh 2001: 437; Kurzman 1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996). Thus, the political opportunity framework outlined above is not used as a set of variables in an effort to find a direct cause and effect relationship between opportunities and movement actions. Instead, the political opportunity framework is used to gain an insight into the influence of international actors on potential opportunities and provide an initial overview, on which more research can be carried out.

CHAPTER THREE: KOSOVO

This chapter assesses how the presence of international actors in Kosovo has shaped the context in which social movements function. I analyse the impact international actors have had upon the political opportunities available to movements. The chapter has been split into two sections, the first focuses on the post-conflict, pre-independence period from 1999 to early 2008. The second focuses on the period after independence was declared in 2008 until the beginning of 2015. Throughout both sections I assess the key actors involved and the events that took place with a view to providing an insight into the impact of these factors on the potential political opportunities for movements.

The first section provides an overview of how Kosovo became a new protectorate and the international actors involved. I take a closer look at the role of UNMIK as the largest feature of the international presence with the most extensive powers. Following this I consider the domestic elites that have emerged since the conflict and the role of the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG). I discuss the coherence of international actors, domestic elites, and the relationship between the two. The influence of international actors on democratic development is then discussed, particularly the conduct and outcome of elections, the rule of law and civil society development. These elements have been significantly shaped by international actors and are those most likely to impact upon political opportunities for movements.

In the second section of this chapter I consider the effects of independence on political opportunities. I provide an overview of the roles of the additional international actors present in Kosovo in the post-independence period, such as the International Civilian Office (ICO) and EULEX. I also briefly revisit the areas discussed in the first section and consider the changes within these areas, up until the end of 2014. This chapter draws on the extensive literature on Kosovo, as well as the new protectorate and political opportunity literature explored in Chapter One and Two, which has been applied to the specific context of Kosovo. The assessment of the influence of international actors and their impact on political opportunities provides the contextual overview for the analysis of Vetëvendosje in the following chapter.

Pre-independence period

International actors

A vast amount of literature has assessed the international presence in Kosovo, including those focused on the intervention (Phillips 2012; Gibbs 2009; Daadler and O'Hanlon 2000), UNMIK (Knudsen and Lausten 2006; Sörensen 2009; Hehir 2010; Zaum and Knaus 2012; Van Willigen 2013), the broader state-building effort and Kosovo's path to independence (Capussela 2015; Ker-Lindsay 2009; Weller 2009; Judah 2008), and the legitimacy of the international presence (see Yannis 2001, 2004; Chesterman 2005; Caplan 2005; Hehir 2006, 2007, 2009; King and Mason 2006; Narten 2008; Lemay-Hébert 2009, 2013). This literature highlights the extensive influence wielded by a variety of international actors involved in the new protectorate. Here, I clarify Kosovo's status as a new protectorate and provide an overview of the international actors involved and the coherence between them. This overview highlights the extensive powers international actors had in post-intervention Kosovo, as well as the range of areas in which they could impact upon political opportunities for movements.

Kosovo as a new protectorate

On March 24th 1999, a 78-day NATO intervention began, which intended to stop the persecution of the Albanian population within Kosovo by Yugoslav armed forces and Serbian police and Serb paramilitary forces. This intervention symbolised the shifts within Western policy-making, and it was the first time NATO used military force against a nation that did not pose a direct threat to a NATO member. After the intervention, UNSCR 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999, with 14 votes in favour and one abstention from China. After the intervention, Kosovo was technically a UN protectorate (Trix 2010). The resolution dictated that an international civil and security presence would be deployed in Kosovo under the auspices of the UN. UNSCR 1244 insisted on the withdrawal of Serbian forces and placed Kosovo under a transitional UN administration overseen by UNMIK (UNSC 1999), the first UN operation of its kind. UNMIK maintained authority over several executive functions until the declaration of independence in 2008.

UNMIK and KFOR, the NATO led international peacekeeping force, represented the largest among a plethora of international actors present in Kosovo after the intervention. Several specialised institutions were also present, such as the European Commission, the OSCE, the IMF, World Bank and several UN agencies, as well as embassies and consulates, development agencies and international NGOs. The presence of the international administration and the extensive involvement of largely Western international actors over nearly a decade means that Kosovo can be considered a new

protectorate, as defined in Chapter One. Such extensive influence by international actors over military and civilian aspects of post-intervention Kosovo resulted in a substantial impact on political opportunities available for movements.

International Community?

As outlined in Chapter One, international interventions are often presented as though they are carried out by and for the international community. This was the case with the intervention in Kosovo. Prior to the intervention, a major conference was held at Rambouillet, France, to try to establish a consensus on how to deal with the conflict. At the conference, the possibility of an intervention was opposed by several states, including China, Russia and India. The Indian ambassador to the UN was particularly vocal against an intervention and argued that despite the intervention being claimed as an act of the international community, it was clearly not representative given the amount of opposition (Nambiar 2000). The intervention was often presented as the international community rescuing the suffering Kosovar Albanians (Lindberg 2014) by bringing an end to "the humanitarian catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo" (NATO 1999). In a press statement the NATO secretary-general, Javier Solana, announced that NATO was taking action due to "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Government's refusal of the International Community's demands", and that the action was "intended to support the political aims of the international community" (NATO 1999).

The term 'international community' appeared regularly in documentary sources and interviews throughout the data collection process. The term seems to largely provide a convenient form of reference to the international actors more broadly, and the values and norms they are generally thought to promote. However, as Chapter One highlighted, the use of the term often refers to a narrow set of actors. This can be seen in Kosovo as the international actors found to have engaged in Kosovo were largely limited to those from the US, some Western European states and Turkey,[13] with little political activity visible from other states.[14] Actors from some states seem to be more active in certain sectors, either geographically or by policy area. For example, Norway is particularly interested

[13] Turkey's involvement in Kosovo stems from the strong historical and cultural links to the region. Turkey tends to engage less in the overtly political matters of the country, content with the approach of other influential states (Interview 18, 2014). Turkey co-operates with other states working in Kosovo, particularly with European states and the US, supporting the EU's work on a dialogue with Serbia and therefore do not pose a point of contention with the more influential actors present in Kosovo (Ibid).

[14] When interviewed, one embassy official commented that countries outside of the EU and the US do not even make public statements in Kosovo (Interview Six, 2014).

in civil society projects (Royal Norwegian Embassy in Prishtina 2014), whereas Turkey focuses on the promotion and restoration of cultural sites (Interview 18, 2014).

Due to Kosovo's geopolitical position within Europe, Western powers had incentives to ensure Kosovo's long-term stability. However, soon after the establishment of the new protectorate, several states, especially the US, were distracted by other crises developing elsewhere. The effects of 9/11, the threat of terrorism, and subsequent events in Iraq and Afghanistan, shifted international, and particularly Western attention away from Kosovo. Despite growing concerns elsewhere, the US and Western states continued to pour significant resources into Kosovo. This was, in part, because the credibility and legitimacy of the NATO intervention rested on the success of subsequent efforts to maintain security and ensure democratic development (Capussela 2015).

The US were publicly very supportive of the Kosovar cause in the build up to the intervention and was one of the most influential actors during and after. The US has been one of the biggest donors to Kosovo, contributing almost $2 billion to Kosovo's development since 1999 (Department of State n.d.). Support from the US takes a number of forms, including development projects led by USAID and advisers or consultants that are placed near ministers (Capussela 2011a: 57). As a result, the US and its ambassadors have maintained a significant level of influence over events in Kosovo (Lewis et al. 2014; Capussela 2011b).

Both UNMIK and KFOR were present as part of UNSCR 1244 but were guided by Western powers. This could be thought to assure some level of coherence between missions (see Capussela 2015; Knudsen and Lautsen 2006). However, the KFOR mission was NATO led and did not take orders from the UN. As noted in the political opportunity literature, levels of coherence or division among international actors may increase or constrain opportunities for movements, depending on the demands the movement makes. Chapter One highlighted that within new protectorates, the international actors involved generally agree on broadly defined goals, though each actor may have its own focus or methods of implementation. An interview with Robin Budd, Second Secretary at the British Embassy in Kosovo, highlights the extent to which he felt international actors collaborate in Kosovo:

> [The] international community shares common goals, when it comes to democracy and civil society development, but I would not go as far as to say [the] international community acts as one body (Interview Eight, 2014).

Despite the autonomy of some actors, the promotion of similar goals by a relatively small number of states involved in Kosovo suggests that it is possible to assume a broad consensus existed when considering political opportunities. Therefore additional opportunities were likely to arise for those organisations and movements with goals that align with those of international actors. However, those with opposing goals, or goals that were not of interest to international actors are likely to perceive fewer additional opportunities.

UNMIK

The main civilian responsibilities for state-building efforts lay with UNMIK. The mission's mandate was:

> to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic, self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo (Noutcheva 2012: 3).

To achieve UNMIK's mandate it helped to establish the PISG and to oversee its functions. Overall responsibility lay with the head of UNMIK, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), chosen by the UN Secretary-General. UNMIK was responsible for several key executive functions, including the UNMIK Police, the UNMIK Department of Justice and the UNMIK Civil Administration. In addition to this, UNMIK set out to support the reconstruction of infrastructure, to maintain civil law and order, promote human rights, assure the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and, coordinate humanitarian relief (UNSC 1999).

UNMIK consisted of four pillars that included the involvement of other international actors:

Pillar I:	Humanitarian Assistance, led by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)
Pillar II:	Civil Administration, under the UN
Pillar III:	Democratisation and Institution Building, led by the OSCE
Pillar IV:	Reconstruction and Economic Development, managed by the EU (UNSC 1999).

The first pillar was phased out at the end of June 2000 as the emergency phase was over and the majority of refugees had returned. This pillar then became responsible for rule of law (including UNMIK Police and the Department of Judicial Affairs). As part of the third pillar, the OSCE's mandate

involved building democracy, and promoting human rights and the rule of law. It was also responsible for institution building, including the Assembly, Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK), and the Kosovo Police force. The EU's remit included responsibility for the UNMIK customs service, the Kosovo Trust Agency, the Fiscal Affairs Office and the Central Banking Authority of Kosovo (Papadimitriou et al. 2007).

From the available information, it seems that initially UNMIK was generally welcomed by the public and the Kosovar elite (Egleder 2012: 281; Lemay-Hébert 2009; UNDP 2004), and was viewed as an extension of the international force that intervened in Kosovo. A survey of Kosovars conducted by the UNDP (2004) showed that 63.8% were satisfied with UNMIK in November 2002. However, political opportunities were quite constrained during the first few years of UNMIK's presence as UNMIK itself was fairly closed and so the channels available to influence UNMIK's decision-making were limited. USAID reported that UNMIK was viewed as being particularly unaccountable and unresponsive to NGOs (USAID 2003, 2004, 2005). This is important in regard of political opportunities as UNMIK was viewed as the most powerful body at the time, while other actors were perceived to have low levels of influence (UNDP 2004). Only 25% perceived the PISG, political parties and civil society as having the power to effect the political situation (UNDP 2004). This suggests that political parties and civil society are unlikely to have been perceived (whether this is accurate or not, the perception is important) as effective channels for movements to utilise.

Five years after the NATO intervention Kosovo continued to struggle with a number of problematic issues. Infrastructure was still poor in many parts of the country, economically it was still donor dependent and reliant on remittances, corruption was rife, trafficking was a concern, unemployment remained around 45%, and there were occasional attacks on Serbs (see Kostić et al. 2012). The lack of progress in Kosovo was largely attributed to UNMIK (Lemay-Hébert 2009; King and Mason 2006). Surveys showed that satisfaction with the functioning of UNMIK, the SRSG and the Assembly was decreasing, there was also dissatisfaction with the government, though to a lesser extent (Lemay-Hébert 2009; Hyseni et al. 2007b; UNDP 2004). Satisfaction with UNMIK had plummeted by almost 40% between November 2002 and March 2004, and UNMIK was now being referred to as 'UNMIKistan' by some (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 69). In the 2004 survey, over half of the respondents (60%) across ethnicities, perceived UNMIK as responsible for the political situation.[15]

[15] Several UNMIK policies were unpopular with parts of the Kosovar Albanian population. For example, the introduction of eight new municipalities within Kosovo were created, three of which contained an ethnic Serb majority (Gračanica, Klokot-Vrbovac and Ranilug).

At the same time, the future status of Kosovo was a key concern for Kosovar elites and the public. 'Uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo' was considered one of the top three problems in Kosovo, across ethnicities (UNDP 2004). UNMIK had yet to address the issue of Kosovo's future status, despite UNSCR 1244 stating that the international civil presence will facilitate a political process to deal with Kosovo's future status (UNSC 1999). UNMIK had set out eight standards that provided a vision for a democratic Kosovo that included a stable political system and market economy. These standards were introduced in 2002 and had to be met before the status issue would be tackled. Many Kosovar Albanians were unhappy that the plan lacked clear steps and a time frame for the resolution of Kosovo's status, fearing that Kosovo's independence was being postponed permanently (Freedom House 2004). Capussela (2015: 34) claims that while international actors attempted to separate their efforts to state-build from the issue of statehood, the Kosovar public and elite eventually perceived UNMIK's mandate as an obstacle to gaining independence for Kosovo.

There have been a number of assessments of UNMIK's effectiveness and role in Kosovo (see Capussela 2015; Tansey 2009; King and Mason 2006), many of which have suggested that UNMIK was not a transparent or accountable institution (Pugh 2006; Visoka 2012). The real and/or perceived failings of UNMIK raised questions regarding the legitimacy of UNMIK's continued presence in Kosovo, an issue that often arises for international actors post-intervention (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 65). Lemay-Hébert (2009: 65) argues that in Kosovo, as occurs in other territories with international administrations, UNMIK attempted "to create the conditions for its own legitimacy, portraying the state-building process as exogenous to the local society." Lemay-Hébert argues that this sets the scene for a "popular backlash against foreign rule" and creates a "legitimacy dilemma" for the international administrators (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 66). Several scholars have argued that international actors did fear a violent backlash and attacks by Albanians, who the international community had set out to help, would have been particularly damaging to the credibility and the legitimacy of the mission (Capussela 2015; Cunliffe 2011: 37, 51-70).

The feared backlash came in the form of riots which broke out in March 2004, during which around 4,500 people were displaced, nearly 900 were injured and 19 died (ICG 2004). Some rioters targeted the UN by throwing rocks at UN buildings, burning UN flags and damaging the UN's 4x4s (King and Mason 2006). Serbian, Ashkali and Roma homes were attacked and public buildings and cultural sites were damaged. The recurring explanation from among analysts at the time was that the riots were the result of ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians, while problems with UNMIK were just a side-line issue (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 71). However, Lemay-Hébert (2009: 71) argues that this was a

simplistic explanation which ignored the dissatisfaction and distrust of UNMIK felt by both Serbs and Albanians. The riots signified the most prominent demonstration of dissatisfaction with the presence of international actors. This very public dissatisfaction was likely to open up opportunities for those movements and organisations that wanted to make demands in opposition to the current situation, including issues surrounding UNMIK, the international presence, poor economic development, and Kosovo's unresolved status.

The riots triggered a significant shift in events in Kosovo, and in the approach taken by international actors. The riots demonstrated that KFOR and UNMIK were not in complete control, and were unable to fully enforce law and order (Capussela 2015; Kostić et al. 2012). International actors began to reassess the current framework concerning Kosovo's status. Norwegian diplomat and UN Special Envoy, Kai Eide, was sent to Kosovo to assess the situation and recommended that the process of determining Kosovo's status should begin. The status process continued to dominate much of the political debate in Kosovo until independence was declared in 2008.

Domestic elites

As outlined in Chapter Two, domestic elites play an important role in new protectorates. The relationship they have with international actors is usually a significant factor in the transition to a democratic state (Tansey 2009). Here, I outline the domestic elites present in the pre-independence period and their relationship with international actors. This relationship was tense due to the desire of domestic elites to deal with the issue of Kosovo's status. Kosovo was not a state when the international intervention took place but many of those in the Kosovo elite, as well as the wider population, had called for independence long before the intervention. Given the dominance of the status issue during the pre-independence period, I will first briefly outline the efforts to gain independence prior to the conflict. This provides a useful insight into Kosovo's post-intervention political elite and allows for a more thorough consideration of the context and the political opportunities available post intervention.

Independence struggle

The last century of Kosovar Albanians' political history has been dominated by efforts to gain independence from Serbia, either as an autonomous state or by becoming part of Albania.[16] The area

[16] Modern Albanian nationalism was conceived in a political organisation known as The League for the Defence of the Rights of the Albanian Nation (commonly known as the League of Prizren) founded in 1878. The organisation aimed to unify areas

that is now known as Kosovo was ceded by the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Some of Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbia and the rest was part of the Kingdom of Montenegro. It was at this time that what could be considered a Kosovar consciousness began to develop. After the First World War, Kosovo was part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The 1920s saw the start of human rights violations against Albanians and some responded with a guerrilla war (Malcolm 1998; Bennett 1995). From 1945, Kosovo was a province within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), along with the province of Vojvodina and six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia). This was the first time Kosovo formed any kind of separate administrative unit though Albanians were still resistant to being incorporated into this state and in 1945 the Yugoslav army put a stop to a mass armed Albanian uprising.[17]

Demonstrations by Kosovar Albanians against the authorities were a common tactic, and were often met with repression. Protests demanding better living conditions and increased levels of autonomy took place throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (Bennett 1995: 71).[18] The authorities' response to the protests were often harsh, though some long-term improvements eventually materialised to try and win over Albanians.[19] Tito made efforts to rebalance ethnicities within the administrative structures in Kosovo, but the small number of those with power lacked experience and the province continued to struggle economically (Bennett 1995). In 1974, a new federal constitution gave Kosovo more autonomy. By the time of Tito's death in 1980, Kosovo was 80% Albanian (Vickers 1998). His death marked a further increase in separatist pressures from Albanians and tensions between Serbs and Albanians within Kosovo.

As of the 1980s, Kosovo was a very poor province and had a high level of illiteracy and unemployed but highly educated graduates (Mertus 1999). Activities at the University of Pristina led to the creation

inhabited by Albanians into an autonomous area within the Ottoman Empire. The concept of a Greater Albania was developed during the Nazi and Italian Occupation of the Balkans in the Second World War.

[17] Initially, little effort was made by Tito (1953-1980) to integrate Albanians into a wider Yugoslav society, and the Serb-dominated secret police and security services were allowed to maintain order in Kosovo (Bennett 1995: 71). Tito did attempt to encourage a kind of overarching Yugoslav patriotism, although this was not entirely successful at overriding existing local ethnic associations or pre-existing myths. At the time Montenegrins and Serbs dominated the security forces and administrative aspects of the SFRY. Up until 1965, most areas in Yugoslavia had gone through a period of repression, although it tended to be worse in Kosovo (Kaldor 2013).

[18] For more on the various protests see Kostovicova (2005), Mertus (1999), and Bennett (1995).

[19] The University of Pristina was established in 1969, the use of Albanian texts, language and literature were permitted, and Albanian became an official language along with Serbo-Croat, which resulted in a rediscovery of Albanian national identity.

of networks that initiated large student protests in 1981 (Kostovicova 2005; Mertus 1999).[20] In 1988 the Albanian leadership in Kosovo was replaced by Milosevic, who limited Kosovo's autonomy (O'Neil 2002). It also led to demonstrations, a general strike and a hunger strike by miners. Events commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo saw more than a million Serbs present in Kosovo to celebrate (Bennett 1995: 100), sparking further protests by Albanians. In 1989, a new political party was formed. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova, focused on opposing the loss of Kosovo's autonomy. Within a few months of its formation, the LDK had 700,000 members, which was most of the adult population of Kosovo.

There were fatal protests and riots in Kosovo in January 1990. The federal army responded and a state of emergency was imposed for three days (Kola 2003). The following year, Albanian lecturers and teachers refused to accept Belgrade's changes to the curriculum (Bennett 1995: 216). In response, Milosevic's new leadership in Kosovo resigned, which was followed by huge rallies in Belgrade. A state of emergency was imposed again and the military moved into Kosovo. The Kosovo Assembly, surrounded by tanks and planes, was coerced into accepting a new constitution giving authority to Serbia. There were claims that the ballot in parliament was fraudulent (Bennett 1995), and Albanians rejected the constitution and boycotted parliament. Policies of repression and discrimination continued for several years and existing traditions of coexistence and acceptance had been ruined and contributed to the alienation of Albanians from Serbia.

In September 1991 the Provincial Assembly in Kosovo held an independence referendum which saw 99% of the 87% turnout voting in favour of independence, but it was boycotted by the Serbian population (DD 2010). The only UN member state to recognise the declaration was Albania. Ibrahim Rugova became the first President of the still unrecognised, Republic of Kosovo. Rugova continued to oppose the loss of Kosovo's autonomy and set up parallel institutions, including healthcare and education systems for ethnic Albanians.[21] Throughout the 1990s, Rugova rejected any negotiations with the Serb authorities which did not directly discuss outright independence. His non-violent approach had been very popular, particularly as Kosovars had seen the violence in Croatia and Bosnia and did not want to face a similar situation in Kosovo. However, tensions worsened in 1995 after the

[20] These protests signified the first time the Yugoslav authorities had positioned themselves on a particular side of a dispute between authorities within the SFRY. Serbs were allowed to intervene in Kosovo with the support of the Communist League of Yugoslavia (LCY), giving them control over the province (Bennett 1995: 90).

[21] Serbs had denied Albanians access to school and university but the parallel educational system was set up with students using makeshift classrooms in shops, houses and cellars as a part of a defiant refusal to accept Belgrade's control over Kosovar education (Kostovičová 2001).

announcement of the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, known as the Dayton Accords. These were facilitated by the Contact Group, an informal group comprised of the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, that was concerned with policy developments in the Balkans. Kosovar Albanians felt their voices were not heard at the Bosnian peace talks and they were shocked by an outcome that left them with no relief from Serbian oppression (Garton Ash 2000). Rugova's nonviolent and peaceful approach was perceived to be making little progress and support for his approach began to diminish. Several alternative solutions to the crisis were put forward, and the more radical and violent approach of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was gaining ground.

The KLA, are thought to have been formed in 1994 (Kostić et al. 2012) by former Enverists (Marxist-Leninist supporters of the communist leader of Albania in the 1970s and 1980s, Enver Hoxha). The KLA became more prominent after it carried out violent attacks on Croatian Serb refugee camps and police forces in 1996 (Kaufman 2002; O'Neil 2002). In 1997, the Albanian government collapsed and armouries were abandoned, which led to a sudden, large influx of weapons into Kosovo, allowing the KLA to increase attacks on Serb targets. The conflict escalated in 1998, particularly between the Serbian police force and the KLA. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) launched military attacks against entire villages in Kosovo in response to KLA military operations which led to the displacement of tens of thousands (Weller 1999). The KLA were considered 'terrorists' by some[22] but they eventually managed to gain Western support, particularly from the US (Fulton 2010).

Increased mobilisation of the KLA, the deaths of key figures within the separatist movement, further acts of violence by Serbian police and the displacement of an increasing number of Kosovar Albanians set the context for the wider conflict between the Serbs and the KLA (Judah 2008). It was at this point that the conflict became more internationalised with input from organisations such as the UN, the OSCE and NATO. NGOs, such as USAID and International Crisis Group, also became involved and focused on human rights or improvements in education, health care, and the media (Troebst 1998). By this time, the KLA's approach began to be eclipse Rugova's. In 1999, the KLA's political chief, Hashim Thaçi was chosen by the underground Kosovo Assembly, to head the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team in discussions over the aborted peace accords known as the Rambouillet Agreement.

After the war Kosovar elites largely consisted of those who had continued to support the LDK and Rugova's policies in the run up to war, and former KLA members, from both its military and political

[22] Such as the US Special envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard (BBC News 1998). The KLA had also appeared on the US list of terrorist organisations (Fulton 2010).

wings. The elite was divided, not along left and right lines, but on their stance towards the conflict and independence. The history of the independence struggle, which included a long period of institutional boycotts and conflict with Serbia, highlights how Kosovo's political elite emerged from a communist political system in a different way to its regional neighbours. Despite the major differences in the pre- and post-1989 elite, the most prominent theme was the struggle for independence.

Independence was also a very important issue to the general public, as shown by the history of demonstrations in the face of repression. The long history of movements and political organisations working towards Albanian independence, such as the League of Prizren, the National Liberation Movement, and the Democratic Front of Albania, may have presented future movements with some opportunities, by serving as a delayed demonstration effect for other movements (see Kurzman 1998; Kitschelt 1986), particularly those addressing the issue of independence.

Provisional institutions of self-government

In 1998, Ibrahim Rugova began a second term as President but lived in exile in Rome in 1999. He returned to Kosovo in 2000 and agreed, with international actors, to work on the creation of the PISG, along with Hashim Thaçi, the former KLA commander who had been leading the provisional government. The PISG was designed to fulfil the requirements of a parliamentary republic and included a non-executive president, a government and an elected parliament. The PISG included the Assembly of Kosovo, the Government of Kosovo, and the Judicial System. Initially these institutions only had responsibility over social and economic issues. UNMIK maintained a veto over any decisions made by the PISG and kept the most significant responsibilities, including the judiciary and constitutional system, and extensive legislative authority. UNSCR 1244 mandated that UNMIK gradually transfer part of its legislative and executive powers to the PISG. The SRSG could stop attempts by the PISG to go beyond its remit as defined by the Constitutional framework, which still included the issue of Kosovo's future status (ICG 2001). Interactions between international and domestic actors were inevitably complex, as responsibilities were shared between UNMIK and the PISG, creating, in effect, a dual system of governance (Capussela 2015: 34; Freedom House 2005, 2004). Capussela (2015: 34) argues that this "confused political accountability and led to increasingly less responsive government by the PISG." Others have suggested that communication between the PISG and UNMIK was often lacking and that the system created tension (Freedom House 2004).

By 2004, many of the responsibilities and competencies were transferred from UNMIK to the PISG. Despite this transfer, when surveyed, 59% of Albanians and 45% of non-Serb minority communities

thought that less than half or none of the competencies had been transferred. In contrast, 56% of Serbs in Kosovo thought that more than half or all competencies had been transferred. This demonstrates that it may have been difficult to establish which body was responsible for certain issues, and that international actors were extremely influential during the pre-independence period. The confusion over where responsibilities lay and the unresponsive nature of the PISG is likely to have constrained opportunities for movements and CSOs by limiting the availability and effectiveness of domestic allies and potential channels through which to influence elites.

For the majority of the pre-independence period, the PISG had quite restricted powers and therefore a low capacity to develop policy independently of the executive, which at this time was the SRSG. Capussela (2015: 43) argues that the PISG were largely ineffective due to the legislative and hierarchical powers of the SRSG. He also argues that the SRSG tried to avoid any conflict with domestic elites. The PISG did approve some laws but it has been suggested that it was not effective at implementing them (Freedom House 2006). An increased capacity for the legislature to develop policy independently of the executive is expected to increase opportunities because an electorally accountable legislature should be more sensitive to public demands (Kitschelt 1986). Despite an electorally accountable legislature, the limited powers held by the PISG throughout much of pre-independence period suggests that the PISG would not have been more sensitive to public demands. International actors were also not particularly sensitive to public demands (with the exception of the post-riot response). Despite the increasing shift in powers from UNMIK to the PISG, there were still few political opportunities available.

The relationship between international actors and domestic elites

Former KLA members formed a significant part of the elite in the post-intervention period and international actors chose to work with those from both its military and political wings. After the intervention, one of KFOR's main tasks was to disband and resettle around 10,000 KLA fighters. It was formally disbanded, and many former KLA members were employed in the police and civil protection corps. However, rather than disarming the KLA fully, a non-aggression pact (see Phillips 2012: 116-17, 203-4) was agreed, which Capussela (2015: 34-36) argues was one of the major policy choices that negatively affected the international administration's abilities to fulfil long-term state-building goals and demonstrates the prioritisation of short-term stability. He also argues that the lack of even a gradual disarmament led to the appeasement of the elite and that many largely autonomous groups that had been part of the KLA were mostly intact, "under the command of leaders who entered politics, business or organized crime" (Capussela 2015: 34). As a result, the international

administration was without a monopoly on the use of force[23] and an elite emerged that possessed the threat of a violent reaction to reforms that may damage their own interests, fuelling the fear of a violent backlash (Capussela 2015; Freedom House 2008, 2007).[24]

Broadly, it seems that the majority of the domestic political elite were keen to work with international actors and saw Western support for Kosovo as an essential step towards gaining independence. Capussela (2015: 34) argues that the goals of international actors were also broadly in line with what the public wanted, particularly given the situation in Kosovo prior to the intervention. The majority of Kosovars did welcome the NATO intervention, and a legacy of gratitude remained for years after the intervention and still exists to a certain extent. This gratitude was closely associated with those leaders who were most proactive in advocating the Kosovar Albanian cause. In the capital, Pristina, there is a statue of Bill Clinton and streets named after George Bush, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair.[25] President Hashim Thaçi has stated that "Kosovo is one of the most pro-American nations on earth" (Thaçi 2014) and he called Tony Blair a "political giant," that "all of us in Kosovo owe him and the British people a considerable debt" (Thaçi 2010).

The complex sharing of responsibilities between domestic and international elites, and the public appearance of domestic support for international actors could both create and constrain opportunities, depending on a movement's or CSO's demands. It is difficult to establish the levels of coherence between international and domestic elites across all issues but it does seem that it would have been difficult for movements to establish where responsibilities lay within the complex system of dual governance. The nature of the system of governance and uncertainty of the status issue suggests that the political system was quite closed resulting in fewer opportunities to influence the

[23] A monopoly on the use of force is considered a key tenant of a functioning state. Although Kosovo was not a internationally recognised independent state at this point, the international administration had a remit covering a set territory and held the responsibility of creating a functional system of self-governance.

[24] Capussela (2015) believes that international actors did have other options, as the social order and elite were not yet set in stone and could have been more malleable, given that there were other forces both inside and outside of the country that could have helped to contain negative reactions to widening economic and political competition. At this time NATO was still heavily present, and Kosovo was economically and politically (in terms of gaining independence) dependent on the international community acting favourably towards it.

[25] Tony Blair visited Pristina in July 2010 and was welcomed by a crowd of several thousand. A few parents decided to name their sons after Tony Blair, giving them the first name Tonibler. As Borger (2014b) states "[i]t is not exactly a mass phenomenon, but it is the embodiment of one."

political process. However, elements of the elite were frustrated with Kosovo's progress and divisions between international actors and domestic elites may have provided potential political allies.

Status negotiations

The negotiations over Kosovo's future status were a key development in the pre-independence era, which saw strong collaboration between international and domestic actors, and had a significant impact on political opportunities. The long period of Kosovo's undetermined status provoked uncertainty in Kosovo and exacerbated the difficulties of post-conflict reconstruction (Chesterman 2002: 3). It was difficult for several international organisations to work as effectively as they might have done if Kosovo's status had been clarified. For example, Kosovo could not have full membership of certain international organisations due to its lack of statehood, and so organisations like the IMF and the Council of Europe (COE) could only work with Kosovo in an advisory capacity (Interview 15, 2014; Interview 17, 2014). Some organisations included member states who disagreed with the principle of independence for Kosovo which meant the organisation as a whole, could not comment on the status issue. Even the OSCE and the UN had to remain neutral on the issue (Interview Five, 2014; Interview Seven, 2014).

The UN Security Council endorsed the conclusions of Kai Eide's report and negotiations on Kosovo's status started in February 2006 in Vienna. These negotiations involved Serbia and Kosovo, and were facilitated by international actors, led by UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari. The negotiators on the Kosovo side, known as the Unity Team, consisted of five members, proposed by Rugova. Several sources suggest that the work of the Unity Team was not very open to the public and it received criticism in Parliament for its undemocratic structure, secrecy and concessions (Freedom House 2007).

A range of technical issues were discussed alongside the status issue, such as economic issues, property rights, the protection of Serbian Orthodox churches, decentralisation, and institutional guarantees for the rights of minorities (see Foniqi-Kabashi 2006). Decentralisation was a particularly sensitive issue. Serbia demanded that Kosovo Serb communities should have close ties between each other and Serbia and that Serb communities should receive direct funding from Serbia rather than via the Kosovo government. The Kosovar Albanian negotiators believed that this scenario could be politicised and were fearful of a similar situation to post-conflict Bosnia (Freedom House 2007).

After a year of negotiations, in March 2007, Ahtisaari's draft status settlement proposed a 'supervised independence' (Ker-Lindsey 2009; Weller 2009, 1999). It is thought, by some, that most Kosovar

Albanian politicians thought the draft proposal, the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (also known as the Ahtisaari Plan) was a reasonable deal (Garton Ash 2007). However, the Ahtisaari Proposal was rejected by the UN Security Council and Serbia, and new talks were proposed.

During the negotiation period, the economy remained poor, many were unemployed, civil society was weak, and the status issue appears to have trumped all other developments. Berisha (2011: 40) argues that the Kosovar leadership were focused on gaining independence and that dissent against the government was stifled and it deflected responsibility in the run up to independence. Berisha states that "the prevailing sentiment was to keep silent on any discontent that would avoid jeopardising Kosovo's awaited independence, which relied on international support" (Berisha 2011:40). This context constrained political opportunities, particularly for making demands on issues that were not directly related to the status issue. For those movements concerned with the issue of Kosovo's future status, the potential for political opportunities appears mixed. These movements may have benefited from the general consensus on independence, although there were divisions over the approach to the negotiations and what to do after the negotiations failed. This limited division among the elite may have provided some opportunities in the form of allies and a platform on which to air their demands. The effects of the status issue on civil society more broadly are considered below.

Democratic development

The establishment of liberal democracy was one of the primary aims for the international actors involved, as found in other new protectorates (see Chapter One). The previous sections have discussed the establishment of democratic institutions and the governance of Kosovo by UNMIK and the PISG. Here, I will consider the conduct and outcome of elections, followed by a broad overview of the some of the aspects of international involvement that have the potential to facilitate or repress movement activity, including the rule of law, and civil society development. This provides a further insight into the international actors' impact on political opportunities, particularly in the areas of facilitation and repression.

Electoral politics

One key aspect of democratic development that international actors were heavily involved in, was the establishment of elections. Electoral politics can affect the political opportunities available in a number of ways, as outlined in Chapter Two. The conduct and outcome of elections can be demonstrative of the capacity for competition for elite status and the ability to participate in political opposition. The greater these capacities, the more open and responsive regimes are expected to be

and are then more likely to assimilate or allow the broad presence of movements (Kitschelt 1986: 62). It is also possible that when these capacities are lower, movements may be galvanised into action (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1634). Movements may also find potential allies as a result of the electoral process and find opportunities where there is division among candidates or representatives (Tarrow 1998; Banks 2007). The conduct and outcome of the elections in Kosovo during the pre-independence period will be analysed here with a view to establishing the impact on political opportunities.

The first municipal elections took place in October 2001, over two and a half years after the intervention. These were followed by the first national elections in November 2001. The ICG (2001) considered the elections to be a landmark for post-conflict Kosovo. They gave some legitimacy to the Albanian population and altered the political landscape and the relationship between international actors and domestic elites. There had been some violence at the first municipal elections, but the conduct during the 2001 national elections was seen as an improvement (ICG 2001). All the elections pre-independence were managed by the OSCE's Department of Elections according to regulations set by the OSCE and UNMIK.

Those putting candidates forward are referred to as 'entities' and include political parties, coalitions, independent candidates and citizen's initiatives. A citizen's initiative is "a group of persons who voluntarily associate on the basis of a common idea, interest or viewpoint with the objective of having their candidates elected, but who do not wish to form a political party" (OSCE 2001). The rules state that each application must have 1,000 signatures from eligible voters along with a fee of 2,000 Deutsche Marks (the currency used until 2000 when the euro was introduced, equating to around £1,000), which is refunded if at least one seat is won. There are 120 seats in the Assembly and applicants must state if they intend to compete for any of the 20 seats reserved for minority communities, 10 for Serbs (designed to encourage participation from the Serb community after a boycott of the first municipal elections) and 10 for Roma, Ashkaeli, Egyptian, Bosniak, Turkish and Gorani.

Twenty-six political entities met the requirements set by Central Election Commission (CEC) (a body comprising of Kosovars and led by the head of the OSCE's mission) and were certified to take part in the election by the OSCE. There were a number of entities attempting to gain the reserved seats, such as the Civic Initiative of Gora, the Democratic Ashkali Party of Kosovo and the United Roma Party of Kosovo. It is argued that the higher the number of political parties, groups and factions that can

effectively engage and put forward ideas, will increase political opportunities (Tarrow 1998; Banks 2007). Given that 26 entities stood in the elections and the representation of minorities was ensured by the allocation of 20 seats, an increase in opportunities for movements is likely. This is particularly likely given that Kosovo had not had its own institutions for very long at this point.

Despite the large number of entities participating in the elections, it appears that there was little to distinguish the three main parties from each other. This will have resulted in potentially fewer opportunities for movements which would usually benefit from a fragmented political elite (Goldstone 2001, 1994). The majority of Albanians voted for three parties, the LDK, PDK and AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo). The LDK,[26] founded by former President Ibrahim Rugova, has stuck with similar policies since it was founded and it is generally considered to be on the centre-right (Balkan Insight 2010). The party's electoral base is largely urban, and in the 2001 elections it received 46.3% of the vote, double that of its closest rival, the PDK.

The PDK[27] received 22.5% of the vote in 2001. The party was founded by several former commanders of the political wing of the KLA in May 1999. Support for the PDK is largely from rural areas, particular the Drenica area in central Kosovo (Balkan Insight 2010). In its early stages the PDK was said to have some socialist tendencies, but now, as with most other parties, it positions itself on the centre right (Balkan Insight 2010). The AAK party placed third in the 2001 election,[28] receiving 7.8% of the vote, making it the smallest of the three parties. It was formed in 2000, and led by Ramush Haradinaj, another former KLA commander. The party's electoral base has remained in the west of the country, where Haradinaj is from, and is also considered to be on the centre-right (Balkan Insight 2010).

The electoral system in Kosovo makes it very unlikely that a single party would be able to govern and each election has resulted in a coalition of some kind. In 2001 a coalition was formed between the LDK and the PDK. Rugova was finally appointed President at the fourth attempt after lengthy political negotiations, and international pressure (Freedom House 2005). Rugova continued to campaign for Kosovo's independence but he insisted that this was to be done peacefully and under the agreement of all parties. He also pursued a policy of close relations with the US and the EU. As the three main parties are all considered to be on the centre-right, the main difference between them is linked to

[26] For more on the LDK see KIPRED (2012: 20-24); IKS (2011: 23-34, 70-71); Sörensen (2009: 139-46).

[27] The PDK changed its name from the Party for the Democratic Progress of Kosovo in May 2000. For more on the PDK see KIPRED (2012: 18-20); IKS (2011: 35-43, 73-74).

[28] For more on the AAK see KIPRED (2012: 27-29); IKS (2011: 44-46, 74-75).

how they approached the conflict with Serbia. The LDK had supported a non-violent approach in contrast to those parties emerging from the former KLA leadership.

The main feature of the 2004 election was the emergence of five new political parties, a large number of independent candidates and the dissolution of some minority coalitions. The newest party, gaining the most votes, was the Civic List ORA, founded by civil society activists. It gained 6.2% of the vote and seven seats, but failed to pass the five percent threshold required to win seats at the following election. Of the 32 political parties and independent candidates that participated in the Assembly elections, 19 won seats, including ten parties occupying regular seats and nine minority parties contesting for the reserved seats (Freedom House 2005). The LDK won the most votes again (45.4%), the PDK placed second (28.9%) and the AAK third (8.3%). Rugova attempted to incorporate supporters of the former KLA into the government and in November 2004 he appointed the AAK leader Ramush Hardinaj as Prime Minister.[29]

The organisation of the 2004 elections saw more involvement from Kosovar bodies and the OSCE took a more advisory role (Freedom House 2005). These elections experienced less interference from international actors when it came to establishing a government than in the 2001 election (Freedom House 2006). The most prominent issues during the election were wide-ranging and included employment, healthcare, agriculture, good governance and anticorruption (Freedom House 2005). After the election in 2005, the first real opposition was formed in Parliament, which seemed to revive parliament, "raising the level of dialogue in institutions and society in general" (Freedom House 2006). However, representatives within the opposition did frequently walk out (Freedom House 2006). The increased number of entities in parliament and the establishment of a clear opposition opens up opportunities due to the increased fragmentation and capacities for opposition to function.

In 2005, Rugova escaped an assassination attempt when a bomb exploded in a waste container as his car drove by in 2005. However, he died soon after in January 2006 of lung cancer. Rugova's death had major effects on the unity within the LDK (Freedom House 2006), which led to a "tumultuous and periodically violent" electoral process for new leadership (Freedom House 2007). Also during this period, the negotiations on status were taking place and the prospects of independence seemed more assured. The political discourse in Kosovo appears to have broadened with some new influences such

[29] Hardinaj only stayed in the position for four months as he was indicted for war crimes by the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia). Agim Ceku took his place and Haradinaj was later acquitted in 2008, returning to a 'hero's welcome'. He faced a retrial in July 2000 which took two years and led to a second acquittal.

as that of Behgjet Pacolli. Pacolli, an ethnic Albanian millionaire who was founder and President of a Swiss based construction and civil engineering company, invested heavily in Kosovo and started a new party, the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR) in March 2006. The party took 12% of the votes in the November 2007 elections, taking third place (though this early success was short lived and the AKR failed to make the 5% threshold at the following elections). The party was considered to be ideologically liberal and to occupy the centre.

The 2007 elections saw another new party emerge - the SLS (Independent Liberal Party), formed in 2006, and the largest party representing Serbs in Kosovo, winning five Assembly seats. These new entities were contributing to the gradually broadening political spectrum of entities that were gaining seats at elections. Ninety-seven entities took part in the 2007 elections and the PDK won the elections for the first time receiving 34.3% of the vote. The party leader, Hashim Thaçi, the former political leader of the KLA, formed a coalition with the LDK, which had won 22.6% of the vote. The SLS also became part of a coalition with the PDK and had two cabinet ministers. The SLS also held the mayoral positions in three Serb-majority areas (Balkan Insight 2010). A Freedom House (2007) report suggests that although there was a stable government in 2007, this was not due to stable structures but due to pressure from international actors, particularly the US and the EU. The consensus that seemed to have been reached between parties was mostly likely down to the ongoing status talks (Freedom House 2007).

Even without the somewhat enforced consensus among domestic elites and the ongoing status talks, the domestic political elite were ideologically very similar. The majority of political parties in Kosovo lacked strong ideological positions, and 90% of those in the Kosovo Albanian political elite claim to be on the centre right (Democracy for Development 2014; Anderson 2010: 3). This lack of fragmentation and the lack of parties from the rest of the political spectrum suggests that movements with alternative demands are likely to see their opportunities constrained. While those movements with a centre-right or similar stance to political parties and those in government may perceive an increase in opportunities.

The influence of international actors in the political process, and the consensus politics for the sake of the negotiation process is likely to have constrained political opportunities for movements. These factors appear to virtually negate the outcome of the elections in relation to movement opportunities. International actors played a significant role in the conduct of elections but it is also evident that certain international actors had some influence over the resulting coalition formation between parties

in the aftermath of elections. Alongside the international influence, there were a number of domestic factors that also influenced the outcome of elections. It is widely acknowledged that patronage and the influence of local ties, regionally and by clan (known as *fis*) tend to dominate electoral politics in Kosovo (Freedom House 2011; Sörensen 2009). Most parties tend to focus on a small number of leaders, and Capussela (2015: 45) argues that most parties were lacking internal democracy and "resembled personal fiefdoms or aggregations of personal clienteles" (Capussela 2015: 46; see Sörensen 2009; Džihić and Kramer 2009; Montanaro 2009).

It seems that the public became quickly dissatisfied with the PISG (Capussela 2015: 45) and participation in elections declined quite rapidly. Reports[30] state that turnout was 80% in 2000, 54% in 2004 and down to 37% by 2007 (IKS 2011; Freedom House 2005). Capussela (2015: 45) argues that this is "an eloquent sign of how ingrained the citizens' distrust of those institutions had become." Freedom House (2006) has suggested that voter turnout is lower because "[p]olitical parties have a limited ability to communicate distinct policies to voters, and the election system fails to produce choices based on individual or local interests." These factors also serve to limit political opportunities.

As late as 2006, Kosovo still did not have an electoral law and the issue of electoral reform was the subject of public debate. Civil society activists raised a number of concerns over the effects of proportional voting, such as poor accountability of assembly members to their constituents and the overrepresentation of minorities with 20 reserved seats. The system of closed lists was also criticised for narrowing voters' choices to three or four significant parties (Freedom House 2007). Prior to the October 2004 elections, civil society activists formed an umbrella group called Reforma, advocating for open party lists that identify each party's candidates. However, the campaign started long after Kosovo's political parties had successfully pressured UNMIK to approve a proportional voting system with close lists. Later, international organisations, such as International Crisis Group, also joined the advocacy of open lists (Freedom House 2006). Some complained that the OSCE and UNMIK failed to engage aspects of civil society in discussions on the electoral system (Freedom House 2007). Eventually open lists were adopted as well as some other reforms in 2007 (Freedom House 2007). This campaign for electoral reform highlights the nature of the relationship between international actors and domestic elites, as well as the lack of responsiveness by both to civil society.

[30] Capussela (2015: 45) advises caution when considering these reports and states that the voter register was inflated and that it continues to be.

Overall, the elections in Kosovo during the pre-independence period show the ability to participate in political opposition, demonstrated by the broad range of groups standing in the elections. However, the number of groups and factions that could effectively engage appears to have been fairly limited. As explained earlier, the majority of elites, including those who were elected, stood on conservative, centre-right platforms and the fragmentation amongst elites was fairly low. This is likely to limit opportunities, particularly for left-leaning movements or those putting forward alternative demands to those elected. Movements are likely to experience different outcomes regarding the potential for allies and opposition within the political elite depending on their demands. Though opposition politics improved in 2005 it was not long before the status talks dominated the political discourse for the two years preceding independence limiting opportunities to present other issues.

Movement facilitation?

Along with the conduct of elections, international actors had significant influence over a number of broad areas that could facilitate or inhibit and repress social movement activity. These broad areas are important to consider as there are no signs that international actors tried to facilitate movements directly. Generally, during the pre-independence period the institutional rules that could facilitate a movement's access to the public sphere and the political decision-making process (Kitschelt 1986) were still being developed. Particularly in the early years of the new protectorate, there were few institutional rules that would facilitate movements. Although a large number of laws were passed that may have been favourable to social movement activity, many were not implemented or used effectively. For example the Law on Access to Information was approved by the assembly in 2003. In 2005, the implementation of the law was still inconsistent and there was a lack of knowledge amongst civil servants as well as the public, so accessing public information from UNMIK and the PISG was still a challenge (Freedom House 2005).

The OSCE, as part of the UNMIK administration, was also responsible for establishing the rule of law, to "help ensure the independence, impartiality and accountability of the justice system", and the mission "reviews human-rights legislation, helps institutions implement it correctly, and assists the Office of the Prime Minister to ensure that legislation is developed and implemented in accordance with the rule of law standards" (OSCE 2016). In the period before independence, Capussela argues that the rule of law could largely be ignored by the PISG and that the public administration was "widely used by the elite as an instrument for patronage, and was plagued by political interference, corruption and nepotism" (Capussela 2015: 45; see Progress Report 2007: 10; Progress Report 2008: 12-13).

The effectiveness of the OSCE rule of law mission has received a mixed response, though the judiciary was weak, it has strengthened throughout pre-independence period (Freedom House 2008). UNMIK, included a police component and was tasked with creating a new police force and to maintain law and order until then. By 2005, the creation of the Kosovo Police Service was near completion with 6,000 officers (Freedom House 2005), but was still under the authority of UNMIK until independence. The international authority over policing and the rule of law links the international actors with police reactions to political protest or repression of social movements. It appears that Vetëvendosje was the only civil society actors that experienced any repression from the authorities, which is explored in more detail in Chapter Four.

Civil society development

International actors have provided large amounts of funding and support into civil society development since the intervention, which has contributed to the significant changes seen in the nature of Kosovo's civil society. As discussed in Chapter One, civil society development can provide social movements with channels of interactions between them and government. In order to assess the international influence on civil society, I first briefly consider Kosovo's civil society prior to the involvement of international actors. This is followed by an assessment of how the presence of, and funding from, international actors had impacted on civil society and the resulting impacts on political opportunities.

Civil society, before the NATO intervention, was a key part of the parallel systems and featured as part of the resistance to Serbian authority (KCSF n.d. a). There were several grassroots organisations concerned mainly with human rights and humanitarian and welfare issues that did not have financial incentives, such as the Council for the Defense of human Rights and Freedoms and the Mother Teresa Charitable Society. In addition, independent trade unions and think-tanks such as Riinvest and the Kosova Action for Civic Initiatives, were also active (Freedom House 2006). Bennett (1995: 216) argues that during this period, Kosovar Albanian society was homogenised as a result of Serbian oppression, and Kosovar Albanians were using resources, such as remittances, collectively. During this time there was a sense of solidarity and that the line between government, under the leadership of Rugova, and these civil society organisations was blurred (Interview 12, 2014).

After the conflict, Kosovo's civil society changed dramatically, particularly in terms of the number and type of organisations, and the issues civil society was concerned with also significantly shifted. Once the initial need for humanitarian relief began to fade, international NGOs and funders began to focus

on civil society. The legal framework influencing civil society in Kosovo, which is mainly found under the Law on Freedom of Association of NGOs and the main elements of Public Beneficiary Status, is one which most analysts seem content with (KCSF n.d. b). UNMIK had an Office for the Registration of Nongovernmental Organisations and it appears that the formal process for entering civil society was quite open and is relatively simple (KCSF n.d. b; Freedom House 2004). A vast number of NGOs that have been set up since the intervention, increasing from 400 registered NGOs in 2000 (USAID 2001) to 1,000 by 2004 (Freedom House 2004), 2,000 by 2005 (Freedom House 2005), and 3,000 by 2006 (Freedom House 2006).

The majority of civil society consists of NGOs (KSCF n.d. b) and a limited amount of other forms of civil society actors. Despite the vast numbers of NGOs registered, it is thought that less than half of registered NGOs are well established and active (Strazzari and Selenica 2013: Kelmendi 2012; Kelmendi 2012; USAID 2009; Pula 2005). As little as 150 of 2,000 registered NGOs were thought to be active in 2005 (Freedom House 2005). Many NGOs are believed to have registered just to gain public benefit status which has damaged the public image of NGOs (Freedom House 2006). The image of NGOs was considered to be poor amongst the public throughout the pre-independence period (UNDP 2008: 142; Freedom House 2004) and it has been suggested that the public perceive NGOs with "apathy, disinterest, and even distrust" (Freedom House 2006). The government also began to provide funding to some civil society groups in 2005 (Freedom House 2005). However, the following year the government appeared to be less supportive, and suggested that NGOs were just small organisations that work for money. Freedom House (2006) states that the language used by the government "undermines or belittles NGOs' democratic role" (Freedom House 2006).

There are also claims that the type of civil society development that has occurred in Kosovo has resulted in the apparent separation of privileged employees from the rest of society, detaching organisations from local concerns, aspirations and identifications (Interview 12, 2014; Freedom House 2006). However, NGOs are thought to have more influence at the local level than the central level due to the closeness of citizens associations and local governments (Freedom House 2005). A Freedom House report (2006) has stated that Kosovo's civil society is characterised by "income opportunity rather than a mission for societal change" or "a civic responsibility."

These claims are part of a range of accounts on the state of Kosovo's civil society, which has been considered energetic and diverse (Pula 2005), as well as "weak or incapable of mobilizing civic activism and holding government accountable" (Kelmendi 2012: 33; also see Fagan 2010; Pula 2005; Freedom

House 2004). There are a number factors which may account for weaknesses within Kosovo's civil society during the pre-independence period, stemming from both domestic and international elements. Demjaha and Peci (2004: 140) state that "the traditional prerequisites for a strong civil society are virtually absent in Kosovo." As discussed in Chapter One, this is somewhat expected by scholars of the region and post-conflict states, as some have highlighted that civil society is often weak in these contexts (Howard 2013; Fagan 2010; Demjaha and Peci 2004).

Howard (2013) outlines three key reasons for weak civil society in post-Communist countries: the legacy of mistrust of communist organisations, the persistence of friendship networks, and disappointment with post-Communist orders. These reasons may go some way to account for a weak civil society in Kosovo, however, the Communist legacy was interrupted by civil resistance between 1989 and 1998 (Pula 2005; Clark 2000) and the conflict which followed. Kelmendi (2012) argues that the period of resistance in Kosovo is a more influential factor on public attitudes towards civil society participation than the presence of a Communist legacy. Scholars have suggested that in many post-communist countries, movements against communism tended to fade away within a year or two of the countries' post-Communist existence (Kopecký and Mudde 2003: 9), whereas resistance was still prominent in Kosovar society for a much longer period. However, the legacy of mistrust, highlighted by Howard (2013), appears to be present in Kosovo as surveys show high levels of mistrust of leaders and institutions (Civicus 2011: 63; UNDP 2008).

One of the key benefits of an effective civil society is the increased access for groups and individuals to the public sphere. Civil society can also provide a channel to influence political decision-making. However, this influence was still weak in Kosovo during the pre-independence period. Pula stated in 2005 that "the direct impact of civil society on the policy process is still rather weak" due to the "unfavourable structure of Kosovo's governing institutions" (Pula 2005: 2). Pula argued that the political potential of civil society would continue to be constrained "as long as the political monopoly in Kosovo is held by UNMIK and a handful of party leaders" (Ibid). Coelho also argues that international actors, "informed by a neoliberal understanding of the state and the politics of international state-building" have created a "largely apolitical NGO sector that has legitimized the political status quo rather than serve as a vehicle for transforming state-society relations" (Coelho 2012: 1).

UNMIK was reported to be particularly unaccountable and unresponsive to NGOs (USAID 2003, 2004, 2005). UNMIK wrote the Interim Constitutional Framework of Kosovo signed in 2001, which had no input or consultation with the public or civil society organisations (USAID 2002: 104). A 2004 USAID

report stated that, “successful collaborations [between NGOs and UNMIK] at the national level were limited to issues […] where UNMIK’s authority and interests are not impeded” (USAID 2004: 140-50). Also, the dual governance system that existed in the pre-independence period meant that, during the period when powers were being slowly transferred from UNMIK to the Kosovar authorities, civil society actors had difficulty participating, advocating or debating some issues. It was not always clear who had responsibility for certain issues (USAID 2004). USAID suggested that structural issues made it easier for certain local and international authorities to avert and divert responsibility in certain areas (USAID 2003: 104). These issues suggest that the opportunities for influencing government by civil society, as well as more broadly, were quite limited during the pre-independence period and were in fact, hindered by UNMIK.

There were positive developments within civil society during the pre-independence period. A Freedom House (2005) report suggests that civil society was maturing by 2005 with some NGOs active in advocacy, providing expert analysis at public hearings, forming coalitions, and receiving more media coverage due to public interest in their activities (Freedom House 2005). Some have suggested that international actors have helped to consolidate civil society (Interview 12, 2014). However, a number of organisations expressed concern that Kosovo’s civil society is unsustainable without international funds (Freedom House 2004). Several organisations have suggested that donor funding has not necessarily represented a better quality in the work of civil society actors (KCSF n.d. a; Freedom House 2005). Analysts argue that most of these organisations are trying to function with poor organisational structures, unstable financial resources (USAID 2004), and that donor funding has led to a more bureaucratic and elitist ‘project culture’ (Sampson 2002a, 2002b).

The main issues addressed by NGOs in Kosovo were those which were most likely to attract donor funding, particularly on minority and youth issues which were priorities of many of the international actors involved in Kosovo (KSCF n.d.b). The KCSF has suggested that this has led to an increasing number “of those that estimate that a large number of civil society initiatives are not driven by the interests of the community” (KSCF n.d.a). This is supported by Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 95) who argues that many of the NGOs in Kosovo were “responding to UN democratization policies and Western donor-driven priorities underpinned by universalist paradigms of civil society.” Coelho (2012: 2) argues that “instead of harnessing the deep-seated pluralism that existed in Kosovo’s civil society during the pre-war era, the international community has largely cultivated a NGO sector that is donor-dependent and apolitical.” As outlined in Chapter One, international funds and support can present civil society’s role as one which is a subsidiary to the state, encouraging interventions only on less

contentious issues. This appears to be how internationally funded civil society has developed in Kosovo. This type of civil society is likely to have an effect on movement activity and on those CSOs that do not receive international funding, particularly those which seek to address more political or contentious issues or those not supported by international donors.

As discussed earlier, the most prominent issue in the pre-independence period was the status issue and the negotiations. The 2005 Freedom House report on Kosovo states that the activities of civil society "decreased owing to the negotiations process for the status of Kosovo, which has dampened civil society enthusiasm for criticism of the Kosovo administration" (Freedom House 2005). The report argued that civil society was stagnant and failed to "provide checks and balances to the emerging government structures and its reduced public willingness to engage in critical monitoring" (Freedom House 2005). NGOs made few demands for transparency in the negotiation process, which largely took place away from the view of the public (Freedom House 2006). It has been suggested that a 'wait and see' approach to the issue of status was prevalent, and that 'hot activities', like anticorruption, should not be pursued in case they negatively affected the outcome of the negotiations (Freedom House 2007). The key factors contributing to this approach were thought to be self-censorship and donor influence (Freedom House 2007). This further supports the suggestion that donor influence was stifling civil society from pursing certain issues, creating an unfavourable environment for positive interaction between citizens and government.

Given the prominence of international actors' influence on the type of civil society that developed in Kosovo, it appears that the environment may not have been particularly conducive for grassroots activity. Some independent activity was visible in addition to Vetëvendosje, including trade unions, though they functioned largely as observers (Freedom House 2006). Student organisations became increasingly active, particularly the Student Union and the group, For a Different University. Other groups such as the KLA War Invalids Association and the KLA War Veterans Association were considered to be politically engaged in opposition to the LDK-AAK coalition but thought to be "serving more as vigilante groups than as genuine interest groups" by Freedom House (2004).

Given the state of civil society in the pre-independence period it seems that movement opportunities are actually constrained by aspects of internationally funded civil society development, rather than increased. The way civil society has developed appears to largely leave out smaller grassroots organisations. Despite the prominence of movements in the historical struggle for independence and the active civil society in the pre-war period, few grassroots organisations and movements emerged

in the pre-independence period. As discussed in Chapter One, there is a historical precedent for movement mobilisation may have a 'demonstration effect' and encourage movement mobilisation (see Kurzman 1998; Kitschelt 1986). However, the post-war scenario of little grassroots activity may limit this 'demonstration effect' and the potential for allies.

Although towards the end of the pre-independence period, once status negotiations had progressed, civil society did become more active again (Freedom House 2007), and there were some signs that UNMIK was responsive to some involvement of NGOs, particularly on fiscal issues (Freedom House 2007), it seems that through this period opportunities relating to civil society development were limited. It is clear that, although the funding from international actors has had some positive effects on civil society development more broadly, international actors also played a large role in limiting the opportunities that could be provided to movements through civil society development. The form of civil society promoted by international actors, the resulting poor image it had with the public, and the response from the government and UNMIK seems likely to have stifled non-donor activities and those concerned with more contentious issues.

The issues with civil society development are not only a result of international donor development. Citizens' ability to participate in the political system generally was relatively low, highlighted by World Bank indicators based on the ability of citizens to participate in choosing a government and freedom of expression, of association and the media (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: World Bank Voice and Accountability Indicator[31]



World Bank (2015)

[31] The Voice and Accountability indicator is defined by the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators website as "capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media" (World Bank 2015).

Capussela (2015: 46) sums up the difficulties facing the Kosovo population, and highlights the difficulty for citizens to hold the government or the international administrators to account in the pre-independence period. He states that the government

> could plausibly deflect any public criticism towards UNMIK […] the international administrators were thus a shield behind which the political leaders could hide their own part of responsibility for the lamentable conditions of the country, from which the attention of the electorate was also distracted by the question of Kosovo's status. Constrained by poverty and unemployment, enticed by the illusory benefits of patronage, inadequately informed, unaided by the intermediate social and political organisations, confused about the allocation of powers and responsibilities between UNMIK and the PISG, and apprehensively focussed on the all-pervading question of Kosovo's independence, the population was not capable of holding its own political institutions to account (Capussela 2015: 46).

The low capacity of citizens to participate, also demonstrates the limited opportunities for movements. As outlined throughout the pre-independence period, the channels of interaction and influence are fairly closed and mobilising other citizens may be difficult for movements due to the numerous factors that make citizens less inclined to participate. At the same time, the limited possibilities for citizens to voice their concerns directly with the government, may in fact draw them to a movement. It is clear that, although domestic actors are involved in governance and civil society, international actors have a major and direct influence on the availability of political opportunities via their executive authority and funding. International actors have also played a role in directing the political discourse, which will also impact on political opportunities, depending on the goals of movements or CSOs, which is explored further in the following chapter.

Post-independence period

The proposal for a supervised independence, put forward by UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari in March 2007 was accepted by the Kosovo Unity Team and then accepted and approved by the Kosovo Assembly. The members of the Unity Team signed the Potantico Declaration, which included an agreement for political parties to remain united for the 120-day transition period which was outlined in the proposal. Once a further six months of negotiations had failed to make progress, the Assembly

of Kosovo unanimously declared its independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008.[32] This section of the chapter considers the period after this declaration was made until the beginning of 2015. I firstly consider the changing nature of the international presence although I argue that Kosovo is still a new protectorate even after the independence declaration. I provide a summary of the changes in Kosovo since the independence declaration in relation to the issues discussed in the first chapter, including the role of international actors and domestic elites, and continued democratic development. I also consider how these changes have affected political opportunities during this period. A number of aspects that were assessed in the first section have experienced little change regarding the availability of political opportunities. These aspects are only touched on very briefly here to establish the changing influence of international actors and to provide a brief assessment of political opportunities in the post-independence period.

International actors

Aspects of the international presence were reconfigured in the wake of the independence declaration. Shortly after, the Ahtisaari Plan was incorporated into Kosovo's new constitution, the Assembly 'invited' the European Union Rule of Law mission (EULEX) and the International Civilian Office (ICO) to supervise the Plan's implementation. Despite the independence declaration, the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan meant that Kosovo would undergo a 'supervised independence' until it met the conditions set out in the Plan. This situation led several to argue that Kosovo's protectorate status was continuing (Judah 2008; Vucheva 2008; Spiegel Online 2008). The ICO had executive powers over domestic decision making processes until December 2012. EULEX still has some executive responsibilities, and a plethora of other international actors, both military and civilian remain active in Kosovo. Due to this existing international presence, I argue that Kosovo remains a new protectorate.

The declaration of independence divided international actors. The Serbian government claimed it still had sovereignty over Kosovo, in line with the UNSCR 1244, taking the issue to the International Court of Justice in 2010, where it lost. Serbia continues to give political and economic support to three Serb-dominated municipalities in Northern Kosovo. These municipalities did not acknowledge Kosovo's independence claim and Serbian law is applied in these areas. Shortly after the independence declaration, two border posts in the north of Kosovo were burnt by Serbs, and NATO forces were forced to intervene, stoking fears that violence might return to Kosovo. (Bilefsky 2008).

[32] Two years after the declaration of independence a Serbian initiative for an advisory opinion from the ICJ was given UN General Assembly backing. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided that the declaration (not independence per se) did not break international law (BBC News 2010).

After the declaration, UNMIK and KFOR began to reduce their presence. EULEX, took over rule of law matters from UNMIK, and was deployed in December 2008 after much negotiation between the EU, UN, and Serbia. It took some time for UNMIK to transfer authority to the ICO and EULEX due to the UN Security Council's failure to endorse the Ahtisaari Plan. UNMIK is still present in Kosovo but has a minor role focused on monitoring, reporting, and facilitating dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.

The International Civilian Office (ICO) was set up in Pristina to prepare and supervise the transition to independence in accordance with the Ahtisaari Plan. The ICO had the power to overrule decisions made by the executive, legislative and judicial branches in Kosovo. It supported the International Civilian Representative (ICR), whose mandate was granted by the International Steering Group of 25, mainly EU, nations (Noutcheva 2012). The ICR's mandate was to interpret the Ahtisaari Plan, and included the power to annul laws or sanction officials who did not enforce the Plan correctly. By September 2012 the ICO were satisfied that Kosovo had completed the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan and ended its supervision, making Kosovo entirely responsible for its own governance. However, EULEX and other international actors maintain a significant presence, particularly the EU and the US, which I will discuss below.

The European Union

The EU had been involved in Kosovo since the intervention. The EU managed UNMIK's fourth pillar that dealt with reconstruction and economic development. The EU has provided over two billion euros in assistance since 1999 (EEAS n.d. b). Kosovo's stability and prosperity is clearly of interest to the EU, given its location. This is reflected by the fact that in 2011, 70% of the aid to Kosovo came from the EU, albeit in both direct and indirect ways (Capussela 2011a: 56). EU involvement and influence in Kosovo gained momentum when EULEX replaced UNMIK in 2008 and again when potential EU membership was on the cards for Kosovo and Serbia. The EU's External Action Service states that the EU's current focus in Kosovo is on "fostering Kosovo's development of stable institutions and sustainable economic development and ensuring Kosovo's European future" (EEAS n.d. b).

The EU's Stabilisation and Association Process maps the steps towards association and eventual membership of the EU for both Kosovo and Serbia: currently Serbia is a candidate country and Kosovo has 'potential candidate' status. The EU has facilitated negotiations to help the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and has used potential membership (including, a priority for Kosovo, visa liberalisation) as both an incentive and threat, to encourage both sides to cooperate. In July 2014, a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was reached, which creates a framework

for Kosovo to comply with EU laws and should enhance dialogue and trade with the EU (Freedom House 2015b).

Politically, Kosovo is keen to be an active part of European politics, which would include joining the EU as quickly as possible. This was stressed in Kosovo's Public Diplomacy campaign, launched in October 2009 (Wählisch and Xharra 2010; Collaku 2010). Many of the interviews conducted in Kosovo revealed that most people thought that EU membership was a very long way off, although the possibility of membership was occasionally heavily used in political rhetoric by politicians within and outside of Kosovo. However, most interviewees suggested that they were not really seeing the practical effects (Interviews Three 2014; Interview Four 2014; Interview Nine 2014; Interview 14, 2014). The involvement of the EU, as a large provider of funds and the process of potential membership, provides opportunities for those making demands in line with the EU and the requirements for EU membership. The increased presence by the EU has the potential to provide new or different allies and the broader discourse of EU membership may also provide opportunities for movements.

Following the establishment of the ICO, UNMIK was replaced by the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). EULEX's mandate was to monitor, mentor and advise Kosovo's institutions in issues related to the rule of law. This mandate has been renewed several times since 2009 and costs the EU 100 million euros a year. In May 2009 EULEX had 2,569 employees, consisting of 1,651 internationals and 918 Kosovars (Džihić and Kramer 2009), although there has been significant downsizing since then.

Given that a new UN resolution has not been issued in relation to EULEX, the presence of EULEX was considered to be illegal by Serbia and Russia (Kostić et al. 2012). At this time, it was not known which law the north of Kosovo would be subject to - UNMIK, Kosovar or Serbian law. This led many within the Kosovar opposition and media to criticise the government and state that this ambiguity signified partition of the country (Freedom House 2009).

Assessments of the effectiveness of EULEX have been mixed (Capussela 2015; Kostić et al. 2012; Džihić and Kramer 2009). When EULEX replaced UNMIK, albeit with a different mandate, it seems that the Kosovar public and other institutions working in Kosovo had very high expectations of the EULEX mission (Interview 12, 2014). This was partly due to the much-discussed fact that it was the EU's largest mission with the resources to make real progress. Also, civil society activists were disappointed

with the lack of progress after ten years of UNMIK (Interview 11, 2014) and were optimistic about the new organisation. However, it seems that the EULEX mandate was not communicated to the public particularly well, and the media's focus was on the more exciting aspects of the mandate such as prosecuting high profile criminals (Interview 12, 2014). The presence of such a large institution administered by international actors highlights the continued influential role played by international actors in the post-independence period.

The United States

Though the presence of EULEX puts the EU at the forefront of international involvement in post-independence Kosovo, many sources and interviewees still feel that it is still the US who have the final or, at least, the most influential say over decision-making in Kosovo (Lewis et al. 2014; Interview Four 2014; Interview Five 2014; Interview Nine 2014; Interview 13, 2014; Capussela 2011c). This may be due to the Kosovo government's preference to deal with the US, and their belief that US assistance is the most beneficial to them. A leaked diplomatic cable from the US ambassador in 2009, sent to provide information for a visit to the US by the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo, suggested that the US still had a sense it had a major role in Kosovo's development. The cable stated that the US presence in Kosovo was still important, particularly because,

> U.S. forces alone are trusted enough by Serbs and Albanians to maintain peace in one of the most volatile parts of Kosovo. Kosovo leaders will also express their belief that only the United States can provide the kind of lasting leadership in Kosovo and the region that is necessary for prolonged stability. Frankly, we agree (Kaidanow 2009b).

The prominent sense of gratitude to the US, among the Kosovo population may have waned in recent years and there is more public criticism of the US and of international actors more broadly than was apparent in the pre-independence years (Interview One 2014; Interview Four 2014; Interview Nine 2014; Interview 14, 2014). Some aspects of US involvement are perceived as being potentially exploitative. One stark example was the US' push for US company Bechtel to be given the contract for the highway that was built from Pristina to Albania. The new road, known as the Patriotic Highway, was incredibly expensive, over-budget and well beyond Kosovo's current needs (Lewis et al. 2014; Collaku et al. 2014). The highway is one of the best in Europe, and cost 20% of Kosovo's GDP, seen as

unnecessary by many (Capussela 2015; Lewis et al. 2014; Brunwasser n.d.; Capussela 2011c).[33] The shift in public attitudes to the presence and influence of international actors may increase opportunities for those who seek to challenge this influence, however, this shift is unlikely to be significant enough to constrain opportunities for those who seek to work with international actors.

Relationship between international actors

The post-independence period saw the scaling back of the UN and the EU taking a much more prominent role. Despite the appearance of overarching unity, different approaches to implementation and expectations between international actors within Kosovo remain, and have had an impact on the efficient functioning of the international presence. For instance, despite what appears to be a clear commitment to Kosovo, five EU member states still do not recognise Kosovo. This has inevitably created some difficulties in developing a consistent policy for the EU and the EULEX mission.[34]

Differences in approach between the EU and the US were highlighted in leaked US diplomatic cables, which gave an insight into the relationship between international actors that is otherwise difficult to uncover. The cables suggest that the US had fairly low expectations of the capabilities of EULEX. One of the cables expressed reservations and showed the level to which the US were unimpressed by European efforts, highlighting the flaws of the European Institutions in Kosovo[35] (Kaidanow 2009b).

[33] Kosovo's government budget in 2012 was 1.5 billion euros. The project budget doubled from the initial offer of £555 million to it costing $1.13 billion in the end (Lewis et al. 2014). It was excessive for Kosovo and half the number of lanes would have been enough to cater for current needs (Capussela 2011a). The deal was signed in April 2010 and the US ambassador at the time, Christopher Dell, had significant influence, which is not considered unusual. However, his recent appointment as Bechtel's country manager in Mozambique has been met with some scepticism despite his compliance with regulations on lobbying on behalf of the company (Lewis et al. 2014). There were concerns regarding the deal from the IMF, the World Bank, EU diplomats and the Kosovar government's legal advisor. Pieter Feith, the ICR in Kosovo from 2008 to 2012, criticised the deal and called for an inquiry, accusing Dell of withholding information regarding the contract as well as lobbying Kosovo into "what he describes as an ill-advised deal with a US company, which placed enormous pressure on the fledgling country's budget" (Lewis et al. 2014). Bechtel were awarded another contract to build a highway from Pristina to Skopje, Macedonia in early 2014 for $833 million (Lewis et al. 2014).

[34] Cables released by WikiLeaks highlighted that some of those who do not recognise Kosovo would make complaints in Brussels after the publication of reports that might suggest EULEX was surpassing its neutral status or the provisions made by UNSCR 1244. These grievances were then relayed back from Brussels to EULEX (Kaidanow 2009b). Capussela (2011b) has argued that the "EU should use its incentives on both Kosovo and Serbia and end its own discussion on the recognition of Kosovo, which still damages nascent European common foreign policy."

[35] For example, one cable outlined that at the April/May 2009 ceremony marking the opening of the new EUELX HQ and the beginning of its Full Operating Capacity, "no Kosovo flag was displayed, though all EU member state flags – including that of the UK, which recently announced its withdrawal of most of its EULEX contingent – were prominently featured. No U.S. or

Another cable expressed American police officers' dismay at the "hands-off approach" of EULEX's officers (Kaidanow 2009b). The US were also concerned about a reversal in the gains and progress they felt they had made in Kosovo and emphasised that their presence was "necessary to bolster European resolve, bring Belgrade to a more realistic sense of its equities in peace and stability, and take a firm line with the UN on further reducing its presence in Kosovo" (Kaidanow 2009b).

Though there is some evidence of disquiet among the international actors, when considering political opportunities the general consensus of the broad goals and future direction of Kosovo seems dominant. Movements may perceive opportunities in the divisions of the international actors, particularly if the movements are making demands in relation to issues of Kosovo's status or Kosovo's relations with Serbia.

International actors in Kosovo were still heavily influential, even after the period of supervised independence. In the pre-independence period it was more likely that movements would perceive greater opportunities if they made demands in line with the goals of international actors, and vice versa. This is still the case in the post-independence period because, although they had fewer executive powers, international actors are still extremely influential. However, for the period of supervised independence (2008-2012), international actors were focused on the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, and less so on other issues. A Freedom House report in 2010 stated that international actors present in Kosovo had not used their leverage to influence what it saw as "negative trends in governance" (such as rising corruption and restrictions on freedom of speech), instead focusing on implementing the Ahtisaari Plan (Freedom House 2010b). This suggests that, like the status issue in the pre-independence period, the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan took precedence over other issues.

Domestic elites

Several authors have argued that by 2008, the PISG were still underdeveloped (Džihić and Kramer 2009; Bideleux and Jeffries 2007). After independence, the governance of Kosovo rested entirely with the new central government though it was still assisted heavily by the ICO and foreign embassies (Freedom House 2009). A number of problematic issues within these institutions continued in the

Turkish flag was flown, either." This was followed by "[w]e expect that this confusion will continue to plague both justice and customs operations in the North, and it will become an ever more vocal bone of contention among Kosovo Albanian political forces and the local media. Right now EULEX is a stabilizing consensus on Kosovo's status, but it could quickly become immobilized by its inherent political limitations" (Kaidanow 2009a).

post-independence era. Political interference with appointments of senior officials were still common, particularly with civil service posts. The lack of transparency regarding these posts led Freedom House (2010) to state that there was a "growing culture of clientelism." There was also little coordination between the government and the Assembly (Freedom House 2009) and the government interfered with the Assembly's agenda (Freedom House 2011). Capussela (2015: 157) argues that this led to a vicious circle in which "a lack of confidence in the legislature's capacity to exercise effective oversight over the executive often led the international community to assist the government in by-passing it, for reasons of convenience, and further discredited it." Therefore, international actors were still influencing political opportunities in relation to the capacity and effectiveness of domestic institutions.

Some improvements were made, for instance, attempts to improve oversight were carried out with the creation of three oversight committees in 2009 (Freedom House 2010b). The opposition were increasingly critical of the government regarding corruption and a lack of vision (Freedom House 2009). However, the opposition were particularly fragmented in the post-independence period and unable to unite effectively against the government (Freedom House 2012). There was some consensus among political elites over how to deal with northern Kosovo but the dialogue with Serbia, facilitated by the EU from March 2011, gained less support (Freedom House 2012). In July the Kosovo government attempted to enforce an embargo on Serbian products (Serbia had blocked imports from Kosovo since the independence declaration in 2008) and special forces were sent to two checkpoints on the northern border and some violent protests occurred. This move had initially been supported by the opposition and civil society but later they were critical of the government and international actors publicly opposed the action (Freedom House 2012).

Local government was one area of governance that appeared to make significant improvements after independence. The European Commission (2011) reported that improvements were made in the decentralisation process regarding local governance, increasing opportunities for citizen representation. These improvements made local government more attractive for more well-known, and senior politicians to stand in local elections (Freedom House 2014b). However, despite these improvements, transparency, accountability and service provision is still considered poor at the local level (Freedom House 2013b). The improvements, albeit small, may provide slightly more opportunities for those seeking to influence government at the local level.

Political opportunities, in relation to domestic institutions, may have improved post-independence but are still limited. Independence meant that Kosovars had much greater control over their own governance, removing some of the effects of dual governance, such as ambiguities over responsibilities. The capacity for the legislature to develop policy independently has improved but is still fairly low due to interference from the executive and international actors. It appears that issues such as corruption and political interference limit a number of the channels of influence available to movements. Opportunities may be increased or constrained by the increasingly active, yet divided opposition.

Democratic development

The declaration of independence and the full transfer of governance responsibilities to domestic institutions was a huge step forward in Kosovo's democratic governance. The declaration removed the issues of dual governance and confused responsibilities, potentially increasing opportunities. During the post-independence period the institutional rules that can facilitate movement's access to the public sphere and the political decision-making process are more developed and the sheer amount of legislation that has been based since the end of the conflict is likely to have increased opportunities relative to the pre-independence period. However, there are still a number of key areas, in which international actors have been active, that are still limiting democratic development and therefore opportunities for movements. These include weak governance and corruption, which actually worsened after independence, as shown by World Bank indicators below in Figure 2 (World Bank 2015; European Commission 2008; Freedom House 2009).

A Transparency International report published in 2014 stated that most Kosovars perceived the judiciary and political parties to be the most corrupt institutions in Kosovo (Martini 2014). Unemployment and poverty both remained around 45% (World Bank 2010; World Bank 2008) and once independence was declared, UNMIK passed over control of an economy that was "still small, backward and uncompetitive" (Capussela 2015: 40-41; see European Commission 2008). International actors were less involved in economic development but organisations such as the IMF still advised the government. Some international actors became increasingly vocal on the issue of government corruption, particularly the US ambassador who requested that parties form a government that did not include anyone under investigation for corruption (Freedom House 2011).

Figure 2: World Bank Control of Corruption Indicator [36]



World Bank (2015)

Electoral politics

As explained in the discussion of pre-independence electoral politics, there are a number of ways electoral politics can facilitate political opportunities. Here, the elections that took place after independence are briefly considered to see if any significant changes occurred that would affect political opportunities.

After the independence declaration, international actors had less direct involvement in electoral politics though their influence can still be seen. New electoral laws were adopted, ending the OSCE's responsibilities in running of elections and Kosovar authorities took responsibility for the Central Election Commission (CEC). The CEC organised the 2009 local elections but it did rely on the OSCE and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) for assistance conducting the election (Freedom House 2010b).

The coalition government, in place before the independence declaration, consisted of the PDK and the LDK. PDK leader Hashim Thaçi was Prime Minister and continued to govern in the initial stages after the independence declaration. The three dominant parties of the pre-independence period, the LDK, PDK and AAK, were still prominent, though the AAK's popularity had decreased. Some new entities appeared but the three main parties with well-known leaders still dominated the political process, patronage still prevailed, and the decline in voter participation continued. The issue of

[36] The Control of Corruption indicator is defined by the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators website as "capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests" (World Bank 2015).

independence and gaining recognition were the dominate features of political debate for the rest of 2008. In second half of the year the opposition were critical of government over corruption and a lack of vision (Freedom House 2009).

After local elections in 2009, the PDK said it wanted to reorganise its ruling coalition, this was an unwelcome step for most other parties. At the end of a period of political upheaval, the coalition remained but interestingly, during the incident the US ambassador and the head of the ICO said that they would not interfere with the process (of changing the coalition if that was the outcome) as long as the constitution was respected (Freedom House 2010b). This announcement of non-interference demonstrates that there was still an expectation of involvement by international actors and that clarifications from these actors were still important. The same year, as Freedom House (2010b) reported, several Western European embassies and the US embassy intervened to prevent incidents in Mitrovica, as well as the overall situation in the north, and a protocol on police cooperation between EULEX and Serbia, being discussed in Parliament. The debate did not go ahead due to the fear of raising tensions. However, the report stated that this move by international actors "added to the Assembly's poor reputation as a body where issues of public concern are not discussed and political accountability is lacking" (Freedom House 2010b).

In 2010 the Constitutional Court ruled that the standing President, Fatmir Sejdiu of the LDK, could not serve at the same time as being leader of his party, the LDK. Sejdiu resigned from his post and an institutional crisis followed, the LDK left the governing coalition and the PDK could not form a new one. A general election was called after a no confidence vote passed (Freedom House 2011). Twenty-nine entities were certified to take part in the 2010 election, far fewer than in the previous election. The significant elements of the 2010 were the cases of fraud that were observed in six municipalities, causing a revote, and the entry of new parties. International observers criticised the election and recounts were conducted in some places. The LDK won the election again (32%), followed by the LDK (25%), Vetëvendosje (13%), the AAK (11%) and the AKR (7%). The AKR, led by Behgjet Pacolli, stood in coalition with the Justice Party and Social-Democratic Party.

Two new parties had entered, Vetëvendosje and the New Spirit party (Fryma e Re), which were both critical of government corruption and the fact that Kosovo is still excluded from the EU's visa free zone (Freedom House 2011). The New Spirit party was formed by three directors of well-known NGOs though they failed to pass the threshold of 5% in the election and later merged with Vetëvendosje. The tradition of leader based politics continued, making it difficult for new leaders and parties to

emerge (Freedom House 2011). The 2010 election demonstrates the representation of a wider political spectrum than previous elections, though new parties gained a small percentage of the vote. Pacolli was nominated as President but a Constitutional Court ruling stated the appointment was unconstitutional as many opposition MPs walked out of the vote (Constitutional Court 2011). Atifete Jahjaga, once a deputy of the Kosovo Police, was nominated and Freedom House (2012) state that it was widely reported that the US Ambassador encouraged leaders to elect her in a private talks.

Parliamentary elections were also held in 2014, but a government was not formed for a further six months due to disagreements over who had the constitutional right to do so. The PDK won the elections again (30%) with a coalition including the Justice Party (PD, which has a pro-Islamic programme), the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (OSHDK), the Movement for Unification (LB, which wants unification with Albania), and the Conservative Party of Kosovo (PK). However, none of the coalition gained more than the 5% threshold required, preventing it from forming a government. The LDK won 25% of the vote, Vetëvendosje 14% and the AAK won almost 10%.

The increasing political opportunities that may have been found in the middle of the pre-independence are probably reduced in the post-independence period. Depending on movement demands, the instability of coalitions and further periods of political upheaval may have increased and constrained the potential for allies and interaction with the Assembly or government. The repeated upheavals, low voter turnout, the high perception of corruption and fraudulent results are all factors that may put movements off attempting to influence in this way. However, the decreased levels of international involvement and increased presence of those representing positions on the political spectrum, other than the centre-right, may provide new sources of allies and channels of influence for movements.

Civil society development

Improvements in the effectiveness of civil society were seen in the period after independence. With the independence issue somewhat dealt with, civil society agendas began to become based around thematic issues. However, most organisations within civil society still struggle to develop their own strategic vision (Freedom House 2009). This is, in part, due to a decrease in international funding. Donors generally fund projects of specific interest to them and the decrease in funding meant many organisations needed new direction and were struggling to be self-sufficient (Interview 12, 2014). Also, many international donors are not necessarily keen to support local initiatives (Freedom House

2010b). A number of factors present in the pre-independence period continue to hinder civil society development. Low levels of trust are still prevalent, demonstrated by a 2011 survey that showed that 9.1% of Kosovars believe that most people can be trusted (Civicus 2011: 23). Kelmendi (2012) argues that civil society in Kosovo seems to be lacking the capacities to support democratisation of the state. Trade unions are still weak (Freedom House 2014b) and the reputation of civil society continued to suffer due to the uptake of political jobs by activists, and what was considered poor election monitoring by civil society organisations in 2010 (Freedom House 2012).

According to the Institute for Development Policy (INDEP), 7,000 NGOs registered between 1999 and 2014, 2,224 are considered active, and 850 of those are based in Pristina (INDEP 2014), though the reach of NGOs outside the capital has increased (Freedom House 2010b). The influence of civil society increased in the post-independence period and is much more prominent when it comes to scrutinising public policy, monitoring government and influencing public debate on a number of issues (Freedom House 2010b, 2015b). For instance, the six-point negotiations caused concern that mobilised civil society into protesting, due to fears that Kosovo was being partitioned (Freedom House 2009). There was more cooperation between civil society and the Assembly (Freedom House 2010), though this was largely on an ad hoc basis (Freedom House 2011). Freedom House (2012) stated that civic groups faced pressure and harassment, and that there were occasions where members of the Assembly slandered some activists. The government and parliament were criticised in the European Commission's 2011 report for not involving civil society in the policy and law making process (European Commission 2011). The European Commission then launched a 3.3 million euro project, the Civil Society Facility, in October 2012 to facilitate the involvement of civil society in policy dialogue (European Commission 2012). During the post-independence era, many activists chose to enter politics (Interview Five 2014; Freedom House 2012).

As in the pre-independence period, tense political periods, such as the period immediately following independence and the aftermath of the 2014 elections, meant that civil society activities were, to some extent, put on hold (Freedom House 2015b). This has a similar effect on civil society's ability to act as a channel for interaction as the status negotiations in the pre-independence period, which were likely to have resulted in fewer opportunities for movements. However, civil society was much more visible to both the media and the Assembly than in the pre-independence period. A number of protests by civil society actors took place in the post-independence period, including one of the largest, against the privatisation of Post and Telecom of Kosovo (PTK) that took place in 2011 (Freedom House 2012).

Conclusion

The NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the subsequent state-building efforts have seen the extensive influence by international actors over Kosovo's democratic development and its transition to independence. International actors have maintained a significant military presence and provided political assistance to domestic elites throughout the new protectorate period, which has in turn, had a significant impact upon political opportunities. The international administration in the form of UNMIK was particularly influential over political decision-making in Kosovo during the pre-independence period. UNMIK was considered unaccountable and was unresponsive to NGOs and therefore many of the constraints to opportunities that are expected in a fairly closed state were present in Kosovo in the early years of the new protectorate.

The interdependence between international actors and the domestic elite resulted in a somewhat enforced coherence, so opportunities as a result of divisions between the two elites are unlikely, though it is possible that movements could attain political allies within either of these sets of elites. However, the issue of Kosovo's status dominated the political discourse of domestic elites, and eventually international actors, in Kosovo during the pre-independence period. The prominence of the independence issue provided opportunities for those movements that were engaged in this issue, yet constrained opportunities for those who were not. The dominance of the status issue actually served to stifle civil society that was concerned with issues other than independence.

There has been little direct or indirect facilitation of movements by the government or international actors and there are few channels for movements to interact with, or to influence elites. The nature of internationally funded civil society in Kosovo, largely ignores movements, and has been weak, particularly in the pre-independence period. Movement opportunities are constrained in this area due to the ineffectiveness of civil society to act as a channel of interaction and the limited type of issues that donor-funded civil society focuses on.

The influence of international actors upon political opportunities in the post-independence era is still significant due to civil society's dependence on funding from international actors, the presence of the ICO and EULEX, and the influence of some international actors on the political system. The declaration of independence and the end of UNMIK's executive authority did signify a greater role for domestic actors and institutions and removed the issues of dual governance. The declaration of independence largely resolved the status issue and opened up space for debate on other issues, potentially providing new opportunities for movements. It is clear that there are more opportunities since the early years

of the new protectorate in line with the development of democratic institutions and civil society. However, the conduct within these institutions and the type of civil society that has developed in Kosovo often serve to constrain, rather than increase opportunities.

Post-independence Kosovo has still suffered from weak governance and a number of other factors hindering democratic development such as the prevalence of corruption. Freedom House reports, which score states across a variety of indicators each year, suggest that little has changed between 2008 and 2014 in the areas of national democratic governance, the electoral process, independent media, the judicial framework and independence, and corruption. The reports do state that civil society development and local democratic governance were two areas which had shown positive signs and received increased scores (Freedom House 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2011, 2012, 2013b, 2014b). The strengthening of civil society in the post-independence period, along with the increasingly critical opposition in the Assembly contribute to the gradual opening up of political opportunities for movements in Kosovo.

CHAPTER FOUR: VETËVENDOSJE

This chapter features a case analysis of the first case study, Vetëvendosje. Here, I seek to establish if Vetëvendosje's strategy was influenced by the presence of international actors in Kosovo. The potential for this influence is assessed, both in terms of the influences on political opportunities and more broadly. In the contextual analysis in Chapter Three I established that the presence of international actors in Kosovo was extensive during the new protectorate period and contributed to an increase in political opportunities. However, these opportunities were largely still very limited in many areas.

This chapter, like Chapter Three, is split into two sections. The first covers the period between the NATO intervention in 1999 and the declaration of independence in February 2008. I discuss Vetëvendosje's formation and emergence from the Kosovo Action Network (KAN), its goals and targets, as well as the types of tactics it chose to employ and incidents of repression that Vetëvendosje experienced. I also consider Vetëvendosje's response to the status talks, followed by an analysis of its allies and opposition. The second section covers the post-independence period until 2015. I revisit Vetëvendosje's goals, targets and tactics and assess how these have changed post-independence. This is followed by an assessment of the decision to participate in elections and how their allies and opposition changed.

Pre-independence period

The Kosovo Action Network

Vetëvendosje emerged from its predecessor, the Kosovo Action Network (KAN) so I will briefly discuss the KAN's background, its aims, allies and tactics, to help establish Vetëvendosje's origins. The KAN was formed by a group of international activists led by an American writer, Alice Mead (now Alice W. James) in 1997 (Vetëvendosje 2010d). The KAN carried out a range of activities in support of student protests and grassroots actions against what they considered to be the occupation of Kosovo by Serbia. They also called for the restoration of the Albanian language (CNN 1997), the release of war hostages, and pressured institutions to address the issue of missing persons (Vetëvendosje 2010d).

Two well-known former KLA members became involved in Vetëvendosje in 2001: Adem Demaçi[37], the former head of the political wing of the KLA, and Albin Kurti, who worked for Demaci. Both had been imprisoned by the Yugoslav authorities for two and a half years, and as a result, were well known across Kosovo. Prior to their imprisonment both had resigned from the KLA after disagreements over the proposed Rambouillet Agreement. The proposed agreement intended to help resolve the conflict between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians, was the result of NATO facilitated negotiations, and led to internal conflict and a split within the KLA. The agreement did not guarantee independence for Kosovo and Demaci and Kurti resigned from the KLA in protest against those in the organisation who were willing to sign the agreement. A BBC report in March 1999 stated that Adem Demaci was "out of touch with the new, younger leadership of the KLA, which is demonstrating considerable pragmatism in its dealings with the international community" (BBC News 1999). This series of events and the reaction to them hints at the way in which the actions of international actors would influence Vetëvendosje throughout the course of its development and sets the scene for Vetëvendosje's potential allies and opposition. Similarly, the involvement of Adem Demaçi highlights Vetëvendosje's role in the continuation of resistance and pursuit of unification with Albania, due to his history as the founder of the Revolution Movement for Albanian Unity (RMAU), which was active in the 1960s.

After 1999 the KAN became increasingly marginalised and turned its attention to opposing UNMIK (Lemay-Hébert 2013: 93). On the fifth anniversary of the UNSCR 1244, in June 2004, about one thousand people protested using whistles, red cards and music. They read a Citizen's Declaration, promising a struggle against what they considered to be the anti-democratic UNMIK. The protest was followed by a tour throughout Kosovo during which slides with slogans were projected on the walls of public and government buildings. In another protest they placed a yellow ribbon saying 'Crime Scene/Do not Cross' around the UNMIK building. The KAN co-ordinated with other organisations across Kosovo that focused on issues stemming from the conflict with Serbia, such as the Gjakova based group, 'The Cries of the Mothers' (*Thirrjet e* Nënave) and the Krusha e Vogel based group, '26 March 1999' (*26 Marsi 1999*). The June 2004 protest is considered to represent the conceptual genesis of Vetëvendosje (Vetëvendosje 2010d) and the gradual transformation of the KAN into Vetëvendosje.

[37] Adem Demaçi was imprisoned for his opposition to the Tito government from 1964-1974 and again from 1975-1990. After his release he was the chair of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms of the People of Kosovo from 1991-1995. In 1991 he won the European Parliament's Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. In 1996 he became the president of the Parliamentary Part of Kosovo, during this time he proposed the idea of a confederation including Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia that would be called Balkania.

Vetëvendosje's formation

Vetëvendosje officially formed on 10 June 2005 with the aim of creating a grassroots movement with purely political motives that would spread across Kosovo, and cooperate with other organisations in Albania and Macedonia (Interview Two 2014). Vetëvendosje displays a number of features commonly found in definitions of social movements, including a collective identity, shared beliefs, attempts to challenge the status quo through collective action and networks of informal interaction. Vetëvendosje define itself as a movement (Interview One 2014; Interview Four 2014), which has proved significant to its positioning relative to other groups such as political parties and NGOs, a factor that is explored further below.

Albin Kurti led Vetëvendosje and soon after its formation it began producing a weekly paper, a biweekly radio programme, weekly columns in two Kosovar newspapers, and an English language newsletter, which started in July 2006 with the intention of explaining Vetëvendosje's ideas and activities to non-Albanian speakers (Vetëvendosje 2010d). It began to expand its membership network and offices were established in most municipalities across Kosovo and several abroad, engaging the diaspora.

Vetëvendosje formed just over a year after the March 2004 riots and just over two weeks after the UN Secretary General appointed Special Envoy Kai Eide to carry out a comprehensive review of Kosovo. The increasing levels of dissatisfaction with UNMIK among the public, the riots in March 2004, and the continued concern over Kosovo's future status meant that this was an opportune time to form in opposition to UNMIK. The same factors also demonstrated a shift in the perceptions of the international administration, which struggled to legitimise its presence to the public (Lemay-Hébert 2013), and began to be seen as an obstacle to Kosovo's independence (Capussela 2015). The riots also highlighted the international administration's weakness and lack of control (Capussela 2015). These signals of weakness in the authorities are considered an opportune time for movements to form (Tarrow 1998: 77).

Goals and targets

Vetëvendosje's initial demands were for self-determination for Kosovo and all other demands stem from this. The movement opposed UNSCR 1244 and claimed that it maintained Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo. Vetëvendosje saw the newly imposed rule by international institutions as a mere replacement for Serbia. It viewed the international administration as a new colonial presence and a

hindrance to achieving self-determination. Anthropologist Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 98) outlines Vetëvendosje's outlook as follows:

> Vetëvendosje's world view is based on a clear distinction between on the one side, the community of natural citizens of Kosovo, in majority Albanians, whose will should be consulted through direct forms of democracy, namely referenda, and who have a right to full sovereignty, self-determination and unification with the motherland [Albania]; and on the other, those forces which represent and impose foreign rule and policies on the people of Kosovo and are, in consequence, labelled undemocratic, (neo)colonialist and oppressive (Schwandner-Sievers 2013: 98).

As a result of Vetëvendosje's main goal of self-determination, via unification with Albania, its attempts to "reclaim sovereignty over the statebuilding process" (Visoka 2016: 9), it has been described as a nationalist movement (Interview One 2014; Interview Five 2014; Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Strazzari and Selenica 2013; McKinna 2012b). Hechter (2000) states that nationalist movements can be distinguished by their claims for self-determination and legitimate rights to govern a specific territory. This feature of Vetëvendosje will be explored in more detail later in the chapter because it played a significant part in its relationship with international actors.

One of the key targets for Vetëvendosje in the pre-independence period was the international administrator, UNMIK. Vetëvendosje believed the institution to be an oppressive regime that existed against the will of the Kosovar people, denying their freedom (Vetëvendosje 2010d**;** Vetëvendosje 2006g). Vetëvendosje claimed that the international presence was inherently undemocratic in its nature and that it was unaccountable. Vetëvendosje based its claims on a number features of the international institutions such as employee immunity from prosecution, the lack of voting within the institutions, and the lack of consultation with the Kosovar public about how, and by whom, they are governed (Interview One 2014; Vetëvendosje 2006a).

Vetëvendosje also opposed the PISG and the political parties functioning within it. This was due to the heavy influence of international actors on the institutions. Visar Ymeri, elected leader of Vetëvendosje in February 2015, stated that Kosovo's institutions and the majority of political parties had been "very servile to all the institutions, towards UNMIK, particularly towards embassies and overseas missions of the IMF and the World Bank" (Interview Three 2014).

Vetëvendosje's actions often attempted to highlight continued Serbian influence in Kosovo's affairs, such as its call for a boycott of Serbian products in Kosovo. It felt that Serbia should apologise for crimes committed during the war, and take some responsibility for the damage caused. Vetëvendosje often carried out direct actions in response to statements made by Serbian politicians and each time a Serbian official visited Pristina, activists threw rotten eggs at them (Vetëvendosje 2010d). Vetëvendosje clearly had different priorities to international actors, who were focused on regional stability, improved relations between Kosovo and Serbia, the rights of Serbs, and the protection of cultural sites in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje did not agree with the approach of international actors to these issues, particularly the inclusion of Serbia in the status negotiations.

Vetëvendosje often referred to the activities of the 'international community' in Kosovo in their newsletter and during interviews. Although the term is often used as a reference to the broad goals and ideas associated with the international community, it was also used as a convenient reference to the US, some Western European states as well as the general international presence. Some references were made to individual institutions but these were also seen as part of the international community's presence in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje's use of the term suggests that international actors were generally perceived as one target, albeit with an appreciation of the responsibilities that each institution and different organisations had within Kosovo. Principally Vetëvendosje claimed not to oppose the support of international actors, but disagreed with the nature of the international presence and a wide range of its policies (Interview One 2014). However, it appears that Vetëvendosje was perceived to be opposed to all aspects of the international presence and anything associated with it, which affected its ability to put forward its own demands, a factor that is explored below.

Vetëvendosje's goals and targets in the pre-independence period were heavily influenced by international actors. Its main target was the international presence itself, particularly the international administrator, UNMIK, but also the influence of several other international actors. This included the influence of international actors on the PISG, which was also seen as a target as a result. Increased dissatisfaction with the international presence was clearly demonstrated by some of the public, which presented an opportunity for Vetëvendosje's formation and expansion. However, the prevailing sentiment among the public and the political elite was that Kosovo needed the international actors present in Kosovo in order to gain independence. Despite targeting different aspects of the international presence it seems that Vetëvendosje generally perceived this presence as coherent, resulting in little potential for allies to emerge from the fragmentation of international actors.

Tactics

The types of tactics used by Vetëvendosje were a mix of novel and creative direct actions and more traditional demonstrations. Actions in the early stages of the movement included demonstrations, blockades, public meetings, exhibitions, graffiti, a boycott of Serbian products and direct actions. A number of the actions carried out by Vetëvendosje built on symbols of the historic Albanian resistance and Albanian culture. The targets of these tactics were mostly international actors, though other elements seen as expressions or representations of them, such as the PISG or the Unity Team, were also targeted. Although explicitly non-violence some of the tactics employed by Vetëvendosje resulted in clashes and repressive responses from the authorities, which led some to consider the movement to be violent. This will be explored further here, along with a consideration of the choice of tactics in relation to political opportunities.

Types of tactics

Vetëvendosje chose direct tactics to highlight its dissatisfaction with UNMIK, often in response to particular decisions or the release of reports by UNMIK. For example, in response to Serbia being allowed to hold a referendum on Serbia's new constitution in Kosovo it placed a toilet wrapped in a pink ribbon at UNMIK's gates and threw brown paint onto the building. In its newsletter, it said

> [t]his is just more of the excrement that UNMIK, itself no better than institutional excrement, has without any caution, spread all over Kosova[38] since its arrival. We have delivered the toilet seat so that in the future they can relieve themselves in the proper place. The only way to keep Kosova clean is to kick UNMIK out (Vetëvendosje 2006g).

Many demonstrations and direct actions were against symbolic elements of the international presence, and were conducted in the centre of Pristina, and outside UNMIK and other institutional buildings. The first action carried out by Vetëvendosje was on 12 June 2005, and involved activists writing 'NO NEGOTIATIONS – SELF DETERMINATION!' on the walls of UNMIK headquarters. This graffiti later appeared on walls and buildings elsewhere, and can still be see around Pristina. Another action targeted UNMIK jeeps that had become a common and symbolic sight in Kosovo, which Vetëvendosje argued, went some way to reinforcing the prejudices UNMIK has of Kosovo as an

[38] Kosova is the Albanian spelling of Kosovo.

extreme environment[39]. Activists added an 'F' and 'D' either side of the 'UN' lettering on the vehicles, making the word 'FUND', which means 'END' in Albanian, signifying what they felt should be the end of the UNMIK regime (Vetëvendosje 2010d).

Other actions included the distribution of an obituary written for UNMIK, the dumping of hay in front of the UNMIK building to highlight that the only thing villagers were able to do on their land was cut the grass, and a large demonstration which blocked the UNMIK building the day before the automatic extension of UN Resolution 1244 (Vetëvendosje 2010d). Vetëvendosje's actions also attempted to raise questions about the moral and political legitimacy of UNMIK (Lemay-Hébert 2013). For instance, the creativity, novelty and unexpected nature of their actions were, in part, to ensure that the police would find their actions difficult to deal with (Delafrouz 2009). In turn, if the regime was unable to deal with Vetëvendosje's actions effectively, the administration would look weak and undermine its authority and legitimacy (Interview One 2014).

Vetëvendosje referred to the principles of self-determination put forward by the UN and used similar language to that used by international institutions. It repeatedly referred to UNSCR 1514, passed in 1960, which grants independence to colonial countries and peoples. One action involved placing that Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as 'parking tickets' on UNMIK and Kosovo police vehicles (Vetëvendosje 2010d). Vetëvendosje argues that the 'will of the people' of Kosovo has been repeatedly ignored, and that even though Kosovar Albanians have experienced repression since 1912, the incidents in 1998-1999 are sufficient to justify the right to self-determination.

The tactics chosen by Vetëvendosje are likely to have been influenced by the limited political opportunities available in the pre-independence period. As discussed in Chapter Three, there were few signs of efforts to facilitate social movement activity by the government, institutional rules were still developing, the government was not open and responsive, and there was a lack of opportunity for citizens to voice dissent and hold the international institutions to account. Furthermore civil society was not serving as an effective channel to influence government and was not monitoring or voicing criticism of the government or international actors at the time. As a result Vetëvendosje perceived its chosen tactics to be the most viable, effective and visible. It believed that direct action,

[39] This idea is supported by some of the peacebuilding literature which highlights that the use of 4x4s illustrate the securitised, privileged and possibly colonialist nature of international intervention (Duffield 2014; Autesserre 2014; Smirl 2015).

demonstrations and its communication outlets were the best way to raise public awareness of the negative impacts of some the decisions being made on behalf of Kosovars and were the only way to be heard (Interview One 2014).

During much of the pre-independence period, it appears that Vetëvendosje more effectively mobilised citizens than political parties did (Freedom House 2007). Vetëvendosje did not perceive domestic institutions as a viable channel for promoting its demands and was opposed to the way these institutions functioned under the supervision of international actors. As a result, the movement would not support or participate in these institutions. Leader, Visar Ymeri stated that "we thought that participating in elections was just another way of paying into the illusion that was being built by UNMIK - that Kosova functions democratically when in reality that could not happen" (Interview Three 2014). Thus, the tactics and used by Vetëvendosje were directed at international actors and their allies, encouraged by the lack of political opportunities.

Violence and repression

Vetëvendosje's publications and interviews position it as an advocate of non-violence, stating that it is the most effective method to achieve its aims in Kosovo. For example:

> Nonviolence should be understood as a confrontation with UNMIK for democracy, for justice, and equality. It means the tools of strike, boycott, civil disobedience and demonstration. There is nothing passive about non-violence. It is an active form of resistance (Vetëvendosje 2006d).

Despite these claims, and regardless of the debate on what constitutes violence, the tactics used by Vetëvendosje, and events at certain demonstrations have led to some deeming it violent. Several Vetëvendosje demonstrations have involved clashes between some demonstrators and the police. Visoka argues that despite the claims of non-violence Vetëvendosje's "protests intentionally incited violent reactions by local and international policy" (2017: 119). It is difficult to assess what provoked these clashes, whether it was the police, Vetëvendosje, a small element of either side, or whether it was carried out by those unaffiliated with Vetëvendosje or by those not adhering to the instructions given by the leadership on either side.

Although, an extensive assessment of international media coverage of Vetëvendosje has not been carried out, a quick assessment suggests that much of the coverage of Vetëvendosje focuses on clashes at demonstrations. Publicity around violent images of confrontations with the police have

impacted on perceptions of Vetëvendosje. Kurti states that the coverage of the protests was a big problem for the public face of Vetëvendosje. He argues that without the protest actions they were not listened to, but the coverage of protests is limited to images of Vetëvendosje's actions as confrontations with the police, rather than coverage of the reasons for the protest (Interview One 2014). Anecdotal evidence from a couple of the interviews in Kosovo suggests that even those who agreed with large parts of Vetëvendosje's agenda, or at least its contribution to the debate on certain issues, were put off by some of the methods used (Interview Nine 2014; Interview Ten 2014).

The response to some of Vetëvendosje's actions and protests was arguably repressive on the part of the authorities (see Tilly 1978). Several sources, including interviewees (Interview Nine 2014, Interview Ten 2014) and reports (Freedom House 2007) have suggested that some of Vetëvendosje's actions had been met with over-the-top and violent reactions from the police. Vetëvendosje was the only civil society actor to experience these types of responses in the pre-independence period (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Freedom House 2007). Many Vetëvendosje activists were arrested and often ill-treated by the police (Freedom House 2006). From its formation until the end of 2006, 198 Vetëvendosje activists were arrested and many were given fines, which they refused to pay, while some received jail sentences. Vetëvendosje claims it did not disturb citizens or receive complaints, stating that in the case of arrests for graffiti, citizens had offered Vetëvendosje the walls of their houses and shops (Vetëvendosje 2010c). In 2006, 322 activists were arrested, and 110 were sentenced. Vetëvendosje claimed that the "psychological pressure against the families of the activists ha[d] also increased", particularly as a result of house searches for activists (Vetëvendosje 2010d). In 2007, 84 activists arrested, 84 activists and citizens injured, and 9 activists beaten (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Vetëvendosje 2010d).

UNMIK was responsible for the rule of law, and had authority over the police. Vetëvendosje perceived the two to be linked: "we are disturbing the peace and order of the UNMIK government, which is effectively being supported by the police" (Vetëvendosje 2010c). It is difficult to assess how much influence international actors had over the reaction of the police at demonstrations but Vetëvendosje claimed that the reaction from authorities got worse, stating that the "police have become ever more violent, more brutal. The system is no longer acting only through KPS [Kosovo Police Service], but also through special units and UNMIK officials. In Prizren, even KFOR soldiers were present" (Vetëvendosje 2010c). As discussed in Chapter One, international actors were concerned about outbreaks of violence, particularly after the March 2004 riots, and the impact this would have on their own

legitimacy. This may provide some explanation to the responses to Vetëvendosje's actions, though it is also possible that they felt that these responses were justified in their own right.

A demonstration in February 2007 was one of the largest and most controversial protests carried out by Vetëvendosje. The figures vary, but the protest is thought to have been attended by between 1,300 and 3,000 (Lemay-Hébert 2013; Kaidanow 2007a). The protest was against the Ahtisaari Plan, the Unity Team, UNMIK, and the upcoming deployment of the International Civil Office. This protest and the aftermath have been well documented, including information garnered from leaked US diplomatic cables. There was a heavy police presence at the protest and the city centre was sealed off to prevent protestors from getting to the UNMIK or PISG buildings. Protestors breached two lines of barricades and the police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets. Fifteen activists were arrested (Vetëvendosje 2010d), and the US ambassador stated, in a leaked diplomatic cable, that around 75 people were treated for tear gas inhalation. Six of them were hospitalised (Kaidanow 2007a). Two protestors died due to injuries from rubber bullets.

After the protest there was criticism that the response by the KPS and UNMIK Police has been an overreaction (Kaidanow 2007a) and raised further questions over UNMIK's accountability (Human Rights Watch 2007). In what was considered to be a "rare move of accountability" the Interior Minister and UNMIK police commissioner both resigned (Freedom House 2007). Albin Kurti was arrested and the KPS searched Vetëvendosje's offices in Pristina and elsewhere. The US ambassador, in a document since leaked, stated that: "our effort – together with UNMIK and KFOR – is to keep the public focused on the real locus of responsibility for the violence: the Self-Determination movement and its extremist leader, Albin Kurti" (Kaidanow 2007a). Contrary to this view, a poll conducted as part of the Early Warning Reports, put together by USAID, UNDP and Riinvest (a local think tank) showed around 45% of those questioned felt that the UNMIK police was responsible for the violence at the protest, compared to just under 20% of those who felt Vetëvendosje was to blame (Hyseni et al. 2007a). This serves as an important indicator of perceptions, regardless of where responsibilities lay.

Several months after the protest, an international prosecutor filed an indictment against Kurti for crimes relating to the violence at the demonstrations in February and he was placed under house arrest. A number of international and Kosovo-based NGOs and the Ombudsperson's Institution in Kosovo were reported to have expressed concern over the legality of Kurti's detention (Amnesty International 2007). Some suggested that the arrest of Kurti was politically motivated, including the Kosovo NGO, the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) (Freedom House

2008), Amnesty International (2007) and Howard Clark (2008) of War Resisters International. There was also the suggestion that most people in Kosovo believed that Kurti was being held to prevent further actions being carried out while the issue of Kosovo's status was being resolved, even among those who did not agree with Kurti's actions (Gashi 2007). Vetëvendosje collected almost 150,000 signatures demanding Kurti's release (Schwandner-Sievers 2013). In the end Kurti's trial was recessed indefinitely, much to the dismay of the US embassy, which stated that Kurti's "past actions have proven not only dangerous, but deadly, and he promises to continue to be a destabilizing force in Kosovo. Why the international judge who ordered his release failed to take this into account remains a mystery" (Kaidanow 2007b). In 2010, Kurti was found guilty of obstructing official persons but all remaining charges were dropped.

The 2007 protest and its aftermath highlights a number of the most overt ways in which the government and international actors inhibited Vetëvendosje's activities, using techniques described by Marx (1979) and discussed in Chapter Two. For example, the arrest of Albin Kurti served to direct the energies of Vetëvendosje to, what Marx (1979) calls, 'defensive maintenance', and away from its goals. It also served to displace and discredit Kurti as Vetëvendosje's leader and potentially contributed to an unfavourable image in the eyes of some.

It is difficult to assess the level of influence of international actors regarding repression or the result of this repression on Vetëvendosje's image and ability to mobilise. There is a debate over whether repression could open up opportunities for movements by increasing mobilisation (see Earle 2006; Brockett 1995; Marks 1989; Kimeldorf 1988; Barkan 1984; Lipset 1983). In the case of Vetëvendosje, it seems that the police reaction to the protests actually served to boost the Vetëvendosje's legitimacy, and encouraged other supporters (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Interview Nine 2014, Interview Ten 2014). Some sources suggest that Kurti's arrest in 2007 actually strengthened Vetëvendosje's popularity (Collaku 2010). What is clear is that some international actors did consider Vetëvendosje to be violent and a threat to security, which shaped the way international actors chose to respond to it, inevitably impacting on potential political opportunities.

The Status Process

By the time the negotiations process had begun in 2006 Vetëvendosje had established itself as a prominent opposition feature and expanded its activities to other urban and rural areas around Kosovo (Vetëvendosje 2010d). The negotiations became an additional target for Vetëvendosje and it was highly critical of the principle of negotiations with Serbia, the conduct of the Unity Team and the

international actors facilitating the process. Albin Kurti, argued that Kosovo never lacked 'status', as every territory has some kind of status (disputed or otherwise). He argued that the framing of Kosovo's undecided status as resolvable via negotiations with Serbia and other international actors was wrong and that the solution should come from a decision by the Kosovar people (Interview One 2014).

Rhetoric highlighting the lack of consultation with Kosovars was used in direct actions, such as the placement of wanted posters with the faces of the Unity Team and text saying that the team were trading away the future of two million people without consulting them (Vetëvendosje 2007). To highlight how 'unfair' the readiness to negotiate with Serbia was, Vetëvendosje activists poured red paint in front of the entrances to the Kosovo Assembly to symbolise the blood that had been sacrificed in liberating Kosovo (Vetëvendosje 2010d), providing another example of references to earlier Albanian resistance movements. Vetëvendosje also sought to raise awareness of the details of the Plan and organised discussions across the country, including at the university, with members of other political parties and a variety of experts.

The negotiations, which became the focus of Vetëvendosje's strategy, were initiated and facilitated by international actors, highlighting another area in which international actors influenced Vetëvendosje's strategy. Vetëvendosje was particularly concerned about the proposed plans for decentralisation, perceiving it to be an ethnic solution, not a multi-ethnic one, and that it was most likely to result in the "Bosniaisation of Kosovo" (i.e. partitioning) (Vetëvendosje 2006b, 2006g), increasing the likelihood of future conflict (Vetëvendosje 2006a). This comparison represented Vetëvendosje's perception of a threat to Kosovo's territorial integrity that was feared would create a territorial, religious and institutional partition of Kosovo, resulting in Kosovo remaining part of Serbia (Vetëvendosje 2006f). Vetëvendosje hung maps showing the effects of decentralisation in city centres (Vetëvendosje 2006c) and hosted a number of public meetings, particularly in towns and villages, that were seen to be most threatened by the decentralisation plans, to gather and highlight information on the issue. This was a response to the feeling that the public, particularly those who lived in the affected municipalities, was not sufficiently consulted on the changes to municipal boundaries. Vetëvendosje believed that special protection zones, also part of the negotiations, would create areas controlled by Serbia, perpetuating the claim that the heritage of the Orthodox Church is exclusively Serbian and not part of Kosovar heritage (Vetëvendosje 2006a). It organised protests, including one in Deçan, around the monastery, which had been given special protection, blocking the UNMIK building (Vetëvendosje 2010d).

Vetëvendosje used the issue of decentralisation as an opportunity to highlight specific and local issues and to incorporate them into its wider claims for self-determination and opposition to the conduct of international actors. It also served as an opportunity to highlight how it felt international actors were defying their own aims, and to demonstrate how Vetëvendosje was actually acting in line with the standards supposedly set by international actors. For instance, the movement stated that:

> The people of Kosova are not allowed to participate in decisions about their local level of government, let alone their future as a state. And this is how the international community thinks democracy is built? (Vetëvendosje 2006a).

There were others who criticised the Unity Team for not being democratic or transparent, including some politicians, elements of the Kosovo media, international organisations (Freedom House 2007), and associations concerned with the effects of the war, such as the KLA veterans' association (Freedom House 2007). Some of these critics also cited the comparison to a potentially similar situation to Bosnia (Freedom House 2007), highlighting potential allies for Vetëvendosje, at least on this issue. Vetëvendosje highlighted this criticism of the negotiations by others, such as that of PDK Assembly member Hydajet Hyseni, referring to his comments in its newsletter (Vetëvendosje 2006e). Vetëvendosje participated in demonstrations with political parties and other organisations, particularly at the local level. For instance, demonstrations in Vitia and Gjilan in September 2006, were joined by all branches of political parties present in these municipalities, which would have been the most affected by the decentralisation plan (Vetëvendosje 2010d). This highlights how Vetëvendosje used opportunities that developed from disagreements and some fragmentation amongst elites, over the UN facilitated negotiations. However, as stated in Chapter Three there was a sense among the domestic elite that it was essential to keep international actors on side during the negotiation process if independence was to be granted for Kosovo. Therefore, overall domestic and international actors represented a somewhat coherent approach to independence. Most of the domestic political elite was keen to work with, or at least be seen to be working with, international actors in order to gain independence. Association or acknowledgement of the views of Vetëvendosje would not be useful to many domestic elites at that time. Thus, there was little potential for alliances with international actors or many domestic actors on this issue, aside from those mentioned at the local level.

The status negotiations dominated public and political debate and provided an opportunity for Vetëvendosje to air its demands relating to Kosovo's self-determination. Vetëvendosje presented similar criticisms of the Ahtisaari Plan. Though opposition to the Ahtisaari Plan may have provided

similar opportunities to the negotiations, in the sense that the Plan provided another target relating to the presence of international actors and another platform on which to make claims regarding self-determination. Garton Ash (2007) argues that the majority of Albanian politicians felt that the Plan was a reasonable deal. This lack of fragmentation amongst both the international and domestic elite again constrained opportunities for Vetëvendosje.

As the negotiations progressed, self-determination for Kosovo seemed more likely in the form of some kind of independence, with the technicalities regarding Kosovo Serbs still being negotiated. This perhaps confirmed the shift in the independence discourse from the call for unification with Albanian that had dominated earlier Albanian efforts, towards independence for Kosovo itself. This shift was started by Rugova and the LDK before the NATO intervention, arguing that Albanians needed to fight for their own causes within each state. This approach was continued by domestic elites in the post-intervention period and some have suggested that the Kosovar elite was attempting to suppress an emphasis on unification with Albania and concentrate on gaining outright independence (Delafrouz 2009). Part of the impetus for this shift in the post-independence period comes from the fact that international support was perceived to be more likely to support the independence of Kosovo, rather than supporting Kosovo's unification with Albania. Again, international influence may have indirectly constrained opportunities for Vetëvendosje by contributing to political situation that resulted in the declining saliency of Vetëvendosje's key demands.

Rather than increasing opportunities for Vetëvendosje, the status negotiations appears to have constrained them. As discussed in Chapter Three, the status negotiations stifled dissent and criticism from civil society more broadly, which was largely silent on the issue, potentially reducing the scope of the debate and potential allies for those critical of the process, such as Vetëvendosje. Though the lack of input from civil society may have been partly self-censorship or outside the remit of many organisations, it was, in part, due to the fact that most civil society actors were funded by international donors. Despite the lack of input and discussion from civil society more broadly, Vetëvendosje, and other grassroots groups, were probably in a better position to publicly criticise and contribute to the debate on the status issue. Vetëvendosje's strategy was largely focused on raising public awareness of the potential repercussions of the status talks and the Ahtisaari Plan.

Allies and opposition

Vetëvendosje collaborated with other small grassroots organisations, such as 'The Cries of Mothers' and the '26 March 1999' and, occasionally, individuals or the local sections of political parties.

However it seems that there were generally few other opportunities for allies during the pre-independence period. This was affected, in part, by the perceptions of Vetëvendosje and the incompatibility of Vetëvendosje's goals with those of other influential actors. Vetëvendosje claims that it was keen to maintain its independence and did not seek support from any international actors (Interview One 2014), which seems logical given its aims. Vetëvendosje claims that most of the office spaces it uses have been donated by supporters and that running costs are paid for from membership fees (Interview One 2014; Interview 13, 2015).

It is very difficult to gauge how much support or opposition Vetëvendosje had throughout the pre-independence period. It is thought that the 2007 demonstration had the highest attendance of demonstrators (between 1,300 and 3,000), while other protests saw lower figures (Lemay-Hébert 2013; Kaidanow 2007a). The number of supporters is not possible to establish reliably, and it is difficult to find concrete indicators of support for or opposition to Vetëvendosje, or to distinguish support for it from general support for its aims, or how active support or opposition was. Vetëvendosje has claimed to have up to 10,000 supporters across 16 branches (Karpat 2006).

Early Warning Reports have given some indication of support for Vetëvendosje through polling in four editions of the report in 2006 and 2007. A poll in a 2006 report shows levels of support across seven regions of Kosovo, giving figures of between 36.9% and 62.6% for those who have a supportive attitude towards Vetëvendosje and between 21.5% and 54.3% for those who oppose it (Hyseni et al. 2006). These figures were fairly similar in the following editions of the reports. Interestingly, as Lemay-Hébert (2013) notes, the first appearance of questions on the movement in a 2006 report, were placed in the annex. In later versions it was moved to the section on 'public and personal security', and support was only assessed on the basis of region or education. One report (Hyseni et al. 2007a) poses questions on feelings of security and levels of support for Vetëvendosje, implying that these two elements are linked. There is no explanation in the reports for featuring Vetëvendosje in the 'public and personal security' section. This is even more striking because no other groups are mentioned. Vetëvendosje was mentioned in the conclusions of a 2006 report stating that the "[d]issatisfaction among members of "Vetëvendosje" with Kosovo's political developments and the occurrence of protests with a tendency to turn violent" was a security concern (Hyseni et al. 2006: 35).

Vetëvendosje appears to have had a fairly broad appeal to a varied cross-section of Kosovar society, as well as within the diaspora. It is possible to identify some key groups from which Vetëvendosje drew support, particularly due to its earlier links with the KAN, war veterans, and Albin Kurti's time as

a political prisoner. This meant that Vetëvendosje often appealed to older, rural populations, KLA veterans, and former political prisoners (Schwandner-Sievers 2013: 96). Several interviewees also suggested that Vetëvendosje was a voice of young people (Interview Five 2014; Interview 13, 2015), an idea also supported by its popularity among students, who often participated in Vetëvendosje's activities. Vetëvendosje often organised events with university students, such as discussions on the Ahtisaari Plan (Vetëvendosje 2010d).

When asked how he felt Vetëvendosje was perceived or represented by the media and international actors, Albin Kurti said Vetëvendosje was viewed as 'a troublemaker', 'a destabiliser,' and 'crazy,' and has been labeled rebels, anarchists, communists, fascists and nationalist. All to convinced people not to listen to them (Interview One 2014). The current head of Vetëvendosje's parliamentary group, Glauk Konjufca said that one image of Vetëvendosje in the pre-independence period suggests they were a "kind of very aggressive, sectarian, very radical, revolutionary organisation" (Interview Two 2014). Konjufca states that the movement were labelled by some, as communists, fascists, and anarchists and that "we were everything over the years" (Interview Two 2014). These claims made by members are supported to some extent by the negative framing of the movement in media sources and reports, such as the Early Warning Reports. Vetëvendosje has been referred to as a 'terrorist' or a 'criminal organisation' in the regional and international media (see examples Abdiu 2007, 2010; Oschliess 2006).

International actors also expressed negative claims about Vetëvendosje and appear to have viewed the movement as a spoiler of the international state-building project. A UN report issued in 2007 stated that Vetëvendosje was exploiting the political uncertainty present in Kosovo, endangering peaceful political processes and stated that it was radical and dangerous (UNSC 2007). It seems that the perceptions of Vetëvendosje among most international actors was negative. Several international interviewees described their negative perceptions during the pre-independence period (Interview Five 2014; Interview Six 2014; Interview 11 2014). One believed that Vetëvendosje's only aim was to get rid of UN interference, and that its very definition as a movement for self-determination would inevitably create conflict with the international community (Interview Six 2014). Anthropologist, Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 6) argues that the "[i]nternational attitudes and reactions towards Vetëvendosje! have been ambiguous and contradictory, if not outright helpless or even defamatory." The public statements and responses to Vetëvendosje by international actors helped create an unfavourable public image and demonstrate efforts to inhibit it.

The negative perceptions appear to have contributed to the difficulties Vetëvendosje experienced in trying to get its messages across to the Kosovar public and the detail of its arguments was often lost. It is possible to see the influence of international actors, both directly and indirectly, on these perceptions. For example, Vetëvendosje were regarded by some as being anti-American (Interview Two 2014, Interview 13 2015). As discussed in Chapter Three, the majority of the Kosovar public and elite are strongly pro-American and pro-European and there was little criticism of the international actors' involvement in Kosovo, particularly in the early years of the new protectorate. Kurti argues that members of Vetëvendosje also value the help of the US but not in the way the US wants. He argues that the US wants Kosovars to have "a 'Borat kind of love' for the United States" and that the US "treat us as idiots". He states that if you are not in line with this then you are feared by the Us - hence why Vetëvendosje is excluded (Interview One 2014).

Vetëvendosje has also argued that this perception has been used against them, in the sense that arguments may be discredited on the basis of its supposed anti-Americanism. Glauk Konjufca stated that propaganda directed against them by the government was always mediated. He argues that public perceptions of the international community as saviours is manipulated by the government, so it has become a terrible accusation to say that someone is not liked by the US (Interview Two 2014).

These negative perceptions of Vetëvendosje constrain opportunities to get more nuanced arguments across that deal with the detail of the international presence. It is of course possible that this also has the potential to attract supporters. However, for the majority of the population, it was likely that being anti-American or against the international presence was seen as being against the public interest.

Given Vetëvendosje's demands and targets, it is clear that it was unlikely to become, or even seek to become, allies with international actors. Several of the interviewees (both Albanian and international) who work within civil society and international institutions, as well as members of Vetëvendosje, suggested that a discourse had been created by the media and international actors which intentionally presented Vetëvendosje in a negative light (Interview Three 2014; Interview Four 2014; Interview Ten 2014; Interview 13, 2015; Interview 15, 2014). Puhie Demarku, Vetëvendosje's Head of External Relations and a deputy in the Assembly, believes that the international community helped to shape the radical appearance of Vetëvendosje, as well as a more positive view of other politicians who later turned out to be corrupt. Demarku also suggested that there was a lack of real analysis concerning what Vetëvendosje stood for in order to create clear opinions, and that "[f]or the sake of short term

stability the international community were willing to support the corrupt criminals and blame Vetëvendosje" (Interview Four 2014).

Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 96) argues that the attitude of international actors is also likely to have had a damaging effect on their own legitimacy amongst sections of the population.

> Perhaps not surprisingly, external state-builders and administrators have responded in a contradictory and rather helpless manner to this form of grass-roots resistance. It can be argued that by ignoring Vetëvendosje!'s historical and cultural basis of self-authentication they contributed to undermining their own legitimacy in the eyes of significant local constituencies and affirmed the claims and expectations of the ideological leaders of this civil protest movement in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Schwandner-Sievers 2013: 96).

It would be very difficult to trace the development of the discourse on Vetëvendosje, or to provide an assessment of whether this discourse and the resulting perceptions were accurate. However, what is important for this analysis is whether this discourse had an impact on Vetëvendosje's strategy. This can be determined from an analysis of Vetëvendosje's own thoughts feelings about how it was portrayed. Whether the negative perceptions of Vetëvendosje were orchestrated or not, members certainly felt the influence of the negative attitudes of some international actors, and the poor relationship between the two led to constraints on some political opportunities. Members have also acknowledged themselves that there was often a big gap between the perceptions of Vetëvendosje and what they stood for, which they did not necessarily manage very well, especially in its early stages (Interview Two 2014). One member expressed some regret about the management of perceptions and the portrayal of Vetëvendosje by the media. He noted the perception gaps which were particularly prominent in 2005, 2006 and February 2007 (Interview Two 2014). Though he did believe that it was very difficult for them to clarify or reassure doubters due to the interpretation that had been made by most of the media, analysts, the government and international actors.

Vetëvendosje's relationship with international actors clearly contributed to the shaping of its strategy during the pre-independence period. Although the independence issue dominated the political discourse, Vetëvendosje resorted to direct actions and mass protests to voice its demands. The lack of political opportunities in Kosovo during this period contributed to this use of these tactics. The perception of Vetëvendosje by international actors also limited potential allies. Many of these factors continued into the post-independence period, as discussed below.

Nationalism

As mentioned, Vetëvendosje has been referred to as a nationalist movement and its goals and displays of ethnonationalism[40] appear to have been a further point of contention for its relationship with international actors. I discussed the roots of the ethnic conflict that led to the NATO intervention in Chapter Three but here it is worth briefly considering the role of nationalism and ethnicity within the new protectorate and how it relates to Vetëvendosje.

There were high levels of nationalism before the Kosovo war, which continued at a similar level afterwards (Dyrstad 2012). Dyrstad (2012: 828) argues that this was most likely due to people being mobilised along ethnic lines well before the war and that the levels of distrust and segregation were already so high that the conflict itself hardly changed this. Some claim that there is a particularly strong primordial sentiment among Kosovo-Albanians (Berisha 2005) and that "large parts of contemporary society in Kosovo continue to identify proudly with the victorious militant resistance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)" (Schwandner-Sievers 2013: 96). Vetëvendosje's rhetoric, which some scholars have suggested is populist (Yabanci 2015; Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Visoka 2011), clearly resonates with some of the Kosovar public and appeals to this identification. One of the common features of social movements, as outlined in Chapter One, is collective identities (Diani 1992), which are readily available for nationalist movements (Vladisavljević 2002). As discussed earlier, many of Vetëvendosje's actions have referenced Albanian history and culture, which serves to assert resistance as well as its internal identity (Schwandner-Sievers 2013). Visoka (2017: 115) argues that "[o]nly by combing nationalism with social concerns did LVV manage to mobilise large crowds of people, who are largely unemployed and unhappy with their socio-economic conditions." In addition to this Strazzari and Selenica (2013) state that nationalism was not an unusual feature of Kosovar civil society in post-intervention Kosovo.

The ethnonationalist elements of Vetëvendosje did not sit well with the objectives of the international actors in Kosovo. Given the state-building agenda, which includes minority protection and pluralism, it is likely that any nationalist element would have been viewed as detrimental to that agenda. Vetëvendosje vocally oppose the approach international actors have taken to ethnicity in Kosovo. Kurti argues that the "international rule in Kosova promotes diversity at the cost of solidarity and

[40] Ethno-nationalism can be defined as "a desire to keep the (ethnic) nation homogenous and separated from other groups, where loyalty to the group is stronger than loyalty to the state" (Dyrstad 2012: 818). Muro (2015) suggests that research on ethno-nationalist conflict and social movements has remained largely separate (Stroschein 2012; Yashar 2005; Beissinger 2002), though there are some exceptions (see Vladisavljević 2002, Beissinger 1996).

difference at the cost of universality" (Kurti 2011). One of the key aims was to build "a free, pluralist and multi-ethnic" Kosovo (UNSC 1999, 16). Actors, including the UN, UNMIK, EULEX and NGOs such as the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) have all placed a great emphasis on the protection, inclusion and empowerment of minorities, which have an allocation of seats in the Kosovo Assembly (UNSC 1999, EULEX 2009, ECMI 2015). However, there has been significant criticism of UNMIK's failure to build an inclusive peace in Kosovo (see Popolo 2011; Hehir 2007, 2006; Franks and Richmond 2008, Fawn and Richmond 2009, Devic 2006). Seifert argues that "[i]nternational policies and discourses, by evoking ethnonationalist categories, tend to silence and obscure realities on the ground whose complexities cannot be captured with such simple categories. International powers create identifiable ethnic units, which serve the purpose of regional administration, thus producing the (ethnonationalist) effects that they name" (Seifert 2014: 238).

Critics argue that the policies carried out by UNMIK have been contradictory and actually "reinforced the separation between communities" along ethnic lines and "undermin[ed] communal proposals for peace" (Bargués-Pedreny 2016: 223) and that is has "institutionalized ethnicity as the only valid political category, strengthening the existing ethnic confrontation and undermining communal or hybrid forms of peace" (Bargués-Pedreny 2016: 227; also see Blumi 2003). Blumi (2003: 17) argues that international actors have demonstrated ambivalence in relation to the ethnonationalist dimensions of Kosovar society. While Seifert has suggested that these developments in Kosovo were not inevitable but actually "a complex interplay of local and - presumably more powerful - external influences is shaping identity" (2014: 239). Similarly Lemay-Hébert (2009:31) argues that the international actors' efforts to promote reconciliation between the Albanians and the Serbs via positive discrimination were misguided and increased hostility rather the desired effect of improving relations.

The decentralisation process was widely criticised by scholars for its focus on ethnicity as well as territory (Bargués-Pedreny 2016**,** see McKinna 2012b; Economides, Ker-Lindsey and Papadimitriou 2010; Kallaba 2010). Several scholars have suggested that this focus actually "fuels the nationalist imaginary" (Bargués-Pedreny 2016: 227, see (Vaughan-Williams 2006; Campbell 1998, 80) and that some have used this approach to their own strategic advantage (Bargués-Pedreny 2016; Franks and Richmond 2008, 90). Jenne (2009: 285) has stated that "*de facto* partition has ensured the electoral success of national parties and policies…, creating a climate of extreme insecurity for ethnic minorities residing in the "wrong" territory."

Bargués-Pedreny argues that there has been a shift in international actors' understanding of state-building "from a process of statebuilding that monitors and manages ethnic differences to a process that seeks to minimize the salience of ethnicity" (2016: 224). However, he goes on to argue that both approaches by international actors result in the same problematisation of the situation in post-conflict Kosovo. This, he argues, is based on Kosovars not being seen "as *people* who disagree over status, rights and needs, but as *ethnic* beings with psychosocial disorders – i.e. because of the war and traumatic post-war period – that have hidden ethnic aspirations" (Bargués-Pedreny 2016: 234).

Vetëvendosje often refers to its constituency as 'Kosovars' and has stated in publications that the right of return should be respected and that it is not anti-Serb (Vetëvendosje 2006f). Kurti states that the nationalism of Vetëvendosje is a "reaction to oppression by Milosevic and the war with the Serbs…Milosevic said there were no good Albanians, so our Albanian identity became our identity, it was a sign of defiance (Bilefski 2007). Kurti argues that if he is to be deemed a nationalist then there is a nuance: "if somebody sees some nationalist traits in me then it is more Franz Fanon than Charles de Gaulle, its more Algerian anti-colonial struggle rather than France is great" (Interview One 2014). However, Vetëvendosje's rejection of decentralisation and the negotiations with the Serbia, as well as the use of some language and imagery by the movement, such as the prevalence of Albanian flags at demonstrations, may create a different impression to some. Thus, it may also have been difficult to reconcile Vetëvendosje's desire to preserve Kosovo as it is, whilst also emphasising that the Albanian majority had been victims to Serbian oppression. Some scholars have argued that Vetëvendosje's populist politics has led to exclusionary attitudes (Visoka 2011), and "inconsistencies and double-standards" (Yabanci 2015: 29) towards minorities. Visoka (2017: 116) argues that "[b]y promoting mono-ethnic emancipation, while also ignoring the distinct identities, rights, and needs of other minority groups, LVV risked further segregating Kosovo society, delaying ethnic reconciliation, and suppressing progressive and moderate politics in the country." Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 98) states that

> even though Vetëvendosje claims to promote citizenship over ethnicity, its ideological certainty and internal construction of moral superiority in the name of nationalism generate internal homogenisation pressures. In theory, these are likely to exclude those who are not able to identify, in unambiguous terms, with the national liberation fight of the Albanians in Kosovo, for those identities and allegiances might be more heterogenous, multiple, ambiguous or divided.

This, Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 98) notes is a known risk when attempting to "generate solidarity and consent for resistance" (also, see Martin 1989).

The use of the term 'nationalist' in reference to Vetëvendosje comes with negative connotations for those of Western European or North American backgrounds, particularly due to the nature of the conflict in Kosovo. The idea that the nationalism of Eastern Europe is somehow different to that of the West appears to have stuck in the psyche of Western publics, journalists and academics, with some exceptions (see Muller 2008; Kymlicka 2001; Schopflin, cited in Kuzio 2001). In 1958, Hans Kohn (1958) stated that Western European nationalism is liberal and civic and linked to ideas of freedom and democracy. Eastern European nationalism is illiberal and ethnic and linked to history and blood-ties. This, Del Rosso (2013) argues, has been a feature of the subsequent literature on the subject and applied to the Balkans (see Kaplan 1993; Ignatieff; Pfaff 1993).

An employee of an international development agency, who had been in Kosovo since shortly after the NATO intervention, believed that Vetëvendosje's aim was to form a union with Albania and to make the Serbs leave. The interviewee went on to suggest that this was a generally held belief, and one which international actors could not be seen to tolerate (Interview Five 2014). Thus, there is a conflict between Vetëvendosje and the international regime, which is seen by Vetëvendosje as a new coloniser replacing Serbia. Thus, the claims to sovereignty made by Vetëvendosje provokes some tensions with the international regime, which is often the case with for nationalist movements (Olzak 2006).

Muro (2015) argues that the structural configuration of power defines the likely resonance of nationalist and ethnic claims. Actions brought in by international actors, such as decentralisation, the allocation of a significant number of seats for minorities in the Assembly have received criticism from various politicians, scholars and civil society groups. Thus, providing an opportunity for Vetëvendosje to criticise and mobilise supporters. Thus, the approach taken by international actors have perhaps encouraged the resonance of Vetëvendosje's claims.

Post-independence period

There were a number of shifts in Vetëvendosje's strategy after independence. Most notably it expanded its demands, directed its actions to new targets and participated in the 2010 elections, which have been assessed here, as well its allies and opposition in the post-independence period.

Expansion of demands

After a quieter period in the immediate aftermath of the independence declaration, Vetëvendosje began to expand its range of demands and shifted its strategy significantly. It took independence as an opportunity to make demands on a variety of other social and economic issues. Vetëvendosje's main aim of self-determination was somewhat resolved, though not entirely in the form it would have liked. Vetëvendosje still seeks unification with Albania via a referendum, though opportunities for this idea to be realised were further constrained by the declaration of independence. Some still suggest that unification would be popular among some sections of the population (Interview Five 2014; Interview 12, 2014). A 2010 poll conducted by Gallup, in cooperation with the European Fund for the Balkans, showed that 81% Albanian respondents in Kosovo were very supportive of a Greater Albanian. This was up from 54% in a 2008 poll (Gallup 2010: 13). Thus, the declaration of independence did not mean the issue of self-determination had been completely dealt with for Vetëvendosje. However, it is likely that this expansion of demands was due to a general acceptance of the independence declaration by the public and the Kosovar elite. This acceptance provided Vetëvendosje with opportunities for greater influence in new areas and allies, particularly as several of its demands were in areas that were also of interest to aspects of civil society and political elites.

International actors did not advocate the independence declaration at the time it was made. However, their role in independence was significant and has impacted significantly on Vetëvendosje's strategy. It felt that even though Kosovo now had full control over its institutions, it was still a protectorate, albeit in a slightly different form (Interview Three 2014).

Vetëvendosje members suggested that there was increased criticism of international actors from other sources (Interview One 2014; Interview Four 2014) and evidence suggests EULEX was widely criticised (see Chapter Three). Vetëvendosje perceived EULEX as one bureaucracy replacing another, and that a one-sided relationship between the international institutions and Kosovars, would continue. "[T]he international community seeks to impose its own political or economic projects in Kosova for its own interests and contrary to the will of Kosov[o]'s people and without their consent" (Vetëvendosje 2010c).

EULEX served as a new target for Vetëvendosje and it continued to use similar tactics to demonstrate its opposition to the presence of EULEX and the ICO. The EU-facilitated dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia was seen by Vetëvendosje as a continuation of attempts by international actors to partition Kosovo that could still result in a similar situation to that found in Bosnia. Vetëvendosje's

opposition to the international presence may have had a slightly different effect on the opportunities available to it in the post-independence period. International actors had less overarching control, EULEX in particular had a much narrower remit than before and the ICO appeared to be more temporary than UNMIK had been. A protest in September 2009, against the signing of a protocol between Serbia and EULEX, had a smaller turnout (of a few hundred) in comparison to other protests organised by Vetëvendosje. However, the smaller turnout may have been a side-effect of a Vetëvendosje protest a month earlier at which a small number of activists turned over EULEX vehicles in Pristina (Freedom House 2010b). It also appears that Vetëvendosje are still viewed as anti-American, as well as against EU membership, something which it actually favours (Interview Four 2014).

A number of the issues Vetëvendosje had begun to pursue, particularly privatisation and corruption, had been protested about by other groups in the pre-independence period. These were salient issues amongst opposition political parties and civil society, increasing the potential for allies for Vetëvendosje. Vetëvendosje has taken a strong position against neoliberal economic policies, stating that certain policies, especially the privatisation of public services, have caused problems in other states and that Vetëvendosje would like Kosovo to take a different path (Interview Three 2014). Demands relating to the economy are largely directed towards the government, which Vetëvendosje states lacks economic vision and focus on costly infrastructure projects (Ibid). Although most of these demands are directed at the government, Vetëvendosje does state that many of these policies were initiated by UNMIK. Vetëvendosje is also very critical of the exploitative nature of the international presence, and highlighted the construction of the Super Highway as an example (Ibid), a project that was widely criticised (see Chapter Three).

Corruption become a key concern for Vetëvendosje. The issue of government corruption has been criticised by opposition parties and is also a key concern for a number of NGOs as well as international actors. Addressing the corruption issue, presented the potential for a range of allies on this issue, particularly given that it is quite distinct from the main issues Vetëvendosje was associated with in the pre-independence period. In 2008, anti-corruption NGO Cohu! and Vetëvendosje both criticised the government as well as the opposition, which a Freedom House (2009) report suggested may have been to avoid being seen as being an extension of the opposition. International actors have not been that successful in fighting corruption so far and have suffered their own corruption scandals (Borger 2014c). However, their attempts have perhaps increased opportunities for the issue to be debated and pressure placed on government. This has occurred via a number of factors, including the funding

of civil society actors to focus on corruption and by the sheer presence of the EULEX mission and the cases it has dealt with, bringing the issue of corruption to the forefront of public debate (for example EULEX 2012).

The expansion of demands highlighted potentially overlapping goals with international actors and perhaps a more favourable context in which to air them. Vetëvendosje felt that it often spoke the language of the 'international community' - as perceived at a global level, but not necessarily in relation to its actions in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje feels that some of its views have been misinterpreted, which has served to increase its desire to be listened to by those who criticise it. Vetëvendosje strongly believes that its ideas do not diverge greatly from the principles that the international actors have tried to promote (Interview Two 2014). Kurti argues that they wanted to "speak in their language" so the West would understand, because "intellectually, philosophically, we are children of the west" (Interview One 2014).

Vetëvendosje advocated democracy in the Western European sense, or rather, as Kurti stated, they were "fully compliant with Western thinking, with a history of Western ideas, but not in compliance with Western foreign policies" so this is a gap Vetëvendosje intended to exploit (Interview One 2014). Kurti argues that the international community did not allow for the 'demos' within democracy and consistently considered Kosovars to be residents and not citizens. Vetëvendosje stated that it is keen to see a 'complete democratic process' in which the active engagement of citizens is enabled by direct and participatory democracy, rather than a purely representative one. It believes that this will bridge the widening gap between the political institutions in Kosovo and the will and interests of the people (Interview Three 2014; Interview Four 2014).

Elections

After extensive debates lasting six months (Interview Three 2014), Vetëvendosje decided to put forward candidates for the elections in 2010, which signifies the biggest shift in Vetëvendosje's strategy throughout its history. The long discussions that took place before the decision was made to enter electoral politics raised a number of concerns about the potential constraints this would have on its identity and ability to mobilise. Concerns included its future identity, its capacities in terms of expertise and analysis, and that energy spent on entering electoral politics would be diverted from other activities (Interview Three 2014).

Vetëvendosje participated in the 2010 elections as a 'citizen's initiative' (see Chapter Three), notably not as a political party or independent candidate. It did not want to be considered solely as a political party and it planned to keep its existing activities at the forefront, seeing the involvement in electoral politics as an additional means of pushing forward its agenda: an "expansion of our strategy" (Interview One 2014; also see Vetëvendosje 2010a). Vetëvendosje continue to self-identify as a movement and continue their movement activities but are now, at least in part, an SMO due to the more organized nature of it parliamentary group.

The decision to continue to call itself a movement has raised questions from political parties and journalists over what type of organisation Vetëvendosje is. Vetëvendosje has, at times, felt under pressure to define itself, though Kurti argues that this should not be necessary (Interview One 2014). Kurti states that:

> we don't think of ourselves as a political party but neither as an NGO or CSO. We are none of these. We are a political movement which has a political concept, starting with a manifesto which we started nine years ago and developed into a political programme (Interview One 2014).

This represents Vetëvendosje's broader efforts to separate itself as a different entity to others operating in Kosovo, such as NGOs and the other political parties. Similarly, another member stated how important the word *movement* was in reflecting the concept of Vetëvendosje's organisation as energetic and vivid (Interview Four 2014). The emphasis on the definition as a movement also serves to confirm the continuation of existing strategies and tactics, to demonstrate that it continues to be a grassroots movement. One member stressed that, "we initially call ourselves activists so we refuse to be limited to a role that is purely institutional" (Interview Four 2014). Vetëvendosje clearly has several elements that are typical of other parties, such as its functions, rules and organisational aspects. However, the movement does not want to reduce itself to those elements alone, refusing to be "reduced to the classical functions of the Western parties in typical parliamentary life" (Interview Two 2014). No other party in Kosovo has formed in this way or considered itself a movement at the same time and the concept is perhaps viewed as unusual.

Despite the entry into electoral politics, Kurti speaks of an "unavoidable alienation with institutions" and that Vetëvendosje seeks to remain a movement (Interview One 2014). As a result Kurti visits his

parliamentary office once a week to allow "some fresh air in"[41] (Interview One 2014). Vetëvendosje has high expectations of its MPs, the standards they should work to and their continuation of participation in demonstrations. A structure has been set up that is intended to ensure that the movement organisation is in control of the parliamentary group and not the other way around.

Vetëvendosje had stated that it did not see Kosovo's domestic institutions as a useful arena for its activities in the pre-independence period. Also, the evidence outlined in Chapter Three suggested that issues of fraudulent results, low voter turnout, and corrupt politicians may put off movements using domestic institutions. However, Vetëvendosje decided to participate in elections, in large part, because the international involvement in domestic institutions had decreased substantially. It was still not satisfied with the conduct of the institutions but viewed the Assembly as an "arena where we are going to fight" (Interview One 2014). Vetëvendosje had decided that this new arena would make it more visible and gave it the opportunity to confront political elites, which Kurti states would not have happened before (Interview One 2014).

There are a few other opportunities that were outlined in Chapter Three that would explain the move into electoral politics, such as the signs that the opposition (whichever party or parties that was) was becoming occasionally more effective, and that other new entities from a different position on the political spectrum (though there were few of these) had also chosen to stand in elections. The moves by a number of those employed in civil society to politics, most notably the three directors of well-known NGOs that formed the New Spirit party, suggests that others also started to see domestic institutions as a viable arena to make demands and effect change. According to Freedom House, the move by Vetëvendosje and several civil society activists prompted scepticism from a number of other organisations who saw them as "a sign of the growing politicization of civil society and a cynical use of civic activism as a path into mainstream politics" (Freedom House 2012). However, it seems that the independence declaration had a major effect on Vetëvendosje's direction. Its expanding demands and goals, the lack of opportunities available to influence in other ways, and the decrease in international influence over political institutions appear to have been the primary factors for Vetëvendosje's decision.

[41] Although Kurti is an MP he spends the majority of his time on what he considers to be movement activity. He attends weekly plenary sessions and meetings on the committee on foreign affairs (two per month), resulting in about six meetings per month. He believes that these meetings, plus preparation time, allows him to spend three out of four weeks working solely on movement activities.

Vetëvendosje first put candidates forward in the 2010 elections and placed third, winning 13% of the vote, gaining 14 of 120 seats. After concerns over incidents of fraud in the election, Vetëvendosje appealed some of the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel's (ECAP) decisions in the Supreme Court, which ruled in favour of Vetëvendosje and another election was held in the Mitrovica municipality. The move into electoral politics did open up a number of other opportunities, including other allies. The move also attracted new activists and some from other political parties (Interview Two 2014**;** Interview Four 2014; Interview Five 2014). Vetëvendosje also continued to organise protests, including one in 2012 on the day an agreement was signed involving the government selling its energy grid and distribution to the Turkish consortium Calik-Limak. Vetëvendosje's MPs were prevented from attending the ceremony by the police. This led to the speaker of parliament accusing the Interior Minister of leading a siege of parliament due to his interference in the autonomy of the police (Freedom House 2013b).

Vetëvendosje put forward its expanded programme in the 'Governing Alternative' in August 2013, which demonstrated it different perspective to other parties in parliament. Vetëvendosje was the only party to oppose the Brussels Agreement that sought to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia. A few members of other parties also voted against but the agreement was ratified with the votes of two-thirds of the MPs (Freedom House 2014b).

In the June 2014 elections, Vetëvendosje gained slightly more votes with almost 14%, resulting in third place and 16 seats. The PDK had won the most votes in the election but the party could not get other parties to form a coalition. The LDK, AAK, and new party, Initiative for Kosovo (NISMA), formed a coalition which Vetëvendosje later joined. Significantly, this coalition wanted to put Vetëvendosje in charge of the process of dialogue with Serbia. However, the Constitutional Court ruled that it was not possible for this coalition to stand as it had not formed prior to the election.

Also in 2014, Shpend Ahmeti, a Vetëvendosje member, formerly of the New Spirit party, was elected as mayor of Pristina, replacing the incumbent LDK mayor in the first success of its kind for Vetëvendosje. The position had become highly sought after by all the main parties as local government had become more appealing to more well-known and senior politicians (see Chapter Three). The improvements to local governance, much of which had occurred with the support of international actors, and the increasing appeal and importance associated with mayoral positions, particularly in Pristina, was an important opportunity for Vetëvendosje. One Vetëvendosje member suggested that there had been a prevailing assumption that if you were not liked by the international community you

had no chance of winning anything. Now it felt that the election of Ahmeti as mayor of Pristina demonstrated that it is possible to become critical of the international community and still win elections (Interview Four 2014). Though it is not possible to assess the reasons the public voted for Ahmeti, it can be argued that he is one of the few elected officials in Kosovo that has been openly critical of international actors.

Allies and opposition

Vetëvendosje has continued to engage with a variety of groups, particularly labour unions and students, as well as a range of interest groups including groups of professionals, farmers and small businesses, and other organisations such as those working with the families of missing persons and those working to help people get together within their neighbourhoods to deal with problems and improvements in their shared space (Interview One 2014). Vetëvendosje has also maintained its relationships with other grassroots organisations. These groups have, for the most part, had little interaction or direct contact with international actors, which makes them more suitable allies than many other civil society actors.

Some of the perceptions of Vetëvendosje may have begun to slowly shift in the post-independence era, particularly after Vetëvendosje's entry into electoral politics and winning the Pristina mayoral election. Participation in elections seems to have given some confirmation that Vetëvendosje is a serious entity and demonstrates a level of support that was hard to quantify in its earlier stages. When interviewed, Robin Budd, Second Secretary at the British Embassy in Pristina said that "[t]he election of the mayor demonstrates VV [Vetëvendosje] is more than just a protest movement and a serious player in the political scene of Kosovo" (Interview Eight 2014). The involvement of Vetëvendosje in electoral politics provided an opportunity for the public and politicians to demonstrate their support or opposition to Vetëvendosje in a way they may not have done before.

In the run up to the 2010 election, Vetëvendosje's focus on corruption gained some high profile support from US diplomat and former head of the Kosovo Verification Mission, William Walker, who endorsed Albin Kurti's bid to become an MP. Walker believed that the international community was "complicit" in the current corruption found in Kosovo (Lewis 2010). Walker, admitted that support of Kurti was "a little unusual", and that this support for Kurti would be regarded as "going rogue" by the State Department. He stated that he was not in agreement with all of Kurti's policies, but that the international community was "looking the other way" while the current government benefitted from corruption (Lewis 2010).

Though it is difficult to gauge and verify how Vetëvendosje is perceived by the public and international actors, anecdotal evidence from 2014 suggests that perceptions have shifted somewhat, even if this has not been publicly acknowledged. Interviews with several international employees suggested that Vetëvendosje's emphasis on anticorruption has led to them becoming seen as an anticorruption movement (Interview Seven 2014; Interview Six 2014). Several interviewees (both international and Kosovar) were positive about this shift, and suggested that Vetëvendosje is "providing an alternative that was missing" (Interview Seven 2014), that it is a healthy political development (Interview Five 2014), and "the only counterweight to corrupt politicians" (Interview Six 2014). It also seems that the new focus of Vetëvendosje, and its agenda more broadly, has given those internationals that had only worked in the country in recent years a more positive impression of Vetëvendosje (Interview Six 2014).

The newly elected major, Shpend Ahmeti was referred to by one international interviewee as the "cuddly face" of Vetëvendosje (Interview Five 2014), while others considered him to be on the 'conservative wing' of the party (Interview Five 2014; Interview Six 2014), "more mainstream" or "less radical" (Interview Six 2014). There is little to suggest that a 'conservative wing' of the party exists, but perhaps this view is due to his former leadership of the New Spirit Party,[42] his Harvard education and his former position as a World Bank economist. It could also be part of an effort to separate him from the rest of Vetëvendosje by suggesting that he is not wholly representative of the party. Another interviewee suggested that Vetëvendosje was unhappy with him, as he is not doing what Vetëvendosje wants him to (Interview Six 2014). It does not appear that he is demonstrating great differences to the rest of the party, although one member did suggest he may be less vocal on unification with Albania (Interview Three 2014). Ahmeti has expressed his disappointment over the limited support from the West. He has said that EULEX is "constrained by timidity in European capitals when it comes to following the corruption trail to the doors of top politicians" and suggested that EU politicians pressure EULEX to delay pursuing individuals, particularly if they are key players in the dialogue with Serbia (Borger 2014a).

The actions of Ahmeti as mayor of Pristina seem to have been fairly well received by international actors, though this also seems to be expressed solely in private. Ahmeti was quick to make efforts to rid Pristina of corruption, tackling the construction sector (the sector most linked to organised crime)

[42] The FeR or 'New Spirit Party', consisted of prominent local NGOs and public policy think-tanks. The creation of FeR had "the intention of bridging the gap between official politics and citizenship, FeR was considered to be EU-friendly, and is mostly composed of young, liberal, technically competent intellectuals and professionals educated in the West" (Strazzari and Selenica 2013: 128). However, they failed to gain the 5% of votes required for parliamentary representation.

by stopping illegal building[43] and issues with waste and water management,[44] leading some to suggest he is "arguably the bravest mayor on the continent" (Borger 2014a). At the time of data collection, many of the international employees interviewed seemed impressed with Ahmeti's efforts in Pristina (Interview Five 2014; Interview Six 2014; Interview Twelve 2014). However, any approval voiced was often followed by the caveat that they did not support the party or Vetëvendosje more widely, not wishing to give them credibility or potentially encouraging voters outside of Pristina. This attitude was something that Vetëvendosje members and other Albanian interviewees seemed to be aware of (Interview Three 2014; Interview Four 2014). This leaves some international actors in a position where they might want to work with and support Ahmeti's activities while not wanting to be seen to endorse him. Thus the lasting perceptions of Vetëvendosje and its lack of allies among international actors is still potentially constraining political opportunities, particularly as it seeks to engage with international actors.

As the above discussion on Ahmeti demonstrates, the underlying positivity towards aspects of Vetëvendosje from those within international institutions does not signify a complete shift in attitude. Vetëvendosje felt that the perception of it has not changed among the most influential sectors of international community and that it was still not accepted by international actors, even after winning seats. Though it did feel that some recognised that Vetëvendosje had modified its aims (Interview Five 2014) and that international actors were likely to feel that they had to be more accepting publicly now that it had gained seats in the election, as it showed a significant level of public support. Kurti stated that participation in elections has forced some degree of engagement, including meetings but no official ones, and that this has not come willingly from international actors (Interview One 2014). Kurti said that Vetëvendosje is not invited to monthly meetings with the US ambassador (Interview One 2014). Despite missing these meetings, Vetëvendosje has changed its strategy and now tries to meet with those representing international actors, not just ambassadors but across the wide range of actors (Interview Four 2014). This is part of an effort to communicate its message more directly (Interview Four 2014), which is something Vetëvendosje has also tried to do with the public more broadly. Members stated that they felt that the gap in perceptions and what they really stand for is much closer than it was before (Interview Two 2014, Interview Three 2014). These efforts to engage with

[43] The issue of violations of building regulations had been neglected over the last 15 years. Well-known architect and the city planning director who was working for the UN, Rexhep Luci, attempted to tackle the issue and was shot in the back six times in 2000. There has already been at least one assassination plot against Ahmeti (Borger 2014a; Luci 2013).

[44] At the time, the city was experiencing daytime cuts in the water supply despite the fact there had been a large amount of rain.

international actors represents a significant shift in strategy and stands in stark contrast to Vetëvendosje's earlier methods of 'communicating' with international actors. This approach by Vetëvendosje and its choice to participate in elections may open up new opportunities, particularly for new allies, but for now the relationship with international actors seems to be less oppositional, though it still has a long way to go.

The potential of a changing relationship between international actors and Vetëvendosje is significant, given the history between the two and its effect on Vetëvendosje's strategy. It is clear that Vetëvendosje's early demands and tactics did not fit with the agenda of the international presence. It is also possible that Vetëvendosje's outright opposition to Kosovo's negotiations with Serbia overshadowed other aims and, to some extent, the perceptions of Vetëvendosje in the pre-independence have stuck. However this changed with independence, which was again an aspect of Kosovo's political context that was largely influenced by international actors. The presence of the international actors gave Vetëvendosje the feeling that there were few alternatives for expressing its demands. Political opportunities, as outlined in Chapter Three, were also generally low, particularly in the pre-independence period. Entry into institutions occurred at a time where there may have appeared to be more potential to influence within the institutions rather than opposing them. This, along with Vetëvendosje's other strategic choices shows how it has adjusted to the constraints it found within the context of a new protectorate. The new priorities and wider set of goals and demands has broadened Vetëvendosje's appeal with the public and may also be altering the perceptions of the elite.

Conclusion

Vetëvendosje's relationship with international actors clearly contributed to the shaping of its strategy throughout the new protectorate period. Vetëvendosje's emergence was a direct result of the prolonged international presence in Kosovo, which it opposed. Vetëvendosje perceived the international presence, particularly in the form of UNMIK, to be an obstacle to its main goal of self-determination for Kosovo and it opposed the decision to involve Serbia in Kosovo's status talks. The lack of opportunities available for Vetëvendosje to influence the discourse on the status issue contribute to the type of tactics used, particularly the use of direct actions and mass protests. There are signs that international actors attempted to inhibit Vetëvendosje's activity and the perception of it by international actors, also limited potential allies. Vetëvendosje's opposition to the international presence made allies within the international actors highly unlikely. The potential for allies within civil society was also limited due to the vast amounts of funding from international actors for projects and

organisations that would work on the issues of concern to international actors. As a result, Vetëvendosje's closest allies were other grassroots movements or groups.

Vetëvendosje was keen to position itself as a different entity to political parties and NGOs which had formed in huge numbers since the intervention due to international funding. During the pre-independence period Vetëvendosje also opposed the PISG due to its control by international actors, and so, enter institutions was not viable tactic. However, after the independence declaration, Vetëvendosje expanded its goals and its tactical repertoire by putting candidates forward for election in 2010. Vetëvendosje argue that this provides it with an additional arena in which to influence, but that its continuing movement activities are still a priority. Vetëvendosje's success in elections has proved its position as a serious political player and it appears that some of the perceptions of Vetëvendosje have altered slightly. Its anti-corruption stance has been well-received by many, including some international actors. Vetëvendosje now meet with some international actors and are keen to discuss its policy ideas. However, Vetëvendosje still feel that the most powerful international actors are still unwilling to listen to them.

Tilly (1979) and Tarrow (1998) have both stated that political opportunities are not just something that social movements have to confront, but can also be influenced by movements themselves. The discussion above suggests that Vetëvendosje also had an impact on the political opportunities available to them as well as those available to others. Several activists from Vetëvendosje have gone on to organise other groups and campaigns, and Vetëvendosje activists have been asked to advise students and unions, and have been asked to be present at their protests (Delafrouz 2009). Several social movement scholars (Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 1986) have stated that the presence of other movements is likely to encourage further movement activity, causing a 'demonstration effect'. The presence of Vetëvendosje may have had such an effect. It is possible that Vetëvendosje's tactics have influenced others and had some impact on the small increase in acts of civil disobedience and protest, as noted by a USAID (2010) report. This may be due to the fact that many of the constraints in political opportunities perceived by Vetëvendosje are also present for other grassroots movements.

CHAPTER FIVE: AFGHANISTAN

This chapter assesses how the presence of international actors in Afghanistan has shaped the context in which social movements might function. Here I provide an overview of how Afghanistan became a new protectorate and the international actors involved. I take a closer look at the role of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and also consider the coherence of the international presence in Afghanistan. Following this I consider the domestic elites that have emerged since the conflict, the coherence of these elites, and their relationship with international actors. I then discuss the influence of international actors on democratic development, particularly the conduct and outcome of elections and civil society development. Throughout the chapter I assess the key actors involved and the events that took place with a view to providing an insight into the impact of these factors on the potential political opportunities in post-intervention Afghanistan. This chapter draws on the extensive literature on Afghanistan, as well as the new protectorate and political opportunity literature explored in Chapter One and Two, which has been applied to the specific context of Afghanistan. The assessment of the international actors influence, and their impact on political opportunities provides the context for the analysis of Afghanistan 1400 in the following chapter.

International actors

A vast amount of literature has assessed Afghanistan's complex history (Dupree 2014; Rubin 2013; Barfield 2010; Rubin 1995; Anderson and Dupree 1990) and conflicts (Fergusson 2011; Rashid 2010; Tanner 2009; Maley 2002), as well as the US led intervention in 2001 and the subsequent state-building efforts (Morgan Edwards 2010; Cramer and Goodhand 2002; Suhrke 2001). State-building attempts in Afghanistan have been the focus of a growing critique within the academic and policy-orientated literature, as has the nature of the state itself and how it has developed historically (Barfield 2010; Rubin 2002; Edwards 1996). This literature highlights the extensive influence from a variety of international actors involved in the new protectorate. Here, I clarify Afghanistan's status as a new protectorate and provide an overview of the international actors involved, particularly the role of UNAMA. This overview provides a broad insight into the levels of influence international actors have had in Afghanistan and their resulting influence on political opportunities for movements.

Afghanistan as a new protectorate

Afghanistan has experienced interference from foreign forces for centuries and, particularly over the last 40 years, has become synonymous with violence and destruction, due to the nine-year Soviet invasion followed by civil war and Taliban rule. The extremely restrictive Taliban rule that had been in

place since 1996 was ended by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The operation took place in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, led by the US with the support of the UK. The US believed that al-Qaeda, and its leader Osama bin Laden, thought to be behind the 9/11 attacks, were being sheltered in Afghanistan by the Taliban. Initial military objectives included the capture of al-Qaeda leaders and the prevention of terrorist activities in Afghanistan through the destruction of training camps and infrastructure on Afghan territory (Bush 2001). US and UK forces used aerial bombing on Taliban and al-Qaeda targets and supported the Northern Alliance (NA), which was a military front formed in 1996. When the NA formed it was largely a Tajik organisation. However, by 2000, several other leaders of ethnic groups, including Uzbeks and Hazaras, joined the NA and participated in the civil war with the largely Pashtun Taliban. Once OEF had begun, the NA quickly took control of most of Northern Afghanistan and Kabul.

A few months into the intervention, NATO committed troops from 43 states[45] outside its own borders for the first time after invoking Article 5 of the NATO treaty. The mission was authorised by the UN Security Council in December 2001 by Resolution 1386, which involved NATO leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. The NATO alliance set out to bring reconciliation across the country, and then planned to withdraw, leaving a widely accepted government, supported by a strong Afghan Army and police (Khan 2013: 104). As well as fighting the Taliban insurgency, the ISAF mission also aimed to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and to assist Afghanistan in rebuilding key government institutions. This expanded the original aims of the intervention to include the removal of the Taliban and the creation of a new legitimate government based on democratic principles and human rights.

A month after NATO involvement began, a political settlement was negotiated by international actors and some Afghan groups at a UN sponsored Conference in Bonn in November 2001. One of the key outcomes of the Bonn Conference, the first of over ten international conferences on Afghanistan, was the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions. This agreement was signed by Afghan representatives from various exile groups, but significantly not by any of the Taliban or many Pashtun tribal leaders (Morgan Edwards 2010). It was the first of a series of agreements intended to establish a process for political reconstruction and the adoption of a new constitution. The conference made provisions for an

[45] Troops were contributed from states including Norway, Canada, Germany, Australia and New Zealand, which were engaged in fighting the Taliban insurgency while US and UK Special Forces continued to target al Qaeda activists (Johnson 2013).

emergency *Loya Jirga* (a grand assembly) to take place in 2002, a Supreme Court, banking and currency arrangements, UN assistance, a human rights commission and agreements on the return of refugees (Johnson 2013). Discussions began over the establishment of democratic elections involving six neighbouring countries, plus the US and Russia (known as the 6+2), who agreed that a multi-ethnic, freely elected government should be chosen in 2004. Prior to this, a Transitional Administration (TA) was established until the elections took place. Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, was selected as Chair of the TA and later elected president in the 2004 elections. A few months after the conference, the UN assistance mission (UNAMA) was established.

The Bonn Conference signified the commencement of the state-building project in earnest, and the significant presence of international actors in Afghanistan. It is from this time that Afghanistan can be considered a new protectorate, in accordance with the definition of new protectorates given in Chapter One. Despite a significant reduction of the international military presence and the Afghan government taking full control of its security in 2014, the country arguably remains a new protectorate. While the NATO-led ISAF ended its mandate at the end of 2014, a new NATO-led mission, Resolute Support, was launched in January 2015 to "train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions" (NATO 2016).

NATO continues to finance the Afghan security forces, and the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership, signed in 2010, which "provides a framework for long term political consultations and practical cooperation," was strengthened at the NATO summit in 2014 (NATO 2015). In addition to this, NATO's Senior Civilian Representative remains in Afghanistan, and further financial assistance has been promised (Reuters 2016b). Although US President Obama announced the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, troops remain, albeit far fewer and with a narrower mandate similar to that of NATO's post 2014 operation. In fact, Obama recently announced that a total of 8,400 troops would remain, nearly 3,000 more than originally planned, due to the continued insecurity in the country (Landler 2016). On top of this, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), details of which are explained below, has had its mandate renewed until March 2017 (UNAMA n.d.). Given this extended political and military presence in Afghanistan, I argue that the new protectorate status of Afghanistan continues, and is likely to remain until 2017 at the earliest.

UNAMA

The presence of international actors in Afghanistan did not take the form of an international administration run by the UN, like those found in Kosovo or East Timor, established two years earlier.

Instead, the UN launched the civilian UNAMA, established by UN Security Council Resolution 1401 in March 2002 (UNSC 2002). The UNAMA's mandate is for a political mission that provides

> "political good offices in Afghanistan; works and supports the government's process of peace and reconciliation; monitors and promotes human rights and the protection of civilians in armed conflict; promotes good governance; and encourages regional cooperation" (UNAMA n.d.).

The UN's role could be considered as a facilitator, applying a 'light footprint approach' (Chesterman 2007: 3). Thus, the political role of the UN was not as extensive as in Kosovo or East Timor, because the UN was not in a position of government, and Afghanistan's sovereignty was maintained throughout the period of international involvement (Chesterman 2007: 9).

The role of the UNAMA was to assist the political structures that had been put in place by the 2001 Bonn conference when requested by the Afghan government. This lighter international presence was intended to assist Afghan institutions gain legitimacy and capabilities quickly (Lockhart 2011). The UNAMA is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the office of the SRSG is charged with overall policy guidance, high-level political decision-making, and liaising with coalitions forces, ISAF and the Afghan Government. The mission has two divisions of activity, political and development and humanitarian issues. It includes several units responsible for coordinating international support for institution-building: Election Support, Military Advisory, Governance, Police Advisory, and Rule of Law.

International Community?

The term 'international community' appeared regularly in documentary sources and interviews throughout the data collection process. As in the case of Kosovo, the term seems to provide a convenient form of reference to the broad presence of international actors and the values and norms they are generally considered to promote. However, as Chapter One highlighted, the use of the term often refers to a narrow but shifting set of actors. The actors being referred to were usually the US, NATO, the UN and affiliated bodies. In addition to the NATO alliance, ISAF forces, and UNAMA, several other international actors have featured in the state-building process in the form of embassies, NGOs, and government development bodies. UN bodies, such as the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the UNAMA, the UNDP and the International Migration Organisation (IOM), as well as a wide variety of NGOs, and state development organisations such as

USAID and DFID were at the forefront of dealing with the many development and economic challenges.

There are several other influential external actors in Afghanistan, which are not considered part of this international effort, either by Afghans or the actors mentioned, particularly Iran, China, and Pakistan. Shia political groups in Iran helped to build and arm the Northern Alliance and now Afghanistan receives aid, and maintains good relations with Iran (see Khan 2013; Rubin 2013). China seemed to have some understanding of the motivations for the initial intervention but was concerned about an enduring international presence, which it perceived as an attempt to prevent Chinese strategic interests in the region. China's interest is largely linked to Afghanistan's strategic transportation and infrastructure routes. In September 2012 China's security leader stated, during a visit that China would "respect the rights of the Afghan people to choose their own path of development and [that it] w[ould] actively participate in Afghanistan's reconstruction after the withdrawal of US and NATO forces" (Bodansky 2013: 190). China has signed several security and economic agreements to help train, equip and fund the Afghan police and develop Afghanistan's natural resources (Bodansky 2013: 190). Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan have a long and mixed history. The early 1970s saw the beginning of interference by Pakistan in Afghanistan's internal affairs (Khan 2013). During the Soviet intervention, over three million Pashtuns fled to Pakistan. The Taliban's capture of Kabul has been attributed by many to support from Pakistan (Khan 2013: 97) and many Taliban members come from neighbouring Pakistan. This has been particularly problematic for security and Afghanistan and in 2008, US president Obama stated that the problems for Afghanistan also lay in Pakistan's tribal areas and the term 'AfPak' was coined (Khan 2013: 103).

All these states are arguably considered to have goals that differ from the goals of the international community (i.e. Western human rights and democracy), nor were they part of the initial intervention in Afghanistan. These states are not considered in further depth here as they were not involved in the initial intervention and do not promote the same developmental and democratising goals as other actors in new protectorates.

The US has been particularly influential, despite showing little interest in Afghanistan during the Clinton administration. It preferred to support UN efforts at peace building and Pakistan (who helped equipping the Taliban), and even suggesting that the NA surrender to the Taliban. This policy began to shift after the US embassy bombings in 1998 in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi after which the US and UN sanctioned the Taliban (UNSCR 1267). After the attacks the US focused on Afghanistan as a

terrorist base that was a threat to the US (Rubin 2013). In August 2001 (prior to the attack on the twin towers), the US administration began supporting Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the NA. The US then instigated the initial intervention and put the most resources into reconstruction efforts, which the US has led as a result. The US and Afghanistan signed a joint declaration, which demonstrated their strategic partnership, giving US forces access to Afghan military facilities. The declaration states that the US will help to sustain Afghan security forces and continue to build Afghanistan's economy and democracy (US State Department 2005).

Other states, particularly the UK, Italy, Germany and Japan, have also shown a substantial commitment to Afghanistan in terms of resources. The EU has had a significant political and economic role in Afghanistan given its financial contributions and the influence of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) (Gross 2008). EU member states and institutions gave eight billion euros in aid between 2002 and 2010 (Buckley 2010: 2), making them collectively the second largest donor (Gross 2008). However, some have suggested that the EU's impact does not match its contributions (Buckley 2010) or that despite increased aid, the influence of the EU has actually decreased (Burke, E. 2014).

Among the actors studied here, there was a general alignment on the fairly broad goals to provide security and establish democracy, which have dominated the concerns of those involved in 'high politics'. This is represented in several agreements made with Afghanistan, including the Bonn Agreement, the EU-Afghanistan Joint Political Declaration (EU 2005) and the Afghanistan Compact (NATO 2006), although as Buckley argues these agreements tend to provide general guidance, outlining broad and ambitious goals, rather than much specific detail (Buckley 2010: 3). Different actors have provided different levels of resources and commitment, and have often taken responsibility for different aspects of state-building, such as military, judicial or police reform. For example, at a G8 meeting in Geneva in Spring 2002, responsibilities for Security Sector Reform (SSR) were distributed. The SSR consisted of different pillars, each led by a different state: Germany led on police reform, the US led military reform, Italy led judicial reform, and the UK led on counter-narcotics and Japan on DDR (Hodes and Sedra 2007). According to Burke, the responsibilities over certain state-building aspects did not necessarily reflect the actors' experience or competence in that area (Burke, E. 2014).

There have been indications of tensions over the delivery of assistance, development efforts involving the military (Dowdy and Erdmann 2013: 279), and among different military actors (Johnson 2013: 145). Paddy Ashdown, who was close to becoming the UN envoy to Afghanistan (BBC News 2008),

presented a damning statement on the coordination of international actors, stating that the failure of international actors in Afghanistan was not due to the Afghan President, but due to "our complete inability in the international community to get our act together and to speak with a single voice; to have a clear plan […] and a clear set of priorities" (Bhadrakumar 2009). This lack of coordination extended to the US and NATO allies, and the approach to military and civilian assistance in Afghanistan since the intervention. Thus, the approach can be considered incoherent, and although recognised by many of these actors, a comprehensive approach has not appeared (Stapleton and Keating 2015).

Tensions and a lack of coherence among international actors has occurred various stages in the state-building process. Rubin (2013: 15) argues that "[o]nce involved, the "international community" seemed to have no way to define achievable goals in Afghanistan, instead piling on objectives, though not the resources to achieve them." Despite this it does not appear that the lack of clear goals or the presence of tension between international represent the type of divisions that would provide opportunities for movements. Despite the vagueness international actors generally present a consensus and assumptions are made about their broad goals, which are clearly distinct from those of a number of domestic actors, such as the Taliban. Therefore, movements or CSOs may pursue specific international actors, but this is most likely to be due to a mutual interest in the issues the movement is concerned with and the potential access it can gain, rather than due to the perception of divisions amongst the international actors.

Despite differences, international actors have been extremely influential in Afghanistan, from the intervention until the present day, resulting in the significant potential to impact upon political opportunities. Despite the 'light footprint approach', international actors have influenced the development of new political institutions and a wide range of development and policy areas. The approach taken by international actors does make it a little more difficult to gauge how much influence international actors had over certain issues. This is due to the considerable amount of influence that is exercised by diplomatic means that are not always publicly discussed or measurable. Despite this, it is still possible to see the influence of international actors on political opportunities in a number of areas, which are discussed further throughout the chapter.

Domestic elites

As discussed in Chapter Two, domestic elites play an important role in new protectorates and their relationship with international actors is significant in the outcome of the transition to a democratic state (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Tansey 2009; Holohan 2005). Here I will outline the domestic elites

present in Afghanistan after the intervention as well as their relationship with international actors. This provides a useful insight into Afghanistan's political elite and allows for a more thorough consideration of related political opportunities.

The current political elite in Afghanistan is representative of power struggles in the country over at least half a century. Once the initial intervention and the ousting of the Taliban from large parts of Afghanistan had occurred, many of the earlier Afghan elite re-emerged, including some returning from exile. These included former regional commanders and warlords, many of whom had been involved in the civil war in the 1990s. On their return, some competed for power and resources (ICG 2002) in the areas they had controlled prior to Taliban rule, continuing as they had during the civil war, creating militias and exploiting those who were not in their patronage network (Farrell and Giustozzi 2013). These warlords, some argue, were effectively rewarded and supported by the West after the intervention, causing further insecurity (Burke, E. 2014: 3-4; Rubin 2006: 5-6).

At the Bonn negotiations in 2001, four delegations of ethnic factions positioned against the Taliban were present, including the Northern Alliance, the Cypress group (exiles with links to Iran), the Rome group (elites loyal to former King Mohammad Zaher Shah), and the Peshawar group (mostly Pashtun exiles based in Pakistan). The Taliban were not invited, and the signatories of the agreement did not include many significant Pashtun leaders, which Morgan Edwards (2010: 11) argues, led to a feeling of alienation from central government among Pashtuns.

Power was distributed at the 2002 *Loya Jirga*, which consisted of 1450 candidates, 1051 of which were chosen by indirect elections. District representatives were chosen, and 100 seats were reserved for refugees, 25 for nomads, 53 for the interim administration and the commission organising the *Jirga*, and 160 seats for women. At the last minute, fifty unelected governors participated in *Loya Jirga*, which Morgan Edwards (2010: 11), who was present, states were in fact 'warlord strongmen.' Morgan Edwards argues that these warlords shaped much of the outcome of the *Loya Jirga*, causing long-term damage to state-building efforts by enabling them to "claim the political legitimisation of the international community" (Ibid). Morgan Edwards (2010: 12) goes on to argue that the outcome of the *Loya Jirga* enabled warlords to influence future key government appointments (also see Lister 2007) as well as the Constitution.

The ratification of the constitution in 2003 was a key event in the state-building process after the Bonn Conference and the 2002 *Loya Jirga*. The Constitutional Commission responsible for preparing the

constitution was supported by the UN, and restructured the Afghan government, creating an Islamic republic with executive, legislative and judicial branches. Daud (2014) argues that the constitution process was dominated by a few members of the elite, particularly Karzai and the Transitional Government. According to the International Crisis Group (2003), there was little public involvement and apparent confusion about the process of producing the new constitution, which the ICG argue was the "product of obfuscation by the TA [transitional administration] and the UN" (ICG 2003). The ICG (2003) also stated that "[m]ost Afghans know what they want from government and from a constitution", and that the efforts by some, particularly the UN, "to paint them as an undifferentiated peasantry lacking meaningful opinions are demeaning" (ICG 2003). This demonstrates the closed nature of the state-building process and the limited opportunities for the public, including CSOs and social movements, to participate in the process. The other result of these early institutional developments was an extremely centralised government (Morgan Edwards 2010: 12; Nijat 2014; Daud 2014). A government that Morgan Edwards (2010: 12) argues "protects the interests of an elite group of strongmen with whom Karzai maintains allegiances." This situation of conservative control by elites is perhaps unsurprising in a post-conflict context (Banks 2007), and results in few opportunities for movements.

There appears to be significant division among the political elite in post-intervention Afghanistan, which would usually be considered to increase political opportunities. However, as Daud (2014) argues, one of the major flaws in Afghanistan's democracy lies in the only 'partial belief' that these diverse elites have in democracy. "Afghan elites fear that, once out of power, they will not only be unable to make a comeback but may also face persecution at the hands of rivals, as is evidenced by Afghanistan's history" (Daud 2014). This absence of a consensus that supports democracy, conservative control over the government and the prevalence of patronage do not tend to allow for the kind of politics in which political opportunities are abundant and social movements flourish.

An additional limitation is the fact that whilst the Taliban is not part of the political elite in post intervention Afghanistan, it has remained an important actor and instigates much of the instability and insecurity experienced in Afghanistan. A Taliban insurgency remained after the intervention, operating from remote parts of Afghanistan and safe havens in Pakistan. Rashid (2013: 214) argues that after the 2001 intervention the Taliban has transformed and became organised like a franchise with more nationalist intent, fighting against foreign occupation. It has had some level of control in most parts of Afghanistan since 2001 and there are fears that it will continue to pose a major threat to stability when US and NATO forces withdraw (Rashid 2013: 214). The continued presence of the

Taliban remains a threat to Afghan stability and the potential for state-building efforts to succeed. The poor security situation also constrains a number of political opportunities, which are considered further below.

The relationship between international actors and domestic elites

The relationship between international and domestic actors in Afghanistan has been complex, and has had a major impact on the state's development, and therefore impacted on the available political opportunities. The influences of international actors on the decisions of the domestic elite is varied. Often international actors use behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts to influence domestic elites, making them difficult to track. Also, agreements between these actors often consist of broad goals, and pressure is exerted with the threat of decreased financial assistance if promises are not kept.

Initially the relationship between international actors and the Government were positive, and the US in particular were pleased with Karzai's appointment as leader and his success in the 2004 presidential elections (Engel Rasmussen 2016; Burke, J. 2014). Karzai, as head of the large Polpazi, Pashtun tribe, had lobbied for Western aid in an attempt to overthrow the Taliban while it was in power (Burke, J. 2014). However, the relationship between President Karzai and the US became increasingly strained. Karzai was said to be frustrated with having to deal with constant changes in senior Western officials and policies (Ibid). As discussed below, by the time of the 2009 presidential elections, the US was keen to see a new president.

However, Karzai remained president until 2014, although there have been a number of tense incidents between international actors and his government. In 2013, Karzai refused to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), which would allow foreign troops to remain in Afghanistan. This was despite the deal being approved by the *Loya Jirga,* and came as a surprise to the US and many of Karzai's own security officials (Graham-Harrison 2013). In August 2014, a New York Times reporter was expelled, after he was accused of endangering Afghan national interests for reporting on government officials' alternative attempts to resolve the electoral crisis (Nordland and Gladstone 2014; Rosenberg 2014). The decision was criticised by the UN and the US embassy in Kabul and was later reversed by the newly elected President Ashraf Ghani.

There were differences of opinion between international actors and domestic elites over how to deal with the Taliban, including both military and political solutions (Khan 2013: 103). Early British attempts to enter negotiations or truces with the Taliban or local insurgents were banned by the Afghan

government (Johnson 2013: 146). Later, in 2007, the Deputy Head of the EU delegation, Michael Semple, and a political officer with the UNAMA, Mervyn Patterson, were expelled by President Karzai, both accused of threatening national security after reportedly talking to the Taliban (Gall 2007). President Karzai, who has stated that he is not "anti-Western" often opposed the tactics used by the US and its military allies, particularly US airstrikes and night raids on Afghan villages (Engel Rasmussen 2016). Karzai stated that these tactics to defeat the Taliban and foreign interference in Afghan politics were undermining Afghanistan's sovereignty (Ibid). Karzai said "[t]his denial of self-determination causes a lot of frustration and anger for the Afghan people, and that helps fuel the conflict" (Ibid). Karzai blamed the West and Pakistan for the resurgence of the Taliban but shifted his position in the last few years of his presidency, and with the support of international actors, made efforts to reconcile with the Taliban.

The current government, led by Ashraf Ghani, disagree with Karzai's view on the efforts by US troops and relations between the US and Ghani appear to be better. Ghani signed the BSA as soon as he entered office. Ghani initially reached out to Pakistan, requesting that the Taliban be brought to the negotiating table, despite stating several times that Pakistan is hostile to Afghanistan and uses the Taliban to put pressure on Afghanistan (Ibid). However, after bombing attacks by the Taliban Ghani announced that the times of giving amnesty to the Taliban and a soft approach is over, but that those who wish to end militancy will be welcomed (Arif 2016).

The differing perspectives and disagreements between Karzai and international actors, occasionally extended to the rest of the Afghan government and the parliament. For instance, in 2007, the Afghan parliament approved an amnesty for warlords, which the UN, some Afghan MPs and human rights groups criticised (Walsh 2007). In 2010, Morgan Edwards (2010: 1-2) went as far as suggesting that Afghanistan is run by a political elite "whose objectives seem diametrically opposed to those of the international community." This division between international actors and Karzai, and often the wider political elite, appears to have the potential to provide more significant political opportunities than the divisions within either the international actors or domestic elite. This is not to suggest that both sets of elites are homogenous, but from the perspective of political opportunities, there appears to be a distinction between the goals and approach of international actors and those of the majority of the domestic elite. This presents movements and CSOs with potential allies and opposition on either side, depending on their goals. A factor that may constrain these opportunities is the effort made to promote the image of a successful relationship. Also there is a great amount of interdependence that exists between some of the international and domestic elites. However, a movement or CSO that

utilises allies within the international or domestic elites may also be able to capitalise on that interdependence by using allies to pressure those within another set of elites.

The approach and actions of international actors have received a mixed reaction from the Afghan public. Many Afghans have been critical of the activities of international actors and have felt that their expectations were not being fulfilled (Johnson 2013; Rashid 2013: 247). Some suggest that the various ethnicities, religions and regions feel differently towards international actors, depending on the benefits they have gained as a result of the intervention (Interview 22, 2015; Interview 23. 2014). The loss of lives and damage caused by, and since the intervention reportedly created a lot of resentment, particularly among Pashtuns (Khan 2013: 101). Those Afghans with ties to the West are often viewed with some scepticism, such as presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani, as discussed below. In light of a number of elites returning from exile after the intervention, the public consultation process on the constitution led to calls for a ban on any minister maintaining dual citizenship (Rubin 2013: 157).

The criticism of the international presence in Afghanistan reflects critiques that are common in new protectorates, as outlined in Chapter One. For instance, some have suggested that international and military staff spent short lengths of time in Afghanistan, UN and military officials often lacked development experience, contract workers were unchecked, and a practice of sub-contracting and extortionate costs reached epidemic proportions (Chandrasekaran 2011). The international presence had very highly paid employees and large accommodation was “already overwhelming the new administration and distorting the economy” in 2002 (Rubin 2013: 107). The public ambivalence about international actors may help or hinder political opportunities. This is likely to depend on whether the movement’s or CSO’s goals align or counteract the goals of international actors.

Despite the problems with the international presence, the Afghan public see international actors as responsible for a number of aspects of Afghanistan’s development, particularly regarding security. It was reported in 2007 that Afghans tend to view the US as “overwhelmingly powerful” and “see the security situation on the ground as a direct reflection of U.S. choices and priorities” (Ray Steele and Thier 2007). Several English language sources have highlighted that many Afghans were concerned about the future of Afghanistan without the presence of the international actors, particularly regarding the security situation and the potential reversal of progress made (Freedom House 2015a; Wilson Center 2013; Dowdy and Erdmann 2013: 279). This highlights the extensive responsibilities that international actors are perceived to have.

Democratic development

The beginnings of the state-building process have been discussed above, along with the broad influences international actors have had on the process. Many of the outcomes of the state-building process have, at first glance, obviously improved in Afghanistan and, as a result, the political opportunities available should have increased. However many of these process in Afghanistan are somewhat flawed or underdeveloped, and in turn limit political opportunities. These processes including electoral politics, and civil society development, are discussed further here.

The state-building efforts in Afghanistan have suffered a number of setbacks, due to a wide range of factors, such as insecurity, resources, and corruption. At the time that the constitutional process was underway, some of the most influential international actors, most notably the US and the UK, shifted their attention and resources to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 (Khan 2013: 98; Rashid 2013: 246).[46] International actors refocused on Afghanistan in 2006, significantly shifting their strategy to security and development. It had become apparent to international actors by 2006 that Afghanistan was unlikely to develop into a fully functioning democracy solely though military means (Interview 21, 2014).

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were introduced in 2006 by the US to coordinate military and development operations by creating areas free of insurgents, allowing development to take place (Johnson 2013: 163).[47] Insecurity remained a problem however, and casualties increased from 4,000 in 2006 to over 6,000 in 2007 (Washington Post 2008). A surge of US troops was deployed in 2008 and 2010. In 2009 the new ISAF commander, General Stanley McChrystal, called for a more coordinated effort with Afghans. Numbers of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were to increase and McChrystal stated that ISAF intended to protect Afghans from the Taliban and corrupt elements in the Afghan government. He also urged the prioritisation of resources to Afghanistan to demonstrate the West's long-term commitment (Johnson 2013a: 143).

Concerns over the lack of progress and increasing vulnerability to extremism provoked more attention on democratic development. As a result the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) was

[46] To demonstrate the differences in resource distribution - in March 2004, several Afghan delegates lobbied for aid in Berlin. They raised $27.6 billion. This amounts to $164 per Afghan, which as Johnson (2013a: 153) points out was lower than the $336 per Iraqi estimated in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war.

[47] The teams, made up of military officers, diplomats, and experts on reconstruction, were also meant to empower local governments to govern their constituents more effectively, though the success of these has been mixed (see Perito 2005).

adopted at the Paris Conference in June 2008 (see Washington Post 2008). At the conference, the US pledged more than $21 billion in assistance to Afghanistan, along with other donors such as the Asian Development Bank ($1.3 billion), the World Bank ($1.1 billion), the UK ($1.2 billion) and the EU ($770 million). These contributions were in addition to the $25 billion that had been pledged to Afghanistan since 2000, though international aid groups have since stated that only about $15 billion had been delivered, partly due to concerns over corruption, inefficiency and the lack of accountability (Washington Post 2008). These large conferences continued to take place, and financial and developmental assistance was often conditional and linked to the progress made by the Afghan government. This allowed international actors to exert pressure on the government to deliver on promises made to international actors in order for financial assistance to be delivered in its entirety.

Despite the increased attention to Afghanistan and its overall development it has been widely suggested that development took a back seat, or was 'second-tier' to military efforts and security issues during this period (Cookman and Wadhams 2010: 1; Morgan Edwards 2010: 2). A short-term approach, often seen in new protectorates, was taken, and, again, state-building efforts suffered as a result (see Dowdy and Erdmann 2013: 279; Johnson 2013: 163; ICG 2002). Debiel and Lambach (2010: 6) argue that a top-down approach to state-building was taken, "promising quick results but downplaying the role of informal actors and grossly underestimating the political dimensions of seemingly apolitical reform."

There are a wide range of factors that impede democratic development in Afghanistan, particularly the security situation, but also weak and ineffective institutions (Daud 2014), poor rule of law, a poor economy and widespread corruption. Afghanistan's economy functions as a war economy and is subject to many structural problems (Goodhand 2004). For decades, Afghanistan has been reliant upon huge amounts of aid from donors. Some have suggested that up to 90% of the Afghan economy is dependent on the international presence, and that it requires up to $8 billion a year to sustain it (Khan 2013: 104). On top of this, Afghanistan repeatedly features in the last few rankings in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, and is currently ranked 168 out of 168 states (Martini 2015). The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators show Control of Corruption only just made it over the 5% mark in 2014 for the first time since its indicators began in 1996 (World Bank 2014). Afghanistan produces over 90% of the world's non-pharmaceutical opium, the profits of which often fund warlords and the Taliban (Washington Post 2008), and is also linked to corruption. The trafficking of drugs and the issue of corruption has been linked to some of the highest levels of the Afghan government. International actors have been involved with programmes to eradicate the

production of the poppy crop and its corrupting influence, however these have had limited success (Goodhand 2008) and were also "inherently alienating" due to the lack of alternative work (Johnson 2013: 153). Corruption is also reported to be undermining Afghanistan's security forces and encouraging public support for the Taliban (Engel Rasmussen 2016). Despite efforts to curb corruption, some have suggested that the policy of international actors has actually aided or exacerbated corruption in Afghanistan (Chayes 2016; Johnson 2013: 164), particularly as much of the corruption has been "bankrolled largely by the inflow of foreign funds" (Engel Rasmussen 2016).

Afghanistan also suffers poor rule of law, and World Bank Indicators show the maintenance of the rule of law remained at less than 5% from 1996 until 2014 (World Bank 2014). The judicial system operates in a haphazard way, there are high levels of corruption within the police force, which is heavily militarised, and its main focus is the protection of administrative centres (Freedom House 2016). Freedom House (2015a) reports that "police and other security personnel have occasionally used excessive force when confronting demonstrations," demonstrating the potential for repression of movements. The effects of repression may limit or open up opportunities for movements, a debate which is discussed in Chapter One. Although areas such as control of corruption, rule of law and accountability score very low according to World Bank's Indicators, they do show a small degree of improvement compared with the pre-intervention period.

Poor democratic development also affects the presence of institutional rules that may facilitate access to the public sphere and the political decision-making process (Kitschelt 1986). There are few such rules in Afghanistan, as might perhaps be expected, at least in the early stages of a new protectorate, limiting opportunities in this area. Although no research has been conducted in this area regarding political opportunities in Afghanistan, indications can be taken from the levels of participation from the public generally. The World Bank's (2014) Worldwide Governance Indicators for voice and accountability in Afghanistan, in Figure 3, show the perceptions of how able citizens are to participate in choosing their government, as well as freedom of expression, association and the media. The figures began to improve after the intervention, dropped in 2009, and began to improve again by 2014, but are very low and have not even reached 20%. Several authors have suggested that major political changes have occurred without the support of the population, with obvious examples being the Bonn Conference and the constitution writing process, which involved no public consultation (Daud 2014; Morgan Edwards 2011).

Figure 3: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator on Voice and Accountability in Afghanistan



World Bank (2015)

Afghanistan has a very ethnically and linguistically diverse population of just over 33 million. Pashtuns make up the largest ethnic group at 42% of the population, followed by Tajiks (27%), Hazaras (9%), Uzbeks (9%) and smaller percentages of Aimaq, Turkmen, Baloch and others. Most of the country is Muslim, around 80% are Sunni and 20% are Shi'a. The constitution itself does state that ethnic and linguistic minorities are officially recognised for the first time, and it guarantees equal status to minorities, most of which have seen improvements in political representation and participation (Freedom House 2016). However, minorities remain subject to discrimination and harassment (Freedom House 2016). The constitution guarantees rights to assembly and association with some restrictions, which are maintained to varying degrees across different regions of Afghanistan (Freedom House 2015a). Rubin (2013: 8) argues that

> "[w]hatever sense of unity and national identity Afghans express does not negate the reality of a conflict largely structured on ethnic lines and characterized by some ugly inter-ethnic violence. Nonetheless, the sense of national identity, and the belief that Afghan national identity is inherently both Islamic and multi-ethnic, seems sincere, widespread, and deeply rooted."

Another element that limits potential participation is the lack of responsiveness by elites, since as Daud (2014) argues, elites have "failed to generate some measure of responsiveness to public opinion." On top of this, Freedom House (2016) reports that in areas under full government control, private discussion is, for the most part, "free and unrestrained", but political discussion in areas controlled by the Taliban is much more dangerous. Participation is hampered across the population due to strong patronage networks, the lack of security, and the problems of fraud and security during

elections (Freedom House 2016). When combined, these factors highlight the limited opportunities for public participation and give a good indication that the opportunities for movements to influence or gain allies among the elite are small.

Electoral politics

The establishment of elections is a key aspect of democratic development and international actors have been heavily involved in them in Afghanistan. Political opportunities can be affected by electoral politics in a number of ways, as outlined in Chapter One and Three. Here, I analyse the conduct and outcome of the elections in Afghanistan since the first elections held in 2004, to the most recent in 2014. This analysis is carried out with a view to establishing the impact on political opportunities.

After the intervention, international actors were keen to see presidential and parliamentary elections take place as quickly as possible. This was part of the 'light footprint approach'. International actors believed that early elections would demonstrate that Afghanistan had, despite the intervention, maintained its sovereignty. Elections are often the focus of international actors in new protectorates, which tend to focus on the technical aspects of democratisation. Elections also demonstrate some signs of success and progress, particularly to domestic audiences of the international actors involved (Morgan Edwards 2010: 12). Electoral politics can demonstrate the capacity for competition of elite status, the ability to participate in political opposition, the capacity of the legislature, and the openness of a regime.

The first parliamentary elections were held in 2005, in which a National Assembly was directly elected, comprised of a lower assembly with 249 seats and an upper house with 102 seats. No municipal elections have taken place in Afghanistan, to date. In the 2005 and 2010 parliamentary elections, former warlords gained the majority of seats in the lower and upper houses. Further parliamentary elections have been delayed due to disagreements over how to ensure fair elections, concerns about the legitimacy of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), proposals for electoral reforms (van Bijlert 2016), as well as security concerns, but are due to take place in October 2016 (Reuters 2016a).

Afghanistan uses the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system, and over 70 political parties, have been registered since 2005. Although the number of registered parties is high, Freedom House (2010a) has reported criticism of the 2003 Political Parties Law. It has been suggested that the law's vague language "could be exploited to deny registration on flimsy grounds". Freedom House (2010a) also reports that it is potentially more difficult for new political parties to participate, particularly given the

SNTV system. However, despite there being so many political parties, nearly all candidates in Afghanistan's elections stand as independents. They may have an affiliation with a political party, but apply for candidacy at the Electoral Commission as independents. This is due to the fact that being associated with a party does not do much to boost a candidate's chances. Freedom House state that political parties "lack a formal role in the legislature, weakening their ability to contribute to stable policymaking and legislative processes" (Freedom House 2016). National Democratic Institute (NDI) research on political parties in Afghanistan in 2011 highlighted that specific ideology, messages and policy proposals were still being developed, lacking specific detail and are very similar among groups of parties (NDI 2011). Rubin (2013: 299) argues that "[c]ollective political actors in Afghanistan are not clearly defined. Politics is highly personalized, tending to crystallize around powerful men and their patronage networks." The political opportunity framework suggests that the higher the numbers of political parties, groups and factions that can effectively engage, increases opportunities. However, given that parties do not engage effectively, the difference between parties is negligible, capacity of the legislature is low, oversight is poor and fragmentation is low, political opportunities to influence and interact with parliament appear to be extremely low.

Presidential elections took place in 2004, 2009 and 2014. The president is elected for up to two five year terms, and appoints ministers, with parliamentary approval. All other executive positions are appointed by the president. In the build-up to the 2004 elections, a joint Afghan - UNAMA election body was established, security was provided by ISAF and the Afghan National Army (ANA), and the election was observed by the OSCE and other groups. International donors provided over $90 million for the elections (Katzman 2006: 3). In December 2004 Hamid Karzai, who stood as an independent candidate, became the first elected president, winning 55.4% of the vote.

The 2009 elections, although organised by Afghans, were still a key concern for international actors. International actors still assisted with the conduct of the elections, particularly security, which was a major concern throughout the election period. As discussed above, the relationship between the US and Karzai had become strained, and the US' expectations of Karzai delivering on his promises to international actors were low (MacAskill 2009). Instead, the US were keen to see their favoured candidate, Ashraf Ghani, a former finance minister and World Bank analyst win. The former US defence secretary, Robert Gates, stated that the US had tried to manipulate the 2009 elections, but called it a 'clumsy and failed putsch' (Gates 2015). However, the fact that Ghani had spent much of his life outside of Afghanistan appeared to have the potential to reduce his attractiveness to the electorate, leading to his loyalty being questioned (Stern 2009). As discussed above, many Afghans

were suspicious of international and especially Western actors. At the time of the elections, it was reported that many Afghans would prefer a lessening of ties to the US (Sarhaddi Nelson 2009). Stern even reported that, although Ghani's "reputation as an academic, technocrat, and reformer is close to sterling […] his international appeal plays to a narrative Afghans are programmed to reject." It has been said that Ghani was referred to as *Zana-e Bush,* meaning 'Bush's wives' (Stern 2009). Despite US support, Ghani only received 3% of the vote in the preliminary round of the elections. Although international support for Karzai had decreased, he remained president, winning 49.7% of the votes in the final round, beating Abdullah Abdullah of the United National Front, who received 30.6% of the vote. Significantly, voter turnout had dramatically reduced from 83.66% in 2004 to 38.8% (IDEA 2011).

Both the 2004 and 2009 elections were marred by accusations of fraud, which was again a major feature of the 2014 election. Despite continued UN supervision, the elections were controversial and prolonged due to the many accusations of fraud. After the second round of voting, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) published preliminary results showing that Ashraf Ghani was leading but Abdullah Abdullah alleged that there had been fraud and declared himself the winner. The US intervened by threatening to cut off aid if the crisis was not resolved in a constitutional manner (Freedom House 2014a). The US brokered an agreement that called for a national unity government (NUG) and an internationally supervised audit (Freedom House 2016). Despite this involvement from the US, both the US and the Afghan government felt the need to clarify that the Afghan government has "full sovereignty and control over political decisions" (Freedom House 2016). In the end, both candidates agreed to a power sharing arrangement with Ghani as president and Abdullah in the new position of chief executive, a position the US had been lobbying for since before the 2009 elections (MacAskill 2009). Since the formation of the NUG, disagreements have led to many government positions remaining unfilled over a year after the elections (Freedom House 2016).

The Taliban have opposed every election, although their calls for a boycott in 2014 were, for the most part, ignored (Freedom House 2016). However, participation is still made difficult by the presence of armed groups from all sides, particularly outside of urban areas (Freedom House 2016). Government officials at all levels are frequently the targets of violence or assassination attempts, with 155 attacks on officials occurring in the first six months of 2012 (Freedom House 2013a). The long periods of political uncertainty surrounding elections, high levels of fraud, low voter turnout and highly centralised nature of the political system do not bode well for political opportunities. Freedom House (2010a) actually state that "Afghanistan is not an electoral democracy" because, although elections have taken place, "significant problems remain with regard to the political framework, effective

governance, and transparency." Poor government effectiveness is shown in World Bank Governance Indicators in Figure 4. All of these factors, combined with the ineffective legislature and political parties, demonstrate the flawed nature of Afghanistan's democracy and the consequent constraints on political opportunities.

Figure 4: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator on Government Effectiveness in Afghanistan



World Bank (2015)

Civil society development

International actors have provided large amounts of funding and support for civil society development, which only really began in earnest in 2006, once development aims gained greater focus. This has contributed to the significant changes seen in the nature of Afghanistan's civil society. As discussed in Chapter One, civil society development can provide social movements with channels of interactions between them and government. In order to assess the international influence on civil society, I briefly consider the effectiveness and results of international funding and development of civil society. I also consider civil society development in relation to Afghanistan's youth, as well as the increasing attempts by civil society actors to function independently from international funds. This provides an insight into the political opportunities that arise as a result of internationally funded civil society development.

Before international actors became involved in civil society development in Afghanistan there were a variety of forms of civil society activity, including *shuras* (community councils), religious networks, NGOs and voluntary groups (see Berg Harpviken et al. 2002). However, Rubin (2013: 59) argues that the "years of war had destroyed much of Afghanistan's social capital as communities and institutions were dispersed or destroyed." The type of internationally donor funded civil society that has

developed since the intervention had not really existed before (Interview 22, 2014), and global civil society actors are now extremely prominent within Afghanistan's civil society (Van den Boogaard 2011: 29). It appears that the type of civil society promoted by international actors was very different to the type of Afghan civil society that had existed before, which has largely been ignored. Van den Boogaard (2011: 29) suggests that

> opportunities for modern Afghan NGOs and traditional civil society organizations to contribute positively to peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts were largely squandered as a result of the international community's focus on a Western neoliberal definition of civil society that did not necessarily fit the Afghan context, resulting in a circumscribed application that limited the breadth of local actors involved.

There is some debate within Afghanistan about what the term 'civil society' really means, and about how traditional and religious components should be included (Winter 2010: 7), but generally the image of civil society in Afghanistan is poor, and was viewed particularly negatively in the early stages (Interview 22, 2014). One interviewee, working for German institute FES and based in Afghanistan, suggested that international donors "define a lot" regarding civil society, and that Afghans had little power to do things differently (Interview 21, 2014). Cramer (2009) argues that Afghanistan's bureaucracy was further eroded by the high salaries provided by NGOs, which in some cases encouraged people to take lower skilled jobs in foreign organisations. Winter (2010: 7) conducted an extensive study of civil society in Afghanistan, and found that Afghan civil society actors have received "little consistent, substantial or helpful support," and that donors were "at a loss" over how to support them. These factors highlight the lack of attention by international donors to more grassroots civil society actors, such as social movements.

It seems that political opportunities may arise for those wishing to utilise potential allies within civil society or to use civil society as a channel to raise public awareness. However, it seems that civil society provides very limited opportunities for interacting with government. For example, the interviewee from FES suggested that there was very little dialogue between civil society and the government, and that where dialogue had occurred "it was probably always a bit forced by the internationals", who told members of the government that there were civil society representatives that they had to listen to (Interview 21, 2014). It is difficult to assess whether the lack of engagement is due to a lack of will or capability, but another interviewee, former Director of the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS), Timur Hakimyar, summed up what may be the simplest explanation

for the lack of engagement by the Afghan government: “they can’t even help themselves so can’t help us” (Interview 31, 2014).

Civil society development has featured in a number of the international conferences on Afghanistan, particularly the London conference in December 2014 (Interview 32, 2015). Huge budgets were drawn up and one interviewee suggested that it marked a shift in Afghan civil society, which realised it had an audience and was increasingly active and professional. However, at the same time, the conference may also have led to smaller organisations being pushed out (Interview 21, 2014). Generally, international funding for civil society is expected to decrease with the military drawdown. Donors, particularly the EU, are, furthermore, changing their approach to funding, and are becoming increasingly interested in supporting Afghan civil society. This shift has been one of the key outcomes of the Tokyo conference on Afghanistan in 2012. Donors are becoming more likely to support projects with organisations which partner with Afghan NGOs (Interview 31, 2014). This is partly due to the increasing feeling amongst donors that little progress had been made so far, despite large amounts of money being put into civil society development (Interview 31, 2014). At the same time, the imminent funding decrease is prompting some organisations to seek alternative sources of funding in order to be sustainable without international funds. Some suggest that this independence will help these organisations, not only in terms of funding, but also in appearing to be ‘home grown’. As a result, it has been suggested that their influence and effectiveness may increase (Interview 23, 2014).

New small-scale organisations, run by Afghans are also being created, keen to remain independent, and many include founders with experience in international organisations (Interview 31, 2014). This could begin to bring opportunities for movements by making independent organisations and grassroots groups more common, and could increase the credibility and of attention to other forms of civil society actors.

There is already a very small but growing number of other organisations beginning to emerge independently, such as A3 (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014) and the ‘I See You’ campaign’, an anti-corruption campaign organised by Peace Street Group volunteers (The Afghanistan Express 2014). The ‘I See You’ campaign was funded by its activists in, as one explained, an attempt to demonstrate that “the initiative is anchored in society, and not only supported by individuals or the international community […] to be legitimate” (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014). However, it may be difficult for many organisations and groups to sustain themselves (Interview 21, 2014; Interview 30, 2014). Kazemi (2012), questions the potential for groups to be independent and inclusive, stating that it is very

difficult to achieve, and that most have either been politically instrumentalised or repeatedly subjected to political manipulation on ethnic, religious, ideological and other grounds, mainly due to their fundamental need for funding.

The effectiveness of internationally supported civil society development has had mixed reports (see Winters 2010), and it remains to be seen whether any achievements that have been made will be sustained once funding decreases. Pessimistic outlooks on civil society commonly cite the lack of participation of women and young people, the urban-rural divide, which skews decision-making, and political, religious and ethnic divisions, which make collaboration difficult (Brookland 2013). Alongside these problems, the idea of volunteerism is weak (Interview 30 2014), as is social responsibility (Brookland 2013), which is in part, down to the economic and security situation, issues of trust after decades of conflict (Interview 21 2014), and a reliance upon international actors (Interview 30 2014).

Despite this, there are signs that internationally developed civil society is having an impact and is increasingly influencing policy (Brookland 2013; Freedom House 2015a). Freedom House (2016) reports that approximately 274 international NGOs and almost 1,800 local NGOs were active in 2015, but also that threats, harassment and violence made it difficult for some NGOs to work and hindered the recruitment of foreign staff. The increased presence of civil society and the donor support provides potential opportunities regarding the allies and a potential, if only a limited channel of interaction with government. The general development of civil society has the potential to increase some opportunities for movements depending on their goals. Despite this, the possibility for some movements to gain allies, mobilise and take advantage of discursive opportunities on certain issues that international donors have given prominence too, particularly human rights and gender equality, have probably increased with the international funding of civil society. The way in which civil society has been developed in Afghanistan has ignored grassroots and movement activities, as found in the wider literature on civil society development and discussed in Chapter One. The small number of movements that exist suggests that a 'demonstration effect', encouraging further movement activity is unlikely (see Kitschelt 1986).

Afghanistan's new generation

Internationally funded civil society may still provide opportunities for allies or opposition, as well as discursive opportunities on issues that movements and CSOs may also be concerned with, particularly in the areas of gender equality, human rights and youth issues, which have been the focus of many international donors (Nikolic 2014; Winters 2010). This is of particular interest here because

Afghanistan 1400, the case study in the following chapter, present themselves as a youth movement, and one which wants to promote youth participation. Afghanistan has a very young population, with 70% of the population being under 25 years (Wilson Centre 2013), while unemployment in this age group is around 40% (Pegasus 2016). However, when people talk about Afghan youth, the 'youth' can be anything up to their mid-thirties (Hewad and Garret Johnson 2014: 2) and is often used to refer to people with what is seen as a progressive mindset, regardless of their age. For decades, young Afghans have left Afghanistan for better education and work elsewhere (Etehad 2016), but it seems that, increasingly, Afghan's youth wants to stay and improve Afghanistan. This 'new generation', as it is often referred to, is demanding a greater influence on Afghanistan's future, and wants to see the end of the old structures of governance (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014). The generational divide is becoming increasingly apparent as Johnson (2013: 168) argues, young Afghans have little time for the older generation, which insists on practices they are not familiar with.

To date, there has been a lack of engagement by the Afghan authorities with Afghanistan's youth. Lockhart (2012) claims that repeated surveys show that Afghanistan's youth have demands similar to those made during the Arab uprisings in 2011 that is, for inclusivity and increased opportunities for young people. There have been some efforts by the government to engage, such as an Afghan National Youth Policy, presented in May 2013 that outlined legislative strategies to address youth issues after consultation with over 500 young people across the country (Wilson Center 2013). The government also made some moves to demonstrate a greater interest in youth activism and held a National Youth Policy Conference in June 2013 in order to create a framework to support youth initiatives.

Most of the major political parties in the country have some kind of youth section and there are some other youth organisations orientated groups, such as the policy Afghanistan Analysis and Awareness (A3). The Jombesh-e Jawanan, the youth section of Abdul Rashid Dostum's National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan party (*Jombesh-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan*) is a particularly visible example. Other youth groups include the Afghanistan Youth Parliament, which used to be supported by the UN and social organisations such as the National Coordination Centre of the Youth of Afghanistan (*Markaz-e Hamahangi-ye Melli-ye Jawanan-e Afghanistan*), its affiliate, the Network of Young Activists for Reform and Change (*Shabaka-ye Fa'alan-e Jawan bara-ye Eslah wa Taqir*) and the Union of the Youth of Afghanistan (*Ettehadia-ye Jawanan-e Afghanistan*), formerly a governmental institution, the Jirga-ye Melli-ye Solh-e Jawanan-e Afghanistan (Afghanistan National Youth Peace Jirga) and the Islamist group the Institution of Young Muslims (*Nahad-e Jawanan-e Mosalman*) (inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood and provide education and social services).

Generally the Karzai government did little to encourage youth engagement in politics, proactively urging university students to keep out of politics. University students have historically been politically active in Afghanistan, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s (Hewad and Garett Johnson 2014). Student groups have been less active in recent years, and have struggled to maintain momentum and expand their reach across the country (Kazemi 2012). Despite this, there have been some signs of activity more recently, such as a hunger strike over university reform by 80 students in May 2013 (Brookland 2013). An attack on the popular Lebanese restaurant 'Taverna du Libnan', in January 2014, prompted several youth action groups into action, organising actions against terrorism (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014).

The build-up to the 2014 elections also saw increased activity amongst young Afghans, particularly in Kabul. While many were very critical of the presidential candidates, the dominant message seemed to be calling people to vote. Rayhab, of Counterpart International, bluntly states, "[l]et's not be naïve about the current reality", "Afghan society is conservative and hierarchical," making it difficult for young people to contribute meaningfully to policymaking and government reform (Wilson Centre 2013). Hewad and Garret Johnson (2014: 1) argue that "the growth of subnational youth political organizations since 2001 is in many cases synonymous with the emergence of a civil society in Afghanistan," and that Afghan youth see civil society organisations as "one route to political power." This suggests that the increased activity by young people within civil society, and the attention from international actors, provides opportunities for those movements and CSOs working with and for young people, in terms of allies, mobilising activists and discursive opportunities.

Conclusion

The NATO intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent state-building efforts have been conducted by international actors from a narrow set of states, most prominently the US, and some international organisations such as UNAMA. These actors have maintained a significant military presence and provided political assistance to domestic elites in an effort to democratise Afghanistan throughout the period of the new protectorate. These international actors have significantly influenced Afghanistan's political system, and as a result have impacted upon the political opportunities.

Although the international actors involved in Afghanistan have had an incoherent approach to civilian and military assistance, and some tensions in the approach exist, they do not represent the type of divisions that would provide political opportunities. International actors generally present a consensus

in relation to their overall goals, which are quite distinct from those of a number of domestic actors, such as the Taliban. The relationship between international actors and the Afghan government under Karzai, although positive initially, was strained. The differences in approach and goals between international and domestic actors demonstrated a lack of coherence between the two. This division is likely to provide more significant political opportunities than the divisions within either the international actors or domestic elite.

The domestic elite in Afghanistan is divided, which would normally present political opportunities, however the absence of a consensus supporting democracy, conservative control among elites and the prevalence of patronage do not allow the kind of politics in which social movements flourish. Also, parties do not engage effectively, the differences between parties is negligible, and the capacity of the legislature is low, which are all factors that result in few opportunities to influence and interact with the government and parliament.

Political opportunities were extremely limited in the period prior to 2006 due to high levels of insecurity, and the lack of focus by international actors on development. Opportunities have increased since that period due to the conduct of elections, an increasingly active civil society and the general increase in the openness of the state. International actors have been the driving force behind state-building efforts, but these have been hampered by a number of factors such as insecurity, an often poor relationship with domestic actors, a weak civil society and corruption. These failings have contributed to constrained opportunities in some areas. For instance, the poor security situation makes it difficult for a variety of actors, including social movements and CSOs, to work outside of the capital, Kabul.

There is little direct or indirect facilitation of movements by the government or international actors and there are few channels for movements to interact with, or influence elites. Despite the nature of the internationally funded civil society that has developed in Afghanistan, which largely ignores movements, the development of civil society may present the most fruitful channel for opportunities regarding allies and as a channel of influence. The increasing prominence of civil society generally, as well as the increasing political activism in recent years, particularly among Afghan youth, suggests that opportunities are increasing. There is no sign that the government are intentionally inhibiting movements but the broader repressive environment serves to limit political opportunities in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER SIX: AFGHANISTAN 1400

This chapter features a case analysis of the second case study, Afghanistan 1400. Here, I seek to establish how Afghanistan 1400's strategy was influenced by the presence of international actors in Afghanistan. This is assessed both in terms of the wider influences of international actors and in the ways political opportunities were influenced by international actors, which was considered in depth in Chapter Five. In the contextual analysis in Chapter Five I established that the presence of international actors in Afghanistan was extremely influential over domestic decision-making, which contributed to an increase in opportunities. However, these opportunities were still extremely limited in many areas.

This chapter considers Afghanistan 1400's formation in December 2012, its membership and growth, allies and tactics, covering the period from its formation until the beginning of 2015 when the data collection period ended. Therefore it is too early to judge the effects of recent developments within the National Unity Government, and the transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghan government. Given the lack of literature on Afghanistan 1400's the majority of the information and perspectives on the movement come from the interviews conducted with members of Afghanistan 1400, diplomats, and Afghan and international employees of civil society organisations.

Formation

Afghanistan 1400 officially launched on 6 December 2012, soon after NATO leaders had declared that full responsibility for security would be handed over to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. Initial talks about the possibility of forming a new and distinct movement had begun much earlier in 2011 and continued over several months. In the initial stages, the seventeen young Afghans, who became known as the founders, held talks about their vision, structure and what role the organisation should play. As word of these discussions spread, the group engaged with other interested young Afghans with common ideas and a similar, but in many cases, previously undiscovered desire to make a political or civic contribution (Interview 26, 2015). Others joined the discussions and so began the build-up to the launch of a potential platform for youth participation in a wide range of aspects of Afghanistan's development. Founding member, and head of the Gawharshad Institute of Higher Education, Elham Gharji, said, "[w]e realised that a new generation of Afghans with leadership potential had come into being, scattered in various places, but which could be connected" (Kazemi 2012). A charter, which is still being worked on and improved, was produced as a result of these discussions and provides the basis of the agreement which new members sign when they join. Afghanistan 1400 sought to be as

democratic and inclusive as possible from the start. For this reason, during the months before the official launch, committees prepared drafts on future goals and the structure of the organisation, which were then discussed and voted on at general assembly meetings. This process was considered to be very participatory by many members (Interview 26, 2015; Interview 24, 2015).

Afghanistan 1400 describes itself as a civil-political movement, "aimed at mobilizing and creating a political platform for the new generation of Afghanistan" (Afghanistan 1400 2012). It believes that this definition enables them to flexibly use a combination of both civil and political methods to change Afghanistan. At the time Afghanistan 1400 formed, many members had a background of experience in the civil society sector, whilst others had been, or wanted to become, politically active. Combining the two elements, Afghanistan 1400 feels that it represents a type of organisation that is rarely seen in Afghanistan (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 25, 2015). It also serves as a means of unifying the diverse membership. Afghanistan 1400 defines itself as a movement, and displays a number of features commonly found in movement definitions, as outlined in Chapter One. These include a collective identity, shared beliefs, and networks of informal interaction. However, as discussed in Chapter Two due to the organisational element and selective membership, Afghanistan 1400 represents a civil society organisation. Later in the chapter I argue that this is, in part, due to the lack of opportunities for movements and therefore, the difficulties in operating as movement during this period in Afghanistan.

The self-identifying as a movement is still an important feature of the organisation because it serves as a strategic effort to highlight to others that Afghanistan 1400 is a new and different type of entity relative to others active in Afghanistan, particularly political parties or NGOs. As outlined in Chapter Five, youth groups in Afghanistan tend to shy away from political parties as a form of organisation, largely due to the poor reputation of parties (Hewad and Garret Johnson 2014: 3). Hewad and Garret Johnson (2014: 7) studied Afghan youth politics and identified four types of organisations among the Afghan youth. Afghanistan 1400, of which Hewad is a member, was considered to be "established by the nation's young political elite post-2001, which remains limited in size and reach and are chiefly concerned with driving policy at the national level" (ibid.: 7). Afghanistan 1400 was careful not to position itself as an opposition to the government or as a political party. When an article was posted on the Huffington Post website, which stated that Afghanistan 1400 was a party, those involved were keen to get it corrected as soon as possible in order to prevent members or an external audience getting the wrong idea about the its position (Interview 20, 2014; see Huffington Post 2014*)*.

Since 2001, a great deal has changed for most young Afghans. Afghanistan 1400 member, Assad Nissar, feels that a generation was lost during the civil war (1978-2001), as many people were forced to leave the country, and, as a result of war, few opportunities existed for those who stayed (Interview 28, 2015). Nissar argues that this has led to low expectations from and of this generation, and little capacity in regard to political and civil developments (Ibid). Now, Afghanistan has a very young population within a traditionally hierarchical society that has historically failed to engage with Afghanistan's youth, as discussed in Chapter Five. Although there are still huge steps to be taken in Afghanistan's development, the emerging new generation of Afghans in the post-intervention period have increasing opportunities, such as better access to education, and exposure to a wide range of influences from outside Afghanistan (Interview 24, 2015; Interview 28, 2015).

Afghanistan 1400 has emerged from this context of huge change that has taken place in post-intervention Afghanistan, taking advantage of some of the broad opportunities present since the intervention. The international presence has played a significant role in shaping the post-intervention context, particularly for Afghan youth, from ending Taliban rule to funding civil society projects focused on Afghanistan's young people. Members of Afghanistan 1400 have personally benefitted from the gradually increasing opportunities available in areas such as education and employment. The organisation's formation can be viewed as a reaction to these circumstances, coupled with members feeling a sense of duty in terms of paying something back to the country (Interview 20, 2014), recognising the potential to affect change, and their capacity to rectify the lack of opportunities for young people by giving them a voice (Interview 24, 2015; Interview 28, 2015).

The existing, older, political generation consists of many former Mujahideen, warlords and members of the former communist regime. Afghanistan 1400 members argue that this older political generation possesses a certain mind-set and approach that is not beneficial to a younger generation of Afghans, who have a different outlook that is not reflected in the country's current leadership (Interview 28, 2015). These views of the political 'old guard' are salient features of the few analyses of the perspectives of Afghan youth, which argue that the attitudes of the older political generation are a limiting factor on youth participation and mobilisation, as outlined in Chapter Five (Hewad and Garret Johnson 2014; Larson and Coburn 2014). As a founding member, Haseeb Humayoon, argues, young people in Afghanistan are better connected than ever, with "new aspirations, new sets of values and a whole different frame about what they want in the country for themselves, [and] for their generation" (NPR 2013). Afghanistan 1400 has set out its own values as a "[b]elief in Islamic values, respect for the Constitution of Afghanistan, democracy, freedom of speech, gender equality,

pluralism, equality and meritocracy" (Afghanistan 1400 2012). It stresses its long-term outlook, which is intended to outlast the presence of international actors, and is reflected in the name, Afghanistan 1400. The '1400' relates to the next century in the Persian calendar, which is the year 2020 according to the Western calendar, and is intended to symbolise a focus on the upcoming century and to express hope for change.

Goals

Afghanistan 1400 has a wide variety of goals that apply to several areas of Afghanistan's political development, but sees the involvement of the new generation as a key factor in the building of a more prosperous Afghanistan. Its vision represents its desire to encourage Afghan youth to be at the forefront of change in Afghanistan, believing that it is the responsibility of Afghanistan's youth to take on the challenges facing Afghanistan, especially in the wake of the international military drawdown. Thus, its vision for the future of Afghanistan is as follows:

> A prosperous and democratic Afghanistan based on the rule of law, with responsible leadership, banking on her diversity, and buttressed by the energy, commitment and creativity of the new generation within political, social, cultural and economic spheres (Afghanistan 1400 2012).

Afghanistan 1400's goals, designed consistently with this vision, are outlined below and reflect its aim to signify a break with the way Afghanistan has developed to date, and to ensure that things do not return to the situation of the 1990s (Interview 28, 2015).

Afghanistan 1400's goals (Afghanistan 1400 2012) are:

- To create a national platform to mobilise and bring together the new generation;
- To create opportunities for young citizens to have an influential and determining voice;
- To depolarise politics in Afghanistan through encouraging understanding, moderation, and tolerance, and through institutionalising politics based on moderation and tolerance;
- To depoliticise the civil service in Afghanistan;
- To present a responsible and realistic perspective on Afghanistan in domestic and international debates;
- To instil a culture of appreciation for the sacrifices and services of Afghanistan's security forces.

Building on these stated values and goals, Afghanistan 1400 also seeks a modern government, constitution and Parliament in Afghanistan (Interview 26, 2015), and the themes of democracy, economic stability, the new generation, diversity and responsibility, recur throughout its goals and actions. The idea of Afghanistan's youth taking responsibility for the future of the country is important to the organisation and is represented in its slogan, 'our country, our responsibility'. Additionally, this makes the point that the younger generation should take responsibility for the future of the country in a way that older generations have failed to.

The slogan also reinforces the message that lasting and sustainable change cannot be produced until the Afghan population acknowledges that it plays a primary role in addressing the challenges present in Afghanistan. During an interview, one member argued that the older generation often places blame for problems in Afghanistan upon others, usually other countries, foreigners within the country, or those who are considered part of the international community. They went on to say that the constant use of an external scapegoat allows Afghans to shirk responsibility, an outlook that they argue is less prevalent among the new generation (Interview 24, 2015).

Several other members interviewed stated that the slogan represented an acceptance of the declining international presence. They argue that given this, Afghans must take on the responsibility of maintaining the advancements that have been made in the country, in order to achieve a prosperous future for Afghanistan (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 26, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). This highlights the mix of self-determination and responsibility that appears to resonate with a number of the goals put forward by Afghanistan 1400. It seeks to unify those who stand for the national interest and follow the constitution, opposing those who do not, an aspect of the movement that is discussed further below. This stance makes the organization less of an oppositional force and is another factor that contributes to the group's status as a CSO. Their stance of supporting the government appears to align with some political leaders. As Rubin (2013: 305) explains,

> Afghans who have lived through the past decades are united in their anxiety over the fragility of the current trends of stabilization. Several leaders of political trends have stated in private that they are reluctant to form an opposition movement, because the government is simply too weak to tolerate it. Afghans have seen what unbridled division can inflict on their society, and one of their most important resources is the determination to resist the forces that may drive them back to violence.

Afghanistan 1400 is keen to see unity among those who support the Afghan constitution in opposition to those who do not. These groups and individuals, such as the Taliban, are perceived as threats to its vision of the future of Afghanistan. Afghanistan 1400 have carried out several activities to encourage resistance against extremism, and produced a statement on the opening of the Doha office of the Taliban. Another call for unity against these threats can be seen in a press statement released in response to the Afghan National Security Council, which had recently commented on a fatwa issued against the Afghan people by a religious scholar in Pakistan. The statement supported the Council and urged the government to make a statement that unifies "political forces against Pakistan's interference" in Afghan affairs. It also suggested that the government should summon the Pakistan ambassador for an explanation, and it should invite representatives from the Afghan forces, political parties and, political and civil movements to discuss how to co-operate and proceed on the issue (Afghanistan 1400, 2013a).

Initial talks about the formation of Afghanistan 1400 did not focus on the international presence, as, at that time, the military drawdown seemed a fairly distant prospect. However, as discussions progressed, the issue became more important, particularly as the drawdown drew closer and the 2014 presidential elections were approaching, both of which signified a significant transition of power in Afghanistan (Interview 27, 2014). Members suggested in interviews that Afghanistan 1400 is a reaction to the 'understandably unsustainable' international military presence and extensive support from international actors (Interview 27, 2014). Others claimed that the international drawdown played a minor role in Afghanistan 1400's formation, precisely because of the membership's low expectations for international assistance in the long-term. Overall it can be argued that the impending diminution of an international presence indirectly contributed to the formation and outlook of Afghanistan 1400. The future withdrawal of international actors did present Afghanistan 1400 with an opportunity to make a break with the past. Afghanistan 1400 also saw the prospective withdrawal as a catalyst for Afghans taking responsibility and maintaining the progress made during the international presence. This underlying influence of the international presence, and its potential absence, on its strategy, gives one indication of how elements of Afghanistan 1400 has been shaped by international actors.

'Western' goals?

Some of the Afghanistan 1400's goals and demands can be, and have been, viewed as overlapping with those of international actors in Afghanistan or being influenced by 'Western' ideas (Interview 22, 2015; Interview 23. 2015). Afghanistan 1400 and international actors both support gender equality,

electoral reform and the peaceful transfer of power to the Afghan population (Interview 26, 2015). However, when Afghanistan 1400 put together its goals in writing, it purposely avoided the extensive use of language associated with the broad, Western-sounding goals of international actors in Afghanistan. For example, a conscious effort was made to avoid the rhetoric of democracy and human rights that is often used by those actors (Interview 20, 2014), so that while democracy is mentioned, Afghanistan 1400's written agenda illustrates that it is keen to demonstrate that it proposes solutions that are both novel and that stem from Afghan influences. These efforts are largely down to members wanting to present Afghan solutions, but also because they feel that if they are too closely associated with international actors they will be seen as being influenced by them, something they are keen to avoid.

Afghanistan 1400's association with Western ideas in the eyes of the public seems to arise largely from the overlap in goals, and the fact that many members have studied or worked in Western states. Eqbal states that "[i]n the beginning, they [other Afghans] said that many of us were in the US so we must be CIA or brainwashed by the UK […] We will talk to internationals but we don't want to give them the sense that they can influence us" (Interview 20, 2014). In most of the interviews, members of Afghanistan 1400 were adamant there was a distinction between their ideas and those of the 'international community' (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 24, 2015; Interview 25, 2015; Interview 26, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). One member said that Afghanistan 1400 definitely, and intentionally, has a different message to most other groups in Afghanistan, but members argue, that it should automatically be associated with "Western" ideas and values that are promoted by international actors in Afghanistan. Members are keen to stress that they are all Afghans and grew up with Afghan values.

Another factor which may give the impression that Afghanistan 1400 is influenced or in line with the thinking of the 'international community' is its vocal critique of the Afghan government (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014; Interview 26, 2015). This type of criticism usually comes from international actors, particularly over corruption and often gains significant attention in the international and Afghan media (see Neumann 2015: 6; Gall 2006). Member, Gran Hewad, argues that publicly criticising the government, "to some extent put the reformist approach of Afghanistan 1400 and the 'international community' in line" (Interview 26, 2015). However, there are also some areas in which the movement are less 'in line' with international actors goals. For example, it is sceptical of peace talks with the Taliban, something that international actors have pushed: "[w]e are not willing to bring you [the

Taliban] in at the cost of compromising our constitution, our women's rights, our democratic procedures and institutions", said the first Chair of the organisation, Shaharzad Akbar (Druzin 2013).

Many members stated that they were in favour of a continued international presence in Afghanistan, even though they believe that an international presence is not sustainable in the long term and is by no means the perfect solution. Shaharzad Akbar explained that:

> [W]e understand and we realise that security commitments will decrease. It means a smaller number of troops, and a possible decrease in aid. We understand that we Afghans need to take responsibility for ourselves and realise that international attention cannot be sustained indefinitely. What we think, however, is that we need a few more years of support to allow the shifts to happen in our political system (Anon 2013: 231).

In Chapter Five, I outlined that there were a number of issues that became more prominent as a result of the presence of international actors, which had the potential to provide political opportunities for those concerned with those issues. Afghanistan 1400 has benefitted from these discursive opportunities that have arisen from the international presence, particularly in areas where it has promoted demands similar to those of international actors. One example of this is Afghanistan 1400's attempts to address gender equality, a subject widely associated with international actors due to their efforts to promote the issue, and which had received little attention in Afghanistan prior to the intervention (see EEAS n.d. a; Morgan 2008; IRN 2002).

Concerns have been expressed that progress made in the area of gender equality could be lost once the presence of international actors diminishes (Calfas 2015: 4; Bernard 2013; Peled 2010). Afghanistan 1400 also acknowledged the fragility of the achievements made in the areas of women's rights and gender quality. It held an event on gender equality and discussed how the debate on gender issues could become an issue at the national and local level (Afghanistan 1400, 2013c). However, although addressing the same issue, members argue that Afghanistan 1400 is approaching it in a different way to that of international actors. Firstly, in terms of its organisational approach, Afghanistan 1400 stresses that it does not function as an NGO, it is not conducting projects for money, but instead trying to focus on the ideas (Interview 20, 2014). Secondly, it is attempting to address the issue in a way appropriate to Afghanistan, rather than the Western approach promoted by international actors.

Thus, despite working towards a common goal, Afghanistan 1400 attempts to find Afghan approaches to dealing with the issue of gender equality (Interview 24, 2015). It has held seminars and meetings on women's rights and gender equality, and attempted to take a fresh look at the issue in the Afghan context in order to find a new and more appropriate approach. In early meetings members attempted to identify a common perspective and language for the way society and Afghanistan 1400 view the issue. For example, there are certain cultural commonalities across Afghanistan which Afghanistan 1400 feel need to be acknowledged before establishing the best way to tackle the issue (Interview 20, 2014). In this case, it is taking advantage of the increased attention to the issue as a result of the international presence, but at the same time wants to address the issue in an alternative way.

Despite the efforts to distance itself from what are perceived as Western ideas, it appears that many see Afghanistan 1400 as having some association with ideas and goals promoted by international actors. Interviewees both outside (Interview 22, 2015; Interview 23, 2014) and inside the organisation (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 27, 2015) suggested that this perception seemed fairly widespread. The association with Western values, is probably fair to some degree; in fact one member stated that many of Afghanistan 1400's ideas were clearly linked with what could be considered Western, and should not be seen as a negative (Interview 27, 2015). The perception may also be a side-effect of being a youth movement with progressive ideas in the emerging post-intervention period. A United States Institute for Peace (USIP) report, co-authored by a member of Afghanistan 1400, stated that progressive politics are often associated with young Afghans (regardless of age) by internationals and Afghans (Hewad and Garret Johnson 2014). Progressive politics in turn, appear to be viewed as being influenced by Western ideas. Therefore, Afghanistan 1400's ideas are seen as more similar to those of international actors in comparison to other groups active in Afghanistan. One member argues that this puts the group in a distinct position that has both advantages and disadvantages, which it is still trying to assess (Interview 24, 2015).

The issue of Afghanistan 1400's perceived association with international actors does impact on the thinking behind its future strategy. This is in addition to the existing considerations over the language it uses, as well as its independence, which is discussed below. An association with international actors and the promotion of Western ideas is seen as a potential constraint on political opportunities to mobilise and succeed and has caused Afghanistan 1400 to consider its goals and demands, as well as how they are presented. On the other hand, it is clear that Afghanistan 1400 sees benefits to this association, and is taking advantage of the opportunities that this presents.

Membership and growth

Afghanistan 1400's membership is ethnically and religiously diverse, and members have varied professional backgrounds, a mixture that is rare for organised groups in Afghanistan. Members state that the different influences and backgrounds would not normally come together in Afghan society (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 24, 2015). This is a factor that members and those outside Afghanistan 1400 feel distinguishes Afghanistan 1400 from previous youth initiatives and other organisations, which are often associated with a specific religion or ethnic group (Interview 24, 2015; Interview 28, 2015; Kazemi 2012). Members have a mix of professional backgrounds too, and includes civil servants, former and current government officials such as President Karzai's former spokesman,[48] and the former chief electoral officer at the IEC, civil society activists, and people from the private sector. This list highlights some of the influential positions held by members, many of whom also possess extensive networks within and outside of these professions. The experience that some members already have of working within the system which they want to influence is viewed by members, and those outside Afghanistan 1400, as a useful asset to its potential to influence and promote its demands (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014).

Although it is in some respects diverse, it does appear that most members have emerged from a similar class, and perhaps many could be considered to be part of a young elite with networks that give them an advantage in terms of accessing other elites and institutions. This influence via the members' professions and networks has arguably provided Afghanistan 1400 with more opportunities to interact with a variety actors in Afghanistan than other available channels of interaction provided by political opportunities, which are otherwise quite limited.

The majority of Afghanistan 1400's members are well-educated, and many hold post-graduate qualifications. Interestingly, many outside the organisation perceive that a significant proportion of Afghanistan 1400's membership has been educated abroad in Western institutions, a feature that some felt was a fairly widespread perception (Interview 22, 2015; Interview 23, 2014; Interview 27, 2014). In reality, members estimated that between 10%-20% of the members have been educated abroad, while the rest had studied within Afghanistan, including the majority of founding members (Interview 28, 2015; Interview 20, 2014). A small number of members were part of a young leaders programme run by the German Institute, *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* (Interview 21, 2014), within Afghanistan, which seems to be the only one of this type in the country (Interview 20, 2014). It was

[48] The former spokesman's involvement created a lot of attention initially but has since left the group as he was very involved in one of the presidential candidates' election campaigns.

suggested that some of the more prominent members, with the most exposure to the media and international organisations, may have studied abroad, and this may have contributed to the generalisation (Interview 28, 2015). Also, these members often presented themselves as representatives of Afghanistan 1400, whereas those who were influential at the local level, often those educated in Afghanistan, are said to have taken less ownership (Interview 20, 2014). Despite the reality of relatively low numbers of Western educated members, the perception has both helped and hindered Afghanistan 1400, particularly with regards to mobilisation and potential allies, and feeds into the wider perception, discussed above, that it has Western associations.

New members were recruited once some of the key aims and structure had been established by the founding members. Existing members were proud of its diversity, but at the same time wanted to ensure that the membership had common values and objectives, particularly during the early stages (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 24, 2014; Interview 27, 2014). Another reason for the deliberately slow membership expansion was a fear of becoming well-known for the 'wrong reasons', and of becoming 'tainted' by one member's background. Members felt that other groups had failed due to their focus and dependence on particular individuals: "We want people to associate us with a mentality rather than a particular individual" (Interview 20, 2014). These concerns accounted for the selective membership process and structure of Afghanistan 1400, which sought to be as democratic as possible. These processes are intended to help keep focus on the organisation's message, rather than on individuals, although it is not clear how effective this has been.

It is also the case that the movement has benefitted from the prominence of some members such as President Karzai's former spokesman, as it helped attract greater attention (Interview 21, 2014; Interview 25, 2015). A set of stringent selection criteria for members was established, and makes clear that members cannot have active membership of a political party, a criminal record, or be accused of any corrupt activity or other controversial associations. New members are briefed on the objectives of the organisation, and are asked to sign an agreement in accordance with its charter before officially becoming a member. The membership has continued to increase and by June 2014 there were around 300 members. However, since then recruitment slowed, due to what could be considered a latent period during and after the elections in 2014, which is discussed further below.

Allies

As outlined in Chapter One, political opportunities may present different allies or opposition. In the case of Afghanistan 1400, there have not been cases of other groups or individuals actively opposing

it. The organisation has taken part in the activities and campaigns of other Afghan based groups. It is difficult to assess how Afghanistan 1400 was received more broadly, as there have only been a very limited number of sources in English that have discussed it; the assessment of its reception and potential allies is therefore drawn largely from the interviews conducted for this research, which provided anecdotal evidence and a useful insight into how it was received by the public and other civil society organisations.

According to interviewees, Afghanistan 1400 has gained verbal support from a number of people and organisations, including both Afghans and internationals working in Afghanistan. Members felt that they received a positive reaction from Afghans and those employed by international actors, and gained significant media coverage, particularly at the time the organisation was launched. A declaration made by Afghanistan 1400 made recommendations on reforms of the electoral system and electoral bodies, which received particular attention from the local Afghan media (Interview 26, 2015). Campaigns after the landslide in Badakshan and the incident at Kargha Lake also received media attention, and are discussed further below (Interview 27, 2014). Members felt that within Afghanistan the response to the organisation was good, and there was a lot of interest in several of their activities, particularly the meetings on gender equality (Interview 25, 2015). One international interviewee working in civil society felt that Afghanistan 1400 was "pretty well known in Kabul, not amongst the politicians because they don't care very much about what the youth is doing but they are known amongst youth networks" (Interview 21, 2014).

Many internationals, working for various international actors, had expressed their optimism about the formation of Afghanistan 1400 to members (Interview 21, 2014; Interview 25, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). Many of the members have friends or colleagues working within international organisations, and felt that there was interest, support and trust in what they were trying to achieve, and members were often asked how things were progressing (Interview 25, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). Internationals who were not known to the group also expressed their support, particularly at various events. Those expressing support were not only those working within civil society, but also those in the private sector or those engaged in research in the country (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 28, 2015). Some embassy and international officials had contacted Afghanistan 1400 and asked how they could help, although at this point in time, members were concerned about the impact of such help on their reputation (Interview 20, 2014). According to Hewad and Garret Johnson (2014), this attention from international actors may have been somewhat predictable considering the features of Afghanistan 1400. Hewad and Garret Johnson's (2014: 7) research into Afghan youth politics highlighted that Afghanistan 1400

featured in a subset of organisations that gained the most international attention due to the high level of education of members, its Kabul location, and the presence of members in the diplomatic community, government posts and international organisations and media.

During interviews with members it became very clear that the reputation of Afghanistan 1400 was a key concern, which led to a cautious approach regarding who it is seen to ally with. The framing and perception by others is seen as key to the potential success of Afghanistan 1400. Members want to maintain a strong unified message representative of the group's aspirations and is very keen to present itself as independent, distancing themselves from other influences, both domestic and international. Afghanistan 1400's members firmly believe that the maintenance of independence is of major importance and a signifier of likely success. Afghanistan 1400 also feels that independence is another factor separating it from other organisations in Afghanistan (Interview 22, 2015; Interview 24, 2015; Interview 28, 2015; Kazemi 2012).

As explained in Chapter Five, many civil society actors and campaigns have emerged with international support, and while only a very small number have emerged independently, there is an increasing focus on independence and sustainability by various groups (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014). There is a small but growing number of independent civil society actors in Afghanistan, a trend that might increase with the declining presence of international funds. In line with this trend, Afghanistan 1400's emphasis on independence is motivated by sustainability and the desire to avoid any kind of dependency, which it has seen causing problems for other organisations. Independence is also important to members, who feel that once they are associated with another organisation, it would be hard to lose that stamp. They also fear that this would hamper its ability to function as it likes. There is a strong feeling amongst members that any public or private money would force them to listen to certain voices. As Assad Nissar argues: "[t]his is our future, we don't want to gamble it over receiving money from anyone. We can afford financing it and we have been doing it till now so we can do it in the future" (Interview 28, 2015).

Afghanistan 1400 is fortunate enough that its membership fees and members' donations have been enough to resource its activities so far. Members pay a small, monthly membership fee of 50 Afghanis (around $1), and make contributions to specific events or campaigns if they can. At this point, there are no plans to take government or foreign funding, but funding may be sought from the Afghan public and businesses in the future. The desire for independence has led Afghanistan 1400 to turn down opportunities that arose from offers of support from international actors. It is thus strategically trying

to limit the any associations with international actors. This is done in order to protect its reputation and to prevent fuelling perceptions that it is somehow associated with Western actors and ideas, which could potentially constrain future opportunities.

Tactics

The tactics used by Afghanistan 1400 are varied and focus on raising awareness of issues stemming from its goals. It organises events, lobbies international and domestic actors, visits sites of Taliban attacks, and releases statements and declarations on a range of issues. Some of its activities to date have been conducted with other organisations, or have been part of a wider cause responding to an incident. Before the official launch, some members were involved in another campaign under the title *Az Su-ye Jawanan-e Afghanistan* (By Afghanistan's Youth). This campaign included the distribution of posters and banners and online publicity showing support for the Afghan police and commandos who prevented attacks by insurgents on the parliament, embassies and the NATO headquarters in Kabul in April 2012 (Interview 25, 2015). Another event involved tree-planting and a memorial at Kargha Lake near Kabul, to show condemnation of a Taliban attack on a hotel in the area that resulted in the death of several civilians (Interview 25, 2015). One of Afghanistan 1400's Facebook posts titled *Where does Afghanistan stand?* stated that this response was part of Afghanistan 1400's aim "[t]o undo fear Afghanistan's enemies seek to instil and shatter our people's confidence" (Afghanistan 1400, 2015a). This was one of several trips and responses encouraging resistance to extremism.

In April 2013, members of Afghanistan 1400 went to the western province of Farah after a Taliban attack on a court killed 50 people. They provided support to families and gave blood at the local hospital. In August 2013 it organised an event with other youth-run organisations to celebrate the victory of the Afghan national football team at the Asian Cup (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014). In 2014, members visited Badakshan, the site of a landslide; they gathered funds and aid to provide shelter, and asked people about their concerns and put these to the government (Interview 25, 2015). Afghanistan 1400 also had a campaign to encourage people to make blood donations for the Afghanistan national forces (Interview 25, 2015). It wanted to highlight the recent good performances of Afghan forces, as it felt they had not received enough support. These forces had also recently experienced their first major test without the support of international forces (Interview 27, 2014). This again highlights Afghanistan 1400's use of the declining presence of international actors as a means of instigating action.

Afghanistan 1400 has a website in English, Dari and Pashtu, though this has not been updated recently, and it produces press releases which are distributed to the print media and TV. It also uses billboards and produces flyers. Facebook is used to provide updates of the movement's activities and speaking events in Dari. Posts include announcements on internal election results, meetings on gender equality, press releases, and actions such as blood drives. Facebook is the most frequently used media, as it is viewed as the best method for the audience that the organisation wants to communicate with (Interview 20, 2014). Afghanistan 1400 also provides statements on relevant news issues, such as the opening of the al-Qaeda office in Qatar, Taliban assaults/victims of terrorism, the landslide in Badakshan, as well as the sporting success of the national football and cricket teams. While some members have attended protests, the organisation as a whole has not yet engaged in such activities largely due to its size and ability to mobilise. So far the other tactics used have been perceived to be a more effective way to achieve the organisation's goals.

International actors feature as one of the minor targets of Afghanistan 1400 as it is much more focused on the new generation of young Afghans and the Afghan government. Afghanistan 1400 has referred to the international community on several occasions, such as in statements on the elections, which made recommendations on how the international community could or should act (Interview 20, 2014). Members have also meet with representatives of international actors such as embassy staff, NGOs and visiting delegations (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 26, 2015). These meetings are often organised at the request of the international actors who contact Afghanistan 1400 as part of efforts to gain a wider spectrum of views on a range of issues. During these meetings Afghanistan 1400 have advocated the continued international support of Afghanistan's national security forces, for continued engagement in Afghanistan and support in strengthening Afghanistan's institutions (Interview 20, 2014). Members also attend seminars, conferences and meetings organised by international organisations with either a permanent or visiting presence in Afghanistan (Interview 26, 2015). Members have also travelled to Western countries, including the US and Denmark, to discuss issues with think tanks, policymakers and media outlets, those actors who may be influencing policy decisions on or for Afghanistan. On many of these occasions the group was approached by international actors to discuss its ideas. On a trip to the US in 2013 some members went to Congress and met with those in the State Department to discuss the opening of the Taliban's office in Doha.

Limited Opportunities

Like other actors in Afghanistan, it is often difficult for Afghanistan 1400 to conduct some activities, and at times the security situation makes it impossible to arrange meetings. In Chapter Five, several

limiting factors for civil society and other political developments were outlined. Many of these factors are also limiting development, tactics and activities. For example, due to the insecurity in many part of Afghanistan it is much more difficult for civil society organisations and election organisers to work in areas outside of Kabul, as it is for Afghanistan 1400. The organisation has made attempts to reach out to provinces and rural areas outside of Kabul, engaging in nationwide campaigns across the country. However, the majority of the campaigns have been Kabul-centric. A few members of Afghanistan 1400 live outside Kabul and travel to meetings, but most are based in the capital (Interview 20, 2014).

Afghanistan 1400 has also struggled to engage with Afghan youth outside of Kabul, who are less likely to be aware of it and its activities (Interview 25, 2015). It is noteworthy, however, that, despite this problem, there have been requests from other youth groups in the provinces for Afghanistan 1400 to visit (Interview 28, 2015). Members have also suggested that many of its ideas may be socially liberal, and therefore less likely to be accepted or appealing in more conservative, rural areas (Interview 25, 2015). Member, Gran Hewad, also highlighted that extra resources are needed in order to fully engage in the provinces as it requires much more time and committed facilitators, both of which were in short supply. Hewad also stressed the lack of political or legal opportunities that support this type of activity in the provinces and that effective work in these areas requires a major investment in time and resources (Interview 26, 2015).

Internationally funded civil society does not appear to have provided many opportunities as a channel for interaction for Afghanistan 1400, although a small number of members have benefitted from programmes run by international actors (Interview 21, 2014), and many members work or have experience working in internationally funded civil society organisations. These experiences are likely to have provided useful insights, experience and contacts that have been brought into Afghanistan 1400. Also, Hewad and Garret Johnson (2014) have suggested that the increase in political activity among Afghan youth has occurred generally in line with the development of internationally funded civil society. Some members have been positive about some of the developments made in civil society and have expressed concern about reductions in funding for civil society organisations (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 25, 2015). They also highlighted the need for civil society to be heard and, specifically, that civil should be allowed to participate in the forming of legislation relating to elections (Afghanistan 1400, 2013b).

However, there is scepticism surrounding the way civil society has developed. The prevailing feeling that came across in interviews with members is that, in general, civil society is project driven, and functions more like an industry in which there is money to be made. The type of civil society developed in Afghanistan fits with that described in Chapter One, i.e. a civil society that does not facilitate social movement activity. Despite the scepticism of many members regarding civil society development, one highlighted that without the international presence, Afghanistan 1400 would not have been able to conduct some of the activities it had, particularly on gender equality (Interview 25, 2015). In this instance, it can be argued that Afghanistan 1400 has benefitted from the international presence as a whole, as well as from the discursive opportunities that have been provided by the international actors pushing some topics that had been difficult to discuss. However, as a channel of interaction civil society provides little opportunities aside from the contacts members have established within civil society.

The limited opportunities resulting from poor democratic development outlined in Chapter Five, and the type of civil society developed by international actors, do seem to be factors in Afghanistan 1400's strategic choices and go some way to account for the reasons why it is not a social movement in its current form. Hewad (Interview 26, 2015) states that the lack of a proper parliamentary system, rights for political parties, or attention to the development of political parties, have all contributed to Afghanistan 1400 developing the way it has, with both civil and political aims, and with the intention of influencing electoral and institutional reforms. As institutional rules that could facilitate movements and channels of interaction with elites are lacking, it appears that most of Afghanistan 1400's access to elites stems from the contacts of its members.

There is also a lack of similar entities or movements in Afghanistan. Thus the 'demonstration effect' that the presence of movement can have on opening up opportunities, as discussed in Chapter One does not exist. Despite the desire to present a new and different entity in the form of Afghanistan 1400, the lack of other similar entities has constrained its opportunities. Several members felt that there are very few reference points in terms of similar movements or groups in Afghanistan, past or present, and that members are, to some extent, working things out as they go along (Interview 24, 2015). Membership of Afghanistan 1400 has been a new experience for most members (Interview 26, 2015). This fits with the assessment of civil society provided in Chapter Five. Social movements do not really feature among Afghanistan's traditional civil society and has not been a part of the civil society development that has occurred since the intervention. Reflecting on Afghanistan 1400's the latent period after the elections, a statement by Afghanistan 1400 said that it was "not an exception to, but

rather at the forefront of overcoming the deficit of a culture of collective action in Afghanistan" (Afghanistan 1400, 2015a).

The tactics that are used by Afghanistan 1400 also reflect the limited opportunities available via other channels, the lack of similar entities in Afghanistan, and the desire to influence domestic institutions using supportive rather than adversarial means. As outlined in Chapter Five, there are very few institutional rules that actually facilitate movement activity, and channels of interaction with elites are limited. However, as touched upon earlier, Afghanistan 1400 does take advantage of the influence and networks of its members, and while it is difficult to assess accurately how much access Afghanistan 1400 has to those it wishes to influence, it appears that the contacts that individual members provide have helped them overcome some of the limited opportunities.

Elections 2014

The presidential elections in 2014 were the focus of much of Afghanistan 1400's activities following its launch in 2012. The focus on these elections both demonstrates the types of tactics used, and signified a set-back in Afghanistan 1400's development, which appears to be largely down to the uncertainty that the prolonged election produced, as well as internal differences on the direction of the organisation.

Afghanistan 1400 released statements (Afghanistan 1400, 2013b) and organised events highlighting the importance of the elections as the first election to take place after the international military withdrawal. The first chair of the movement, Shahrzad Akbar stated that,

> [w]e see the democratic transfer of power – the political transition – as the most important thing on the national agenda at this point. We have constantly been raising attention, encouraging participation, calling on our political leaders to encourage participation and mobilize voters, and also going out there saying that we are looking at agendas rather than personalities (Anon 2013: 227).

Afghanistan 1400 also discussed the significance of the elections and lessons from previous elections (Interview 20, 2014), producing a document recommending changes that should be made to the electoral system, and strongly arguing that the elections were the only way of helping to ensure that this transfer was a success (Interview 20, 2014). In 2013, leaders of the group visited the US and tried

to encourage American officials to focus on helping to ensure that the April 5th elections were free and fair rather than concentrating on talks with the Taliban (Gienger 2013).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Afghanistan 1400's activities following its formation created certain expectations among both Afghans and those working in embassies and international NGOs. These observers believed that Afghanistan 1400 would be vocal in the run up to the elections, and many were keen to see who the organisation would support (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 21, 2014; Interview 28, 2015; Interview 30, 2014). Some interviewees outside Afghanistan 1400 said that they were a bit disappointed that it was not as outspoken as they had hoped (Interview 21, 2014; Interview 30, 2014). However, after much debate Afghanistan 1400 had decided not to endorse any of the presidential candidates officially, and instead focused on encouraging people to vote and on the elections being fair and transparent. This was due, in part, to the inability to reach a consensus over which candidate to support (Interview 20, 2014). In addition, some aspects of the campaigning had become associated with a tribal approach, which was something that members felt was not good for the country (Interview 26, 2015). Members also believed that fraud was taking place, tarnishing the elections, and wanted to maintain their values and principles (Ibid).

This decision not to support a particular candidate did create something of a division or polarisation within the organisation (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 26, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). Some members were disappointed at what they viewed as a missed opportunity (Interview 28, 2015). Afghanistan 1400 nevertheless maintained its independence throughout the elections, although some members did go on to work on the campaigns of various candidates. Those who chose to support or campaign for a particular candidate had to sign a set of guidelines, and also meant they must resign from leadership positions (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 28, 2015). Some wanted to bring forward the political elements of the organisation and build the rest of the structure around that progress, not wanting to miss opportunities. Other members seemed happy and confident with the decision to remain neutral, particularly given the outcome of the elections (Interview 26, 2015). In addition, there was some feeling that members may have infused ideas and principles from the organisation into the election campaigns they worked with, using the same language as Afghanistan 1400(Interview 20, 2014), and therefore effectively spread its ideas in that way. Afghanistan 1400 did continue its outreach activities, produce press releases and organised meetings with members of the Afghan government and electoral institutions (Interview 26, 2015).

Despite not supporting any particular candidate in the election, two members recently became ministers - Assad Zamir as Minister of Agriculture and Humayoun al Rasa as Minister of Commerce. Both are active within Afghanistan 1400, but had to stand as independent candidates as Afghanistan 1400 is not a registered party. Although they were both members of Afghanistan 1400, they were not solely associated with it, and had other supporters and people lobbying for them. Both were already respected within the political community, and had previous government experience, so it is not possible to determine whether they benefitted from their links with Afghanistan 1400 (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 26, 2015). It is also difficult to say whether or not the majority of the Afghan public will be aware of the relationship, but some members certainly see their selection as a demonstration of the qualities and advantages the organisation has (Interview 24, 2015; Interview 26, 2015).

Since June 2014 Afghanistan 1400 has focused on internal restructuring and internal changes which have resulted in a period or dormancy regarding public activities and member recruitment, although discussions and meeting have been ongoing. Hewad and Garret Johnson (2014: 3) note that a focus on internal discussions is common among youth organisations, "[g]iven the conflict between inherited values and status quo power dynamics on one hand and contemporary events, education and exposure on the other." The decision not to support an electoral candidate, and disagreements over the direction of the organisation played a significant part in the onset of a latent period, but there were also other events making it difficult for Afghanistan 1400 to operate.

The political uncertainty surrounding the elections went on for six months, narrowing opportunities even further, as outlined in Chapter Five. A statement posted by Afghanistan 1400 on Facebook stated that "[w]hile our launch and aftermath were impactful and grandiose, we have also suffered unwanted pauses and were unaffected by the general political environment in the country" (Afghanistan 1400, 2015). The statement also said that the elections posed questioned for the organisation that were "bigger than its then two year-long presence on the scene could address" (ibid). It felt that many of its actions would risk being hijacked by the fact that the elections were ongoing, and could end up being associated with a particular candidate, which it had already tried to avoid (Interview 25, 2015). And finally, the poor security situation meant that it was difficult to organise events, and Afghanistan 1400 did not want to encourage people to attend events at which it could not guarantee the safety of attendees (Interview 25, 2015).

Discussions, particularly since the elections, have involved the possibility of becoming a political party as well as a movement, and most of its upcoming activities are likely to focus on this. Many of the

members felt that the self-definition as a civil-political movement had hindered its ability to be more active during the elections (Interview 20, 2014: Nisser 2015): “On the one hand we were a civil and political movement so we couldn’t be involved […] We were also left disengaged […] [and we] should have allied with a candidate” (Interview 20, 2014). Another member felt that by attempting to act as a civil society organisation as well as a political one, Afghanistan 1400 ended up being considered a civil society group and therefore neutral. He, and others, felt that this left Afghanistan 1400 less likely to be listened to and that the its potential had been damaged due to the lack of a more political stance (Interview 26, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). Realistically the process of becoming a political party would take another two or three years, and perhaps longer. The decision to become a political party seems to have emerged largely from the perception of limited opportunities to influence in its current form, despite the reputation of political parties in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Chapter Five outlined the extensive influence of international actors and limited availability of political opportunities. The way in which Afghanistan 1400 has developed clearly demonstrated both the influence of international actors and the limited opportunities for movement activity. Factors constraining Afghanistan 1400’s activities and ability to function as a movement largely stem from limited opportunities relating to the insecurity still present in the country, the difficulties in engaging outside of Kabul, the conservative control of elites, and the lack of similar entities. Afghanistan 1400 has not been subject to intentional efforts by other to inhibit its activities, or repression, but there are few clear examples of Afghanistan 1400 benefitting from facilitation by international or domestic actors. With the exception of some international actors seeking out the opinions of those within Afghanistan 1400, most of the other opportunities it has taken up, such as the general development of civil society or the opportunity to lobby the government over elections, have been advantageous but in no way have these developments sought to facilitate this type of activity specifically. The lack of opportunities to influence government has influenced Afghanistan 1400’s tactics on a number of issues. The contacts and networks that the members of Afghanistan 1400 have, appears to be the key factor in countering the limited political opportunities.

Although political opportunities are in many respects severely restricted in Afghanistan, the presence of international actors has nevertheless had a major impact on the context in which Afghanistan 1400 operates, and it can be said that it effectively emerged from the broad opportunities that individual members had gained from the international presence, as well having taken advantage of the opening up of opportunities. However, the skeptical and often negative public perception of the West and the

international presence has also had some influence on Afghanistan 1400's strategic choices, and contributed to its stance on maintaining independence, as well as the language it uses and the approaches it takes to dealing with certain issues. Despite the attempts to distance itself from Western ideas, Afghanistan 1400 has taken advantage of opportunities that arose as a result of the international presence, such as the opportunity to lobby international actors. However, overall poor levels of democratic development and high levels of insecurity have clearly affected the political opportunities available. These are both key areas that international actors set out to improve after the intervention and thus it could be argued that their state-building failures and insufficient levels of improvement in Afghanistan has substantially impacted on Afghanistan 1400's strategy. The decision to become a political party, though in part down to the ambitions of members, also suggests that the post-intervention environment has not presented sufficient political opportunities for it to carry out the activities it set out to conduct as a movement.

CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION

Throughout this thesis, I have analysed the extent to which international actors influence political opportunity and social movement development more broadly within a new protectorate context. In this chapter, I draw together and discuss the broader findings that have emerged from that analysis. I do this by focusing on the influence of international actors on two levels. The first level involves the impact of the international presence on the availability of political opportunities. For this, I revisit the categories of the political opportunity framework, which were outlined in Chapter Two of this thesis. I then explore the findings of the contextual analyses of Kosovo and Afghanistan and reflect on the political opportunities found in each state. The second level is concerned with how political opportunities and international actors have influenced the two case studies more specifically. This involves a consideration and comparison of the formation and outlook, tactics and allies of Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 and the influence of international actors on their strategies. This two-layered analysis allows me to draw broader conclusions about how international actors can shape social movement development.

International actors' influence on political opportunities

By focusing on the influence of international actors I do not intend to suggest that they are a *unique* shaper of political opportunities, or indeed of the case studies themselves. There are a number of other factors and actors that can, and do, affect the outcome of political opportunities and strategic decisions. These can emerge from different regional, historical and cultural settings, as well as the wide-ranging effects of the conflict and the intervention itself. The new protectorate context does, nevertheless, provide a new setting in which to analyse the influence of external factors on social movement development, and thus also provides new ground on which to apply a political opportunity framework.

Applying the political opportunity framework to the two case studies has demonstrated that the influence of international actors was significant and contributed to the increase and constraint of opportunities in different areas. The extent and type of influence exerted by international actors fluctuated throughout the existence of both new protectorates. It also differed in each territory, largely due to the nature of the international presence being more extensive before independence in Kosovo and generally more assistive in Afghanistan.

One of the key findings from the analysis of the political opportunities available in Afghanistan and Kosovo was the existence of a very limited level of opportunities. Many of the factors limiting opportunities were a result of the new protectorate context, and as a result are highly likely to be found in other new protectorates. The level of opportunities was particularly low in the years following the intervention, and while both territories have seen opportunities opening up, the speed at which they have done so appears to be higher in Kosovo. The ongoing insecurity and poor democratic development in Afghanistan seem to be the most significant factors constraining opportunities. Political opportunities increased alongside the improved potential for the population to participate and voice its demands in the public sphere and political system. Opportunities have increased in both states, though more so in Kosovo, due to the gradual strengthening of civil society, and the implementation of elections. These factors are considered below within the sections considering each category of the political opportunity framework: openness, coherence of elites, facilitation and repression, and allies and opposition. Within these sections, I compare and contrast the political opportunities available in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as the influence of international actors on them. Finally, I reflect on the political opportunity literature, outlined in Chapter Two, and analyse how my findings relate to those in the existing literature.

Openness

The political opportunity literature sets out a number of elements that contribute to the openness of the state, such as the capacity to compete for elite status, the potential to change laws and to participate in political opposition (Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 1986; Tilly 1978). The literature also suggests that the more open a state's political system is, the more opportunities exist (see Tarrow 1998; Clemens 1997; Koopmans 1996; Esman 1994; Tilly 1978; Eisinger 1973). The analysis of the opportunities available in Kosovo and Afghanistan supports this literature to some extent. Both territories had fairly closed political systems in the early years of the new protectorate, particularly in the period before the first elections took place, and both had very limited political opportunities as a result. Both states gradually opened up due to elections being held, and saw an increase in avenues for public participation as well as an increase in competition for elite status. However, despite the existence of these features, political opportunities in both Kosovo and Afghanistan remained low.

My research has highlighted that although many of the features considered to contribute to an open state exist, many are not developed enough in order to serve as an effective means of facilitating movements. For example, the existence of elected officials that represent a different party to the government, does not necessarily constitute an effective opposition, which means that the

opportunities that could arise from the fragmentation of elites are less useful. The ineffectiveness of the opposition effectively constrains those opportunities to provide an ally that is likely to effectively influence the government. It was not until 2005 that something like an effective political opposition was formed in Kosovo (Freedom House 2006), and an effective opposition has yet to be seen in Afghanistan. There were also a number of cases of fraud during several elections in both Kosovo and Afghanistan, which also poses questions over the effectiveness of the electoral politics in both territories. There were a number of issues that hindered democratic development in both territories that are also commonly found in other new protectorates, such as the prevalence of corruption, patronage and insecurity. These findings highlight that although the features of a more open state may be visible, the effectiveness of those features must also be taken into account.

The political opportunity literature suggests that the more closed a state is, the less responsive it is likely to be. This appears to have been the case in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The Afghan government was not responsive to the activities of Afghanistan 1400. Although the organisation was known among civil society actors, both international and Afghan, it was largely overlooked by the government (Interview 21, 2014). This lack of responsiveness from the Afghan government also applies to civil society actors more widely (Interview 21, 2014; Interview 22, 2015), and the channels of interaction between government and civil society as a whole are lacking. This appears to be more obviously the case for those organisations that are not put forward by international actors to interact with the government (Interview 21, 2014). Some representatives of international actors, did privately welcome the formation of Afghanistan 1400 and some offered to support it. However, the Afghanistan 1400 did not accept support from international actors due to its desire to remain independent, demonstrating that the opportunity for potentially powerful allies is not always taken up (see Caruso 2015).

In Kosovo, neither international, nor domestic actors were responsive to movements. It did in fact take some time before either set of actors became responsive to civil society. In the case of Vetëvendosje, it experienced incidents of repression from domestic actors, such as the Kosovo Police (KPS), over which international actors had some authority. There were also occasions when international actors actually inhibited Vetëvendosje's activities, as discussed below. Once Vetëvendosje had representatives elected to the Assembly, domestic and international actors did respond slightly differently to it. This was largely in relation to the elected representatives rather than Vetëvendosje as a whole. After the election success, Vetëvendosje did occasionally meet with international actors, though these have not been official meetings and the members of Vetëvendosje

felt that the attitude of the major international actors was the same as it had been prior to the elections. The success in elections did give Vetëvendosje a different status, in the sense that it had demonstrated that it had gained significant public support through democratic means, and that it could now engage in the political system as a serious player.

New protectorates have proved to be an interesting context in which to assess the openness of the political system. In the political opportunity literature outlined in Chapter Two, openness is generally considered in reference to domestic state actors and focuses on the impact of the openness of the domestic state apparatus on political opportunities (see Tarrow 1998; Clemens 1997; Koopmans 1996; Esman 1994; Tilly 1978; Eisinger 1973). However, further analysis of the new protectorate context highlighted that international actors had an impact on the openness of the state. This was particularly clear in the case of UNMIK, which had extensive authority in Kosovo, and took on the role of a state authority. From an early stage in the new protectorate, UNMIK was gradually transferring powers to the PISG and democratic elections took place. This meant that the actions of both international and domestic actors were contributing to the level of openness of the state. When focusing on the influence of international actors on the level of openness, it was clear that UNMIK contributed to the closed nature of the political system. As discussed in Chapter Three, this was largely due to its executive powers and unaccountable nature (Pugh 2006; Visoka 2012).

As my research progressed, it became clear that the broader influences of international actors should also be considered to impact on the degree of state openness, and not just that of an international administration. However, I found some aspects of the international actors' influence difficult to assess, partly because influence is generally difficult to measure (see Lowery 2013; Tsui and Lucas 2013; Dür 2008), and partly due to the lack of public information on how the influence of international actors is exerted. However, I argue that the elements of the international presence that affect political decision-making also play a role in the level of openness of the state and therefore on the political opportunities available. As a result, it can be argued that the extent of the influence of international actors on the political system requires further analysis in addition to that of the domestic state apparatus. This analysis needs to be incorporated into political opportunity frameworks that analyse territories with a heavy international influence, in order to fully gauge the openness of the state and the availability of political opportunities.

Coherence of elites

The coherence of elites can have an impact on political opportunities in a number of ways. The existing literature on political opportunity highlights that fragmentation within the party system or division amongst elites is seen as a potential incentive for movements (Banks 2007; Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 1986). The somewhat amended political opportunity framework I developed and set out in Chapter Two suggested that there were three aspects of elite coherence that should be considered in relation to their impact on political opportunities: the coherence of domestic elites, the coherence of international actors, which effectively form another distinct set of elites, and thirdly, the coherence of international actors and domestic elites. I will revisit all three aspects here.

Domestic elites

In both Afghanistan and Kosovo much of the domestic elite attempted to maintain conservative control. This meant that elites attempted to keep power by maintaining the status quo, rather than encouraging change, which could have been beneficial to them, as found by Tilly (1978). This is similar to findings in the literature on post-conflict or fragile states (Banks 2007), in which power is likely to be concentrated among a small elite (McAdam 1982). The latter is likely to have a conservative approach to maintaining the boundaries of the political system (Walter 2002). This situation appears to be similar in new protectorate contexts due to the international influence and the recent, or in cases such as Afghanistan, the ongoing conflict.

International actors have a significant influence on the domestic elites that they work with on developing a new administration and institutions. In a new protectorate, international actors generally prioritise stability and seek to work with the elite that will be the most stable option. This can influence the relationship between international actors and domestic elites, as we saw in the case of Kosovo. When it came to the issue of Kosovo's status, in order to make progress an effort was made to promote some degree of consensus among domestic elites, as well as with international actors. In Kosovo and Afghanistan patronage is still pervasive and has an impact on the power held by elites. These local ties in Afghanistan make it possible for elites to exert their power in ways outside of the democratic system. These factors tend to override the political opportunities that are thought to emerge from fragmentation and division among domestic elites. As highlighted in reference to opportunities and openness, the analysis of the new protectorate context highlights that despite the appearance of division and fragmentation among the elite, a deeper investigation of elite interaction and interests should be conducted in order to establish whether these political opportunities really exist.

Much of the literature on political opportunities in relation to domestic elites discusses the potential impacts of election outcomes and the party system, i.e. the organisation and establishment of the most powerful elites in a democratic context. For instance, the literature suggests that the ideological leaning of a government is likely to result in a government being more responsive to movements with a similar ideological outlook (Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1995; Amenta and Zylan 1992). However, it is often difficult to categorise movements as being on the left or right of the political spectrum (Caruso 2015). The two case studies had broad goals linked to the pursuit of self-determination. These goals do not fit neatly into a left-right spectrum. They are in fact quite different to the goals of those that may be pursuing policy change in a specific area, such as education or the health care.

In Kosovo, both Vetëvendosje and the government were pursuing self-determination for Kosovo. However, they were doing so in different ways. While the government chose to work with international actors, Vetëvendosje saw international actors as an opposition, and a barrier to self-determination. As a result, the attempts to present a somewhat coherent approach by international and domestic actors constrained opportunities for Vetëvendosje. This is expected in the political opportunity literature, which states that a division of elites is more likely to create opportunities than solidarity (see Banks 2007; Selbin 2006; Goldstone 2001, 1994; Tarrow 1998; Goldfrank 1994; Kitschelt 1986; Skocpol 1979; Trimberger 1978; Gurr 1970). The case of Afghanistan 1400 however, presents a somewhat different scenario. Afghanistan 1400 have focused on engaging Afghan youth in politics and coming up with its own solutions and methods of presenting its ideas to the government. This stems from the lack of other channels and allies that could influence the government, either directly by Afghanistan 1400, or on its behalf. Therefore, the perceptions of political opportunities stemming from divisions within the elite have been less relevant to date. In fact, Afghanistan 1400 has occasionally advocated that elites, along with other groups, should unify together behind a particular cause or against a commonly perceived threat, such as the Taliban. This approach appears to override the issue of fragmentation and division within elites as the opportunities that may otherwise come from these factors are lacking.

The contextual analysis of Kosovo and Afghanistan highlighted the relatively narrow spectrum of ideological stances among political parties, with research on political parties in Kosovo showing little difference in ideological stances, and that most parties can be considered to be on the centre-right (Democracy for Development 2014; Anderson 2010: 3). Given Vetëvendosje's goals and the dominance of the centre-right stance of parties, the ideological leanings of government were unlikely to provide Vetëvendosje with many opportunities. After independence, Vetëvendosje's goals

expanded and can be considered largely left-wing, which did not change the potential for opportunities in relation to the government. However, the lack of a left-wing option for voters and candidates in itself provided Vetëvendosje with an opportunity to participate in elections by providing candidates that represented a different position to the majority of the other candidates. The entry of Vetëvendosje into electoral politics was the most significant change in the dominance of centre-right parties in Kosovo.

In Afghanistan, research also shows that there is little difference in the ideological and policy platforms of most political parties, which remain largely underdeveloped and indistinguishable (Freedom House 2016; NDI 2011). Most candidates stand as independent candidates in elections and do not bring party associations into their campaigns. The lack of developed political parties, the narrow political spectrum represented in elections, and the broadly conservative control of elites in both Kosovo and Afghanistan all limit political opportunities. This is a situation is that is highly likely to be found in other new protectorates.

The analysis of both territories also highlighted the potential that elections have to create political uncertainty and to lead to periods of instability that can hinder movement activity. In Kosovo and Afghanistan some elections were marred by incidents of fraud or the formation of a government was heavily delayed, events which appear to have constrained opportunities. For instance, Afghanistan 1400 felt that the long period of uncertainty after the 2014 elections made it increasingly difficult for it to engage. This was due to the fear that a lot of potential activities would be viewed as a sign of support for one of the remaining two candidates. It was also difficult for Afghanistan 1400 to target and attempt to influence a government that was still not fully formed after six months, as was the case after the 2014 elections in Afghanistan.

International actors

In order to assess the degree of coherence of international actors, it was first necessary to assess who the key actors were, and then to determine the type and extent of influence these actors wielded. As explored in Chapter One, the international presence together with the activities of international actors, are often referred to as the 'international community,' by members of Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400, the public, and a range of media and analysts. The analysis of Afghanistan and Kosovo highlighted how few states are actually involved in new protectorates. In both cases, the US took a leading role in the intervention and state-building efforts, particularly in the initial stages.

The analysis also highlighted several examples of disagreements among the international actors involved. As a result I thought it possible that fragmentation between international actors could be perceived as an opportunity. However, in the case study analysis, the lack of coherence among international actors did not appear to lead to either case study perceiving additional opportunities in this area. This may be because the disagreements were often related to the commitment of resources or a particular approach to the deployment of civilian or military assets, rather than about the goals and broad policies that were being promoted. All the international actors wanted to see security, a reduction in violence, and the conduct of free and fair elections. When it comes to more specific infrastructure projects or development policy areas, certain states or agencies tend to take up projects that are of particular interest to them, and which they approach within the broader promotion of human rights and democracy. This does however leave little potential for divisions that could generate political opportunities. The broad overarching goals and approach of the international actors and their association with the ideals of the 'international community' were a more prominent feature than the disagreements among international actors. This is demonstrated by the fact that both case studies tended to target the 'international community' as a whole. For instance, Afghanistan 1400 would address the 'international community' in statements that made recommendations to a variety of bodies. Vetëvendosje also targeted the international presence as a whole whilst carrying out direct actions and making statements directed at specific institutions or actors when relevant.

International actors and domestic elites

Despite the lack of perceived opportunities in relation to the coherence of international actors, the findings of my research demonstrate that the relationship between international actors is extremely important when analysing the availability of opportunities. In fact, the coherence between the two often created, constrained, or increased opportunities to a greater extent than the coherence of one set of elites did. The new protectorate context contains two quite distinct sets of elites. Although either set is unlikely to be homogenous, the relationship that international actors have with domestic elites, particularly those they seek to work with, can have an effect on a number of political opportunities, particularly in the areas of facilitation, repression and allies.

In Kosovo, most of the public and the political elites were grateful for the NATO intervention into the conflict between Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians. The international actors' broad goals of democracy and human rights were also generally welcomed. Most domestic elites were keen to work with international actors, viewing their support as the best way to gain independence. This meant that Vetëvendosje's opposition to the international presence was likely to impact upon the potential for

allies among domestic elites, as well as the potential for its demands to be heard by domestic actors. Therefore, the coherence of domestic and international actors resulted in limited opportunities for Vetëvendosje.

In Afghanistan, the response to the intervention, the presence of international actors and the promotion of democracy and human rights was much more mixed than it was in Kosovo. Given Afghanistan's geopolitical position and its cultural history, the goals of the international actors represented a much starker change for Afghanistan than it did for Kosovo, which as a result has led to a greater distinction between international actors and the domestic elite. The relationship between international actors and domestic elites has been much rockier in Afghanistan than in Kosovo. These factors also help to explain why some perceive elements of Afghanistan 1400 to be 'Western'. For example, when Afghanistan 1400 is critical of the Afghan government it is put in the same camp as international actors because it is known for criticising the government. This association has both increased and constrained opportunities for Afghanistan 1400. It increased its appeal to those who also support claims that may be similar to those made by international actors, but it constrained its efforts to present Afghan solutions, or to assert its independence from other influences.

Facilitation and repression

The types of interactions between movements, civil society more broadly, and government can influence the ease of access for new claims and interests to be aired within the decision-making process. In Chapter Two, I highlighted a number of ways in which government or international actors in a new protectorate may facilitate movement activity. This includes the development of civil society, the presence of institutional rules (Kitschelt 1986), the facilitation of particular actions and the freedom of action, the creation of a favourable image, and, the supply of finance or facilities (Marx 1979). In Kosovo and Afghanistan, it was difficult to find any examples of the facilitation of movements generally, or in relation to the case studies.

Although there was not a direct focus, the presence of institutional rules and civil society development did have the potential to facilitate movement activity. However, during the analysis of Kosovo and Afghanistan, it became clear that the institutional rules that might benefit movements were virtually non-existent in the first few years of the new protectorates but did increase to some extent throughout the new protectorate period. However, even when potentially relevant legislation was passed, the implementation and enforcement was often slow and the public and officials may not have been aware of the new rules for some time. This is another example of the apparent presence

of opportunities, which does not correspond to the opportunities that are actually available. Legislation that could help movements may have been put in place but the poor implementation or awareness of it still constrains political opportunities.

While much of the literature on political opportunities concludes that movements benefit from the expansion of political opportunities (see Jenkins and Perrow 1997; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Voss 1993; Tarrow 1994, 1996; della Porta 1996; Oberschall 1996), some scholars have argued that movements can also benefit from constrained opportunities (Suh 2001), repression (Lipset 1983; Barkan 1984; Kimeldorf 1988; Marks 1989; Brockett 1995) and threats, which can actually galvanise movements (Caruso 2015; Gamson and Meyer 1996). Several authors have concluded that activists are most likely to succeed when government policy appears to be particularly hostile and institutional mechanisms appear to be closed (Meyer 1993b; Schlzman and Tierney 1986; Smith 1996; Staggenborg 1991).

The two case studies responded differently to constrained opportunities and Vetëvendosje did experience some repression and attempts by international actors to inhibit its activities. Some international actors made derogatory public statements that damaged the image of Vetëvendosje to some. It also experienced a degree of repression from domestic actors and, arguably, international actors that had authority over the Kosovo Police and UNMIK police. Vetëvendosje claims to have experienced repression at protests, and in the form of harassment and arrest of its activists (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Vetëvendosje 2010d). Sources external to the movement, including international organisations and interviewees, suggested that, on some occasions, the response to Vetëvendosje's activities was repressive and, in some cases, over the top (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Freedom House 2007). These responses to Vetëvendosje's tactics have also served to inhibit its activities. For example, the house arrest of Albin Kurti that some thought to be politically motivated (see Clark 2008; Freedom House 2008; Gashi 2007; Amnesty International 2007) served to discredit Vetëvendosje's leaders and divert its attention and resources towards defending itself and its image, rather than using its energies to focus on its goals.

The political opportunity framework outlined in Chapter Two suggested that a repressive response by state authorities would be somewhat expected due to Vetëvendosje's goals and tactics, which sought fundamental change and were therefore seen as a potential threat to stability by international actors (see Kaidanow 2009a). Even after Vetëvendosje participated in elections, protests continued to result in clashes with the authorities and Assembly members have been arrested. The response to

Vetëvendosje's tactics and the repression it experienced, have had varying effects on its appeal. For instance, in February 2007 when two protestors were killed by rubber bullets shot by UNMIK officers, many thought that sympathy and support for Vetëvendosje increased (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Interview Nine 2014, Interview Ten 2014). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the images of clashes with the police at other protests put many people off Vetëvendosje's activities, even if they might have had some sympathy with its goals (Interview Nine 2014; Interview Ten 2014). Many interviewees did for example perceive the turning over of EULEX cars by Vetëvendosje activists as a step too far (Interview Six, 2014; Interview Nine, 2014).

Afghanistan 1400 did not experience attempts by others to inhibit its activity, nor did it experience the same type of repression as Vetëvendosje. This is not least due to its organisational nature but also because its goals and tactics were unlikely to cause such a response. However, it can be argued that some of the goals and tactics used by Afghanistan 1400 emerged from a repressive environment more broadly and explain its development as a CSO and not a social movement. The insecurity and the threat caused by the Taliban made aspects of Afghanistan 1400's tactics difficult to conduct at various times, particularly outside of Kabul. The organisation favoured a collaborative approach in its efforts to influence government and often encouraged different entities and the government, to unite in order to resolve a particular problem. This aspect of Afghanistan 1400's outlook resulted in goals and tactics that would not threaten the government, and so, state repression was unlikely. This represents a key difference between the case studies, which both acted within a context of extremely limited political opportunities. Vetëvendosje's response to the lack of opportunities was to use tactics of mass protest and direct action, while Afghanistan 1400's tactics encouraged collaboration. However, the main similarity in both responses to the lack of opportunities was the decision to participate in elections.

Elements of the repressive environment found in Kosovo, and more so in Afghanistan, were due to threats perceived by the case studies, and in some cases also by the state and other domestic actors. For Afghanistan 1400, these threats came from the Taliban and the external influence of other states, particularly Pakistan. For Vetëvendosje, threats were considered to come from international actors and Serbia, which were seen as obstacles to its goals for itself and Kosovo as a whole. Thus, both case studies were galvanised to some extent by threats, as expected in the existing political opportunity literature (Caruso 2015; Gamson and Meyer 1996). However, the origins of these threats have come from sources other than the state, which is the usual actor of consideration for political opportunity frameworks (see Kriesi et al. 1995).

Suh (2001) states that social movements can actually be positively affected if fewer opportunities are perceived. In a sense, both case studies have responded to the lack of opportunities available and have managed varying degrees of success as a result. Afghanistan 1400 seems to have attempted to make the best of the few political opportunities available, which has led it to develop and strategise in the way it has and resulted in its limited outreach. The latent period that Afghanistan 1400 has entered and its decision to participate in elections are also, in part, due to the perception of constrained opportunities. Vetëvendosje also adjusted its tactics in response to the limited opportunities available. The constrained opportunities contributed to the use of protest to express the lack of influence on the decision-making process, as found by Caruso (2015). But ultimately Vetëvendosje did choose to participate in elections in order to exert greater influence. The two case studies do not provide a uniform finding on repression or the perception of threat. It is however clear that the repressive context in Afghanistan and the repression and inhibiting actions against Vetëvendosje shaped the opportunities and therefore the strategies of both cases, albeit in different ways.

Civil society development

The discussion in Chapter Two suggested that civil society development could result in civil society providing a channel for social movements to interact with government, and the potential for allies. International actors spent significant resources on funding and developing civil society in Kosovo and Afghanistan and there are a lot of similarities in the way in which the internationally funded civil society developed, as well as in the effects on social movement activity. The increasingly active nature of civil society and the opening up of debate broadly benefited both case studies. However, in both territories the form which civil society took and its weakness did not provide an effective means for the case studies to interact with or influence government. It also appears to have contributed to the side-lining of social movement and independent grassroots activity more broadly.

Donor-funded civil society often focuses on issues of importance to the international actors providing the funding, which does not always result in the funding of issues that are of most importance to, or most needed by, the local population. In some instances these issues may not be issues that are that prominent in domestic discourse or within domestic civil society. Some obvious examples of this arose in both case study analyses. In both cases there was some focus by donor-funded civil society on youth issues. International actors heavily promoted the issue of gender equality and women's rights in Afghanistan (Nikolic 2014; Winters 2010). Women's rights had not been a prominent issue prior to the intervention and there are concerns that a decrease in funding and attention from international actors

would result in the loss of any gains made in this area (Calfas 2015: 4; Bernard 2013; Peled 2010). In Kosovo, donor-funded civil society focused heavily on the issue of minority rights. This had been a prominent issue prior to the intervention in relation to the Albanian minority in Serbia. However, minority rights within Kosovo had not been a salient issue prior to the intervention (KSCF n.d. b). The analysis of both states finds that the space for these issues to be discussed was opened up by the international presence, providing opportunities for those concerned with these issues. These opportunities also raise the potential for allies within the international actors that could be lobbied or collaborated with.

The introduction or renewed focus on certain issues also occurred outside the realm of civil society development. Some issues were mentioned in the rhetoric of international politicians or development bodies. In this sense, the presence of international actors can be said to introduce a new cultural component to the political opportunities that may be available. The cultural component of political opportunities has been acknowledged by a number of scholars after criticism that cultural influences had been overlooked by early political opportunity literature (see Koopmans et al. 2005; Ferree et al. 2002, Gamson and Meyer 1996, McAdam 1996). In both Kosovo and Afghanistan, international actors play a role in shaping the cultural setting, not only in political terms by implementing democratic institutions, but also by influencing issue areas relating to democratisation more widely. It is questionable how successful international actors are in engraining these cultural aspects in new protectorates. Several scholars have already highlighted that democratisation is often somewhat limited to technical aspects such as elections and voting rather than cultural factors (Scott 2007). The impact of this cultural component of the international presence on political opportunities and social movements warrants further research.

The analysis of civil society development in Kosovo and Afghanistan has confirmed the findings of Coelho (2012) who argues that international practices are "informed by neoliberal understanding of the state and the politics of international statebuilding" which created a "largely apolitical NGO sector that has legitimized the political status quo rather than serve as a vehicle for transforming state-society relations" (Coelho 2012: 1). My case study analyses also support the wider discussion on civil society development in Chapter One. The framing of civil society by international actors in new protectorates is different to the way it is discussed within traditional discourse of liberal modernity (see Chandler 2013). In both Kosovo and Afghanistan the organisations funded by international actors are largely focused on non-contentious issues of concern to international actors, such as those which educate or advocate inclusive principles or for a pluralism of political identities such as youth and

women (see Chandler 2013 and Belloni 2008). Less attention is paid to holding the government to account and there are few projects likely to cause contention between civil society and the government or international actors.

Civil society has developed in a way that many scholars have noted elsewhere, which has resulted in a professional and bureaucratised civil society, with donor dependent NGOs being the dominant entity (see Smith 2015; Lynch 2013; Choudry and Kapoor 2013; Paffenholz 2009; Aksartova 2009; Alvarez 2009; Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009; Rajagopol 2003). This confirms the development of a more depoliticized civil society (see Bridaux and Kurki 2014; Chandler 2013; Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009) and has resulted in other actors being side-lined (see Vogel 2016; della Porta 2014; Pouligny 2006; Veltmeyer 2004; Kasfir 1998). Both case studies have actively tried to position themselves as something different to this form of civil society and do not want to be associated with the development of NGOs and internationally funded organisations. The case of Vetëvendosje also demonstrates that social movements are side-lined and demonized by international actors if they are deemed as spoilers or 'uncivil' and do not adhere to the type of civil society those actors wish to develop. Afghanistan 1400 appears to be a 'civil' element of civil society and has been seen in a positive light by several representatives of international actors. However, the case study analysis of Afghanistan 1400 highlights the difficulties in maintaining independence from international actors in terms of funding and the ability to distinguish itself from the discourse of international actors.

Allies and opposition

The presence of potential allies or opposition within the elite is another important factor that can influence political opportunities (Giugni 2007: 55; Schock 2005: 33-34; Tarrow 1998: 79). The presence of international actors itself provides an additional set of elites to consider in terms of allies and opposition. This proved to be an important consideration in the cases of Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400. It was clear that international actors did provide both allies and opposition directly, and also influenced other potential allies and opposition for both case studies. The allies and opposition specific to the case studies are discussed in the following section. Here, I focus on the allies and opposition available more generally in both states.

Existing research has considered social movements and their relations with international actors, in the form of institutions (Parks 2015; Sikkink 2003), but much of this considers the ability of transnational movements to influence policy at the international level (Wylie 1999). The majority of studies tend to focus on the issue of globalisation and the discussion on global civil society (Tarrow n.d.; James and

van Seters 2014; Karides, Smith and Beckers 2008; della Porta et al. 2006; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005). There is, however, no existing literature that covers the relationship between social movements and international actors working within the same state. The findings of this research highlight that the closed nature of the international actors working within new protectorates limit the potential for allies within international actors. The international funding of much of civil society within both new protectorates meant that international actors also had some influence over the potential allies or opposition that may be found in civil society. As discussed above, the issues that donor-funded civil society focused on can provide allies for those concerned with the same issues. However, the non-contentious nature of this part of civil society largely ignored social movement and grassroots activity and limits the potential for allies, particularly those focusing on different issues to those of donor-funded organisations.

The presence of other movements and counter-movements was also cited as having the potential to affect the mobilisation opportunities and strategy of a movement (see Meyer and Staggenborg 2007; Kurzman 1998; Kitschelt 1986). There were no direct counter-movements to Vetëvendosje and the presence of other movements, or similar entities, was low in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In the case of Vetëvendosje it was clear that it was building on a history of movement activity, particularly in relation to the independence issue. It can be said that there was a historic 'demonstration effect' that could have encouraged Vetëvendosje (see Kitschelt 1986) though there was little other social movement activity in the post-intervention period. As explained above, the way in which donor-funded civil society developed led to grassroots movements and activism being overlooked. It appears that this type of activity seems to have declined in the post-intervention period, for a variety of reasons, such as the post-conflict context and the introduction of a donor-funded civil society.

Influence of international actors on movement strategy

The strategies chosen by Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 are quite different. Some of these aspects are down to the differing nature and structure of the two entities but still highlight the ways in which the international presence might influence social movement development. Differences can be observed in the structures of each case, in the tactics employed, in the allies utilised and in the relationship with domestic and international actors. However, similarities can be seen in the way international actors have influenced both case studies, yet their strategic decisions often took different paths. Here, I briefly outline the key features of Vetëvendosje's and Afghanistan 1400's strategy, including their formation and outlook, tactics and allies. These features were established as prominent aspects of strategy in Chapter Two, and formed the basis of analysis of Afghanistan 1400

and Vetëvendosje in the case study chapters. Following a brief overview of both case studies, I compare and contrast these features and then consider the findings regarding the influence of international actors in order to determine the extent of the influence and to draw conclusions from both case studies.

Vetëvendosje

Vetëvendosje emerged from its predecessor, the Kosovo Action Network (KAN). The KAN had been active since before the conflict with Serbia and had carried out a range of actions against what it considered to be the occupation of Kosovo by Serbia. After the conflict the KAN became more marginalised and began opposing UNMIK (Lemay-Hébert 2013: 93) by using direct action, demonstrations and through collaboration with grassroots organisations across Kosovo. The KAN gradually transformed into Vetëvendosje, which officially launched in June 2005. Vetëvendosje was led by the well-known political prisoner Albin Kurti, who had worked for the former head of the political wing of the KLA. Vetëvendosje continued to oppose UNMIK using similar tactics and allies to those utilised during the KAN's existence.

During the pre-independence period, Vetëvendosje's main goal was self-determination for Kosovo, and all of its demands could be related to this. Vetëvendosje opposed the international administration and other aspects of the presence of international actors as it considered it an obstacle to gaining self-determination. Vetëvendosje vocally opposed the status process, facilitated by the UN and negotiations with Serbia. As well as its opposition to UNMIK, Vetëvendosje opposed other aspects of the international presence as well as the PISG, due to the heavy influence of international actors on these institutions.

After the declaration of independence, Vetëvendosje's goals expanded to cover a wider range of political issues at the national level, and in recent years it has become well known for its anti-corruption stance. Two years after independence, Vetëvendosje participated in elections whist continuing its existing activities against government decisions and the continued international presence in the form of EULEX. Vetëvendosje saw participation in elections as an opportunity to broaden its repertoire given that Kosovo's domestic political institutions were now fully under Kosovar authority. Vetëvendosje won around 13% of the vote in 2010 and 2014.

Afghanistan 1400

Afghanistan 1400 officially launched on 6 December 2012, soon after NATO leaders had declared that full responsibility for security would be handed over to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. It intended to serve as a platform for youth participation across a number of aspects of Afghanistan's development. It claimed that the new generation of Afghan youth should be at the forefront of tackling the challenges facing Afghanistan and that Afghans needed to take responsibility for the future of their country. Afghanistan 1400 employed a variety of tactics and largely focused on awareness raising through the organisation of events, the release of statements and through lobbying international and domestic actors.

Afghanistan 1400 has grown gradually and its membership includes a variety of religious, ethnic and professional backgrounds. This distinguishes it from the majority of other groups in Afghanistan, which are often associated with one of these features. Afghanistan 1400 has been critical of the Afghan government but seeks a more collaborative approach to achieving its goals. It has often advocated that various stakeholders in Afghanistan should unite in order to achieve success and oppose those who do not work in Afghanistan's national interest.

The Afghan presidential elections in 2014 became a focus for Afghanistan 1400 soon after its launch. The organisation tried to highlight the importance of the elections and encouraged young Afghans to vote. Despite the focus on the elections, its activities slowed over the election period due to its decision not to support a particular candidate. The length of the elections and the long period of political uncertainty as a government was being formed, led to an extended latent period. During this time Afghanistan 1400 continued to discuss how best to approach a variety of issues and took the decision to form a political party, which, will function alongside its existing activities.

Formation and outlook

Afghanistan 1400 and Vetëvendosje formed for quite different reasons but the influence of international actors can be seen in the formations of both. Broadly both emerged within the post-intervention context, which presented new opportunities and constraints. More specifically both formations were galvanised by either the threat of a prolonged international presence or by the threat of an expected decline in the international presence. Thus, the influence of international actors played a role in the formation of both case studies, though in quite different ways. Both were, perhaps inevitably, affected by the sheer presence of international actors and the political change that resulted

from that presence. Vetëvendosje's formation came as a direct response to the international presence while Afghanistan 1400's formation came as this influence was declining.

In the case of Vetëvendosje, the threat of a prolonged international presence galvanised members of its predecessor, the Kosovo Action Network (KAN) to form a new movement in order to better tackle its goals. Vetëvendosje saw the aspects of the international presence as an obstacle to its demands for self-determination. International actors formed one of Vetëvendosje's key targets for actions and a clear oppositional stance was taken from the beginning of Vetëvendosje's existence. In contrast, it was the declining presence of international actors that encouraged some to form Afghanistan 1400. The military drawdown shaped aspects of the organisations outlook, in the sense that its founders believed the time had come for young Afghans to take responsibility for Afghanistan and that efforts should be made to uphold the achievements that had been made during the period since the international intervention.

The above findings on the formation of both case studies demonstrate the more direct influence of international actors. However, it is also possible to say that, more broadly, both Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 emerged in post-intervention environments, which had been shaped by international actors. The fact that it was several years after an intervention had taken place when Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 formed suggests that opportunities may have increased enough for members to perceive that a movement was a viable means of enabling political change. This does appear to be more the case in Afghanistan, than in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje was able to build on the activities of the KAN that had formed several years earlier. Vetëvendosje was fighting for an issue, which had been prominent among Kosovar Albanians for decades. Afghanistan 1400, on the other hand, emerged from the changing nature of post-intervention Afghan society, which saw the opening up of opportunities for, particularly young, Afghans. However, in this case, it appears that Afghanistan 1400 developed into a CSO rather than a movement, as a result of some of the limited opportunities both political and cultural.

It is also possible to say that the formations of both case studies occurred at a time when a threat was perceived. In the case of Vetëvendosje, the threat of a prolonged and extensive presence of international actors in Kosovo and the failure to deal with the status issue in a satisfactory way prompted its formation. In the case of Afghanistan 1400, the threat was perceived from the declining international presence and the potential for the achievements made since the intervention to be lost.

This further suggests that the international presence itself contributed to the Afghanistan 1400's formation.

Interestingly, both case studies have sought to position themselves as distinct entities to political parties and internationally donor-funded NGOs. A significant finding in this context is that both felt it necessary to define the type of entity they want to be perceived as, in order to be distinguished from others. This self-identification as a movement and an alternative to other entities has been successful for Vetëvendosje. The tactics it employed, particularly demonstrations and direct action, are widely associated with movement activity. Vetëvendosje's name actually includes the word *movement*, which helps to distinguish it from other entities. Vetëvendosje also benefits from a history of movement activity commonly associated with the Kosovo Albanian struggle for independence. On the other hand, Afghanistan 1400 presents a more unusual entity in Afghanistan. In fact, only few similar organisations have existed since the intervention.

As discussed in Chapter Six, though Afghanistan 1400 self-defines as a movement, it also demonstrates a number of characteristics that are less common to social movements. This includes the small and somewhat selective membership process and the lack of protest as a tactic. The interesting aspect of this self-identification as a movement is the need to position itself as an alternative to other entities, which in this case, is perhaps more important to the organisation than adhering to the characteristics traditionally associated with a movement. This is, in part, due to the very low level of political and cultural opportunities for movement activity and the repressive context found in Afghanistan. This is demonstrated by the members concern about maintaining a reputation of independence and the feeling that the types of tactics employed are the most effective at the moment.

Both case studies have clear goals that focus on political change at the national level. Vetëvendosje's early demands stemmed from its goal of self-determination. Within months of Kosovo's declaration of independence Vetëvendosje expanded its goals to cover a wide range of salient political issues at the national level. Afghanistan 1400's goals were broad and over-arching from its formation, aimed at engaging the new generation of Afghans and tackling the political challenges facing Afghanistan. Afghanistan 1400's goals also contain an element of self-determination, due to its demands for Afghanistan's youth to take responsibility for the country's future and to unite with others in order to promote the national interest against those that do not (i.e. those who do not abide by the constitution). It also wants to ensure that any progress that has been made since the fall of the Taliban is maintained.

The way in which Afghanistan 1400 approaches the issue of self-determination and national identity clearly contrasts with Vetëvendosje's approach. The existing literature on nationalism and state-building states that efforts to state-build often encourage "mobile[s]ation processes in ideology, politics and sentiment" (Seifert 2014: 239). Both cases studies have mobilised identity in different ways, though Afghanistan 1400's appears to differ with the existing literature on nationalism in state-building contexts. The case of Vetëvendosje demonstrates its mobilisation of identity via its use of ethnic and nationalist claims, which it also links to the presence of international actors. Vetëvendosje can be considered part of the backlash against external actors, which is expected to occur in relation to the policies of international actors on identity (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Stroehle 2011). This can be seen as a part of a wider backlash that results from the legitimacy dilemma that international administrations often suffer from (Lemay-Hébert 2009).

Interestingly, the goals of both case studies affected their position in relation to international actors, which influenced their strategies. For Vetëvendosje, its approach to self-determination in the pre-independence period was very different to the approach taken up by international actors. However, it attempted to use the language of the 'international community', often referring to democracy and self-determination in the same way international actors have done. Vetëvendosje wanted to demonstrate that it was speaking the language of international actors and that its demands were in line with the goals that the international actors should (in theory) be aiming for. In doing so, Vetëvendosje also sought to highlight the mismatch between the type of policies and values associated with the international community and the reality that was being implemented in Kosovo.

In Afghanistan 1400's case, a number of its demands focused on similar areas as the goals of international actors, the reason why some have perceived the organisation as 'Western'. Even in its very early days, it was conscious that it wanted to represent Afghan solutions to Afghan problems and did not want to be associated too strongly with international actors. When Afghanistan 1400 set out its vision and goals, it was careful to use language that demonstrated this, and not fall in with the discourse of human rights and democracy that is associated with the international community. These strategic decisions by both case studies highlight the types of responses to the indirect influences of international actors and their goals of democratisation.

Allies

The allies each case study has utilised also demonstrate stark differences in strategy. The presence of international actors clearly provided a new set of potential allies and also impacted upon the potential

for other allies and opposition as a result of their own allegiances and influences. It is difficult to assess the extent of this influence though some assumptions can be made. For instance, the opposition to the international presence by Vetëvendosje is highly likely to have had some influence on other potential domestic allies who were keen to work with international actors. The perceptions and positions, which both case studies took towards international actors also influenced other aspects of their strategies. The stance taken towards international actors also had repercussions in terms of public perceptions of both Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 and the potential allies that might be available to them.

Neither of the case studies has received financial assistance from international or domestic actors and both feel that maintaining the independence is a key feature for success. Both feel that external support would jeopardise their status. However, they did collaborate with a few small grassroots groups and campaigns and had some allies within official institutions. Many of the other organisations that Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 collaborated with were also independent grassroots organisations that have emerged from domestic civil society. Both case studies appear to have collaborated with internationally donor-funded civil society to a far lesser extent.

The choices of allies appears to stem from some scepticism from members towards donor-funded civil society. Also, as explained above, many of the goals of the case studies are not addressed by donor-funded CSOs or at least not in the same ways. This in turn limits the potential for suitable allies. Each of the case studies had some political allies with the potential to carry their demands into institutional arenas (Giugni 2007: 55), though these have been limited. Members of Afghanistan 1400 felt that some of their ideas were incorporated by some of the campaigns run by candidates in the lead up to the 2014 elections. This was often the result of members working on these campaigns. The lack of powerful allies within the institutional arena is also likely to have encouraged both case studies to enter electoral politics.

The positioning by both case studies and their desire to maintain independence has also had an effect on potential allies. The stance taken by each of the case studies towards international actors also had the potential to affect their relationships with other entities and on public perceptions. Afghanistan 1400's attempts to distinguish it from Western ideas, which are associated with international actors, were at least partially a result of the negative perception held by some of the population, that Western ideas are foreign, alien or unwanted. Although it is difficult to gain evidence of widespread public perceptions, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Afghans perceive the international actors to have

disappointed and not met their expectations and failed to deliver on promises made. As a result, Afghanistan 1400 tried to place emphasis on the Afghan roots of its vision, goals and methods, rather than the similarities between its goals and those of international actors.

In contrast, Vetëvendosje's oppositional stance towards international actors was not a salient feature of widespread public opinion. There had been riots and protests against UNMIK and a lack of discussion over Kosovo's future status in the early years of UNMIK's presence. However, the population was generally supportive of international actors due to the intervention itself and the general desire among Kosovars to become a stable state with a European and Western outlook, and hopes for future EU membership. Domestic elites also took a view that the support of international actors was necessary if Kosovo wanted to gain independence, a view which much of the public accepted. According to Vetëvendosje, this led to some perceiving Vetëvendosje to be anti-Western, anti-American and even pro-Russian in some cases. The Kosovar population was also largely content with the broad goals put forward by the international actors, with the exception of the status issue, which took a long time to be resolved. Broadly, the public and elites were in favour of democracy and a political future that looked similar to that established in Western Europe. In contrast, there was no such consensus among the population or the elites concerning the implementation of democratic governance in Afghanistan.

The oppositional stance towards international actors taken by Vetëvendosje did lead to tensions with international actors, which also had an impact on Vetëvendosje's strategy. It appears that, before Vetëvendosje participated in elections, there was little by way of direct contact between it and international actors. In fact, it felt that the repression it experienced was linked to the international presence. It also felt that its views were largely ignored by international actors. Vetëvendosje was negatively perceived and portrayed by international actors, which also appears to have influenced the opinion of others. For instance, the majority of the domestic elite was keen to work with international actors and was unlikely to want to associate with Vetëvendosje due to its stance towards international actors, even if it had agreed with some of Vetëvendosje's demands. This limited the opportunities for it to gain allies and influence in the domestic realm. The lack of powerful allies may have impacted upon the choice of Vetëvendosje's more radical tactics. The situation for Vetëvendosje has altered slightly since its election participation, and it now has meetings with representatives from international actors, albeit usually in unofficial settings. Members of Vetëvendosje feel that this stems from the acceptance of some international actors, that Vetëvendosje does have public support and

must therefore be taken more seriously, especially since it now has democratically elected representatives in the Assembly.

In contrast, Afghanistan 1400 presents a supportive, if critical, approach to international actors. Representatives from international actors who are aware of its activities view Afghanistan 1400 in a positive light. Members often meet with representatives from international actors in formal and informal settings and seek to maintain a good relationship. It received offers of more direct support but declined this, as members did not want to be seen to be influenced by international actors. This indicates the limited potential of international actors as allies in some cases (see Caruso 2015). Although some international actors appear to be a logical choice of ally for Afghanistan 1400, some members suggested that the wider impact of the Western presence, and the perception of international actors within the population could have a counteracting effect on its strategy. The findings in relation to the influence of international actors on potential allies and opposition highlights that the influence is not only direct in the sense that international actors may choose to support or oppose particular movements or CSOs, but also indirectly. This indirect influence can occur as a result of the domestic elites that international actors work with, as well as via the promotion of particular agendas.

Tactics

From an early stage, Afghanistan 1400 developed a detailed and democratic structure with a very selective membership process. Vetëvendosje had a much more fluid structure and a bigger, more inclusive membership. Afghanistan 1400's tactics have been dominated by less contentious lobbying efforts, statements, visits to the sites of Taliban attacks, and meetings, all attempting to raise awareness of issues of concern to the organisation. While also attempting to raise awareness through the use of its communication outlets, Vetëvendosje has organised demonstrations and carried out direct actions. These factors also highlight the different ways in which social movements, SMOs and CSOs function. However, both case studies do have similar broad targets for their demands in the form of domestic institutions, international actors, and the general population. Vetëvendosje has expanded its presence in the form of offices and activities outside of the capital Pristina, while Afghanistan 1400 has found it more difficult to engage outside of Kabul, largely due to resources and security concerns. Generally, both have been most active in Kabul and Pristina.

The analyses of both case studies suggested that the tactics used emanated, in part, from the political opportunities that were available to each of them, as touched on already. Both suggested that the

tactics they chose were justified by the lack of opportunities, although they emerged in quite different ways. While Vetëvendosje felt that it would not be heard without the use of mass demonstrations, direct action and a more adversarial approach, Afghanistan 1400 preferred to use less contentious tactics, taking advantage of its members' contacts and networks.

A key finding from the case study analyses is the decision by both case studies to enter electoral politics. The decision to expand their repertoire and participate in elections has demonstrated a significant shift in strategy. This raises interesting questions about when and why movements and independent CSOs, form parties in new protectorate contexts. While Vetëvendosje became a party in 2010, members of Afghanistan 1400 are still discussing how and when it will become a party. As mentioned above Vetëvendosje was keen to present itself as a different entity to others operating in Kosovo, particularly the internationally funded NGOs. This was in part due to a perception among members that these organisations were largely ineffective and associated with a particular way of working. Interestingly, when Vetëvendosje decided to enter institutions it remained insistent that it would also remain a movement. This move arguably makes it an SMO, perhaps as part of a wider movement. Members feel that even the term 'movement' signifies dynamism and represents an effort to demonstrate that Vetëvendosje would continue its activities as before. However, political parties claimed to be confused by their status and often asked Vetëvendosje in an accusatory way what type of entity it was (Interview One 2014).

Afghanistan 1400 was quite conscious of positioning itself as a different entity to those already active in Afghanistan. Some its members took a similar view of internationally funded civil society as Vetëvendosje, despite many members having worked for internationally funded organisations and advocating the 'civil' elements of the organisation. Some members perceived civil society organisations to be project based and questioned the implementation of projects in some areas. Afghanistan 1400 attempted to sit between a political and civil society entity and felt that defining itself as a 'movement' was the best strategy to carry out its goals. Before the decision was made to form a political party, which only happened after a lot of deliberation, Afghanistan 1400 did not want to appear as an opposition to the government or to be seen as a political party. This stands in contrast with Vetëvendosje, which, due to its tactics and opposition to the institutions in Kosovo, was unlikely to be thought of as a political party. This has similarities to Goldstone's (2003: 3) findings that many protest movements self-identify as 'outside of' and 'opposing' established parties and the political system "to avoid the taint of cooperation or excessive compromise". This does appear to be the case for Vetëvendosje as it wanted to appear outside of the new political system due to the control by

international actors. After six months of deliberations over becoming a party, Vetëvendosje registered as a citizen's initiative. By registering as a citizen's initiative, rather than a political party of coalition, Vetëvendosje is not formally a political party but a group of citizens. It went on to win 13 and 14 seats in the 2010 and 2014 elections respectively, as well as winning the mayoral election in Pristina in 2014.

Although not a party yet, Afghanistan 1400 has had at least two members who stood and gained seats as independent candidates in the 2014 election. However, the two candidates are not considered direct representatives of the organisation as at the time of the elections, Afghanistan 1400 was not yet registered as a party, and both candidates had other affiliations. However, Afghanistan 1400 now regards these elections as demonstrative of the potential for success it could have in fielding its candidates in elections. As discussed in Chapter Five, the majority of election candidates in Afghanistan stand as independents as the party affiliation is not seen as a great advantage to candidates. However this could be an important factor in the future for organisations like Afghanistan 1400. The majority of parties in Afghanistan are underdeveloped and present a fairly conservative approach. If Afghanistan 1400 forms a party, it will be presenting a very different platform in comparison to the majority of the over 70 other parties registered in the country.

Interviews with members from both case studies demonstrated that they felt that they would have a greater impact by participating in elections. The findings of both case study analyses suggest that part of this perception stems from the limited political opportunities available in both states. Election success is seen as a means to gain further channels of interaction and influence, which are otherwise limited. For Afghanistan 1400 it does not seem that international actors played a direct role in this decision, which largely stemmed from frustration with the limited influence the organisation has had in its current form.

For Vetëvendosje, the decreasing presence and influence of international actors over domestic institutions was seen as a new opportunity. Thus, along with Vetëvendosje's desire to increase its tactical repertoire, the decreasing presence of international actors and Kosovar sovereignty over its own governance played a role in this decision. In theory, Vetëvendosje could have registered to take part in elections before the international actors had less authority over domestic institutions. However, it had not perceived this as an opportunity before, due to its opposition to the international actors' authority over the institutions. New opportunities arose once Vetëvendosje had participated in elections. It felt that other actors, including international actors, had to take it more seriously given that it had some electoral support. Winning seats in the Assembly has provided Vetëvendosje with a

new arena for it to air its demands. A number of other smaller parties, which include some prominent civil society activists, have now become part of Vetëvendosje.

There is a long history of social movements becoming political parties (Caruso 2015; Johnstone 2012; Goldstone 2004; Tilly 2004a, 1986; Glenn 2003). Goldstone (2003: 4) argues that in the US and Western Europe political parties and social movements have become "overlapping, mutually dependent actors in shaping politics, to the point where even long-established political parties welcome social movement support and often rely specifically on their association with social movements in order to win elections." This has been seen in the case of the Republican Party in the US and the religious right (Green et al. 1998). In Afghanistan and Kosovo, movements are not established forces in this sense and there are few, if any, movements that collaborate with parties in this way. The existing nature of political parties and the prevalence of patronage appear to play a large role in this. The potential for overlap between movements and parties seemed small, hence the development of Vetëvendosje and to some extent Afghanistan 1400, regarding electoral politics.

Conclusion

The analysis of both case studies has demonstrated the different types of influence that international actors can have on the strategic decisions of social movements and independent CSOs in new protectorates. Applying the altered political opportunity framework has demonstrated that the influence of international actors was significant in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and contributed to the opening up and constraint of political opportunities in a range of areas. The extent and type of influence exerted by international actors fluctuated throughout the existence of both new protectorates. The key difference found in the extent of the international influence in each territory was due to the presence of an international administration in pre-independence Kosovo and a more assistive international presence in Afghanistan. The key similarity in both new protectorates was the limited level of opportunities despite an increase in comparison to the pre-intervention period.

Both Kosovo and Afghanistan had fairly closed political systems in the early years of the new protectorates, but both began to open up as democratic institutions strengthened and elections took place. UNMIK operated in a closed way during the pre-independence period in Kosovo, demonstrating the need for international actors to be analysed in relation to the openness of the state, and resulting political opportunities. The relationship between international actors and domestic elites was found to have a greater effect on opportunities for both case studies, than the coherence within either domestic elites or international actors. There was no direct facilitation of movement activity by

government or international actors in either Kosovo or Afghanistan. In both territories, institutional rules are weak and internationally donor-funded civil society has developed in a similar way, which ultimately ignores movement activity. The development of civil society has provided some broad possibilities for facilitation but overall it does not serve as a very effective channel for interacting with, or influencing, government. Vetëvendosje has experienced some attempts by the government and international actors to inhibit and repress its activities, while there were no signs of such efforts in the case of Afghanistan 1400.

The case analysis of both case studies demonstrates the very different strategic decisions in response to the influence of international actors and the lack of available political opportunities. These differences can be seen even in the formation of the two entities. Although both emerged as a result of the international presence, Vetëvendosje formed in opposition to the prolonged presence of international actors, while Afghanistan 1400's formation was influenced by the expected diminution in the international presence. Both cases had political goals aimed at the national level and initially sought to distinguish themselves as different entities to political parties and internationally funded CSOs. Vetëvendosje sought to use more radical tactics in the form of mass protests and direct actions, while Afghanistan 1400 sought to influence by releasing statements, lobbying and engaging with Afghan youth. Neither received financial support from international actors, though Afghanistan 1400 did maintain a good relationship with some elements of the international presence. Due to Vetëvendosje's opposition to the international presence, it had a tense relationship with international actors. Both tend to have stronger relationships with other grassroots organisations and political allies were limited.

Interestingly, both cases studies have taken the decision to participate in elections alongside their existing activities. Vetëvendosje first participated in the 2010 elections in Kosovo, as a 'citizen's initiative' and won 13% of the vote. It won a similar portion of the vote in 2014 and the mayoral election in Pristina. It saw institutional politics as a possible extension to its tactical repertoire once international actors no longer had authority over Kosovo's domestic institutions. Afghanistan 1400 made the decision to form a political party alongside its existing activities during the latent period that it experienced after the presidential elections in 2014. I argue that the decision to participate in elections, by both case studies, stems from the lack of opportunities available for case studies to influence the political system.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS

In this final chapter I outline the key findings of the thesis and discuss their wider contribution to the literature. I reflect on the methods used and present suggestions for future research. First, I consider the key findings in relation to the two case studies, Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400. Second, I discuss the influence of international actors on political opportunities in both territories and outcomes for the two case studies. I then reflect on the methods used to conduct this thesis and consider how the political opportunity framework can be developed for future applications to new protectorates. Following this I discuss the wider contributions of the findings of this thesis, particularly in reference to the literature on new protectorates and social movements. Finally, I consider the possibilities for future research that have come to light while conducting this research.

Key findings

This research has found that international actors have played a significant role in shaping the strategies of Vetëvendosje, a social movement and SMO, and Afghanistan 1400, a CSO. The two case studies have developed in different ways and represented different entities, but both strategies, including the choice of allies and tactics were shaped, to varying extents, by the international presence. My case study analyses demonstrate that, although there are many similarities in the influences of international actors in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the case studies have responded differently.

The influence of international actors can be seen in the formation of both, and although they emerged as a result of the international presence. Vetëvendosje formed in opposition to the prolonged presence of international actors, while Afghanistan 1400's formation was influenced by the expected diminution in the international presence. Both have sought broad political change at the national level, but while Vetëvendosje possesses a relatively large membership, and predominantly uses tactics involving direct action and protest, Afghanistan 1400 has a selective membership and uses lobbying and public engagement to put forward its demands. This reflects the different types of entities of both case studies.

The relationship that both case studies have with international actors has, to a large extent, been determined by their stance towards them. Vetëvendosje opposed aspects of the international presence and international organisations were the target of their direct actions and protests. This led to a tense relationship between Vetëvendosje and international actors, which also impacted upon its

allies and opposition. Vetëvendosje's main allies were other small grassroots organisations as well as local politicians who joined protests and meetings on issues relevant to them. In contrast, Afghanistan 1400 were in favour of international actors extending their presence in Afghanistan. The majority of Afghanistan 1400's allies are other small grassroots organisations. However, the organisation also maintained good relations with a number of representatives of international actors. Despite its attitude towards international actors, Afghanistan 1400 is keen not to be too strongly associated with international actors, in order to maintain its independence and its claims to represent Afghan interests.

Both case studies have been keen to distinguish themselves from other types of organisations found within each territory, particularly political parties and internationally funded NGOs. This is partly due to the poor reputation of political parties and the image of donor-funded civil society. Some of the aims of both cases have been similar to those of international actors, such as calls against corruption and the conduct of free and fair elections. Interestingly, although Vetëvendosje has opposed aspects of the international presence in Kosovo, it purposely used the language of the 'international community' to demonstrate that its goals were not dissimilar to those the international community promotes. In contrast, although Afghanistan 1400 had several goals that aligned with those of international actors, it sought to use language that demonstrates that its goals were to bring Afghan solutions to Afghan problems, and purposely avoided the language of democracy and human rights that is usually associated with the international community.

One of the most significant findings and similarities between the two cases was the decision to participate in elections alongside their existing activities. I argue that the decision to put candidates forward in elections stemmed from the perception of limited opportunities for influence and the desire by both cases to extend their tactical repertoires.

Political opportunities

The analysis of the influence of international actors included an assessment of their impact on the political opportunities available. Applying the political opportunity framework outlined in Chapter Two highlighted that international actors had an impact upon a wide range of opportunities in both territories. This influence was at its most extensive during the UNMIK administration of pre-independence Kosovo. The findings demonstrate that the level of opportunities gradually increased in both territories after the intervention by international actors, however, opportunities remain

limited across a number of areas. Poor security and low levels of development have played a significant role in constraining political opportunities.

While some studies have found that the presence of political opportunities does not play a key role in the emergence or effectiveness of social movements (for example, Caruso 2015), this study finds that both entities emerged within a context of limited but increasing opportunities. New protectorates are territories in a state of transition, in which huge changes can occur at speed, often including the introduction of an entirely new political system put in place in the space of a few years. The speed and direction of change in new protectorates is quite different to the trajectory of change in other states, which are considered to be "cumulative and important, but not typically dramatic or influential in the short run" (Amenta and Young 1999: 154). Thus it is to be expected that a relationship between the emergence of social movements and the opening up of opportunities is starker.

I have analysed the opportunities and constraints on movements in Kosovo and Afghanistan at a broad level, while also considering the specific opportunities available to the case studies where possible. This included the application of a political opportunity framework to a CSO rather than a social movement. This proved extremely useful in the analysis of potential social movement development broadly and the potential challenges that those wishing to form a movement face in new protectorate contexts. The use of the framework in relation to Afghanistan 1400 highlights the potential for its use in analysing other organisations that do not fit within the definition of social movements. Political opportunities were affected in Kosovo and Afghanistan across each of the categories outlined in the political opportunity framework in Chapter Two. Here, I will briefly explain the key findings relating to each category.

Openness

The international presence contributed to the gradual opening up of the political system in Kosovo and Afghanistan, most notably by contributing to the introduction and implementation of democratic institutions and elections. However, the findings highlight that the implementation and effectiveness of a number of factors that are considered to contribute to a more open political system, such as free and fair elections, an effective opposition, and the implementation of legislation are still relatively poor and must be taken into account when assessing openness. At the same time, the findings highlight that the very nature of the influence of international actors can also play a role in closing aspects of the political system, as demonstrated by the lack of accountability of the UNMIK

administration. This tends to occur in tandem with international actors promoting liberal democratic policies, which theoretically include an open political system.

Coherence of elites

Three aspects were considered when analysing the coherence of the elites in Kosovo and Afghanistan: the domestic elite, the international elite, and the relationship between these two broad sets of elites. Although divided on a number of issues, by attempting to maintain conservative control and exerting their power via non-democratic means, domestic elites were effectively coherent from the perspective of political opportunities, resulting in few political opportunities. Similarly, despite some divisions, the overriding perception of international actors as representative of an 'international community' with similar goals, resulted in few political opportunities being perceived. However, the coherence between international actors and domestic elites did impact upon political opportunities. The coherence and interdependence of these actors in Kosovo constrained opportunities for Vetëvendosje due to its opposition to the international presence. For Afghanistan 1400 the divisions between the government and the international actors did not provide opportunities as it often advocated a range of entities uniting behind particular issues, including international actors and domestic elites. The party system and the outcome of elections, considered to be important elements in the creation of opportunities, appear to have constrained some political opportunities. The ideological and policy platforms of political parties in both states remains largely underdeveloped and indistinguishable, and patronage prevails.

Allies and opposition

The international presence created additional potential for allies and opposition for movements and CSOs, and influenced the possibility of other allies and opposition. This occurred in a number of ways, including directly, via public approval or disapproval or, more indirectly, via the substantial amounts of funding to civil society. Neither case study had particularly powerful political allies, which may have contributed to their decision to participate in electoral politics. The most prominent allies of both cases were a few small grassroots organisations that were not funded by international donors. Vetëvendosje's opposition to the international presence reduced the likelihood of international allies, though former US diplomat William Walker did support leader, Albin Kurti's bid to become an MP, in a particularly unusual show of support (Lewis 2010). Although Afghanistan 1400 was approached by international actors which offered support, it declined in an effort to maintain its independence.

Facilitation and repression

In terms of facilitation, international actors paid little attention to social movements and did not formulate policy that specifically concerned social movements in either Kosovo or Afghanistan. The implementation and effectiveness of institutional rules that may have benefited social movement activity was often slow. There were some benefits to movements from the development of civil society although the type of civil society that developed, and its weakness, was not conducive to movement or grassroots activity and it did not provide an effective channel for interaction with the government or international actors in either territory. The type of civil society promoted by international actors has led to a professionalised and depoliticised civil society, largely made up of donor-funded NGOs, which has resulted in the side-lining of alternatives such as social movements and grassroots organisations.

There were occasions when international actors inhibited Vetëvendosje's activities by, for instance, damaging its public image by making derogatory public statements. Vetëvendosje also experienced a degree of repression at protests in the form of over the top responses by Kosovo and UNMIK police, as well as the arrest of activists. This also served to inhibit Vetëvendosje's activities, particularly the prolonged house arrest of Albin Kurti, which caused it to direct its energies away from its core goals. Although Afghanistan 1400 did not experience repression in the way Vetëvendosje did, the general environment in which it functions is repressive, due to the levels of insecurity and aspects of poor democratic development, such as flawed elections. Another notable finding was the perception of threat by both cases that did not emerge from the state, but from external sources, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan or Serbian influence in Kosovo.

The analysis of political opportunities in new protectorate contexts demonstrates that despite the existence of democratic institutions, elections, and a funded civil society, the corresponding opportunities expected in the literature are still not present or are very limited. Much of this literature has considered political opportunities within established democratic states in Western Europe and the US. In the case of new protectorates, elements of poor democratic development may be explained by their very nature, in which there is usually a huge range of issues to be dealt with, including humanitarian aid, conflict resolution, the return of refugees, and the re-building of infrastructure. It is to be expected that democratisation processes take considerable time, particularly in these circumstances.

However, the findings regarding political opportunities and openness in particular highlight some of the uneasiness in the type of state, democracy, and civil society that are typically promoted by international actors. As discussed in Chapter One, the prevailing concept among international 'state-builders' is that the state should be a liberal market democracy, which is little debated (Samuels and von Esiedel 2004). Development programmes intend to mould the state into one that emulates a European liberal Weberian state. However, the appropriateness of the type of democracy that is widely promoted by international actors, a liberal one, has been hotly debated (see Bridoux and Kurki 2014). The version of liberal democracy seen in new protectorates has shaped political opportunities broadly by the development of institutions and the conduct of elections, however, the poor functioning of these has limited opportunities. This is particularly obvious in Afghanistan where a consensus on the implementation of liberal democracy is lacking and appears to limit the development of democratic institutions and therefore political opportunities.

Both case studies also appear to be uneasy with the way democracy and civil society has been promoted. Vetëvendosje has attempted to highlight the mismatch between the policies and values associated with the 'international community' and the reality found in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje has also put forward demands for a more participatory form of democracy and has criticised the neoliberal economic policies put forward by the government and international actors. Afghanistan 1400 has been weary of using the language of democracy and human rights that is promoted by international actors due to public scepticism surrounding these issues and the organisations desire to promote Afghan solutions to the challenges in Afghanistan. Thus, the lack of social movement activity in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as new protectorates more broadly, can be seen as, in part, a result of type of democracy and civil society promoted by international actors.

Methods

The methods chosen to conduct the data collection for this study enabled a thorough overview of the role and goals of international actors and the case studies. The interviews provided a vital insight into the perspectives of those working for international and civil society organisations, as well as the members of both case studies. The case analysis, which covered two different territories, has allowed for some broad assumptions to be made about international influence and new protectorate contexts. The analysis of both case studies in the previous chapter has compared the two and the type of influence in the territories in which they are active.

Questions have been raised over the transferability of lessons learnt from the development of states. Some authors have argued that historical lessons can be learnt from state development (see Moore 2004; Tilly 1985), while others disagree (Herbst 2000). Many of these questions are related to the utility of comparison in contexts that are not identical (Scott 2007: 9). However, Afghanistan and Kosovo, as new protectorates, have experienced an international presence that is unprecedented in most territories, making them worthy of comparison. The international presence was extensive in relation to most other states and covered a wide range of areas, making it possible to compare with other new protectorates, though the international presence did have a notable difference. Kosovo experienced an international administration for nearly a decade, while Afghanistan's international presence took a more assistive approach. However, the wide range of areas covered also makes the findings of this research relevant to other studies that may consider territories in which international influence is prominent in a particular area, such as efforts to strengthen democratic institutions or develop civil society.

The comparison of the two cases highlighted the different strategic decisions taken by each case in response to the influence of international actors. The fact that the two cases responded quite differently to the international presence and have been active at different points in the new protectorate, serves to strengthen the comparative utility of the study. Vetëvendosje formed six years after the international intervention, though it emerged from the KAN that had been active since before that time. Afghanistan 1400 formed over ten years after the intervention and real activity began once international actors had announced the withdrawal of significant numbers of troops. Not comparing like for like has highlighted how the changing context and fluctuating influence of the international presence can affect strategic choices.

Political opportunity framework

The political opportunity framework was used to guide the analysis of international actor influence on strategic decisions. The common features of the new protectorate setting, established in Chapter One, were combined with the literature on political opportunities to form an altered version of the political opportunity categories to form a new framework. As the political opportunity literature largely focused on the state, the new framework attempted to take into account the additional factors that the presence of international actors were likely to have on political opportunities. Reflecting on the framework in Chapter Seven, it was possible to note the key aspects that should be incorporated into a political opportunity framework for new protectorates. Future use of such a framework should consider the following additional aspects, in relation to each category of the framework.

Openness

The existing political opportunity literature that considers openness in relation to political opportunities is focused on domestic state institutions (Tarrow 1998; Clemens 1997; Koopmans 1996; Esman 1994; Tilly 1978; Eisinger 1973). In addition to the consideration of these institutions, the framework outlined in Chapter Two stated that the extensive influence of international actors should also be considered. This is due to the extensive influence by these actors on the democratisation process in new protectorates. This allowed an assessment, not only of the outcomes regarding the availability of opportunities, but also the level of influence international actors had on these processes. The findings of this thesis confirm that international actors were very influential over the creation of democratic institutions and electoral process in Kosovo and Afghanistan, which significantly contributed to the opening up of the state.

In addition to this influence, the conduct of the international actors themselves had an impact on opportunities. This was most obvious in the case of the international administration in Kosovo. Although democratic institutions were created and elections were carried out, UNMIK and its affiliated institutions were quite closed. This resulted in a very low level of political opportunities to influence or interact with the administration. Therefore, it is also important that the international actors themselves are analysed in relation to the levels of openness within the new protectorate, in addition to their influence over processes that open up the state.

Coherence of elites

The existing political opportunity literature generally analyses the coherence of the domestic elite within the state and argues that divisions within the elite can create opportunities for movements (Selbin 2006; Goldstone 2001, 1994; Goldfrank 1994; Skocpol 1979; Trimberger 1978; Gurr 1970). The political opportunity framework outlined in Chapter Two stated that three elements should be analysed when assessing the coherence of elites and potential opportunities. These three elements were the coherence of the domestic elite, the coherence of international actors, and the relationship between domestic and international actors. Analysing these three aspects in Kosovo and Afghanistan highlighted that the relationship between international actors and domestic elites had a more significant impact on political opportunities than the coherence of either domestic elites or international actors, a scenario that is unlikely to feature in other contexts.

When analysing the coherence of international actors in both new protectorates, I found that there were disagreements between international actors and criticism of their incoherent approach to

civilian and military assistance (Stapleton and Keating 2015; Mayall and Oliveira 2011). However, both case studies appeared to perceive the international actors as a coherent set of actors that is representative of the international community. Therefore they did not perceive opportunities as a result of any divisions within these actors. I argue that this is due to the broad coherence in the goals of security, democratisation and human rights. Generally the state actors most heavily involved in the new protectorates were from North America and European nations, which promoted values associated with the West, and so reducing the potential for broad disagreement. This is likely to be the case in other new protectorates. Although the coherence of international actors appears to be less significant, the findings of this research do confirm that the relationship between international and domestic actors should feature as an important part of a future framework applied to new protectorates.

Facilitation and repression

The majority of the literature on political opportunities considers the ways in which governments can facilitate, inhibit or repress of movements (Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 1986; Marx 1979). The framework outlined in Chapter Two stated that international actors also had the potential to facilitate or inhibit movement activity and that these actors should be analysed in addition to the domestic government. The case study analyses highlighted that international actors did not seek to facilitate movement activity specifically. In fact the type of civil society that was developed by international actors ignored movement activity. In the case of Vetëvendosje there were incidences of attempts to inhibit movement activity by international actors. These actors also had authority over bodies that, on some occasions, repressed protest activity. Thus, international actors in new protectorates do have the capacity to facilitate or inhibit the activities of social movements, SMOs and CSOs and should be considered in addition to domestic state actors.

Allies and opposition

The political opportunity framework outlined in Chapter Two highlighted that international actors could provide significant allies or opposition to movements or CSOs. This proved to be the case for both cases in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The findings also highlighted that international actors can influence other potential allies and opposition. For instance, the international funding of civil society limited the number of allies for Vetëvendosje. Therefore, the direct and indirect influences of international actors should be included in a future framework that considered the influence of international actors.

Although the altered framework was relatively easy to apply to the new protectorate context, there are still some limitations, most of which have been addressed elsewhere in the literature, and were discussed in Chapter Two (see Koopmans and Statham 2010; Gamson and Meyer 1996). For instance, the framework does not account for the agency of members, internal discussions, a lack of resources, or influential factors that stem from the historical and cultural background of the territory or the post-conflict environment. However, the focus of this research was the influence of international actors, curbing the impact of these limitations. While the use of the framework did help highlight some of the broader political and cultural influences of the international presence, it did not cover them specifically. These aspects have been addressed independently of the framework in the analysis of both case studies.

It was occasionally more difficult to establish the extent of the influence international actors had over some aspects of political opportunities. This was more prominent in the case of Afghanistan, where the international presence was considered to be following a 'light footprint approach' rather than the more extensive international administration present in Kosovo. However, the difficulties experienced when trying to establish the influence of international actors was not entirely down to the nature of the political opportunity framework. During the data collection process I found that in several instances there was little information provided by international actors on their activities within new protectorates. Taking the example of UNAMA, the amount of information they provide publicly is quite low. UNAMA's website, for example, provides a couple of paragraphs on each of its activities, covering 'Good Offices', 'Human Rights', 'Development Coherence', and 'Regional Cooperation' (UNAMA n.d.). It also provides transcripts of the SRSG's quarterly briefings to the UN Security Council. These generally consist of only a few pages. The website also provides a quarterly newspaper that is largely full of 'good news stories' such as meet and greets by UN envoys, and cultural events. None of this provides particularly insightful information on what political assistance the UN are really giving to the Afghan government. Despite this, it was possible to establish a broad picture of international influence on political opportunities from the variety of sources used.

Contributions to the literature

This study has brought together different fields of literature that are not often considered collectively, thus providing a greater insight into the relationships between them. The thesis has sought to address a number of gaps in the literature, primarily the lack of literature that considers social movements in a new protectorate context and the type of international influence experienced in this context. Although Vetëvendosje has been studied by others scholars (see Lemay-Hébert 2013; Schwandner-

Sievers 2013) this research presents new perspectives. In Afghanistan, although there is growing interest and coverage of youth activity (see Nikolic 2014; Hewad and Garett Johnson 2014), this is the first academic analysis of Afghanistan 1400. By considering the new protectorate context and the two case studies, the findings of this research have contributed to the growing literature that considers social movements outside of the traditional regions of focus in Western Europe and the US. This research also explores a new context for social movement activity.

Existing research has considered social movements and their relations with international actors (Parks 2015; Sikkink 2003; Wylie 1999). There is, however, little existing literature that covers the relationship between social movements, SMOs, independent CSOs and international actors working within the same state. The findings of this research highlight a different aspect of relations with international actors. The analysis of these entities within the new protectorate context and the focus of international actors has also provided an insight into a different arena in which social movements, SMOs and CSOs function and in which political opportunities can be found. To date, most social movement studies have focused on the state as the key arena of social movement contestation (Smith 2015; Marks and McAdam 2000; McAdam 1996: 34), while some have also considered the inter-state arena (see Smith 2015; Tarrow 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Although, the state was a key aspect of the case analysis of this research, the findings suggest that the state arena was expanded by the presence of international actors and their influence. My findings suggest that new protectorates have the potential to demonstrate a hybrid arena, combing elements of the state and inter-state arenas, and thus encourage further reconsideration of the relationship between movements and the state, and inter-state system.

A political opportunity framework has not been applied to a context like a new protectorate before, and the framework is rarely applied outside of Western Europe and the US, the areas that have received the most attention to date. New protectorates are a feature of the post-Cold War period and really came into force with the interventions and international administrations in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 - almost two decades after the concept of political opportunities came into being. The political opportunity literature is also focused on the state, though some have found that the global arena is also a source of political opportunities for movements (Smith 2015). Again, this research has highlighted that the presence of international actors within another territory provides an additional arena for political opportunities that is somewhat distinct from the state or global arenas considered by other studies. This arena sits somewhere between the two as the international presence seeks to influence the state via the state-building process but also brings with it particular socio-cultural,

economic and political associations, which have an impact on the discourse and political opportunities within that territory. Also, as mentioned above, this research has demonstrated the utility of a political opportunity framework in relation to other types of entity, such as independent CSOs.

In addition to bringing together the literature on social movement studies and new protectorates, this research has also discussed some of the impacts of donor-funded civil society development on movement and grassroots activity. There is very little existing literature that addresses the relationship between civil society and social movements, with the exception of della Porta (2014) and a small body of literature that considers the effects of NGO-isation on civil society actors, including social movements (Choudry and Kapoor 2013). The findings of this research support the findings within this literature that states that donor-funded development has the potential to stifle contentious, radical and grassroots activism, such as social movement activity. This research has highlighted the importance of understanding how donor-funded society works and the relationships between different types of civil society actors.

Becoming political parties

Both case studies have chosen to participate in electoral politics. Vetëvendosje registered as a 'citizen's initiative' in the 2010 elections and won 13% of the vote. Despite this, Vetëvendosje continues its existing activities alongside its institutional ones. Afghanistan 1400 has made the decision to form a political party alongside its existing activities in the near future. Here I will briefly outline how the insights gained regarding Vetëvendosje's decision to stand in elections contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between social movements and political parties.

Social movements have long been linked to the consolidation of democratic political systems, often seen through the relationship between social movements and political parties (see Caruso 2015; Johnstone 2012; Tilly 2004a, 1986; Goldstone 2004). Goldstone (2004) cites the 1950s, 60s and 70s, as a period which saw party politics in Europe significantly change and ties between political parties and movements were increasingly close. This link is thought to have become close enough that social movements have become a part of normal politics and that "the boundary between institutionali[s]ed and non-institutionali[s]ed politics becomes fuzzy and permeable" (Caruso 2015: 4). Again, these studies largely refer to more established democracies in Western Europe and the US. The findings of the case analysis in this research demonstrate that this is not yet the case in Kosovo or Afghanistan, over fifteen years after the new protectorates began. The relationship between parties and outside

groups is less established and movements are not playing the same role as scholarship on movements in Western Europe and the US suggests.

However, Caruso (2014: 23) argues that the state, democracy and political parties have changed significantly since the 70s, and that relationships have changed as a result. Caruso (2015: 23) states that his case studies of local movements in Italy, as well as recent movements against austerity, such as *Indignados* and Occupy Wall Street, show that "political systems and political parties have become largely impervious to the demands of movements and to the claims emerging from social conflicts." This analysis seems to be more representative of the situation found in new protectorates. Social movements have not yet been a priority for international actors, which may be representative of the lack of attention paid to the long-term effects of new protectorates and to democratisation beyond the technical aspects. Interestingly this runs contrary to Smith's (2015) findings related to transnational activism, which, she argues, has seen an increase in the engagement of movements by international institutions. This has even resulted in some organisations encouraging direct engagement, such as the provision of space for activists to converge at UN conferences (see Friedman et al. 2005).

Although it seems that the augmented levels of democratisation in Kosovo and Afghanistan have increased political opportunities to a limited extent, there are still very few movements emerging in either state. It appears that in new protectorates, there is little attention paid to the interactions between the centre and rest of the population - a feature of the democratisation process in more established democracies in Western Europe and the US. This raises the question of whether the Western-liberal form of democracy promoted in new protectorates may itself be less conducive to the emergence and engagement of social movements.

The decision by Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 to form a political party, alongside existing activities is one of the key strategic decisions in both cases' history. The decision demonstrates both that the opportunity to become a party is available, but that the opportunities and potential to influence political parties has been low. The formation of political parties could have an effect on the potential for new relationships between movements and parties. Movements forming parties alongside their movement activity is not a new phenomenon. Recent developments in Europe have resulted in a number of populist movements that have then had success in elections, such as *Syriza* in Greece, *Podemos* and *Partido X* in Spain, the 5 Star Movement in Italy and the Pirate Party in several countries. Like these movements, Vetëvendosje, emphasises fundamental differences between itself

and other political parties. The case analysis in this thesis provides insightful examples of a movement entering democratic institutions that has emerged in a very different context to those often-studied in established democracies.

Suggestions for future research

The findings of this research have raised further questions that would benefit from future research. It would be interesting to revisit both case studies and states in a few years' time to see how the situation has changed. Already, since the data collection period, Afghanistan 1400 have furthered discussions on forming a political party and Vetëvendosje has continued its movement activities whilst also disrupting parliament with other members of the opposition, even using tear gas on some occasions (Delauney 2015; Fazliu and Butcher 2015; Morina 2015). Further study of both case studies could provide useful insights into the longer-term effects of new protectorates and international influence. Further study on Vetëvendosje's participation in elections and how effective this is, as well as how it impacts upon other entities would also provide a useful insight into the relationships between movements and political parties.

Future research could also use the political opportunity framework as the basis for considering other cases of movements and grassroots CSOs in new protectorates, as well as those in states transitioning to democracy. This further research would also test the overall findings of this study to see if they are generalisable in these contexts. It would be particularly interesting to see if, after a longer period after intervention or after the period of a new protectorate is over, political opportunities and social movement activity increase. There are positive signs for emerging movements that warrant further research. For instance, Bieber (2013: 37) has stated that "recent protests in Bosnia suggest that social movements against the *status quo* are now reaching the region." Similarly, in Afghanistan in 2016 there were protests over electricity provision and the wider rights of the Hazaras by the Hazara Enlightenment Movement (*Junbish-e Roshnai*) (see BBC Trending 2016; Bengali 2016; Mitra 2016; Kerr Chiovenda 2014).

Aspects of the framework could also be used to consider the influence of international actors in specific areas. For instance, a variety of international actors have attempted to strengthen democratic institutions in a range of countries, or provide large amounts of funding to civil society development. The effects of donor-funded civil society development on political opportunities and the relationship between social movements and civil society would benefit from more in-depth research, further bridging the gap between the literature on social movements and civil society. It would also be useful

to conduct further study of other examples in Afghanistan and Kosovo in order to see how political opportunities affected them. Further research on other new protectorates could reveal other ways of improving the political opportunity framework when applied to new protectorates.

Although we have not seen international administrations in the same form since those found in Kosovo or East Timor, we have seen international actors intervene in other territories during or after conflicts or humanitarian disasters, as well as in transitional states. Significant funding and assistance has also been provided by international actors to various civil society groups and development programmes worldwide. Based on these precedents, there is strong potential for future new protectorates, or similar scenarios in which international influence plays a significant role in the shaping of social movement development. Future research could help determine whether the findings of this thesis are also likely to be found in these scenarios in places such as Somalia, Congo, Haiti, Kashmir, South Sudan and Syria.

This thesis provides the first study that focuses on the influence of international actors on social movement activity within a new protectorate context. It is also the first use of a political opportunity framework as a guide to analyse social movements, SMOs and CSOs within this context. By considering cases in two states with different types of international influence, this research has looked beyond the technical aspects of the international influence, such as elections, which are often the focus of most studies in this area. It is clear that this influence has occurred in a variety of ways and that, despite international actors not specifically focusing on social movements, the influence of international actors has shaped them and demonstrates the deeper effects of an international presence, including some of the unintended consequences. This research has also sought to bring together different aspects of the literature considered within this thesis.

Given the broad range of issues addressed and the continued presence of international involvement in the affairs of other states, the findings of this research will be useful to policy-makers, academics, and those working within international institutions and civil society organisations. The research findings highlight one of the ways in which citizens are organising in new protectorates. Given the resources, consequences and goals of international interventions and new protectorates, it is important to further consider some of the repercussions for local populations beyond the headline issues, especially given that these types of interventions are still occurring and are likely to continue to play a significant role in international politics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdelrahman, M. (2015) *Social Movements and the Question of Organisation: Egypt and Everywhere*. [online] London: London School of Economics – Middle East Centre. Available from: http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/publications/Paper-Series/MahaAbdelrahman.aspx [Accessed: 16/09/2016].

Abdiu, D. (2007) Kosovo Radicals Draw a Blank in Macedonia. *BalkanInsight*, (2 March).

Abdiu, D. (2010) Incidents During Attempted Kurti Arrest. *B92: News Crimes and War Crimes*, (27 April).

Afghanistan 1400 (2012) *Vision, Mission, Values*. [online] Afghanistan: Afghanistan 1400. Available from: http://1400.af/eng/about/vision-mission-values/ [Accessed 28/07/2016].

Afghanistan 1400 (2013a) *Press Release*. [Facebook] 4 March. Available from: https://www.facebook.com/Afg1400/photos/a.173227686157998.1073741825.145555448925222/173227929491307/?type=3&theater&__mref=message [Accessed: 26/09/2016].

Afghanistan 1400 (2013b) *Press Release*. [Facebook] 17 March. Available from: https://www.facebook.com/Afg1400/posts/179121642235269?__mref=message [Accessed: 26/09/2016].

Afghanistan 1400 (2013c) *Hierarchy of gender discussion.* [Facebook] 10 December. Available from: https://www.facebook.com/Afg1400/photos/a.173227686157998.1073741825.145555448925222/272290012918431/?type=3&__mref=message [Accessed: 26/09/2016].

Afghanistan 1400 (2015) *Where does Afghanistan 1400 stand?* [Facebook] 18 November. Available from: https://www.facebook.com/Afg1400/posts/563147313832698:0 [Accessed: 26/09/2016].

Aksartova, S. (2009) Promoting Civil Society or Diffusing NGOs? U.S. Donors in the Former Soviet Union. In: Hammack, D. C. and Heydemann, S. (eds.) *Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil Society.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Al-Ali, N. and N. Pratt (2009) *What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Alimi, E. Y. (2015) Repertoires of Contention. In: Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (eds.) *Oxford Handbook on Social Movements.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Alsaawi, A. (2014) A Critical Review of Qualitative Interviews. *European Journal of Business and Social Sciences,* 3(4) 149-156.

Alvarez, S. E. (2009) Beyond NGO-ization? Reflections from Latin America. *Development*, 52(2) 175-184.

Amenta, E. (2005) Political Contexts, Challenger Strategies, and Mobilization: Explaining the Impact of the Townsend Plan. In: Meyer, D. S., Jenness, V. and Ingram, H. (eds.) *Routing the Opposition.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Amenta, E. (2005) State-Centered and Political Institutional Theories in Political Sociology: Retrospect and Prospect. In: Alford, R., Hicks, A., Janoski, T. and Schwartz M. A. (eds.) *The Handbook of Political Sociology*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Amenta, E. (2006) *When Movements Matter.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Amenta, E. and Young, M. P. (1999) Democratic States and Social Movements: Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses. *Social Problems*, 46(2) 153-168.

Amenta, E., Carruthers, B. G. and Zylan, Y. (1992) A Hero for the Aged? The Townsend Movement, the Political Mediation Model, and the U.S. Old-Age Policy, 1934-1950. *American Journal of Sociology* 98(2) 308-39.

Amenta, E., Dunleavy, K. and Bernstein, M. (1994) Stolen Thunder? Huey Long's Share our Wealth, Political Mediation, and the Second New Deal. *American Sociological Review* 59(5) 678-702.

Amin, S. (2004) U.S. imperialism, Europe, and the Middle East. *Monthly Review*, 56(6) 13-33.

Amnesty International (2007) *A politically motivated prosecution?* [online] Australia: Amnesty International. Available from: http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/7098/ [Accessed: 28/07/2016].

Anderson, A. (2010) *State of constriction? Governance and free expression in Kosovo.* [online] Pristina: Youth Initiative for Human Rights. Available from: http://ks.yihr.org/public/fck_files/ksfile/STATE%20of%20CONSTRICTION%20read%20only.pdf [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Anderson, E. W. and Dupree, N. H. (1990) *The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism.* New York: Pinter.

Anon (2013) Access for All: The Future for Afghanistan. *Journal of International Affairs,* 67(1) 225-234.

Appadurai, A. (2002) Broken Promises. *Foreign Policy,* 123(Sep. - Oct.) 42-44.

Arato, A. (2009) *Constitution Making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq.* New York: Colombia University Press.

Arbatli, E. and Rosenberg, D. (eds.) (2017) *Non-Western Social Movements and Participatory Democracy: Protest in the Age of Transnationalism.* Dordrecht: Springer International Publishing.

Arif, S. (2016) [online] *Ashraf Ghani's New Plan to Win Afghanistan's Long War Against the Taliban - Afghanistan's president appears determined to move beyond peace talks*. [online] Tokyo: The Diplomat. Available from: http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/ashraf-ghanis-new-plan-to-win-afghanistans-long-war-against-the-taliban/ [Accessed: 25/09/2016].

Arksey, H. and Knight, P. (1999) *Interviewing for social scientists*. London: Sage.

Atwood, J. B. (1994) Nation Building and Crisis Prevention in the Post-Cold War World. *Brown Journal of World Affairs,* 2(1) 11-17.

Austesserre, S. (2007) DR Congo: Explaining Peace Building Failures, 2003-2006. *Review of African Political Economy,* 34(113) 423-41.

Autesserre, S. (2014) *Peaceland: Conflict resolution and the everyday politics of international intervention.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Avritzer, L. and de Sousa, S. B. (2003) *Towards widening the democratic canon*. [online] Vienna: Eurozine. Available from: http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2003-11-03-santos-en.pdf [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Ayoob, M. (2002) Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The International Journal of Human Rights,* 6(1) 81-102.

Ayoob, M. (2007) State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure. In Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F.O. and Aall, P. (eds.) *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World,* Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Bain, W. (2011) Protectorates New and Old: A Conceptual Critique. In: Mayall, J. and de Oliveira R. S. (eds.) *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States*. London: Hurst and Company.

Baker, G. (2002) Problems in the Theorisation of Global Civil Society. *Political Studies,* 50(5) 928-943.

Balkan Insight (2010) *Key Political Parties in Kosovo*. [online] Multiple locations: Balkan Insight. Available from: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/who-is-who-political-parties-in-kosovo [Accessed 24/03/2016].

Banazak, L. (1996) *Why Movements Success or Fail*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Banks, A. M. (2007) Challenging Political Boundaries in Post-Conflict States. *Journal of International Law,* 29(1) 105-168.

Baranovsky, V. (2001) Humanitarian Intervention: Russian Perspectives. *Pugwash Occasional Papers,* 2(1) 12-38.

Barfield, T. (2010) *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bargués-Pedreny, P. (2016) From Promoting to De-emphasizing 'Ethnicity': Rethinking the Endless Supervision of Kosovo. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 10(2), 222-240.

Barkan, S. E. (1979) Strategic, Tactical, and Organizational Dilemmas of the Protest Movement Against Nuclear Power. *Social Problems,* 27(1) 19-37.

Barnett, M. (2005) Humanitarianism Transformed. *Perspectives on Politics,* 3(4) 723-740.

Barnett, M. and Zürcher, C., (2009) The Peace-builder's Contract: How External State-building Reinforces Weak Statehood. In: Paris, A. and Sisk, T. D. (eds) *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations.* London: Routledge.

Barnett, M., Hunjoon, K., O'Donnell, M. amd Sitea, L. (2007), Peacebuilding: What is in a Name? *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 13(1) 35-58.

Batliwala, S. (2002) Grassroots Movements as Transnational Actors. *International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations,* 13(4) 393-410.

Bauer, M. W. and Aarts, B. (2000) Corpus Construction: a Principle for Qualitative Data Collection. In Bauer, M. W. and Gaskell, G. (eds) *Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound*. London: Sage.

Bayley, D. H. (2005) Police Reform as Foreign Policy. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology,* 32(8) 206-215.

BBC News (1998) *The KLA - terrorists or freedom fighters?* [online] London: BBC. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/121818.stm [Accessed 09/09/2016].

BBC News (1999) *Kosovo rebel leader quits*. [online] London BBC. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/289021.stm [Accessed: 22/05/16].

BBC News (2008) *Ashdown pulls out of Afghan role*. [online] London: BBC. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7211667.stm [Accessed 28/08/2016].

BBC News (2010) *Kosovo independence move not illegal, says UN court*. [online] London: BBC. Available from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-10730573 [Accessed 09/09/2016].

BBC Trending (2016) *God forgot Afghanistan*. [online] London: BBC. Available from: http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-36925169 [Accessed: 30/10/2017].

Beckford, J. (2001) Social movements as free-floating religious phenomena. In Fenn, R. (ed.) *The Blackwell companion to sociology of religion*. Malden: Blackwell.

Bellamy, A. (2004) Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention. *Journal of Military Ethics,* 3(3) 216-232.

Benard, C. (2005) *A future for the young: Options for helping Middle Eastern youth escape the trap of radicalization*. Santa Monica: RAND.

Bendaña, A. (2003) *What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Critical Assessment from the South.* Paper prepared for the International Development Research Council (IDRC) on the 10th anniversary of An Agenda for Peace. [online] Ottawa: Canada.

Bengali, S. (2016) *In a first for post-Taliban Afghansitan, a grass-roots protest movement challenges the government*. [online] Los Angeles: LA Times. Available from: http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-afghanistan-protest-snap-story.html [Accessed: 30/10/2017].

Benin, J. (2016) *Political Economy and Social Movement Theory Perspectives on the Tunisian and Egyptian Uprisings of 2011*. [online] London: London School of Economics – Middle East Centre. Available from: http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/publications/Paper-Series/2016/JoelBeinin.aspx [Accessed: 16/09/2016].

Benin, J. and Vairel, F. (eds) (2011) *Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bennett, C. (1995) *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences.* New York and London: New York University Press.

Berclaz, J. and M. Giugni (2005) Specifying the Concept of Political Opportunity Structures. In: Kousis, M. and Tilly, C. (eds.) *Economic and Political Contention in Comparative Perspectives.* Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.

Berdal, M. and Keen, D. (2011) The Political Economy of Protectorates and "Post-Conflict" Intervention. In: Mayall, J. and de Oliveira, J. S. (eds.) *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States*. London: Hurst and Company.

Berdal, M. and Zaum, D. (2012) Introduction: power after peace. In: Berdal, M. and Zaum, D. (eds.) *Political economy of statebuilding: power after peace*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Berg Harpviken, Strand, K, A. and Ask, K. (2002) *Afghanistan and Civil Society.* [online] Peshawar and Bergen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available from: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1765-afghanistan-and-civil-society [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Berger, M. and Weber, H. (2006) Beyond State-Building: Global Governance and the Crisis of the Nation-state System in the 21st Century. *Third World Quarterly*, 27(1) 201-208.
Berisha, K. (2011) Image. *Kosovo 2.0,* 1(Summer Issue) 36-43.

Bernard, N. (2013) *Women's Rights in Afghanistan Uncertain After U.S. Drawdown*. [online] Washington: The Washington Free Beacon. Available from: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/womens-rights-in-afghanistan-uncertain-after-u-s-drawdown/ [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Beissinger, M. R. (1996) How Nationalisms Spread: Eastern Europe Adrift the Tides and Cycles of Nationalist Contention. *Social Research,* 63(1) 97-146.

Beissinger, M. (2002) *Nationalist Mobilization and the collapse of the Soviet State.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Berisha, K. M. (2005) After the War the World Started to Understand our True Identity. In: Kelmendi, M. and Arlinda, D. (eds) *Who is Kosovar?* Prishtina: Java Multimedia Production.

Bhadrakumar, M. K. (2009) *Wizards and wives drive Afghan election*. [online] Hon Kong :Asia Times. Available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI03Df04.html [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Bhatti, J. (2014) *Young voters see promise in Afghanistan*. [online] New York, Los Angeles and Chicago: USA Today. Available from: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/04/05/afghanistan-elections-youth-vote/7323915/ [Accessed: 27/06/2014].

Bickerton, C. J. (2007) State Building: Exporting State Failure. In: Bixkerton, C., Cunliffe, P. and Gourevitch, A. (eds.) *Politics Without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations.* London: UCL Press.

Bideleux, R, and Jeffries, I. (2007) *The Balkans: A Post-Communist History.* London: Routledge.

Bieber, F. (2013) Is change coming to Bosnia? Reflections on protests and their prospects, *SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe.* 16(1) 37-39.

Bilefsky, D. (2008) *Angry Serbs Burn Border Posts in Kosovo*. [online] New York: The New York Times Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/world/europe/20kosovo.html?_r=0 [Accessed 20/09/2016].

Bridoux, J. (2011) It's the Political, Stupid: National versus Transnational Perspectives on Democratisation in Iraq. *The International Journal of Human Rights,* 15(4) 552-71.
Bridoux, J. and Kurki, M. (2014) *Democracy Promotion: A critical introduction*. Lon don and New York: Routledge.

Brinks, D. and M. Coppedge (2006) Diffusion is no illusion: Neighbour emulation in the third wave of democracy. *Comparative Political Studies* 39(4) 463-89.

Brubaker, R. (1996) *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the new Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Burnell, P. (2000) *Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization*. London: Frank Cass.

Blair, T. (1999) *Doctrine of the International Community*. [online] London: The National Archives. Available from: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297 [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Blee, K. M. and Taylor, V. (2002) Semi-structured interviewing in social movement research. In: Klandermans, B. and Staggenborg, S. (eds.) *Methods of Social Movement Research*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Blumer, H. (1969) Collective Behavior. In: Lee, A. M. (ed.) *Principles of Sociology,* 3rd edition. New York: Barnes and Noble Books.

Blumi, I. (2003) Ethnic Borders to a Democratic Society in Kosova: The UN's Identity Card. In: Bieber, F. and Daskalovski, Z. (eds.) *Understanding the War in Kosovo.* London: Routledge.

Bøas, M. and Jennings, K. M. (2005) Insecurity and development: the rhetoric of the "failed state". *European Journal of Development Research,* 17(3) 385-395.

Bodansky, Y. (2013) The China Gambit. In Richards, C. and Stewart, J. (eds.) *Afghanistan Revealed: Beyond the Headlines.* London: Frontline Books, 170-191.

Boege, V., Brown, A., Clements, K. and Nolan, A. (2008) *On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility'*. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.

Boot, M. (2002) *The Savages Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.

Borger, J. (2014a) *Europe's bravest mayor? The man trying to clean up Kosovo's capital*. [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/21/europes-bravest-mayor-kosovo
[Accessed: 20/10/14].

Borger, J. (2014b*) Meet the Kosovan Alabanian who names their sons after Tony Blair*. [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jun/20/kosovan-albanians-name-children-tony-blair-tonibler [Accessed: 22/09/2016].

Borger, J. (2014c) EU's Biggest Foreign Mission in Turmoil over Corruption Row. [online] London> The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/05/eu-facing-questions-dismissal-prosecutor-alleged-corruption [Accessed: 22/10/2017].
Boudreau, V. (1996) Northern Theory, Southern Protest: Opportunity Structure Analysis in Cross-National Perspective. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 1(2) 175-189.

Boyle, M. J. (2011) Policing the Neo-Imperial Frontier: CIVPOL Missions in the New Protectorates. In Mayall, J. and de Oliveira, R. S. (eds.) *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States.* London: Hurst and Company.

Boyle, M. J. (2014) *Violence after War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict States*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Briscoe, I. and Pellecer, M. R. (2010) *A state under siege: elites, criminal networks and institutional reform in Guatemala*. [online] The Hague: Clingendael – Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Available from : https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20100913_cru_publication_ibriscoe.pdf [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Brock, L., (2001) *Nation-building – Prelude or Belated Solution to the Failing of States? Paper presented at the Conference on Failed States IV: Structures, Cases and Policies*. [online] West Lafayette: Purdue University. Available from: www.ippu.purdue.edu/failed_states/200/papers/brock.pdf [Accessed: 10/09/2014].

Brockett, C. D. (1991) *The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobolization in Central America*. [online] Virginia: Virginia Tech. Available from: http://courses.arch.vt.edu/courses/wdunaway/gia5274/brockett.pdf [Accessed: 16/09/2016].

Brookland, J. (2013) *Optimists and realists agree on this: successful Afghan civil society depends on youth*. [online] Arlington: Counterpart International. Available from: http://www.counterpart.org/blog/afghan-civil-society [Accessed: 15/07/2014].

Bruce, H. (2013 The Movement of a Movement: VETËVENDOSJE! and the Transition from Grassroots to Government. *Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection,* Paper 1720.

Brunwasser, M. (n.d.) *Steamrolled: A special investigation into the diplomacy of doing business abroad*. [online] Washinton: Foreign Policy. Available from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/30/steamrolled-investigation-bechtel-highway-business-kosovo/ [Accessed: 22/09/2016].

Bryman, A. (2008) *Social Research Methods*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buckley, J. (2010) *Can the EU be more effective in Afghanistan? Policy Brief.* [onlne] London: Centre for European Reform. Available from: http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/policy-brief/2010/can-eu-be-more-effective-afghanistan [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Burke, E. (2014) *Game Over? The EU's legacy in Afghanistan*. [online] Madrid: FRIDE. Available from: http://fride.org/publication/1176/game-over?-the-eu%25E2%2580%2599s-legacy-in-afghanistan [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Burke, J. (2014) *Hamid Karzai's tangled legacy: inept failure or anti-Taliban hero?* [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/30/hamid-karzai-afghanistan-tangled-legacy-taliban [Accessed: 25/09/2016].

Burnham, P., Lutz, K. L., Grant, W. and Layton-Henry, Z. (2008) Research Methods in Politics, Second Edition. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillen.

Burstein, P. (1998) *Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Burstein, P. (1999) Social Movements and Public Policy. In: Giugni, M., McAdam, D. and Tilly, C. (eds.) *How Social Movements Matter*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Burstein, P. and Freudenburg, W. (1978) Changing Public Policy: The Impact of Public Opinion, Anti-War Demonstrations and War Costs on Senate Voting on Vietnam War Motions. *American Journal of Sociology,* 84(1) 99-122.

Burstein, P. and Linton, A. (2002) The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns. *Social Forces,* 81(2) 380-408.

Bush, G. W. (2001) *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People* [online] Washington: The White House. Available from: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Calderón, F., Piscitelli, A. and Reyna, J. L. (1992) Social Movements: Actors, Theories, Expectations. In: Escobar, A. and Alvarz, S. (eds.) *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy.* Boulder: Westview Press

Calfas, A. (2015*) Supporting Afghan Women in the 2014 Transition*. [online] Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Available from: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB184-Supporting-Afghan-Women-in-the-2014-Transition.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Call, C. T. (2003) Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing Rule of Law in El Salvador. *Journal of Latin American Studies,* 35(4) 827-862.

Campbell, D. (1998) *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Campbell, S. and Peterson, J. H. (2013) Statebuilding. In MacGinty, R. (ed) *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding.* London and New York: Routledge.

Caplan, R. (2005) *International Governance of War-Torn Territories.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Capussela, A. (2011a) The Foreigners Exposed. *Kosovo 2.0,* 1(Summer Issue) 53-60.

Capussela, A. (2011b) *Kosovo heads for ruin while its watchdog looks on*. [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/30/kosovo-imf-international-civilian-office [Accessed 10/10/2014].

Capussela, A. (2011c) *Kosovo: the unnecessary highway that could bankrupt Europe's poorest state*. [online] Roverto: Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso - Transeuropa. Available from: http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Kosovo/Kosovo-the-unnecessary-highway-that-could-bankrupt-Europe-s-poorest-state-108430 [Accessed: 22/09/2016].

Capussela, A. L. (2015) *State-Building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the EU in the Balkans*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

Carothers, T. (1999) Civil Society: Think Again. *Foreign Policy*, 117(Winter) 18-29.

Carothers, T. (2002) The End of the Transition Paradigm. *Journal of Democracy,* 13(1) 5-21.

Carothers, T. (2007a) The "Sequencing" Fallacy. *Journal of Democracy,* 18(1) 12-27. HAS BECOME 2007a

Carothers, T. (2007b) A Quarter Century of Promoting Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 18(4) 112-15.

Caruso, L. (2015) Theories of the Political Process, Political Opportunities Structure and Local Mobilizations. The case of Italy. *Sociologica*, 3(IX) 1-29.

Casanova, J. (2001) Civil society and religion: Retrospective reflections on Catholicism and prospective reflections on Islam. *Social Research,* 68 (4) 1041-1080.

Castillejo, C. (2008) *Strengthening women's citizenship in the context of state-building: The experience of Sierra Leone [FRIDE working paper 69]*. Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior.

Castillo, G. D. (2008) *Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chabel, P. and Daloz, J.-P. (1999) *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Chamberlain, J. (1897) *Foreign and Colonial Speeches.* London: George Routledge & Sons.

Chandhoke, N. (2007) Civil Society. *Development in Practice*, 17(4-5) 607-614.
Chandler, D. and O. P. Richmond (2015) Contesting Postliberalism: Governmentality or Emancipation? *Journal of International Relations and Development.* 18(1) 1-24.

Chandler, D. and Sisk, T. (eds.) (2013) *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding.* London: Routledge.

Chandler, D. (2006) *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building.* London: Pluto Press.

Chandler, D. (2010) *Interntional State-building: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance.* London: Routledge.

Chandler, D. (2013) Statebuilding, civil society, and the privileging of difference. In Chandler, D. and Sisk, T. D. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding.* London and New York: Routledge.

Chandrasekaran, R. (2008*) Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad's Green Zone*. New York: Random House.

Chandrasekaran, R. (2011) *US military dismayed by delays in 3 key development projects in Afghanistan*. [online] Washington: Washington Post. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-military-dismayed-by-delays-in-3-key-development-projects-in-afghanistan/2011/04/22/AFD6jq8E_story.html [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Chayes, S. (2016) *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Chebankova, E. (2012) Contemporary Russian Multiculturalism. *Post-Soviet Affairs,* 28(3) 319-345.

Chesterman, S. (2002) *Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan.* [online] New York: International Peace Academy. Available from: https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/justice_under_intl.pdf [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Chesterman, S. (2005) *You, the People - The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chesterman, S. (2007) Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 1(1) 3-26.

Chesterman, S., Iggnatieff, M. and Thakur, R. (eds.) (2004) *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance.* Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Chomsky, N. (2002) The Crimes of 'Intcom'. *Foreign Policy,* 123(Sep. - Oct.) 34-35.

Chopra, J. (2000) The UN's kingdom in East Timor. *Survival,* 42(3) 27-39.
Chopra, J. (2002) Building state failure in East Timor. *Development and Change,* 33(5) 979-1000.

Choudry, A. and Kapoor, D. (eds.) (2013) *NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects*. London: Zed Books.

Christopher, W. (1993) Opening statement at press conference. *New Steps toward Conflict Resolution in the Former Yugoslavia*, 10 February.

Civicus (2011) *2011 State of Civil Society Report.* [online] Johannesburg: CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. Available from: http://socs.civicus.org/2011/ [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Clapham, C. (2011) Africa and Trusteeship in the Modern Global Order. In: Mayall, J. and de Oliveira, R. S. (eds.) *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States.* London: Hurst and Company.

Clapham, C. (2011) Africa and Trusteeship in the Modern Global Order. In: Mayall, J. and de Oliveira, R. S. (eds.) *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States.* London: Hurst and Company.

Clark, H. (2000) *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*. London: Pluto Press.

Clark, H. (2008) *Kosovo: international pacifist organisation calls for end of prosecution of Albin Kurti*. [online] London: War Resisters' International. Available from: http://www.wri-irg.org/statemnt/kurti08-en.htm [Accessed: 10/10/15].

CNN (1997) *Kosovo students protest for Albanian-language education*. [online] USA: CNN. Available from: http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9710/29/yugo.kosovo/ [Accessed: 29/10/14].

Collaku, P. (2010) *Albin Kurti, Guardian of Flame of Kosovo Nationalism*. [online] Serbia: Balkan Insight. Available from: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albin-kurti-guardian-of-flame-of-kosovo-nationalism [Accessed: 10/10/15].

Coehlo, J. (2012) Vehicles for Transformation, or Tools for the Status Quo? Civil Society and International Statebuilding in Kosovo. *The Western Balkan Review*, 2(2) 1-26,

Collaku, P. (2010) *Kosovo: the Unemployed 'Young Europeans'*. Pristina: Balkan Insight. Available from: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/the-unemployed-young-europeans1 [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Collaku, P., Rusi, E., Likmeta, B. and Marzouk, L. (2014) *Albania-Kosovo Highway Costs Soar To 2 Billion Euros.* [online] Pristina: Balkan Insight. Available from: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-kosovo-highway-costs-soar-to-2-billion-euro [Accessed 29/10/2014].

Constitutional Court (2011) *Constitutional Review of the Decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, No. 04-V-04, concerning the election of the President of the Republic of Kosovo, dated 22 February 2011*. Pristina: The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo.

Cookman, C. and Wadhams, C. (2010) *Governance in Afghanistan: Looking Ahead to What We Leave Behind*. [online] Washington: Centre for American Progress. Available from: https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/05/pdf/afghangovernance.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Costain, A. N. and Majstorovic, S. (1994) Congress, Social Movements and Public Opinion: Multiple Origins of Women's RIghts Legislation. *Political Research Quarterly*, 47(1) 111-135.

Costoya, M. M. (2007) *Toward a Typology of Civil Society Actors: The Case of the Movement to Change International Trade Rules and Barriers [United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper Number 30]*. [online] Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Available from: http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetITFramePDF?ReadForm&parentunid=0451352E376C1031C12573A60044CE42&parentdoctype=paper&netitpath=80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/0451352E376C1031C12573A60044CE42/$file/Mejidopaper.pdf [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Cramer, C. (2006) *Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries.* London: Hurst.

Cramer, C. (2009) Trajectories of accumulation through war and peace. In Paris, R. and Sisk, T. (eds.) *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*. Abingdon: Routledge, 129-148.

Cramer, C. and Goodhand, J. (2002) Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State, and the 'Post-Conflict' Challenge in Afghanistan. *Development and Change*, 33(5) 885-909.

Cress, D. M. and Snow, D. A. (2000) The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing. *American Journal of Sociology,* 105(4) 1063-1071.

Cunliffe, P. (2011) A dangerous duty: power, paternalism and the global "duty of care"'. In: Cunliffe, P. (ed.) *Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Daalder, I. H. and O'Hanlon, M. E. (2000) *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo.* Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Daud, M. (2014) *The Centrality of Power and Elite Structures to Afghanistan's Electoral Failures*. [online] Kabul: Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Available from: http://af.boell.org/2014/10/22/centrality-power-and-elite-structures-afghanistans-electoral-failings [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

DD (2010) *Kosovo (Jugoslawien), 30. September 1991 : Unabhängigkeit.* [online] Unknown location: sudd.ch. Available from: http://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=ks011991 [Accessed 09/09/2016].

De Vaus, D. A. (2001) *Research Design in Social Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

De Wet, E. (2009) The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Establishment and Functioning of EULEX. *The American Journal of International Law,* 103(1) 83-96.

Debiel, T. and Klein, A. (eds) (2002) *Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions.* Zed Books: London.

Debiel, T. and Lambach, D. (2010) *Global Governance Meets Local Politics: On Western State-building and the Resilience of Hybrid Political Orders – Paper presented at the Global Conference of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA)*, Sydney.

De Fronzo, J. (2015) *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, Fifth Edition.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Del Rosso, S. J. (2013) Hiding in plain sight: The neglected dilemma of nationalism for statebuilding. In: Chandler, D. and Sisk, T. D. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding.* London and New York: Routledge.

Delafrouz, G. (2009) *Vetëvendosje – A Minor Field Study of the Kosovo Albanian Resistance Movement*. [online] Lund: Lund University. Available from: http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1405441&fileOId=1414996 [Accessed: 19/03/2014].

Delauney, G. (2015) *Why Kosovo's opposition MPs are tear-gassing parliament*. [online] London: BBC. Available form: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34986909 [Accessed: 28/09/2016].

Della Porta, D. (1995) *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Della Porta, D. (2002) Comparative Politics and Social Movements, In: Klandermans, B. and Staggenborg, S. (eds.) *Methods of Social Movement Research.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Della Porta, D. (2014) Democratization from Below: Civil Society versus Social Movements? In: Beichelt, T., Hahn-Fuhr, I., Schimmelfennig, F. and Worschech, S. (eds) (2014) *Civil Society and Democracy Promotion.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2006) *Social Movements: An Introduction, Second Edition*. Malden: Blackwell.

Della Porta, D. and Rucht, D. (2002) Comparative Environmental Campaigns. *Mobilization,* 7(1) 1-14.
Della Porta, D. and Tarrow, S. (2005) *Transitional protest and global activism: People, passions and power*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Mosca, L. and Reiter, H. (2006) *Globalization from below: Transnational activists and protest networks.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. and Rucht, D. (2009) Social Movements in a Globalizing World: an Introduction. In, della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. and Rucht, D. (eds.) *Social Movements in a Globalizing World.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Demjaha, A. and Peci, L. (2004) The Development of Civil society in Kosovo After the "Kosovo Conflict". In Gordon, D. R. and Durst, D. C. (eds.) *Civil Society in Southeast Europe.* Amsterdam and New York: Brill.

Democracy for Development (2014) Kosovo's Political Compass: Mapping Party Ideology. [online] Pristina: Democracy for Development. Available from: http://d4d-ks.org/punimet/kosovos-political-compass-mapping-party-ideology/?lang=en [Accessed 29/10/2014].

Denzin, N. K. (1989) *The research act, 3rd edition*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Department of State (n.d.) *US State Assistance to Kosovo*. [online] Washington: US Department of State. Available from: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/kv/c26235.htm [Accessed 20/09/2016].

Deutsch, K. (1966) *Nationalism and social communication: An inquiry into the foundations of nationality.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Devic, A. (2006) Transnationalization of Civil Society in Kosovo: International and Local Limits of Peace and Multiculturalism. *Ethnopolitics, Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics,* 5(3) 257-273.

Diamond, L. (1994) Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation. *Journal of Democracy,* 5(3) 4-17.

Diamond, L. (1999) *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Diani, M. (1992) The concept of social movement. *Sociological Review*, 40(1) 1-25.

Dinnen, S., (2006) *Nation-building Concepts Paper*. [online] Canberra: Australian University. Available from: http://www2.pazifik-infostelle.org/uploads/DossierNationBuilding.pdf [Accessed: 19/09/2016].

Dobbins, J. (2003) *America's role in nation-building.* Los Angeles, CA: RAND Corporation.

Dobbins, J. (2007) *The beginner's guide to nation-building.* Los Angeles, CA: RAND Corporation.

Dobbins, J. (2008) *After the Taliban: Nation-building in Afghanistan.* Washington, DC: Potomac Books.

Dodge, T. (2006) Iraq: the Contradictions of Exogenous State-building in Historical Perspective. *Third World Quarterly*, 27(1) 187-200.

Dodge, T. (2010) The Ideological Roots of Failure: The Application of Kinetic Liberalism to Iraq. *International Affairs,* 86(6) 1269-86.

Doubt, K. (2000) *Sociology After Bosnia and Kosovo.* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Dowdy, J. and Erdmann, A. (2013) After the "War Economy". In: Richards, C. and Stewart, J. (eds.) *Afghanistan Revealed: Beyond the Headlines*. London: Frontline Books, 260-281.

Doyle, M. W. (2001) The New Interventionism. *Metaphilosophy,* 32(1-2) 212-235.

DRC-Citizenship (2006) Building effective states: Taking a citizen's perspective. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

DRC-Citizenship (2010) *Putting citizens at the centre: Linking states and societies for responsive governance. [Prepared for the conference on 'The politics of poverty, elites, citizens and states]*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Druzin, H. (2013) *Youth movement looks to challenge Afghanistan's old ways.* [online] Washington: Stars and Stripes. Available from: http://www.stripes.com/news/youth-movement-looks-to-challenge-afghanistan-s-old-ways-1.230856 [Accessed: 15/07/2014].

Dryzek, J. (2000) *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Duffield, M. (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars.* London: Zed Books.

Duffield, M. (2014) From immersion to simulation: remote methodologies and the decline of area studies. *Review of African Political Economy,* 41(1) 75-94.

Dupree, L. (2014) *Afghanistan.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dür, A. (2008) Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Methodology. *European Union Politics,* 9(4) 559-576.

Dyrstad, K. (2012) After ethnic civil war: Ethno-nationalism in the Western Balkans. *Journal of Peace Research,* 49(6) 817-831.

Džihić, V. and Kramer, H. (2009) *Kosovo After Independence Is the EU's EULEX Mission Delivering on its Promises?* Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - International Policy Analysis.

Earle, L. (2009) *Occupying the illegal city: Urban Social Movements and Transgressive Citizenship in São Paulo [PhD Thesis]*. London: London School of Economics.

Earle, L. (2011) *Literature Review on the Dynamics of Social Movements in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States* [online] Birmingham: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. Available from: http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/EIRS13.pdf [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Earle, L. and Pratt, B. (2009) *Indigenous social movements and international NGOs in the Peruvian Amazon*. Oxford: INTRAC Occasional Paper Series.

EC (2012) *The Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe's Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations*. [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions]. [online] European Commission: Brussels. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0492:FIN:EN:PDF [Accessed 15/10/2016].

ECMI (2015) *Annual Programme.* [online] Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues. Available from: http://www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx_lfpubdb/ECMI_AP_2015_Final.pdf [Accessed 22/10/2017].

Economides, S., Ker-Lindsey, J. and Papadimitriou, D. (2010) Kosovo: Four Futures. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,* 52(5) 99-116.

Edwards, D. B. (1996) *Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

EEAS (n.d. a) *Human Rights*. [online]. Kabul: Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan. Available from: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/eu_afghanistan/human-rights/index_en.htm [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

EEAS (n.d. b) *Political & economic relations*. [online] Pristina: European Union Office in Kosovo / European Union Special Representative in Kosovo. Available from: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations/index_en.htm [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Egleder, J. (2012) *Peace through Peace Media? The media activities of the international missions (KFOR and UNMIK) and their contribution to peacebuilding in Kosovo from 1999 till 2008.* Münster: Lit Verlag.

Egnall, R. (2010) The organised hypocrisy of international state-building. *Conflict, Security & Development,* 10(4) 465-491.

Eisinger, P. (1973) The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities. *American Political Science Review,* 81(2) 405-424.

Engel Rasmussen, S. (2016) US *airstrikes undermining Afghan security, says former president.* [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/04/former-afghan-president-criticises-foreign-led-combat-against-taliban [Accessed: 25/09/2016].

Eriksen, S. S. (2005) The Politics of State Formation: Contradictions and Conditions of Possibility. *European Journal of Development Research,* 17(3) 396-410.

Eriksen, S. S. (2010) State Formation and the Politics of Regime Survival: Zimbabwe in Theoretical Perspective. *Journal of Historical Sociology,* 23(2) 316-340.

Escobar, A. and Alvarez, S. E. (eds.) (1992) *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy.* Boulder: Westview.

Esteves, A. M., Motta, S. and Cox, L. (2009) "Civil society" versus social movements. *Interface,* 1(2) 1-21.

Etehad, M. (2016) *Young people don't see a future in Afghanistan, so they're leaving*. [online] Washington: The Washington Post. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/young-people-dont-see-a-future-in-afghanistan-so-theyre-leaving/2016/08/12/8737d2a8-5e3e-11e6-84c1-6d27287896b5_story.html [Accessed: 25/09/2016].

Etzioni, A. (2004) The Emerging Global Normative Synthesis. *The Journal of Political Philosophy,* 12(2) 214-244.

EU (2005) *EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration: Committing to a new EU-Afghan Partnership*. [online] Strasbourg: Council of the European Union, Strasbourg. Available from: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014519%202005%20INIT [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

EULEX (2009) *EULEX Programme Report 2009.* [online] Pristina: EULEX. Available from http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/Accountability/EULEX-PROGRAMME-REPORT-July-2009-new.pdf [Accessed 22/11/2012].

EULEX (2012) *EULEX in support of Anti-Corruption Agency.*[online] Pristina: EULEX. Available from: http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/news/000376.php [Accessed: 01/11/2017].

European Commission (2008) *Kosovo (Under Unscr 1244/99) 2008 Progress Report*. [online] Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/kosovo_progress_report_en.pdf [Accessed 09/09/2016].

European Commission (2011) *Kosovo (Under Unscr 1244/99) 2009 Progress Report*. [online] Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/ks_rapport_2009_en.pdf [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Fagan, A. (2010) *Europe's Balkan Dilemma: Paths to Civil Society or State-Building?* London: I.B. Tauris.

Fallon, K. (2008) *Democracy and the rise of women's movements in sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Farrell, T. and Giustozzi, A. (2013) The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004-2012. *International Affairs,* 89(4) 825-843.

Fawn, R. and Richmond, O. P. (2009) De Facto States in the Balkans: Shared Governance versus Ethnic Sovereignty in Republika Srpska and Kosovo. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 3(2) 205-238.

Fazliu E. and Butcher, J. (2015) *Tear Gas, Eggs and Protests: Seven Things You Need to Know about Kosovo's Political Standoff.* [online] Pristina: Kosovo 2.0. Available from: http://www.kosovotwopointzero.com/en/article/1914/tear-gas-eggs-and-protests-seven-things-you-need-to-know-about-kosovos-political-standoff [Accessed: 28/09/2016].

Fearon, J. and Laitin, D. (2004) Neo-trusteeship and the Problem of Weak States. *International Security*, 28(4) 5-43.

Fergusson, J. (2011) *Taliban – The True Story of the World's most feared guerilla Fighters.* London: Transworld Publishers/Corgi.

Ferree, M., Gamson, W., Gerhards, J. and Rucht, D. (2002) S*haping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fetherston, A. B. (2000) Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks. *International Peacekeeping,* 7(1) 190-218.

Fisher, W. F. (1997) DOING GOOD? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices. *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 26(1) 439-464.

Fominaya, C. F. and Cox, L. (eds) (2013) *Understanding European Movements: New social movements, global justice struggles, anti-austerity protest*. London: Routledge.

Foniqi-Kabashi, B. (2006) *Negotiations on status of Kosovo still under way.* [online] Unknown location: Southeast European Times. Available from: http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2006/12/15/feature-02 [Accessed 01/12/2014].

Foweraker, J. (1995) *Theorizing Social Movements, Critical Studies on Latin America.* London: Pluto Press.

Foweraker. J. (2001) *Grassroots Movements, Political Activism and Social Development in Latin America: A Comparison of Chile and Brazil*. Geneva: UNRISD.

Frankfort-Nachmias, C. and Nachmias, D. (1992) *Research Methods in the Social Sciences, 4th edition.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Franks, J. and Richmond, O. P. (2008) Coopting Liberal Peace-building: Untying the Gordian Knot in Kosovo. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 43(1) 81-103.

Freedom House (2004) *Kosovo [2004 Report].* [online] Washington: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2004/kosovo [Accessed 09/09/2015].

Freedom House (2006) *[Freedom House Report on] Kosovo* [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2006/kosovo [Accessed: 28/07/2015].

Freedom House (2007) *[Freedom House Report on] Kosovo* [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2007/kosovo [Accessed: 28/07/2015].

Freedom House (2008) *[Freedom House Report on] Kosovo* [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2008/kosovo [Accessed: 28/07/2015].

Freedom House (2009) *[Freedom House Report on] Kosovo* [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2009/kosovo [Accessed: 28/07/2015].

Freedom House (2010a) *Afghanistan [Country Report 2010]*. [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/afghanistan [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Freedom House (2010b) *[Freedom House Report on] Kosovo* [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2010/kosovo [Accessed: 28/07/2015].

Freedom House (2011) *Kosovo [2005 Report].* [online] Washington: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2011/kosovo [Accessed 09/09/2015].

Freedom House (2012) *[Freedom House Report on] Kosovo* [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/kosovo [Accessed: 28/07/2015].

Freedom House (2013a) Afghanistan *[Country Report 2013]*. [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/afghanistan [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Freedom House (2013b) *[Freedom House Report on] Kosovo* [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2013/kosovo [Accessed: 28/07/2015].

Freedom House (2014a) *Afghanistan [Country Report 2014]*. [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/afghanistan [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Freedom House (2014b) *[Freedom House Report on] Kosovo* [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/kosovo [Accessed: 28/07/2015].

Freedom House (2015a) *Afghanistan [Country Report 2015].* [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/afghanistan [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Freedom House (2015b) *Kosovo [2005 Report].* [online] Washington: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2015/kosovo [Accessed 09/05/2016].

Freedom House (2016) *Afghanistan [Country Report 2016].* [online] Washington and New York: Freedom House. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/afghanistan [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Friedman, E. J., Clark, A. M. and K. Hochstetler (2005) *Sovereignty, Democracy, and Global Civil Society: State-Society Relations at the UN World Conferences.* New York: State University of New York Press.

Fröhlich, C. (2012) Civil society and the state intertwined: The case of disability NGOs in Russia. *East European Politics,* 28(4) 371-89.

Gall, C. (2006) *Nation Faltering, Afghans' Leader Draws Criticism*. [online] New York: The New York Times. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/23/world/asia/23karzai.html?pagewanted=print [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Gall, C. (2007) *Afghanistan to Expel 2 Officials*. [online] New York: The New York Times. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/27/world/asia/27afghan.html?_r=0 [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Gallup (2010) *Balkan Monitor, Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans 2010 - Summary of Findings*. [online] Berlin, Brussels and Vienna: ESI. Available from: http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf [Accessed: 22/10/2017].

Gamson W. and Meyer, D. (1996) Framing Political Opportunity. In: McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. (eds.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gamson, J. (1995) Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma. *Social Problems,* 42(3) 390-407.

Ganz, M. (2009) *Why David Sometimes Wins.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Garrison, R. (2005) *The Role of the Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization: Case Study East Timor*. [online] Strömsborg: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Available from: http://www.idea.int/cbp/upload/CBP-Timor-Leste.pdf [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Garton Ash, T. (2000) *The war we almost lost*. [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/04/balkans2 [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Garton Ash, T. (2007) *Why Kosovo should become the 33rd member - and Serbia the 34th.* [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/feb/15/balkans.eu [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Gashi, K. (2007) *Kurti case presents legal headache for UN in Kosovo*. [online] Serbia: Balkan Insight. Available from: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kurti-case-presents-legal-headache-for-un-in-kosovo [Accessed: 10/10/15].

Gates, R. M. (2015) *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*. Toronto: Random House.

Gbowee, L. (2009) Effecting change through women's activism in Liberia. *IDS Bulletin*, 40(2) 50-53.

Gelb, L. (2009) *Power Rules.* London: HarperCollins.

Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism, 2nd edition*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Ghai, Y. and Galli, G. (2006) *Constitution Building Processes and Democratization*. [online] Strömsborg: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Available from: http://www.idea.int/publications/cbp_democratization/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&pageid=15234 [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Ghani, A. and Lockhart, C. (2007) *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding A Fractured World.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ghani, A., Lockhart, C. and Carnahan, M. (2005) *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building [ODI Working paper 253].* London: Overseas Development Institute.
Gibbs, D. (2009) *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

Gill, B. and Huang, C.-H. (2009) *China's Expanding Peacekeeping Role: its Significance and the Policy Implications [SIPRI Policy Brief]*. [online] Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available from: http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIPB0902.pdf [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Giugni, M. (2007) Useless Protest? A Time-Series Analysis of the Policy Outcomes of Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in the United States, 1977-1995. *Mobilization* 12(1) 53-77.

Giugni, M. (2011) Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 15 (2) 361-368.

Gleditch, K. S. and Ward, M. D. (2006) Diffusion and the international context of democratization. *International Organization,* 60(Fall) 911-33.

Glenn, J. K. (2003) Parties out of Movements: Party Emergence in Postcommunist Eastern Europe. In: Goldstone, J. A. (ed.) *States, Parties and Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goetze, C. and Guzina, D. (2008) Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, Nationbuilding: Turtles All the Way Down? *Civil Wars,* 10(4) 319-347.

Goldstone, J. (2001) Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4 139-187.

Goldstone, J. (2003) Bridging Institutionalized and Non-institutionalized Politics. In: Goldstone, J. (ed.) *States, Parties and Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Goldstone, J. (2004) More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity Structures to Relational Fields. *Theory and Society,* 33(3) 333-365.

Goodhand, J. (2004) From War Economy to Peace Economy? Reconstruction and State Building in Afghanistan. *Journal of International Affairs,* 58(1) 155-174.

Goodhand, J. (2008) Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan. *International Peacekeeping,* 15(3) 405-423.

Goodwin, J, and Jasper, J. M. (2003) *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J. (1999) Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory. *Sociological Forum,* 14(1) 27-54.

Gowers, A. (2002) Power of Two. *Foreign Policy,* 123(Sep. – Oct) 32-33.

Graham-Harrison, E. (2013) *Hamid Karzai refuses to sign US-Afghan security pact*. [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/hamid-karzai-refuses-to-sign-us-afghan-security-deal [Accessed: 25/09/2016].
Greenfield, L. (1992) *Nationalism: Five roads to modernity.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Grau, B. (2016) Supporting women's movements in Afghanistan: challenges of activism in a fragile context. *Gender & Development,* 3(24) 409-426.

Gross, E. (2008) *The EU in Afghanistan - Growing Engagement in Turbulent Times*. [online] Kabul: Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Available from: https://www.boell.de/de/navigation/asien-4225.html [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Grynkewich, A. (2008) Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 31(4) 350-370.

Gubrium, J. and Holstein, J. (eds.) (2001) *Handbook of interview research.* London: Sage.

Guidry, J. A. (2003) The Struggle to Be Seen: Social Movements and the Public Sphere in Brazil. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 16(4) 493-524.

Gunning, J. (2007) Terrorism, Charities and Diasporas: Contrasting the Fundraising Practices of Hamas and al Qaeda among Muslims in Europe. In: Biersteker, T. and Eckert, S. (eds.) *Countering the Financing of Terrorism.* London: Routledge.

Gurtov, M. and Van Ness, P. (2005) *Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific.* London: Routledge Curzon.

Haas, R. N. (2013) What International Community? [online] Prague and New York: Project Syndicate. Available from: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-broken-tools-of-global-cooperation-by-richard-n--haass [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Haas, R. N. (2013) What International Community? [online] Prague and New York: Project Syndicate. Available from: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-broken-tools-of-global-cooperation-by-richard-n--haass [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Habermas, J. (1992) Further Reflections on the Public Sphere. In: Calhoun, J. (ed.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere.* Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Hagmann, T. and Péclard, T. (2010) Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa. *Development and Change,* 41(4) 539-562.

Hammersley, M (1989) The Dilemma of Qualitative Method. London: Routledge.

Hann, C. (1996) Introduction: Political Society and Civil Anthropology. In: Hann, C. and Dunn, E. (eds.) C*ivil Society: Challenging Western Models.* London: Routledge.
Hann, C. and Dunn, E. (eds.) (1996) C*ivil Society: Challenging Western Models.* London: Routledge.

Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2001) Response. *Rethinking Marxism*, 13(3-4) 236-243.

Harvey, D. (2003) *The New Imperialism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harvey, D. (2007) Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 610 21-44.

Heathershaw, J. (2008) Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Disources. *Millennium Journal of International Studies,* 36(3) 597-621.

Hehir, A. (2006) Autonomous province building: identification theory and the failure of UNMIK. *International Peacekeeping*, 13(2) 200-213.

Hehir, A. (2007) Determining Kosovo's final status: the viability of ongoing administration. *Civil Wars*, 9(3) 243-261.

Hehir, A. (2009) Intervention and statebuilding in Kosovo. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3(2) 135-142.

Hehir, A. (ed.) (2010) *Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding: The International Community and the Transition to Independence.* London: Routledge.

Hehir, J. B. (2002) The Limits of Loyalty. *Foreign Policy,* 123(Sep. - Oct.) 38-39.

Heinrich Böll Stiftung (2014) *"They are our future!" – Kabul's young generation*. [online] Kabul: Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Available from: http://af.boell.org/2014/04/20/they-are-our-future-kabuls-young-generation [Accessed: 15/07/2014].

Herring, E. and Rangwala, G. (2006) *Iraq in Fragments. The Occupation and Its Legacy.* London: Hurst and Company.

Hechter, M. (2000) *Containing Nationalism.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Hewad, G. and Johnson, G. C. (2014[online] Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Available from: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR344-A-Rough-Guide-to-Afghan-Youth-Politics.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Hilhorst, D. (2003) *The Real World of NGOs: Discourses, Diversity and Development.* London: Zed Books.

Hippler, J. (2004) Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building – Terminology and Political Concepts. In: Hippler, J. (ed.) *Nation-building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation?* London: Pluto Press.
Hobsbawn, E. J. (1990) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobson, C. and Kurki, M. (eds) (2012) *The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Hodes, C. and Sedra, M. (2007) *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Holohan, A. (2005) *Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Howard, M. M. (2003) *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huffington Post (2014) *Sonia Iqbal: 'We Have Not Planned for Economic Recession, But It Is Sitting on Our Doorstep*. [online] New York: Huffington Post. Available from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/unveiling-afghanistan/sonia-iqbal-we-have-not-p_b_5266762.html [Accessed: 15/07/2014].

Human Rights Watch (2007) *Better Late Than Never - Enhancing the Accountability of International Institutions in Kosovo*. [online] New York: Human Rights Watch. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/06/14/better-late-never/enhancing-accountability-international-institutions-kosovo [Accessed: 28/09/2016].

Hunter, R. E. (2006) *The EU should put up or shut up in Afghanistan*. [online] Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Available from: http://www.rand.org/blog/2006/11/the-eu-should-put-up-or-shut-up-in-afghanistan.html [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Huntington, S. P. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century.* Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.

Hyseni, Y., Duri, I. and Haskuka, M. (2006) *Early Warning Report Kosovo – Report # 15*. [online] USA: USAID. Available from: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadk243.pdf. [Accessed: 28/07/16].

Hyseni, Y., Duri, I. and Haskuka, M. (2007a) *Early Warning Report Kosovo – Report # 16*. [online] USA: USAID. Available from: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadk244.pdf. [Accessed: 28/07/16].

Hyseni, Y., Duri, I. and Haskuka, M. (2007b) *Early Warning Report Kosovo – Report # 17*. [online] USA: USAID. Available from: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadk245.pdf [Accessed: 28/07/2016].

ICG (2001) *Kosovo: Landmark Election.* [online] Pristina and Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available from: https://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/world/europe/south_east_europe/kosovo/KosovoLandmarkElection.pdf [Accessed 09/09/2016].
ICG (2002) *The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and Perils*. [online] Kabul and Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available from: https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/4234/uploads [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

ICG (2003) *Afghanistan's Flawed Constitutional Process*. [online] Kabul and Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available from: http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5886~v~Afghanistan_s_Flawed_Constitutional_Process.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

ICG (2004) *Collapse in Kosovo - Europe Report No. 155*. [online] Pristina and Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo/155-collapse-in-kosovo.aspx [Accessed 09/04/2014].

IDEA (2011) *Voter turnout data for Afghanistan*. [online] Strömsborg: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Available from: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=4 [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Ignatieff, M. (1993) *Blood and belonging: Journeys into the new nationalism.* London: BBC Books and Chatto & Windus.

Igoe, J. (2003) Scaling up Civil Society: Donor Money, NGOs and the Pastoralist Land Rights Movement in Tanzania. *Development and Change*, 34(5) 863-885.

IKS (2011) *Reconstruction national integrity system survey Kosovo.* Pristina: Kosovar Stability Initiative.

INDEP (2014) *Cooperation Between Government of Kosovo and Civil Society Becomes Electronic*. [online] Pristina: Institute for Development Policy. Available from: http://www.indep.info/?id=5,0,0,1,e,154 [Accessed 09/09/2016].

IRIN (2002) *Focus on women emerging from the shadow of the Taliban*. [online] Kabul: Integrated Regional Information Networks. Available from: http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2002/03/07/focus-women-emerging-shadow-taliban [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Isakhan, B. (2006) Read All about It: The Free Press, the Public Sphere and Democracy in Iraq. *Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies,* 8(1-2) 119-54.

Isakhan, B. (2008) The Post-Saddam Iraqi Media: Reporting the Democratic Developments of 2005. *Global Media Journal,* 7(13).

Isakhan, B. (2009) *The Streets of Iraq: protests, the Public Sphere and Democracy*. [online] Multiple Locations: Griffith University. Available from: https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/bitstream/handle/10072/31827/59767_1.pdf?sequence=1 [Assessed: 22/10/2017].

Isakhan, B. (2012) *Democracy in Iraq: History, Politics, Discourse*. London: Ashgate.

Isakhan, B. (ed.) (2015) *The Legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 War to the 'Islamic State'*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Ivanou, A. (2010) "Tagenka 3" Group: An Instance of Local Urban Activism in Moscow. In Jacobsson, K. and Saxonberg, S. (eds.) Beyond NGO-ization: *The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe.* London and New York: Routledge.

Jackson, R. (1990) States and Quasi-states. In: Jackson, R. H. (ed.) *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jacobsson, K. (2012) Fragmentation of the collective action space: The animal rights movement in Poland. *East European Politics,* 28(4) 353-70.

Jacobsson, K. and Saxonberg, S. (eds.) *(2013) Beyond NGO-ization: The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Jacques, M. (2006) What the hell is the international community? [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/24/whatthehellistheinternati [Accessed: 10/02/2015].

Jaggers, K. and Gurr, T. R. (1995) Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data. *Journal of Peace Research,* 32(4) 469-482.

James, P. and van Seters, P. (eds.) (2014) *Globalization and Politics - Volume II: Global Social Movements and Global Civil Society.* London: Sage.

Jasper, J. M. (2004) A Strategic Approach to Collective Action: Looking for Agency in Social Movement Choices. *Mobilization,* 9(1) 1-16.

Jasper, J. M. (2006) *Getting Your Way: strategic Dilemmas in the Real World.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jasper, J. M., Moran, K. and Tramontano, M. (2015) Strategy. In: della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (eds.) *Oxford Handbook on Social Movements.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jenkins, C. and Perrow, C. (1977) The Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Workers' Movements (1946-1972). *American Sociological Review,* 42(2) 249-68.

Jenkins, J. C. (1981) Sociopolitical Movements. In: Long, S. L. (ed.) *Handbook of Political Behaviour, volume 4.* New York: Plenum Publishers.

Jenne, E. K. (2009) The Paradox of Ethnic Partition: Lessons from De Facto Partition in Bosnia and Kosovo. *Regional & Federal Studies,* 19(2) 273-289.

Johnson, R. (2013) War Amongst the People. In Richards, C. and Stewart, J. (eds.) *Afghanistan Revealed: Beyond the Headlines*. London: Frontline Books, 142-169.

Johnston, H. (2012) *States and Social Movements.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jones, B. and Elgin-Cossart, M. (2011) Development in the shadow of violence: A knowledge agenda for policy 2011. *Report on the future of investment in evidence on issues of fragility, security and conflict.* Ottawa: International Development Research Council.

Jones, L. (2010) (Post-)Colonial State-building and state failure in East Timor: bringing social conflict back in. *Conflict, Security & Development,* 10(4) 547-575.

Judah, T. (2008) *Kosovo: the era of the EU protectorate dawns.* [online] Paris and Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies. Available from: http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/kosovo-the-era-of-the-eu-protectorate-dawns/. [Accessed 03/03/2015].

Juhasz, A. (2006) *The Bush Agenda. Invading the World, One Economy at a Time.* London: Duckworth.

Kaidanow, T. (2007a) *Kosovo: "Self-determination movement" protest turns deadly.* [online] Unknown location: Wikileaks. Available from: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07PRISTINA112_a.html [Accessed: 04/04/2014].

Kaidanow, T. (2007b) *Kosovo: Albin Kurti indicted for february 10 riot, but then released to house arrest.* [online] Unknown location: Wikileaks. Available from: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07PRISTINA453_a.html [Accessed: 04/04/2014].

Kaidanow, T. (2009a) *Kosovo/Eulex: At full operating capability, but not without problems.* [online] No location: Wikileaks. Available from: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09PRISTINA148_a.html [Accessed: 04/04/2014].

Kaidanow, T. (2009b*) Scenesetter for the visit of Kosovo President Sejdiu and Prime Minister Thaci to Washington, February 26, 2008* [online] No location: Wikileaks. Available from: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09PRISTINA77_a.html [Accessed: 04/04/2014].

Kaldor, M. (2003) The idea of global civil society. *International Affairs,* 79(3) 583-593.

Kaldor, M. (2006) *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd edition*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kaldor, M. (2013) *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, 3rd edition.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kallaba, P. (2010) *Power-Sharing, Decentralization and the Institutional Paradox: A Critical Assessment of the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo.* Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Kampfner, J. (2003) *Blair's Wars.* London: Free Press.

Kane, M. D. (2003) Social Movement Policy Success: Decriminalizing State Sodomy Laws, 1969-1998. *Mobilization,* 8(3) 313-334.

Kaplan, R. (1993) *Balkan ghosts: A journey through history.* New York: St Martin's Press.

Karides, M., Smith, J. and Becker, M. (eds.) (2008) *Global democracy and the World Social Forums*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.

Karpat, C. (2006) *Albin Kurti: the youthful symbol of non-violence*. [online] No location: AIA Balkanian Section. Available from: http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=618 [Accessed: 04/04/2014].

Karnow, S. (1989) *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines.* New York: Random House.

Kasfir, N. (1998) Civil Society, the State, and Democracy in Africa. *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* 36(2) 123-149.

Katzman, K. (2006) *Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government - CRS Report for Congress*. [online] Washington: Congressional Research Service. Available from: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67158.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Kaufman, J. and Williams, K. (2010) *Women and war. Gender identity and activism in times of conflict*. Sterling: Kumarian.

Kaufman, J. P. (2002) *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Kazemi, S. R. (2012) *The Afghanistan 1400 Movement: Changing Youth Politics in Afghanistan?* [online] Afghanistan: Afghanistan Analysts Network. Available from: http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-afghanistan-1400-movement-changing-youth-politics-in-afghanistan/ [Accessed: 15/07/2014].

KCSF (n.d. a) *Civil Society Background*. [online] Pristina: Kosovar Civil Society Foundation. Available from: http://www.kcsfoundation.org/?page=2,106#.V2GiHo5U6V4 [Accessed 09/09/2016].

KCSF (n.d. b) *Basic Legal Framework for Civil Society*. [online] Pristina: Kosovar Civil Society Foundation. Available from: http://www.kcsfoundation.org/?page=2,117#.V2GxoI5U6V4 [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kelmendi, P. (2012) Civil Society and Contentious Politics in Post-Conflict Kosovo. In: Agani, M. (ed.) *Civil Society in Kosovo since 1999.* Pristina: Centre for Political Courage.

Ker-Lindsay, J. (2009) *Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Kerr Chiovenda, M. (2014) The illumination of marginality: how ethnic Hazaras in Bamyan, Afghanistan, perceive the lack of electricity as discrimination. *Central Asian Survey,* 33(4) 449-462.

Khan, K. (2013) The Pashtuns. In Richards, C. and Stewart, J. (eds.) *Afghanistan Revealed: Beyond the Headlines*. London: Frontline Books, 84-106.

Kiely, R. (2005) *Empire in the Age of Globalisation. US Hegemony and Neoliberal Disorder.* London: Pluto Press.

King, I. and Mason, W. (2006) *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

KIPRED (2012) *Strengthening Statehood of Kosovo through the Democratization of Political Parties*. Pristina: Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development.

Kirkpatrick, J. J. (2002) The Shackles of Consensus. *Foreign Policy,* 123(Sep. - Oct.) 36-37.

Kirmani, N. (2008) *The relationships between social movements and religion in processes of social change: A preliminary literature review*. Brimingham: University of Birmingham, Religions and Development Research Programme.

Kitschelt, H. P. (1986) Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science,* 16(1) 57-85.

Klandermans, B. (1984) Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory. *American Sociological Review* 49(5) 583-600.

Knudsen, T. B. and Lautsen, C. B. (2006) *Kosovo between War and Peace: Nationalism, Peacebuilding and International Trusteeship*. London: Routledge.

Kohn, K. (1958) *The idea of nationalism.* New York: Macmillan.

Kola, P. (2003) *The Search for Greater Albania.* London: Jurst.

Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (2010) *The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M. and Passy, F. (2005) *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kopecký, P. and Mudde, C. (2003) *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe.* London: Routledge.

Kostić, R. (2007) *Ambivalent Peace: External Peacebuilding, Threatened Identity and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

Kostić, R., Krampe, F. and Swain, A. (2012) Liberal State-Building and Environmental Security: The International Community Between Trade-Off and Carelessness. In: Amer, R., Swain, A. and Öjendal, J.

(eds.) *The Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development.* London, New York and Delhi: Anthem Press.

Kostovicova, D. (2005) *Kosovo: the politics of identity and space.* London: Routledge.

Kostovicova, D. (2008) Legitimacy and International Administration: The Ahtisaari Settlement or Kosovo from a Human Security Perspective. *International Peacekeeping* 15(5) 631-647.

Kothari, R. (1987) On Humane Governance. *Alternatives,* (12)3 277-290.

Krebs, R. R. and Rapport, A. (2012) International Relations and the Psychology of Time Horizons. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(3) 530–543.

Kriesi, H., della Porta, D. and Rucht, D. (2009) *Social Movements against corporate globalization.* Durham: Duke University Press.

Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W. and Giugni, M. (1995) *New Social Movements in Western Europe.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kriesi, H., Lavenex, S., Esser, F., Matthes, J., Bulhmann, M. and Bochsler, D. (2013) *Democracy in The Age of Globalization and Mediatization.* Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kurki, M. (2013) *Democratic Futures: Revisioning Democracy Promotion*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Kurti, A. (2011) JISB Interview: Kosova in Dependence: From Stability of Crisis to the Crisis of Stability. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 5(1) 89-97.

Kurzman, C. (1996) Structural Opportunities and Perceived Opportunities in Social-Movement Theory: Evidence from the Iranian Revolution of 1979. *American Sociological Review*, 61(1) 153-79.

Kurzman, C. (1998) Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement Mobilization: A Comparative Analysis of Four Religious Movement. *Mobilization: An International Journal,* 3(1) 23-49.

Kuzio, T. (2001) Nationalizing states or nation-building: Critical view of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence. *Nations and Nationalism,* 7(2) 135-154.

Kymlicka, W. (2001) *Politics in the vernacular: Nationalism, multiculturalism, and citizenship,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

LA Times (2007) *General wants more troops in Afghanistan*. [online] Los Angeles: Los Angeles Times. Available from: http://articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/09/world/fg-afghan9 [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Ladbury, S. and Khan, S. (2008) *Increased religiosity among women in Muslim majority countries*. London: Social Development Direct/Governance and Social Development Resource Centre.

Lahusen, C. (1999) International Campaigns in Context: Collective Action between the Local and the Global. In: della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. and Rucht, D. (eds.) *Social Movements in a Globalizing World.* New York: Macmillan Press.

Lake, A. (1994) *Dialogue: The Reach of Democracy; Tying Power To Diplomacy*. [online] New York: The New York Times. Available from: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D07E3D7143AF930A1575AC0A962958260 [Accessed 20/09/2016].

Landler, M. (2016) *Obama Says He Will Keep More Troops in Afghanistan Than Planned*. New York: The New York Times. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/world/asia/obama-afghanistan-troops.html?_r=0 [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Langrish, J. (1993) Case studies as biological research process, *Design Studies,* 14(4) 357-364.

Laremont, R. R. (ed.) *Borders, nationalism and the African State.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Le Billon, P. (2008) Corrupting Peace? Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Corruption. *International Peacekeeping,* 15(3) 344-61.

Lemay-Hébert, N. (2009) State-Building From the Outside-In: UNMIK and its Paradox. *Journal of Public and International Affairs,* 20(1) 65-86.

Lemay-Hébert, N. (2013) Everyday Legitimacy and International Administration: Global Governance and Local Legitimacy in Kosovo. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 7(1) 87-104.

Lewis, D. (2002) Civil Society in African Contexts. Reflections on the Usefulness of a Concept. *Development and Change,* 33(4) 569-586.

Lewis, P. (2010) *Former US diplomat backs Albanian nationalist in Kosovo elections*. [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/12/former-diplomat-backs-albanian-nationalist [Accessed: 17/04/14].

Lewis, P., Marzouk, L., Collaku, P. and Rusi, E. (2014) *US ambassador to Kosovo hired by construction firm he lobbied for.* [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/us-ambassador-kosovo-construction-contract-firm-highway [Accessed 10/10/2014].

Lieske, J. A. (1978) The Conditions of Racial Violence in American Cities: A Developmental Synthesis. *American Political Science Review,* 72(4) 1324-1340.

Likmeta, B. (2010) Poll Reveals Support for 'Greater Albania' [online] Unknown location: Balkan Insight. Available from: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/survey-greater-albania-remains-popular [Accessed: 30/09/2017].

Lindberg, S. I. (ed.) (2009) *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Lindberg, T. (2014) Making Sense of the "International Community" [Working Paper]. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A. (1996) *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press

Lister, S. (2007) *Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan [Crisis States Research Centre Working Paper No. 14]*. [online] London: London School of Economics. Available from: http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp142.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Lockhart, C. (2012) *Next Generation Afghanistan*. [online] Stanford: Hoover Institution - Stanford University. Available from: http://www.hoover.org/research/next-generation-afghanistan [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Lowery, D. (2013) Lobbying influence: Meaning, measurement and missing. *Interest Groups and Advocacy,* 2(1) 1-26.

Loyn, D. (2008) *Butcher and Bolt: Two Hundred Years of Foreign Engagement in Afghanistan.* London: Hutchinson.

Luci, B. (2013) *Letter from the editor*. [online] Pristina: Kosovo 2.0. Available from: http://www.kosovotwopointzero.com/en/article/453/letter-from-the-editor [Accessed 23/09/2016].

Lynch, C. (2013) Neoliberal Ethics, the Humanitarian International, and Practices of Peacebuilding. In: Smith, J. and Verdeja, E. (eds.) *Globalization, Social Movements, and Peacebuilding.* Syracuse : Syracuse University Press.

Lyons, T. (2002) *Post conflict elections, war termination, democratization, and demilitarizing politics, Working Paper*. Arlington VA: George Mason University Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

MacAskill, E. (2009) *Obama administration to continue to push for chief executive in Afghanistan*. [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/19/obama-chief-executive-afghanistan [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

MacFarlane, N. S. (2005) *Intervention in Contemporary Politics.* London: Routledge.

Mac Ginty, R. (2006) *No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mac Ginty, R. and Richmond, O. (2013) The Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A Critical Agenda for Peace. *Third World Quarterly,* 34(5) 763-783.

Mainwaring, S. and Pérez-Liñan, A. (2009) *International factors and regime change in Latin America, 1945-2005.* Paper presented at the 67th Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2-5, in Chicago. [online] Chicago: SSRN The Guardian. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/Sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1449044 [Accessed: 28/09/2017].

Malcolm, N. (1999) *Kosovo: A Short History.* New York: New York University Press.

Maley, W. (2002) *The Wars in Afghanistan*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave

Mandelbaum, M. (2002) *The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century.* New York: Public Affairs.

Mann, M. (1993) *The Sources of Social Power - Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2013) *The Sources of Social Power* - Volume IV: Globalizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mansbridge, J. (1996) Reconstructing Democracy. In: Hirschmann, N. J. and di Stefano, C. (eds.) *Revisioning the Political: Feminist Reconstructions of Traditional Concepts in Western Political Theory.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Mansfield, E. and Synder, J. (2005) *Electing to fight.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Mansfield, E. and Synder, J. (2007) The Sequencing "fallacy". *Journal of Democracy,* 18(3) 5-10.

Marenin, O. (1998) The Goal of Democracy in International Police Assistance Programs. *Policing* 21(1) 159-177.

Marks, G. and McAdam, D. (1996) Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union. In Marks, G., Scharpf, F. W., Schmitter, P. C. and Streeck, W. *Governance in the European Union.* London: Sage Publications.

Marks, G, and McAdam, D. (2009) On the Relationship of Political Opportunities to the Form of Collective Action: the case of the European Union. In: Della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. and Ruchts, D. (eds.) *Social movements in a globalizing world.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Marsh, S. and Mackenstein, H. (2005) *The International Relations of the EU.* London: Routledge.

Marshall, C. and Rossman, G. B. (1999) *Designing Qualitative Research, 3rd edition.* London: Sage Publications.

Marten, K. (2006) Warlordism in Comparative Perspective. *International Security,* 31(3) 41-73.

Martin, B. (1989) Gene Sharp's Theory of Power. *Journal of Peace Research,* 26(2) 213-22.

Martini, M. (2014) *Kosovo: Overview of Political Corruption in Kosovo.* [online] Berlin: Transparency International. Available from: http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Kosovo_Overview_of_political_corruption_2014.pdf

Marton, P. and Hynek, N. (2013) 'Liberal' statebuilding in Afghanistan. In Chandler, D. and Sisk, T. D. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding.* London and New York: Routledge.

Marx, G. T. (1979) External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Some Patterns, Explanations, Outcomes, and Complications. In: Zald, M. and McCarthy, J. (eds.) *The Dynamics of Social Movements.* New York: Winthrop Publishers. Also available online from: http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/movement.html [Accessed: 26/09/2016].

Masden, S. T. (1997) Between People and the State: NGOs as Troubleshoorters and Innovators. In: Lindberg, S. and A. Sverrison (eds) *Social Movements in Development: The Challenge of Globalization and Democratization.* Houndmills and London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mason, J. (2002) *Qualitative Researching, 2nd edition.* London: Sage Publications.

Mauss, A. L. (1975) *Social Problems of Social Movements*. Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Mayall, J. and de Oliveira, R. S. (2011) Introduction. In Mayall, J. and de Oliveira R. S. (eds.) *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States*. London: Hurst and Company.

McAdam, D. (1982) *Political Process the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, D. (1996) Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions. In: McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. (eds.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, D. and Su, Y. (2002) The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973. *American Sociological Review,* 67(5) 696-721.

McAdam, D. Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C. (2001) *The Dynamics of Contention.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McCammon, H., Campbell, K., Granberg, E. and Mowery, C. (2001) How Movements Win: Gendered Opportunity Structures and U.S. Women's Suffrage Movements 1866 to 1919. *American Sociological Review*, 66(1) 47-70.

McCammon, H. J., Campbell, K. E., Granberg, E. M. and Mowery, C. (2001) How Movements Win: Gendered Opportunity Structures and U.S. Women's Movements, 1866 to 1919. *American Sociological Review,* 66(1) 49-70.

McCool, C. (2004) *The Role of the Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization: Case Study Afghanistan*. [online] Strömsborg: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Available from: http://www.idea.int/cbp/upload/AFGfinalpaper.pdf [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

McKinna, A. (2012a) *The Vetevendosje Movement in Kosovo: An Increasing Focus on Nationalism*. [online] Unknown location: Balkanalysis.com. Available from: http://www.balkanalysis.com/kosovo/2012/02/22/the-vetevendosje-movement-in-kosovo-an-increasing-focus-on-nationalism/ [Accessed: 22/10/2017].

McKinna, A. (2012b). Kosovo: The International Community's European Project. *European Review,* 20(1) 10-22.

McMahon, P. and Western, J. (2010) *The International Community and Statebuilding: Getting its Act Together.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Mendelson, S. E. and Glenn, J. K. (eds.) (2002) *The Power and Limits of NGOs: A critical look at building democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mercer, C. (2007) NGOs, civil society and democratization: a critical review of the literature. *Progress in Development Studies*, 2(1) 5-22.

Mertus, J. A. (1999) *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Meyer, D. S. (2004) Protest and Political Opportunities. *Annual Review of Sociology,* 30 125-145.

Meyer, D. S. and Minkoff, D. C. (2004) Conceptualizing Political Opportunity. *Social Forces*, 82(4) 1457-1492.

Meyer, D. S. and Staggenborg S. (2007) *Thinking about Srategy [Paper Prepared for delivery at American Sociological Association, Collective Behavior/Social Movement Section's Workshop, "Movement Cultures, Strategies, and Outcomes].* [online] New York: Hofsra University. Available from: http://www.hofstra.edu/pdf/cbsm_plenary_3.pdf [Accessed: 20/09/2016].

Meyer, D. S. and Staggenborg, S. (1996) Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity. *The American Journal of Sociology,* 101(6) 1628-1660.

Migdal, J. (2001) Why do so Many States Stay Intact? In: Migdal, J. S. (ed.) *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mitra, D. (2016) *In Search for Power, Afghanistan's Hazara Community Vows to Fight On*. [online] No location: The Wire. Available from: https://thewire.in/63492/search-power-afghanistans-hazara-community-vows-fight/ [Accessed: 20/10/2017].

Mochizuki, K. (2009) Opposition movements and the youth in Nigeria's oil-producing area: an inquiry into framing. In: Shigetomi, S. and Makino, K. (eds.) *Protest and social movements in the developing world*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Molyneux, M. (2002) Gender and the Silences of Social Capital: Lessons from Latin America. *Development and Change,* 33(2) 167-188.

Montanaro, L. (2009) *The Kosovo statebuilding conundrum: addressing fragility in a contested state – FRIDE Working Paper No. 91*. Madrid: FRIDE.

Monten, J. (2014) Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 656(1) 173-191.

Morales-Gamboa, A. and Baranyi, S. (2005) State-building, National Leadership and "Relative Success" in Costa Rica. In: Chesterman, S., Ignatieff, M. and Thakur, R. (eds.) *Making State Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance.* Geneva: United Nations University Press.

Morgan Edwards, L. (2010) State-building in Afghanistan: a case showing the limits*? International Review of the Red Cross*, 92(880) 1-25.

Morgan, C. (2008) *Afghanistan: The status of women*. [online] Ottawa: Canadian Library of Parliament. Available from: http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0734-e.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Morina, D. Balkan Insight (2015) *Opposition MP Sets Off Tear Gas in Kosovo Parliament*. [online] Unknown location: Balkan Insight. Available from: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/opposition-mp-release-tear-gas-in-kosovo-parliament-08-09-2016 [Accessed: 28/09/2016].

Morris, A. D. and Herring, C. (1987) Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical Review. *Annual Review of Political Science,* 2 137-198.

Mulaj, K. (2011) The problematic legitimacy of international-led statebuilding: Challenges of uniting international and local interests in post-conflict Kosovo. *Contemporary Politics,* 17(3) 241-256.

Muller, E. N. and Opp, K. (1986) Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action. *American Political Science Review,* 80(2) 471-487.

Muller, E. N., Dietz, H.A. and Finkel, S. E. (1991) Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion - The case of Peru. *American Political Science Review,* 85(4) 1261-1282.

Munck, G. L. (2007) “Democracy studies”: Agendas, findings, challenges. In Berg-Schlosser, D. (ed.) *Democratization: The state of the art*. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers.

Muro, D. (2015) Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Social Movements. In: della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nambiar, S. (2000) India: An Uneasy Precedent. In: Schnabel, A. and Thakur, R. (eds.) *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship.* Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Narten, J. (2008) Post-conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Dynamics of External-Local Interaction in Kosovo under United Nations Administration. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 2(3) 369-390.

Narten, J. (2009) Dilemmas of Promoting Local Ownership: State Building in Post-war Kosovo. In: Paris, A. and Sisk, T. D. (eds) *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations.* London: Routledge.

NATO (2006) *The Afghanistan Compact - Building on success: the London Conference on Afghanistan*. [online] Multiple locations: NATO. Available from: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

NATO (2015) *A new chapter in NATO-Afghanistan relations from 2015.* [online] Multiple locations: NATO. Available from: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_06/20150622_1506-media-bckgr-afghanistan.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

NATO (2016) *NATO and Afghanistan*. [online] Multiple locations: NATO. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

NDI (2011) *Political Parties in Afghanistan: A Review of the State of Political Parties after the 2009 and 2010 Elections*. [online] Washington: National Democratic Institute. Available from: https://www.ndi.org/files/Afghanistan-political-parties-july-2011.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Neumann, R. E. (2015) *Failed Relations between Hamid Karzai and the United States: What Can We Learn?* [online] Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Available from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR373-Failed-Relations-between-Hamid-Karzai-and-the-United-States.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Newman, E. and Rich, R. (eds.) (2004) *The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality.* Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Newman, E. and Richmond, O. (2006) *Challenges to peacebuilding: Managing spoilers during conflict resolution* Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press.

Nield, R. (2001) Democratic Police Reforms in War-Torn Societies. *Conflict Security and Development,* 1(1) 21-43.

Nijat, A. (2014) *Governance in Afghanistan: An Introduction - Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Issue Paper.* [online] Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Available from: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1402E-GOVERNANCE%20IN%20AFGHANISTAN.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Nikolic, J. (2014) *How young activists are changing Afghanistan*. [online] Kabul: Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Available from: http://www.boell.de/en/2014/04/04/how-young-activists-are-changing-afghanistan [Accessed: 14/07/2014].

Nordland, R. and Gladstone, R. (2014) *Afghanistan Defends Expulsion of a Times Reporter*. [online] New York: The New York Times. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/22/world/asia/afghanistan-matthew-rosenberg-expelled.html [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Norris, P. (2006) *Political protest in fragile states.* Paper for the International Political Science Association World Congress, Fukuoka.

Noutcheva, G. (2012) *European Foreign Policy and the challenges of Balkan Accession: Conditionality, legitimacy and compliance*. London: Routledge.

NPR (2013) *Afghanistan's Next Generation Wants Taliban Held Accountable.* [online] Washington: National Public Radio. Available from: http://www.npr.org/2013/07/01/197525609/afghanistans-next-generation-wants-to-hold-taliban-accountable [Accessed: 27/07/2014].

Nuscheler, F. (2003) *Civil-Society Actors: A Democratic Corrective for International Organizations?* Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P.C. and Whitehead, L. (eds.) (1986), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy.* Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

O'Neill, W. G. (2002) *Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Obi, C. (2005) *Environmental movements in sub-Saharan Africa. A political ecology of power and conflict. [Civil society and social movements programme paper no. 15]*. Geneva: UNRISD.

OECD/DAC (2008) *State building in situations of fragility: Initial findings*. Paris: OECD/DAC Publishing.

OECD (2009) *Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness. Findings, Recommendations and Good Practice - Publication Series: Better Aid.* Paris: OECD Publishing.

Offe, C. (1997) Micro Aspects of Democratic Theory: What Makes for the Deliberative Competence of Citizens? In Hadenius, A. (ed.) *Democracy's Victory and Crisis.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ogata, S. (2002) Guilty Parties. *Foreign Policy,* 123(Sep. - Oct.) 39-40.

Oliver, P. (1989) Bringing the Crowd Bank In: The Nonorganizational Elements of Social Movements. In Kriesberg, L. (ed.) *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* - Volume 10. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Olzak, S. (2006) Ethnic, Racial, and Nationalist Social Movements. In Spitzer, G. (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Sociology.* Malden*:* Blackwell Publishers.

Oosterom, M. (2009) *Fragility at the local level. Challenges to building local state-citizen relations in fragile settings. [Paper prepared for the workshop 'Local Governance in Fragile settings']*. [online] The Hague: Hivos – People Unlimited. Available from: https://www.hivos.org/sites/default/files/publications/fragilityatlocallevelworkingpapernovember2009.pdf [Accessed: 20/09/2016].

Opp, K. (1988) Community Integration and Incentives for Political Protest. *International Social Movement Research,* 1 83-101.

Opp, K. (1994) Repression and Revolutionary Action: East Germany in 1989. *Rationality and Society,* 6(1) 101-138.

Opp, K. and Gern, C. (1993) Dissident Groups, Personal Networks, and Spontaneous Cooperation: The East German Revolution of 1989. *American Sociological Review,* 58 659-680.

Opp, K. and Ruehl, W. (1990) Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest. *Social Forces,* 69(2) 521-547.

Osa, M. and Corduneanu-Huci, C. (2003) Running Uphill: Political Opportunity in Non-democracies*. Comparative Sociology*, 2(4) 605-629.

OSCE (2001) *Who we are*. [online] Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Available from : http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/central-election-commission-approves-certification-requirements-2001elections [Accessed 20/09/2016].

OSCE (2016) [online] *Rule of Law*. [online] Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Available from : http://www.osce.org/kosovo/105101 [Accessed 20/09/2016].

Oschliess, W. (2006) *Albin Kurti: Mit wohlbekannten Methoden auf dem Weg nach Großalbanien*. [online] Altomünster: Eurasisches Magazin. Available from: http://www.eurasischesmagazin.de/artikel/Albin-Kurti-Mit-wohlbekannten-Methoden-auf-dem-Weg-nach-Grosz-Albanien/20060705 [Accessed: 28/07/2016].

Ottaway, M. (2002) Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States. *Development and Change*, 33(5) 1001-1023.

Paffenholz, T. (2009) *Civil society and peacebuilding. Summary of results for a comparative research project.* Geneva: Centre on Conflict Development and Peacebuilding.

Panel on UN Peace Operations (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [A/55/305 -S/2000/809] New York: General Assembly of The UN. Available from: http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Papadimitriou, D., Petrov, P. and Greiçevci, L. (2007) To Build a State: Europeanization, EU Actorness and State-Building in Kosovo. *European Foreign Affairs Review,* 12(2) 219-238.

Paris, R. (2004) *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Paris, R., (2006) *Understanding the 'Co-ordination Problem' in Post-war State-building [RPPS Working Paper]*. [online] No location: state-building.org http://state-building.org/resources/Paris_RPPS_October2006.pdf [Accessed: 01/05/2014].

Parks, L. (2015) *Social Movement Campaigns on EU Policy: In the Corridors and in the Streets.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Passy, F. (1999) Supranational Political Opportunities as a Channel of Globalization of Political Conflicts: The Case of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In: Della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. and Rucht, D. (eds.) *Social Movements in a Globalizing World.* New York: Macmillan Press.

Paulus, A. (2003) The Influence of the United States on the Concept of the 'International Community'. In Byers, M. and Nolte, G. (eds.) *United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pegasus (2016) *Youth Unemployment in Afghanistan*. [online] Spain: Pegasus – Youth Unemployment Project. Available from: http://www.youthemploymentdecade.org/en/repor/youth-unemployment-afganistan/ [Accessed: 25/09/2016].

Peled, D. (2010) *Afghan Women's Fragile Gains Face Threat*. [online] Multiple locations: Institute for War & Peace Reporting. Available from: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/afghan-womens-fragile-gains-face-threat [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Perito, R. M. (2005) *The U.S Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*. [online] Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Available from: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr152.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Petras, J. (1997) Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America. *Monthly Review,* 49(7) 10-27.

Petras, J. and Veltmeyer, H. (2011) *Social Movements in Latin America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pevehouse, J. C. (2005) *Democracy From Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pfaff, W. (1993) *The wrath of nations: Civilization and the furies of nationalism.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Phillips, D. (2012) *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and US Intervention.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Piotrowski, G. (2009) Civil and/or "uncivil" society? The development of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe in the context of political transformation during the post-socialist period. *Interface,* 1(2)166-189.

Piven, F. F. and Cloward, R. A. (1977) *Poor People's Movements.* New York: Pantheon.

Popolo, D. (2011) *A New Science of International Relations: Modernity, Complexity and the Kosovo Conflict.* Surrey: Ashgate.

Potter, D. (1997) Explaining Democratization. In: Potter, D., Goldblatt, D., Kiloh, M. and Lewis, P. (eds) *Democratization*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Pouligny, B. (2005) Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building "New" Societies. *Security Dialogue,* 36(4) 495-510.

Povey, T. (2015) *Social Movements in Egypt and Iran*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Press, R. (2010) "Guided by the hand of God": Liberian women peacemakers and civil war. *The review of faith and international affairs*. 8(1) 23-29.

Pridham, G. (2005) *Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pridham, G., Herring, E. and Sanford, G. (eds) (1997) *Building Democracy: The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe, Revised edition*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Przeworski, A. (1991) *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pugh, M. (2006) Crime and Capitalism in Kosovo's Transformation. In: Knudsen, T. B. and Bagge, C. (eds.) *Kosovo between War and Peace: Nationalism, Peacebuilding and International Trusteeship.* London: Routledge.

Pula, B. (2005) *A Changing Society, A Changing Civil Society: Kosovo's NGO Sector After the War. Second Edition.* [online] Pristina: Kosovar Institute for Policy and Research and Development. Available from:

http://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/A_Changing_Society,_A_Changing_Civil_Society_846905.pdf [Accessed 03/03/2015].

Quadagno, J. (1992) Social Movements and State Transformation: Labor Unions and Racial Conflict in the War on Poverty. *American Sociology Review,* 57(5) 616-634.

Rajagopal, B. (2003) *International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, and Third World Resistance.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rao, P. S. (2011) Concept of International Community. In: Fastenrath, U., Geiger, R., Khan, D., Paulus, A., von Schorlemer, S. and Vedder, C. (eds.) *From Bilateralism to Community Interest: essays in honour of Judge Bruno.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rashid, A. (2010) *Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Rashid, A. (2013) Afghan Endgame. In Richards, C. and Stewart, J. (eds.) *Afghanistan Revealed: Beyond the Headlines*. London: Frontline Books, 243-259.

Rasmussen, M. V. (2003) *The West, Civil Society, and the Construction of Peace*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Ray Steele, R. and Thier, J. A. (2007) *Hearts and Minds: Afghan Opinion on the Taliban, the Government and the International Forces*. [online] Washington: United States Institute for Peace. Available from: http://www.usip.org/publications/hearts-and-minds-afghan-opinion-the-taliban-the-government-and-the-international-forces [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Ray, A. K. (2011) India and the Challenges of New Protectorates. In: Mayall, J. and de Oliveira, R. S. (eds.) *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States*. London: Hurst and Company.

Reno, W. (2000) Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa. *Journal of International Affairs*, 53(2) 433-459.

Reuters (2016a) Afghanistan to hold delayed parliamentary elections in October. [online] London: Reuters. Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-election-idUSKCN0UW0Q6 [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Reuters (2016b) *NATO set to approve further support for Afghanistan*. [online] London: Reuters. Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-nato-idUSKCN0ZM0RY [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Review of African Political Economy (2010) *Special Issue: Social Movement Struggles in Africa,* 37(125).

Rice, C. (2005) *Remarks at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris – Sciences Po*. [online] Washington: US Department of State Archive. Available from: http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/41973.htm [Accessed 18/02/2015].

Richmond, O. P. (2005) *The Transformation of Peace.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Richter, J. (2002) Evaluating Western assistance to Russian women's organizations. In: Mendelson, S. E. and Glenn, J. K. (eds.) *The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.* New York: Colombia University Press.

Rosenberg, M. (2014) *Amid Election Impasse, Calls in Afghanistan for an Interim Government*. [online]. New York: The New York Times. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/world/asia/amid-election-impasse-calls-in-afghanistan-for-an-interim-government.html?_r=0 [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Royal Norwegian Embassy in Prishtina (2014) *Strengthening Civil Society Fun 2014*.

Rubin, B. (1995) *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Rubin, B. (2006) Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for Whose Security? *Third World Quarterly,* 27(1) 175-185.

Rubin, B. R. (2013) *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H. and Stephens, J. D. (1992) *Capitalist Development and Democracy.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Sajjad, T. and Härdig, A. C. (2016) Too many enemies: Mobilization, marginalization, and political violence [pre-print] Submitted to *Terrorism and Political Violence.* Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2015.1127807 [Accessed: 14/09/2016].

Salmon, J. and Anderson, C. (2013) Elites and statebuilding. In Chandler, D. and Sisk, T. D. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding.* London and New York: Routledge.

Sampson, S. (2002a) Beyond Transition: Rethinking Elite Configurations in the Balkans. In: Hann, C. and Dunn, E. (eds.) *Civil Society: Rethinking Western Models.* London: Routledge.

Sampson, S. (2002b) Trouble Spots: Projects, Bandits and State Fragmentation. In: Friedman, J. (ed.) *Globalisation, the State and Violence.* San Fancisco: Alta Mira Press.

Samuels, K. (2006) Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making. *Chicago Journal of International Law,* 6(2) 663-682.

Samuels, K. and von Esiedel, S. (2004) *The Future of UN State-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq*. [online] Vienna: International Peace Academy: http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/FUTURE_OF_UN_STATE_BUILDING.pdf [Accessed: 01/05/2014].

Sarhaddi Nelson, S. (2009) *James Carville Joins The Afghan Campaign Trail*. [online] Multiple locations: NPR. Available from: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=107006724 [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Schlaepfer, C., Rodrigues, V. and Moretti, S. (1994) Community development and social movements: an experience of solidarity and citizenship in Brazil, *Community Development,* 29(4) 329-336.

Schock, K. (1999) People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma. *Social Problems*, 46 (3) 355-375.

Schock, K. (2005) Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies. Mineapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Schwandner-Sievers, S. (2013) Democratisation through Defiance? The Albanian Civil Organisation 'Self-Determination' and International Supervision in Kosovo. In: Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V., Ker-Lindsay, J. and Kostovicova, D. (eds) *Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Scott, Z. (2007) Literature Review on State-Building. [online] Birmingham: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham. Available from: http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hd528.pdf [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Sedra, M. (2012) Finding Innovation in State-Building: Moving Beyond the Orthodox Liberal Model. *Prism,* 2(3) 47-62.

Seferiades, S. and Johnston, H. (eds.) (2012) *Violent Protest, Contentious Politics, and the Neoliberal State*, London and New York: Routledge.

Seifert, R. (2014) Nationalism and Beyond: Memory and Identity in Postwar Kosovo/Kosova. In: Kissane, B. (ed.) *After Civil War: Division, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Contemporary Europe.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

Sen, J. (2005) *On incivility and transnationality: towards alliances of critical hope*. Paper to IACS conference 'Emerging inter-Asian subjectivities in cultural movements'. [online] Delhi: CACIM - India Institute for Critical Action. Available from: http://www.cacim.net/twiki/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=58&page=1 [Accessed 30/09/2017].

Shet, D. L. (1987) Alternative Development as Political Practice. *Alternatives* 12(2) 155-171.

Shiva, V. (1989) *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development.* London: Zed Books.

Shrestha, C. and Adhikiar, R. (2010) Antipolitics and counterpolitics in Nepal's civil society: The case of Nepal's Citizen's Movement. *Voluntas,* 21(3) 293-316.

Shriver, E. and Adams, A. (2013) Collective Identity and The Subjective Terrain of Political Opportunities: movement Dissension Over Participation in Party Politics. *Mobilization,* (18)1 489-506.

Sikkink, K. (2003) A Typology of Relations Between Social Movements and International Institutions. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law),* 97(April) 301-305.

Simma, B. and Paulus, L. A. (1998) The 'International Community': Facing the Challenge of Globalization. *European Journal of International Law,* 9(2) 266-277.

Simonsen, S. (2006) The authoritarian temptation in East Timor: Nation-building and the need for inclusive governance. *Asian Survey,* 46(4) 575-596.

Sisk, T. D. (2008) Peacebuilding as democratization: Findings and recommendations. In Jarstad, A. K. and Sisk, T. D. (eds.) *From War to democracy: Dilemmas of peacebuilding.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sisk, T. D. (2013) Elections and statebuilding after civil war: Lurching toward democracy. In Chandler, D. and Sisk, T. D. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding.* London and New York: Routledge.

Smirl, L. (2015) *Spaces of Aid: How cars, compounds and hotels shape humanitarianism.* London: Zed Books.
Smith, A. (1993) *National Identity.* Reno, NE: University of Nevada Press.

Smith, J. (1999) Global Politics and Transnational Social Movement Strategies: the Transnational Campaign against International Trade in Toxic Wastes. In: Della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. and Rucht, D. (eds.) *Social Movements in a Globalizing World.* New York: Macmillan Press.

Stapleton, J. B. and Keating, M. (2015) *Military and Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan 2001–14: An Incoherent Approach [Briefing - Afghanistan: Opportunity in Crisis Series No. 10]*. [internet] London: Chatham House – The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Available from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150722MilitaryCivilianAssistanceAfghanistanStapletonKeating.pdf [Accessed: 26/09/2016].

Stephenson, M. and Zanotti, L. (2012) *Peacebuilding Through Community-Based NGOs: Paradoxes and Possibilities.* Sterling, Virginia: Kumarian Press.

Stilhof Sörensen, J. (2013) Intervention and statebuilding in Kosovo. In: Chandler, D. and Sisk, T. D. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding.* London and New York: Routledge.

Stroschein, S. (2012) *Ethnic Struggle, Coexistence, and Democratization in Eastern Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, T. (1979) *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slaughter, A. (2009) America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century. *Foreign Affairs,* 88(1) 94.

Smith, J. (2015) Social Movements and the Multilateral Arena. In: della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (eds.) *Oxford Handbook on Social Movements.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, J. and Verdeja, E. (eds.) (2013) *Globalization, Social Movements, and Peacebuilding.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B. Jr., Worden, S. K. and Benford, R. D. (1986) Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociological Review,* 51(4) 464, 470.

Snow, D., Soule, S. and Cress, S. M. (2003) *Homeless Protest across 17 U.S. Cities, 1989-1991: Assessment of the Explanatory Utility of Strain, Resource Mobilization, and Political Opportunity Theories, Unpublished manuscript*. Irvine: University of California, Irvine.

Solana, J. (1999) *Press Release 1999(040)*. [online] No location: NATO. Available from: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm [Accessed 20/09/2016].

Sörensen, J. (2009) *State Collapse and Reconstruction at the Periphery: Political Economy, Ethnicity and Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo.* Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Soule, S. A. and Olzak, S. (2004) When Do Movements Matter? The Politics of Contingency and the Equal Rights Amendment. *American Sociological Review,* 69(4) 473-97.

Soule, S. A., McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D. and Su, Y. (1999) Protest events: cause of consequence of state action? The U.S. women's movement and federal Congressional activities 1956-1979. *Mobilization,* 4(2) 239-256.

Sperling, V. (1999) *Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia: Engendering Transition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stake, R. E. (2005) Qualitative case Studies. In: Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.) *The Sage handbook of qualitative research, (3rd edition.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Stern, J. (2009) *The Making of an Afghan Politician*. [online] New York and Washington: Slate. Available from: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/dispatches/2009/08/the_making_of_an_afghan_politician.html [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1998) *Basics of Qualitative Research Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, 2nd edition.* London: Sage Publications.

Strazzari, F. and Selenica, E. (2013) Nationalism and Civil Society Organisations in Post-Independence Kosovo. In Vesna, B., Ker-Lindsay, J. and Kostovicova, S. (eds.) (2013) *Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stroehle, I. (2011) Re-Inventing Kosovo: Newborn and the Young, Europeans. In: Suber, D. and Kamanic, S. (eds.) *Retracting Images: Visual Culture After Yugoslavia.* Leiden: Brill.

Suh, S. (2001) How do Political Opportunities Matter for Social Movements? Political Opportunity, Misframing, Pseudosuccess, and Pseudofailure. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 42(3) 437-460.

Suhrke, A. (2001) Peacekeepers as nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor. *International Peacekeeping,* 8(4) 1-20.

Suhrke, A. (2009) The dangers of a tight embrace: externally assisted statebuilding in Afghanistan. In Paris, R. and Sisk. T. (eds) *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*. Abingdon: Routledge, 227-251.

Suzuki, S. (2011) Paternal Authority, Civilized State: China's Evolving Attitude towards International Trusteeships. In: Mayall, J. and de Oliveira, R. S. (eds.) *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States.* London: Hurst and Company.

Swain, A. and Krampe, G. (2011) Stability and Sustainability in Peace Building: Priority Area for Warfare Ecology. In: Machlis, G. G., Hanson, T., Spirić, Z. and Mckendry, J. E. (eds.) *Warfare Ecology.* Dordrecht: Springer.

Syal, R. (2015) *EU Kosovo mission accused of trying to silence whistleblower*. [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/03/eu-kosovo-corruption-bamieh [Accessed: 18/09/2016].

Tanjug (2008) *Jeremić: EULEX acceptable, with conditions.* [online] Zagreb: B92. Available from: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=11&dd=01&nav_id=54655 [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Tanner, S. (2009) *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban*. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press.

Tansey, O. (2009) *Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tarrow, S. (1993) Social Protest and Policy Reform: May 1968 and the *Loi d'Orientation* in France. *Comparative Political Studies,* 25(4) 579-607.

Tarrow, S. (1994) *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, S. (1996) States and opportunities: The political structuring of social movements. In: McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (eds.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, S. (1998) *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd Edition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, S. (2005) *The new transnational activism. Cambridge studies in contentious politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, S. (2010) The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice. *Comparative Political Studies,* 43(2) 230-259.

Tarrow, S. (n.d.) *Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics*. [online] Ithaca: Cornell University. Available from: http://government.arts.cornell.edu/assets/faculty/docs/tarrow/contention_and_institutions.pdf [Accessed: 14/09/2016].

Taylor, C. (1991) Civil Society in the Western Tradition. In Groffier, E. and Paradis, M. (eds.) *The Notion of Tolerance and Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Raymond Kibansky.* Ottawa: University of Carleton Press.

Taylor, L. (1997) *Privatising Protest: NGOs and the Progessionalisation of Social Movements [paper prepared for the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association]*. Guadalajara: Latin American Studies Association.

Taylor, V. and Rupp, L. J. (1991) Researching the Women's Movement We Make Our Own History, But Not Just As We Please. In: Fonow, M. M. and Cook, J. A. (eds.) *Beyond Methodology: Feminist Scholarship as Lived Research.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Teivainen, T. (2009) The Pedagogy of Global Development: the Promotion of Electoral Democracy and the Latin Americanisation of Europe. *Third World Quarterly,* 30(1) 163-79.

Thaci, H. (2014) *To Kosovans, Blair is a true hero* [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/sep/02/kosovans-blair-true-hero [Accessed 20/09/2016].

The Afghanistan Express (2014) *I SEE YOU; Campaign against Corruption in Kabul*. [online] Kabul: The Afghanistan Express. Available from: http://theafghanistanexpress.com/i-see-you-campaign-against-corruption-in-kabul/ [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

The Asia Foundation (2011) *Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People*. [online] Multiple locations: The Asia Foundation. Available from: https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/TAF2011AGSurvey.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Theam Choy, L. (2014) The Strengths and Weaknesses of Research Methodology: Comparison and Complimentary between Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* 19(4) 99-104.

Tilly, C. (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Tilly, C. (1984) Social Movements and National Politics. In: Bright, C. and Harding S. (eds.) *State-Making and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Tilly, C. (1985) War Making and State Making as Organised Crime. In: Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In.* Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (1988) Social Movement, Old and New. In: Kriesberg, L. (ed.) *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* - Volume 10. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Tilly, C. (2004a) *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (2004b) Wise Quacks, in Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J. (eds.) *Rethinking Social Movements.* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Tilly, C. and Tarrow, S. (2006) *Contentious Politics.* London: Paradigm.

Tilly, C., Tilly, L. and Tilly, R. (1975) *The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Transparency International (2015) *Corruption Perceptions Index 2015.* [online] Berlin: Transparency International. Available from: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Traynor, I. (2010) Wikileaks cables: Kosovo sliding towards partition, Washington told. [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/09/wikileaks-cables-kosovo-independence-serbia [Accessed 20/09/2016].

Trix, F. (2010) Kosova: Resisting expulsion and striving for independence. In: Ramet, S. P. (ed.) *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Troebst, S. (1998) *Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998 [ECMI Working Paper 1]*. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues.

Tsui, J. and Lucs, B. (2013) *Methodologies for measuring influence*. [online] Unknown location: GSDRC. Available from: http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq905.pdf [Accessed: 28/09/2016].

UN (1992) *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping.* New York: United Nations.

UN (2011) *From Rhetoric to Practice: Operationalizing National Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.* New York: Peacebuilding Support Office of the UN.

UNAMA (n.d.) *[UNAMA] Mandate.* [online] Kabul: UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Available from: http://unama.unmissions.org/mandate [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

UNDP (2008) *Early Warning Report Kosovo – Report # 20/21 - Special Edition*. USA: USAID.

UNSC (1999) *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244*. [online] New York: Official Document System of the United Nations. Available from: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1244%281999%29 [Accessed 12/03/2013].

UNSC (2005) *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1645.* [online] New York: Official Document System of the United Nations. Available from: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/N0565417.pdf [Accessed 12/03/2013].

UNSC (2002*) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1401 (2002)*. [online] Kabul: UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Available from: http://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/28%20March%202002.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].
UNSC (2007) *United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo [S/2007/134].* [online] New York: UNSC. Available from: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2007/134 [Accessed: 25/09/2016].

Urdal, H. (2004) *The devil in the demographics: The effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict, 1950-2000.* Washington: World Bank Social Development Papers on Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction.

US State Department (2005) *Joint Declaration of the United State-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership*. [online] Washington: US Government Publishing Office. Available from: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2005-05-30/pdf/WCPD-2005-05-30-Pg863.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

USAID (2001) *The 2000 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, Fourth Edition*. Washington: United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia.

USAID (2002) *The 2001 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, Fifth Edition.* Washington: United States Agency for International Development. Bureau for Europe and Eurasia.

USAID (2003) *The 2003 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia*. Washington: USAID Bureau for Europe and Eurasia.

USAID (2004) *The 2004 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia*. Washington: USAID Bureau for Europe and Eurasia.

USAID (2005) *The 2005 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia*. Washington: USAID Bureau for Europe and Eurasia.

USAID (2006) *Fragile States Indicators*. Washington: USAID.

USAID (2009) *The 2008 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 12th Edition*. Washington: United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia.

USAID (2010) *The 2009 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia*. Washington: USAID Bureau for Europe and Eurasia.

USAID (2011) *Statebuilding in situations of fragility and conflict: Relevance for US policies and programs.* Washington DC: United States Agency for International Development.

Vadari-Kesler, A. (2012) Politics of Protest in Supervised Statehood: Co-Shared Governance and Erosion of Citizenship. The case study of the Vetëvendosje Movement in Kosovo, *Southeastern Europe,* 36(2) 149-77.

Van Bijlert, M. (2016) *The IEC Announces 2016 Election Date - but what about electoral reform?* [online] Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network. Available from: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-iec-announces-an-election-date/ [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Van der Heijden, H. (2010) *Social Movements, Public Spheres and the European Politics of the Environment: Green Power Europe?* Houdsmill and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Van Dyke, N. (2003) Crossing movement boundaries: factors that facilitate coalition protest by American college students, 1930-1990. *Social Problems,* 50(2) 226-250.

Van Dyke, N. and Soule, S. (2002) Structural social change and the mobilizing effect of threat: explaining levels of patriot and militia organizing in the United States. *Social Problems,* 49(4) 397-530.

Van Willigen, N. (2013) *Peacebuilding and International Administration: The Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Vanhanen, T. (2000) A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998. *Journal of Peace Research,* 37(2) 251-265.

Vaughan-Williams, N. (2006) Towards a Problematisation of the Problematisations that Reduce Northern Ireland to a 'Problem'. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,* 9(4) 513-526.

Veltmeyer, H. (2004) *Civil Society and Social Movements: The Dynamics of Intersectoral Alliances and Urban-Rural Linkages in Latin America - United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Programme Paper Number 10*. Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD).

Vetëvendosje (2006a) Cernica says 'NO' to Ethnic Municipalities. *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 2.

Vetëvendosje (2006b) Negotiations on June 7th and 8th in Vienna. *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 3.

Vetëvendosje (2006c) Decentralization → Partition. *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 4.

Vetëvendosje (2006d) Why non-violence? *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 5.

Vetëvendosje (2006e) Why Self-determination? *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 8.

Vetëvendosje (2006f) Why do we argue Serbia is trying to re-colonize Kosova? *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 11.

Vetëvendosje (2006g) More s**t from UNMIK. *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 15.

Vetëvendosje (2007) Lëvizja Vetëvendosje! in 2006. *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 24.

Vetëvendosje (2010a) Decision to Participate in Elections. *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 202.

Vetëvendosje (2010b) Why has Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE! Decided to Participate in Elections? *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 204.

Vetëvendosje (2010c) How will Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE! Work with the International Community? *Newsletter from the Movement for SELF-DETERMINATION,* 221.

Vetëvendosje (2010d) *History of Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE!* [online] Pristina: Vetëvendosje. Available from: http://www.vetevendosje.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/index3.pdf [Accessed 12/04/2013].

Vickers, M. (1998) *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*. New York: Colombia University Press.

Visoka, G. (2011) International Governance and Local Resistance in Kosovo: The Thin Line between Ethical, Emancipatory and Exclusionary Politics. *Irish Studies in International Affairs,* 22(1) 99-125.

Visoka, G. (2012) The 'Kafkaesque Accountability' of International Governance in Kosovo. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 6(2) 189-212.

Visoka, G. (2017) *Shaping Peace in Kosovo: The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vladisavljević, N. (2002) Nationalism, social movement theory and the grass roots movement of Kosovo Serbs, 1985-1988. *Europe-Asia Studies,* 54(5) 771-790.

Vogel, B. (2016) Civil Society Capture: Top-Down Interventions from Below? *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 4(10) 472-489.

Voss, K. (1996) The collapse of a social movement: The interplay of mobilizing structures, framing, and political opportunities in the Knights of Labor. In: McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. N. (eds.): *Comparative Perspective on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Vu, T. (2010) Studying the State Through State Formation. *World Politics,* 62(1) 148-175.

Vucheva, E. (2008) *EU warned against turning Kosovo into a 'protectorate*'. [online] Brussels: EUobserver. Available from: https://euobserver.com/foreign/25644. [Accessed 04/03/2015].

Wählisch, M. and Xharra, B. (2010) *Public Diplomacy in Kosovo: Status Quo, Challenges and Options*. Los Angeles: USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School University of Southern California.

Wainwright, H. (2004) Civil Society, Democracy and Power: Global Connections. In: Anheier, H., Glasius, M. and Kaldor, M. (eds.) *Global Civil Society 2004/5.* London: Sage Publications.

Walsh, D. (2007) *Afghanistan approves amnesty for warlords*. [online] London: The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/01/afghanistan.warcrimes [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

Walsham, G. (1995) Interpretive Case Studies in IS Research: Nature and Method. *European Journal of Information Systems,* 4(2) 74-81.

Walter, B. F. (2002) *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Warren, C. (1988) *Gender issues in field research*. Newbury Park: Sage.

Washington Post (2008) *International Donors Pledge Additional $21 Billion for Afghanistan*. [online] Washington: Washington Post. Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/12/AR2008061200269.html [Accessed: 28/08/2016].
Wedgwood, R. (2002) Gallant Delusions. *Foreign Policy,* 123(Sep. - Oct.) 44-46.

Wejner, B. (2005) Diffusion, development, and democracy, 1800-1999. *American Sociological Review,* 70(1) 53-81.

Weller, M. (1999) The Rambouillet Conference On Kosovo. *International Affairs,* 75(2) 211-51.

Weller, M. (2009) *Contested Statehood: Kosovo's Struggle for Independence,* Oxford University Press: New York.

Whitehead, L. (1996) *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whitehead, L. (ed.) (2001) *The International Dimensions of Democratisation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whittier, N. (2002) Meaning and structure in social movements. In: Meyer, D. S., Whittier, N. and Robnett, B. (eds.) *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wilde, R. (2001) From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration. *American Journal of International Law,* 95(3) 583-606.

Wilson Center (2013) *Debate: Afghanistan Beyond the Headlines: Women, Youth, and War*. [online] Washington: Wilson Centre. Available from: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/afghanistan-beyond-the-headlines-women-youth-and-war [Accessed: 27/06/2014].

Winter, E. (2010) *Civil Society Development in Afghanistan*. London: LSE Centre for Civil Society.

World Bank (2008) *Kosovo Youth in Jeopardy. Being Young, Unemployed, and Poor in Kosovo: A Report on Youth Employment in Kosovo [Report No. 43596-XK].* Washington: World Bank.

World Bank (2010) *Kosovo: Unlocking Growth Potential. Strategies, Politics, Actions: A Country Economic Memorandum [Report No. 53185-XK]*. Washington: World Bank.

World Bank (2011) *Conflict, security and development - The World Development Report 2011.* Washington DC: The World Bank.

World Bank (2014) *Country Data Report for Afghanistan: 1996-2014*. [online] Washington: World Bank. Available from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c3.pdf [Accessed: 28/08/2016].

World Bank (2015) *Worldwide Governance Indicators – frequently asked questions*. [online] Washington: The World Bank Group. Available from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq-2 [Accessed 09/09/2016].

Wylie, G. (1999) Social Movements and International Change: The Case of “Détente from Below”. *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, 4(2).

Yabanci, B. (2015) Populism and Anti-Establishment Politics in Kosovo: A Case Study of Lëvizja Vetëvendosje. *Contemporary Southeastern Europe,* 3(2) 17-43.

Yannis, A. (2001) Kosovo Under International Administration. *Survival,* 45(2) 31-48.

Yannis, A. (2004) The UN as Government in Kosovo. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations,* 10(1), 67-81.

Yashar, D. (2005) *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yates, S. J. (2009) *Doing Social Science Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Yin, R. K. (1994) Discovering the future of the case study method in evaluation research. *Evaluation and Practice*, 15(3) 283-290.

Youngs, R. (2001) *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe’s Mediterranean and Asian Policies*. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press.

Zald, M. N. and Ash, R. (1966) Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change. *Social Forces,* 44 (2) 327-341.

Zartman, W. (1995) Posing the problem of State Collapse. In: Zartman, W. (ed.) *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority.* Boulder, London.

Zaum, D. (2007) *The Sovereignty Paradox - The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zaum, D. and Knaus, V. (eds.) (2012) *Political economy of state-building: power after peace.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Zoellick, R. (2009) Fragile states: Securing development. *Survival,* 50(6) 67-84.

INTERVIEWS

	Name	Position	Date	Location
1	Albin Kurti	Former leader of Vetëvendosje (June 2005 – March 2015). Currently MP	13/06/2014	Pristina
2	Glauk Konjufca	Head of Vetëvendosje's Parliamentary Group	02/08/2014	Pristina
3	Visar Ymeri	President of Vetëvendosje	05/08/2014	Pristina
4	Puhie Demarku	Vetëvendosje's Head of External Relations	02/08/2014	Pristina
5	Anonymous	International governmental organisation	03/09/2014	Pristina
6	Anonymous	Embassy official	03/09/2014	Pristina
7	Armend Bekaj	OSCE Chief of Analysis and Reporting Cell	05/09/2014	Pristina
8	Robin Budd	Second Secretary, British Embassy, Kosovo	22/09/2014	via email
9	Besa Luzha	Head of Democratisation Programme, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	04/09/2014	Pristina
10	Xhevdet Sarfa	Journalist	05/09/2014	Pristina
11	Anonymous	International institution employee	05/09/2014	Pristina
12	Anonymous	International governmental organisation	04/09/2014	Pristina
13	Burham Qerimi	Vetëvendosje member	08/05/2015	via Skype
14	Leon Malazogu	Executive Director Democracy for Development (D4D)	04/09/2014	Pristina
15	Anonymous	International institution employee	05/09/2014	Pristina
16	Jetmir Bakija	Kosovo Democratic Institute (KDI)	02/09/2014	Pristina
17	Selim Thaci and Frauk Lakinjk	International Monetary Fund (IMF)	04/09/2014	Pristina
18	Servet Akman	Second Secretary, Turkish Embassy, Pristina	05/09/2014	Pristina
19	Alexander Chavarrio	National Democratic Institute (NDI)	05/09/2014	Pristina
20	Sonia Eqbal	Founding Member of Afghanistan 1400, Chair 2013-2014	28/08/2014	via Skype
21	Adrienne Woltersdorf	Country Director for Afghanistan, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Kabul	29/09/2014	via Skype
22	Hussein Hasrat	Lecturer at Gowharshad University, Afghanistan, formerly a researcher with the AIHRC	24/04/2015	via Skype
23	Haseeb Ammar	BBC Afghan Service	01/11/2014	London
24	Anonymous		25/04/2015	via Skype
25	Samim Faizy	Afghanistan 1400 Member	24/04/2015	via Skype
26	Gran Hewad	Founding Member of Afghanistan 1400	19/04/2015	via Skype
27	Mariam Jalazada	Afghanistan 1400 Member	06/03/2015	via Skype
28	Assad Nissar	Afghanistan 1400 Member	05/04/2015	via Skype
29	Jawed Nader	Director of British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG)	03/09/2015	via Skype
30	Timur Hakimyar	Former Director, Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS)	11/10/2014	via Skype
31	Anna Nijsters	Acting Director/Advocacy and Communication Coordinator, European Network of NGO's in Afghanistan	22/09/2014	via Skype
32	Manisha Cheek	Afghanistan Desk, DFID	27/04/2015	via Skype and email